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The main research question in this thesis is what lessons can New Zealand learn 
from the Australian experience in water allocation? In order to answer this 
question the thesis first examines the current water allocation law and policy 
problems in New Zealand. New Zealand has problems with over allocation and a 
lack of mechanisms to transfer water. There are also more complex issues relating 
to the lack of systematic planning for water allocation across New Zealand 
catchments and the consequences of the “first come, first served” method of water 
allocation that applies under the administrative provisions of the Resource 
Management Act 1991.  
Much of the water allocation literature has an economic or scientific perspective. 
For that reason the thesis also examines key terms such as “scarcity” in order to 
fully understand its various dimensions within the literature. The thesis also makes 
it clear that legal problems relating to how to regulate water allocation require legal 
analysis. Hence the economic and scientific literature inform the analysis but do not 
form the primary basis for the analysis. The method of analysis is conventional legal 
analysis between New Zealand and Australia.  
The thesis continues by examining the key characteristics of the recent Australian 
water law reforms of the last 20 years. The analysis shows that implementing law 
reform for water allocation has been fraught with constitutional barriers as it tried 
to work across political state boundaries within the Murray Darling Basin. The 
Australian approach of co-operative federalism has played a key role in supporting 
the implementation of the reforms in the National Water Initiative 2004 and Water 
Act 2007 (Cth). The implementation of the reforms are also examined at the state 
level. 
The analysis of the Australian water law reform provides a rich source of lessons 
for New Zealand. The analysis shows that Australian reform was based on firm 
legal foundations. There was independent oversight of the reform implementation 
by the National Water Commission. Water allocation information was recorded on 
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a water register which could include information relating to water securities. The 
actual water allocation was aided by the creation of many water products. Water 
allocations could be distinguished on the basis of a right to receive water at a site, 
a delivery right to use water infrastructure, temporary allocations and allocation 
based on a percentage of the total amount of water available in a catchment. These 
innovative features of water law and policy ought to be considered as possible 
features to introduce in New Zealand water law.  
There are also cautionary lessons from Australia. More recent reviews of the 
changes to water law reform, including the disestablishment of the National Water 
Commission, are critical of the Australian government in undermining the progress 
that has been made. Allegations of water theft and a lack of compliance monitoring 
are so serious that there has been a Royal Commission by the South Australian 
government. There is the potential that the reforms could be undermined 
significantly if state support falls. The lesson from New Zealand from these points 
is equally if not more important. It shows that regardless of how much is invested 
in water law reform, compliance and monitoring of water allocation need to be 
addressed urgently whenever the issue arises. New Zealand also has allegations of 
water theft and a lack of compliance with the water metering regulations. A strong 
compliance culture for measuring water takes is essential to the long-term success 
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CHAPTER ONE – INTRODUCTION 
 Introduction 
This thesis asserts that by drawing upon lessons from the Australian water law 
experience over the past 20 years New Zealand can learn how to improve its water 
allocation. The primary legislation regulating water allocation in New Zealand is 
the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA). When enacted, the Act led the world 
in implementing principles of sustainability in environmental planning and natural 
resource allocation.1 Extensive environmental law reform preceded its enactment, 
creating expectations that it would improve resource allocation, including water 
allocation.2 It is now clear that the current problems with water allocation under the 
RMA were unforeseen and that the reality is quite different from the expectations 
that it would provide a “greener” law for water allocation. 3  New Zealand is 
experiencing problems with its current “first come, first served” method of water 
allocation. One of the major problems facing catchments is how to address over-
allocation. The National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management 2014 
requires all regional councils to have rules in place to stop over-allocation by the 
year 2025. 
While several factors regarding the problems facing New Zealand water allocation 
law and policy have been identified, one influential factor that has not been 
examined in sufficient detail is the consequences of the failure to fully implement 
the RMA. For 20 years, from 1991 until 2011, New Zealand did not have national 
 
1 Hon Simon Upton “Stace Hammond Grace Lecture: Purpose and Principle in the Resource 
Management Act” (1995) 3 Waikato L. Rev. 17; Caroline Miller Implementing Sustainability. 
The New Zealand Experience (Routledge, New York, 2011); Geoffrey Palmer Environmental 
Politics. A Greenprint for New Zealand (John McIndoe, Dunedin, 1990); and Nicola Wheen “A 
Natural Flow - A History of Water Law in New Zealand” (1997) 9(1) Otago L. Rev. 71. 
2 Ministry for the Environment The State of New Zealand’s Environment 1997 (Ministry for the 
Environment, Wellington, 1997) provides an overview of the Resource Management Law 
Reform Project; Bret C. Birdsong “Adjudicating Sustainability. New Zealand's Environment 
Court and the Resource Management Act” (2002) 29(1) Ecology L. Q. 1; and Nicola Wheen 
“The Resource Management Act 1991: A Greener Law for Water” (1997) 1 NZJ Envtl. L. 165. 
3 Geoffrey Palmer “The Resource Management Act: -How we Got It and What Changes are Being 
Made to It” (paper presented to Address to Resource Management Law Association 27 
September 2013, New Plymouth, 2013).  
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guidance on water policy.4 During this time a “gap” in water allocation law and 
policy existed, a lacuna which in turn affected the creation of rules for water 
allocation in regional plans. Under the RMA, central and local government had the 
statutory function of establishing rules for resource management according to 
policies and principles within a hierarchical structure.5 Ideally, these plans and 
policies should have included rules and policies for water allocation. However, fully 
implementing the RMA required a National Policy Statement for water allocation.6 
Finally, after several failed attempts, the government developed the first National 
Policy Statement for Freshwater Management in 2011.7  
The water policy gap from 1991 until 2011 contributed to the emergence of a default 
model of water allocation which has acted as a significant barrier to reallocating 
water to other uses. The barrier existed because water permit applications were 
prioritised following the “first come, first served” precedent established in 
Fleetwing Farms v Marlborough District Council.8 The effect of the precedent was 
that it did not allow for a comparative evaluation of applications for the same water 
take. As a result, for some applicants, the time of application for a water permit 
became the most critical factor in successfully securing a water permit. The 
consequences of the policy gap on regional water allocation practice are an 
important feature of New Zealand water allocation as the policy gap has contributed 
to the variation in the creation and application of rules for water allocation. 
Alternatives to the policy gap included government direction on priorities for water 
allocation. However, instead of following such a course, New Zealand finds itself 
 
4 National policy was only promulgated in 2011. See National Policy Statement for Freshwater 
Management 2011. Revised in 2014 and reviewed in 2017. 
5 Establishing Regional Plans is one of the “functions” of regional councils under section 30 of the 
RMA. A key distinction in the New Zealand context is that a “function” does not confer a legal 
obligation to create the Regional Plan. District plans must have regard to regional policy and not 
be inconsistent with national policy statements. See Resource Management Act, s 73(4).  
6 However, it is important to acknowledge that there was no statutory obligation for the 
government to create a National Policy Statement for water under the RMA. Establishing 
National Policy Statements is also expressed as one of the “functions” of regional councils under 
section 24(a) of the RMA. The Minister for the Environment may recommend the issue of a 
national policy statement subject to the process in section 52 of the Act. 
7 See Chapter Four at 2.1. 
8 Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council [1997] 3 NZLR 257 (CA). The rule is also 
referred to as the “first in, first served” rule or allocation by priority of time in policy documents 
referred to in this thesis.  
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in a situation where a lack of national and regional guidance on water allocation, 
water allocation by priority of time and the policy gap have contributed to 
contemporary water allocation problems facing New Zealand.9  
Government policy recognises the limitations of the current “first come, first 
served” default method of water allocation in New Zealand. For instance, it is 
recognised that in the case of fully-allocated or over-allocated catchments the “first 
come, first served” method of water allocation leaves limited scope to reallocate 
water to higher value uses.10 The New Zealand government did not anticipate the 
potential economic impact of the “first come, first served” method of water 
allocation under the RMA. Consequently, that lack of foresight may have had some 
influence on the lack of progress in water allocation. By drawing upon lessons from 
Australia, this thesis examines how to address New Zealand’s water allocation 
problems which have emerged since the promulgation of the RMA.  
Water allocation is a significant issue in Australia and the challenges of water 
scarcity have increased in their severity over time. More recent reforms began with 
a focus on improving productivity and within this context specific policy on water 
allocation was developed.11 It is these more recent Australian reforms that are the 
 
9 Refer to Chapter Five for a detailed evaluation of the law and policy relating to the contribution 
of the policy gap to current problems with New Zealand water allocation.  
10 New Zealand Government Briefing to the Incoming Ministers – Environment and Climate 
Change (Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 2017) at 11. See also the extensive policy 
work undertaken by the Land and Water Forum in their four reports at n 3 above. Sarah Boone 
and Stephen Fragaszy “Emerging Scarcity and Emerging Commons: Water Management Groups 
and Groundwater Governance in Aotearoa New Zealand” (2018) 11(3) Water Alternatives 795. 
  The Land and Water Forum has undertaken significant policy work which includes identifying 
problems with water quality and allocation under the RMA. New Zealand; Land and Water 
Forum Terms of Reference for Land and Water Forum Project (Land and Water Forum, 
Wellington, 2009); Land and Water Forum Report of the Land and Water Forum: A Fresh Start 
for Fresh Water (Land and Water Trust, Wellington, 2010); Land and Water Forum Second 
Report of the Land and Water Forum. Setting Limits for Water Quality and Quantity (Land and 
Water Trust, Wellington, 2012); Land and Water Forum Third Report of the Land and Water 
Forum: Managing Water Quality and Allocating Water (Land and Water Trust, Wellington, 
2012); Land and Water Forum Fourth Report of the Land and Water Forum (Land and Water 
Forum Trust, Wellington, 2015). 
11 The Council of Australian Government (COAG) COAG Water Reform Framework 1994- 
Attachment A: Water Resource Policy (Communique, 25 February 1994); Productivity 
Commission Impact of Competition Policy Reforms on Rural and Regional Australia, Report 
No. 8 (Productivity Commission, Canberra, 1999); National Water Initiative 2004; Water Act 
2007(Cth); Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair (eds) Reforming Water Law and Governance. 
From Stagnation to Innovation in Australia (Springer, Singapore, 2018); John Quiggin, Thilak 
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focus of the research.  New Zealand can observe Australia’s successes and 
shortcomings during that experience and use those lessons to improve its own water 
allocation law and policy. Specifically, Australian water allocation reform included 
creating a water register, distinguishing bulk water allocation, unbundling of water 
entitlements  and ways in which to regulate water markets.12  
The purpose of the comparison is to consider the lessons from the Australian 
experience in water law reform that may be used to address New Zealand’s water 
allocation problems. This thesis argues that changes should be made to New 
Zealand water allocation law and policy based on the lessons from Australia. 
This thesis contributes to the literature by departing from the traditional accounts 
of New Zealand water law and policy that focus mainly on the Water and Soil 
Conservation Act 1967 and the RMA.13 It contributes to the New Zealand literature 
on water law and policy by including the impact of privatising irrigation schemes 
under the Irrigation Schemes Act 1990. Water allocated to irrigation is a part of the 
water allocation debate in New Zealand. The public funding of New Zealand 
irrigation schemes has gained increasing interest in recent years. In May 2011, the 
New Zealand National-led government announced the launch of the Irrigation 
Acceleration Fund, which appeared to contradict the privatisation of irrigation 
schemes undertaken in 1990. The Fund provided an initial public investment in 
irrigation schemes of $35 million over five years to investigate “investment ready” 
proposals and then increase the amount to $400 million to invest as equity into 
 
Mallawaarachchi and Sarah Chambers (eds) Water Policy Reform, Lessons in Sustainability 
from the Murray Darling Basin (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2012); Murray Darling Basin 
Authority Guide to the Proposed Basin Plan (MDBA, Canberra, 2010); Daniel Connell and 
Quentin Grafton “Planning for water security in the Murray-Darling Basin” (2008) 3(1)  Public 
Policy 67; and Australian Government, Murray Darling Basin Authority A Path to Water 
Reform. Timeline of Water Resource Management in the Murray-Darling Basin (Murray Darling 
Basin Authority, Canberra, n.d.). 
12 Water Act 2007 (Cth). 
13 Wheen, above n 1; Miller, above n 1 and Palmer, above n 1. 
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irrigation schemes.14 The Fund came under increasing public scrutiny until the 
newly elected Labour-led government ended it in 2017.15  
 
 Research Purpose and Objectives  
The purpose of this research is to provide an account of lessons from the Australian 
experience in water law reform that can apply to New Zealand. The study is focused 
on identifying legal solutions to legal problems. The comparison with Australia will 
provide recommendations to address the water allocation problems faced by New 
Zealand. 
The specific research questions are: 
• What are the issues facing water allocation law and policy in New Zealand? 
• Which factors contributed to water allocation law reform in Australia and 
how was it implemented?  
• What lessons from the Australian experience of reforming water allocation 
law and policy can be implemented in New Zealand? 
One point of language use worth addressing is to simplify the understanding of 
“water allocation” as a term used in this thesis. Readers will be assisted by looking 
at the definition of the word “allocation”. An “allocation” may be either the “act of 
setting aside” something or “that which is allocated to a particular person”.16 In 
New Zealand as understood in a general sense - pursuant to the RMA the term 
“water allocation” is the grant of a consent in the form of a water permit by the 
Crown to take and use water at a particular location to the applicant, such as in 
individual or company. The volume of water allocated under a water permit is the 
“water allocation” which is usually a fixed amount, unless the regional council has 
 
14 David Carter “Budget 2011: Lifting investment in irrigation”  New Zealand Government (9 May 
2011) – Press Release.  
15 Labour, New Zealand First, New Zealand Labour Party & New Zealand First Coalition 
Agreement 52nd Parliament (Labour, New Zealand First, Wellington, 2017).  




made rules that affect the reliability of that water permit.  In Australia, the term 
“water allocation” is used in a general sense to refer to the system of distribution of 
water. Under the NWI reforms, however, the equivalent term is a “water 
entitlement” which refers to a legal right to access water in the form of a “water 
licence”. The amount received under the water licence is not the same and the 
volume of water actually received. This distinction is due to the introduction of 
concepts that relate to sharing water. Typically, the holder of a water entitlement 
will not receive a set volume of water, instead they will receive a pro-rate seasonal 
or annual share of the water available to be allocated. This process of determining 
the volume of water delivered or pumped under the water entitlement is what is 
commonly referred to as “water allocation” in the Australian literature. 
 
A word is needed to avoid confusion about the term “unbundling”. Unbundling is 
a term that is used in different ways. The meaning ascribed to it evolves. At times 
it is used to mean the separation of a water allocation from land. This use if often 
found in non-legal literature on water allocation. At other times it is used in its 
correct legal sense which is the separation of the right to take water from the right 
to use. To avoid confusion in this research both definitions are used according to 
the context of the writing. The former is used more so where there is a policy 
discussion. The latter is used more in the Australian section of the thesis where 
water rights have actually been unbundled in the correct legal sense.  
There is a compound understanding of unbundling which is best illustrated by 
Australian experience in water allocation law reform. In a fully unbundled system 
the water take and use can be further unbundled so that new types of water products 
are created. The more recent water allocation reforms in Australia provide an 
example of how full unbundling can occur. For example, a fully unbundled system 
can set the volume of water allocation that will be physically delivered to each water 
licence holder at the catchment level. A fully unbundled system will have a seasonal 
water allocation determined for a catchment usually as a percentage of the water 
that licence holders are entitled to receive under their water licence.  
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New Zealand usage of unbundling is quite loose when it refers to separating water 
takes from land. It leads to some adjustment being required because unbundling has 
not occurred in New Zealand in the true legal sense.17 This is despite the occurrence 
of some limited trading in irrigation schemes which are administrative in nature. To 
unbundle New Zealand water allocations in the correct legal sense requires 
Parliament to pass appropriate regulation to unbundle. This has occurred with the 
example of fisheries in New Zealand which have unbundled the allocation of 
fisheries resources successfully. Which leads to the point that regional councils are 
not in the position to implement unbundling as defined in the correct legal sense, 
which is comparable to the Australian experience of water law reform, as they do 
not hold the mandate to do so.  
 
 Contribution to Knowledge 
This thesis provides a detailed account of New Zealand water law and policy that 
crucially evaluates New Zealand’s aspirations for sustainable water allocation 
under the RMA. By examining historical water allocation law and policy those 
features of water allocation law that under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 
1967 were not transitioned into the RMA can be identified. The present study 
contributes to the literature on the privatisation of irrigation schemes in New 
Zealand by examining the effect of irrigation schemes on water allocation. Water 
transfers may occur in a catchment if the relevant regional plan allows the transfer 
under s 136 of the RMA. Once scheme operators obtain a overall water take consent 
for their scheme then further trades may occur within the scheme. But there is 
limited trading that occurs because the water permit is tied to a particular use and 
this presents a barrier to trade.18 The effect of the Irrigation Schemes Act 1990 was 
 
17 K G Counsell and L T Evans, “Essays on Water Allocation in New Zealand: The Way Forward” 
(Working paper for the New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation, 
2005) at 45 states “Water rights defined to be clearly separate from land and tradeable across 
uses and locations. In the New Zealand case, this would include ensuring rights are not defined 
to apply only to a specific use”. 
18 Above at 20; Olivia Nyce “Water Markets Under the Resource Management Act 1991: Do They 
Hold Water?" (2008) 5(14), CanterLawRw 123 and A Hayward, 'Freshwater Management:  
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to privatise irrigation schemes. However, the privatisation model was not 
accompanied by further regulation that would assist with temporary water transfers 
within those schemes or mandatory water management plans. Generally, water 
transfers (both temporary and permanent)  that occurred within the schemes were 
based on private contractual arrangements with limited ability to change water use 
in comparison to the examples of regulated irrigation schemes  like those operating 
in Australia. 
The research also clearly identifies a national policy gap in water allocation that 
existed from 1991 to 2011. Again, the impact of this gap on water allocation law 
and policy has not been addressed in depth when examining the national policy gap. 
The thesis shows that water allocation policy and plans developed on a regional 
basis varied greatly. As this study shows, there were some regions where plans were 
not developed and the New Zealand government intervened on an ad hoc basis. 
Overall, the cumulative effect of the lack of regional plans for water allocation is 
that this shortcoming has affected the over-allocation problem experienced in some 
regions. This in-depth examination of how water allocation policy and plans 
developed should be considered together with the Court’s interpretation of the 
priority rule for water allocation, “first come, first served”. By identifying the 
factors that have influenced water allocation policy and law the research provides 
an up-to-date account of the source of the problems that currently exist in New 
Zealand water allocation.  
The research on the Australian water allocation reform experience makes a 
contribution to the literature by consolidating and comparing the implementation of 
the National Water Initiative 2004 across various states. It provides a detailed 
examination of the law and policy that were used to implement a change to 
unbundle and allocate water through markets. The account states key points in water 
law reform that assist with implementation. These key points were necessary for 
Australia because of the constitutional barriers it faced in water management. 
 





Extensive effort was made by the Commonwealth government to attain cooperation 
from states in implementing water reform.  
Finally, the main contribution of this research is to provide a comprehensive 
comparative analysis of water law and policy in Australia and New Zealand. The 
comparison is detailed to the level of considering how particular points of 
implementing water law reform would work in New Zealand.  
A limitation of this thesis is that it does not address the role of Māori claims relating 
to water. Wheen observed the marginalised role of Māori in the history of water 
law.19 Wheen states any pre-existing notions of Māori customary law were not 
acknowledged when common law was applied by the Courts.20 This stance was 
continued as it was “ignored or avoided as introduced common law was applied”.21 
Preliminary research includes an extensive literature review undertaken on the 
interpretation of water related law and Māori customary law.22 In the Australian 
context, greater inclusion of indigenous participation in water allocation is one of 
the challenges for the more recent reforms.23 Māori customary law has not been 
used for the allocation of water by the New Zealand government. Its treatment is 
beyond the scope of this thesis. However, the role of Māori in water law in New 
Zealand is worthy of separate attention as an area of future research.  
While this thesis does not address issues relating to Maori claims, it is conceded 
that this issue has come into much sharper focus over the time that this research was 
undertaken. Even if this dimension was acknowledged as part of the scope of the 
research the question of water allocation remains to be addressed. The present 
method of water allocation is unsustainable regardless of who holds the allocation. 
Indeed the lack of political to address water allocation may be in part due to the 
 
19 Nicola Wheen “A Natural Flow - A History of Water Law in New Zealand” above, n 1, at 75. 
20 At 72. 
21 At 72. 
22 Jacinta Ruru The Legal Voice of Māori in Freshwater Governance. A Literature Review. 
(Landcare Research, 2009).  
23 Elizabeth Macpherson and others “Lessons from Australian Water Reforms: Indigenous and 
Environmental Values in Market-Based Water Regulation” in Cameron Holley and Darren 
Sinclair (eds) Reforming Water Law and Governance. (Springer, Singapore, 2018) 
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associated questions about the role of Maori in water allocation and the complexity 
of finding answers. 
The Crown is in ongoing discussions with the Iwi Leaders Group and Iwi Chairs 
regarding freshwater related discussions. The Cabinet position was initially that no 
one can own freshwater, including the Crown, which preserves the common law 
position on water ownership. It has also stated that there will not be a national 
settlement of freshwater claims on a national level and that generally looking 
forward to the next stage of freshwater reforms there will be provision for including 
iwi/hapu rights and interests.24  In 2018, these “bottom lines” were updated to 
include the common interest in improving water quality and quantity, that while no 
one owns freshwater, however, there is a guardianship role for all to look after 
freshwater resources.25 There was specific reference to the high rate of undeveloped 
land being owned by Maori and acknowledging the interests of existing users. It 
contains a policy intention to work with Maori and regional government to address 
the water quality and allocation.  
In 2018, the government released a policy document on the Maori and Crown 
relationship with regards to freshwater. It stated that a phased approach would be 
taken and water quality issues would be addressed before water allocation issues. 
Policy 10.2 stated that there where three possible options for the Crown and Maori 
to move forward on freshwater issues:26 
10.2 Option B: find a mechanism to more equitably share the resources over time 
through a ‘regulatory’ route: in scarce catchments this proposal could require the 
generation of ‘headroom’ between the total allocated quantum of ‘use rights’ and the 
sustainable limit in order to give Māori (and other new users) the opportunity to obtain 
a share of those use rights.  
 
24 Ministry for the Environment and Māori Crown Relations Unit. Shared Interests in Freshwater: 
A New Approach to the Crown/Māori Relationship for Freshwater. (Ministry for the 
Environment and Māori Crown Relations Unit, Wellington, 2018). 
25 Cabinet Paper “A New Approach to Crown/Maori Relationship for Freshwater” (3 July 2018) 
CAB 18-00032.  
26 Ministry for the Environment and Māori Crown Relations Unit, above n 24 at 39. 
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Option A of relying on a resource levy was not considered further because of the 
Coalition Agreement of the present government. Option B involved an approach 
where the Courts and Waitangi Tribunal would influence policy outcomes. If 
Option B is to be pursued than examining methods by which water allocation law 
and policy can work to provide that “headroom” between total allocation and 
sustainable limits will require a careful examination of water allocation law and 
policy. In 2017, the incoming briefing to the current Minister for the Environment 
stated that a new allocation system “should include sharper economic incentives” 
and continues by observing the potential effect on Maori by implementing such 
instruments:27 
93. Two examples of sharper economic incentives are a cap and trade system, and a 
price on water or discharges. Note that introducing sharper economic incentives is 
likely to bring ownership issues to the foreground, and iwi and hapū rights and 
interests will need to be addressed in this. 
It appears that the Crown reluctance to act on matters regarding water allocation is 
of benefit to existing permit holders, the majority of which are irrigators. Yet these 
issues are important to consider when implementing substantive reform in the area 
of water allocation.  
 
 Research Methodology and Method  
The sources of material this research relied upon are those used in conventional 
legal analysis. This research involves the use the primary materials such as case law 
and legislation relevant to the Australian and New Zealand jurisdictions. Secondary 
material includes books, journal articles, conference papers, reports and 
government documents.  
 
27 Ministry for the Environment Briefing for the Incoming Minister for the Environment. Water 
Issues. (Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 2017) at 19. 
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Comparative legal analysis is the methodology used in this study. 28  Here the 
comparative analysis analyses the similarities and differences between Australia 
and New Zealand in order to answer the research questions. The underlying premise 
is that both jurisdictions need to address similar legal problems.  
Comparative legal method examines different legal practices in two or more 
jurisdictions with a view to understanding the context from which those differences 
arise. 29 It acknowledges that to some extent “‘all legal systems are overlapping” 
and will have some characteristics that are similar. 30  Despite recognising that 
similarities in law can exist between jurisdictions, the purpose of applying 
comparative legal method in this research is not just to look for common patterns. 
It is to undertake a in-depth analysis of the policy trends influencing the current law 
in both countries. Merely focusing on a common legal pattern in the development 
of law and policy could actually obscure the true reasons for the development of 
law in a particular way within a jurisdiction.31  
When applying these considerations to the current study examining water law and 
policy in each jurisdiction is not just to look for patterns based on a common legal 
heritage. The common legal heritage of each country means that there are points of 
congruence between each country but there are also important contextual 
differences that become apparent in the analysis. The common patterns include the 
transplant of common law which will be detailed below. The transplant of common 
law is linked to the history of British settlement, common language, common 
development of the legal profession and legal education. The actual context of legal 
development is important and is relevant to the next factor considered in 
comparative legal method. Hence the purpose of the comparison undertaken in this 
 
28 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1998).  
29 Above. Zweigert and Kotz  note the earlier positivist approach in comparative legal method took 
the position that the same law could be applied to legal problems in different jurisdictions. Later 
this developed into a greater focus on understanding the context and reasons why the law was 
different in each jurisdiction.  
30 Esin Orucu The Enigma of Comparative Law :Variations on a theme for the  twenty-first century 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden ;Boston, 2004) at 42 
31 Above.  
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thesis is not just to look for similar patterns of legal development but to understand 
why they have occurred by examining relevant policy documents. To that end there 
are even some some policy overlaps where the same terminology is used but the 
meaning will depend on the context of the jurisdiction.  
One of the fields in comparative law which has direct relevance to New Zealand  
and Australiais the concept of “transplanting” law.32 Watson examined how ideas 
from  foreign legal systems are incorporated into other jurisdictions.33 Examples of 
legal transplants include the adoption of Roman law up until the middle ages, 
codifications of law in Europe34 and the spread of common law across legal systems 
such as New Zealand and Australia.  Watson stated that one persistent trend 
observed in the countries receiving legal transplants was the desire to hold on to the 
foreign legal system. He provided that example that despite acquiring independence 
the English legal heritage remained influential in former colonies. 35 It may even be 
possible that “transplanted” legal concepts become more entrenched in the country 
that transplants the foreign law.36 In developing this concept further, De Cruz stated 
that despite independence these Commonwealth countries maintain their link with 
the common law by their method of interpreting law “in accordance with typical 
English legal methods, doctrines and legal conventions”.37 The main problem with 
holding on to English legal heritage is that when it comes to environmental 
problems the underlying differences in climate will impact on the problem itself. 
Law and geography literature states that a comparative analysis of jurisdictions 
should take into account differences in geography because different geographical 
 
32 Michele Graziadei "Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions" in Reinhard 
Zimmerman and Mathias Reimann (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (New York, 
Oxford University Press, 2008) at 441. 
33 Above at 442. 
34 Above at 448. ‘The most influential codification in Europe was the French civil code enacted in 
1804. Its model was widely imitated throughout the world.’ 
35 Above at 452-453 
36 Ugo Mattei, Teemu Ruskola and Antonio Gidi. Schlesinger's Comparative Law: Cases, Text, 
Materials (Foundation Press; Thomson Reuters, 2009) at 67. 
37 Peter De Cruz Comparative Law in a Changing World (3rd ed, Routledge-Cavendish, London, 
2007) at 101. 
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conditions will also influence the creation of law. 38  In other words, law and 
geography literature recognised that geographical conditions are unique to each 
jurisdiction and a part of the context of comparative legal analysis.  
Related to the idea of legal transplants is problems associated with policy 
transplants.  A policy transplant is defined as the transfer of policies and 
administrative arrangements of one political system from the past or present to 
another.39 In the policy transfer literature, much like the legal transplant literature, 
there is support for the idea that policy transfers are not successful just by 
replicating policies that have been successful in other political systems. Much like 
the legal transplant literature, the importance of context is emphasised in analysing 
the water policy transfer. In particular it is the political and institutional context that 
is most relevant to an analysis of water policy transplant.40  
As has been shown above, contextual or “extra-legal” factors are relevant to 
comparative legal method. Contextual factors are important because “they widen 
one’s knowledge of the social and economic milieu within which a legal systems 
and legal rules operate”.41 These may be obvious such as large social movements. 
Or they maybe events that are more “momentous” such as “changes in government 
that prompt radical shifts in economic and legal policy, widespread unemployment, 
the introduction of wide-ranging technological change” and so on. 42  The most 
significant effect is considered to be international instruments and their effect on 
domestic jurisdictions as they are implemented by governments because they have 
to be incorporated into legislation and as a result affect legal practice.43 These 
contextual considerations are the most important in the comparative legal analysis 
 
38 Bernhard Grossfeld The Strengths and Weakness of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford,  1990) 
39 Rebecca Swainson and Rob C. de Loe (2011) “The importance of context in relation to policy 
transfer: a case study of environmental water allocation in Australia” Environmental Policy and 
Governance 21(1) 58-69 at 58. 
40 Above. 
41  Peter De Cruz Comparative Law in a Changing World (3rd ed, Routledge-Cavendish, London, 
2007) at 230. 
42 Above at 230. 
43 Above at 230. 
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method because the changes to water law have occurred in a particular context. As 
will be shown in this thesis the dramatic shift in economic policy changed how 
natural resources were viewed in Australia and New Zealand. However, for some 
reason the recognition of water as a valuable economic resource is incomplete.  
The comparison shows the different approaches taken in each country to allocating 
water. As Australia has embarked upon the policy of implementing water markets, 
and New Zealand has not, the comparison provides insight into the factors that 
should be considered when undertaking water law reform to allocate water via 
markets.  
 
Australia has been selected at a comparative jurisdiction because of its extensive 
experience in water law reform over the last 20 years gained from implementing 
the National Water Initiative 2004 and the Water Act 2007 (Cth) and for a number 
of reasons.  
First, comparative studies on the topic of water law have already been undertaken 
between Australia and other countries, including the United States, South Africa 
and Chile. 44  These studies show that comparisons with Australia are a sound 
method for developing our understanding of water law and policy. For example, 
water market development in Australia and the United States has been defined as a 
“reallocation” problem with demand increasing from various sectors.45 Lessons 
 
44 Thomas Garry “Water Markets and Water Lessons in the United States: Lessons from Australia” 
(2007) 4(2) MqJICEL 23; Peter Davis “Australian and American Water Allocation Systems 
Compared” (1968) 9 Boston College L. Rev. 647; Lee Godden “Water Law Reform in Australia 
and South Africa: Sustainability, Efficiency and Social Justice” (2005) 17(2) J. Environ. Law 
181; Erin O’Donnell and Elizabeth MacPherson “Challenges and Opportunities for 
Environmental Water Management in Chile: An Australian Perspective” (2011) 23 Water Law 
24; Kenneth M Murchison “Environmental Law in Australia and the United States: A 
Comparative Overview: (1995) 22 Boston College of Environmental Affairs Law Review 503; 
Lin Crase and Bethany Cooper. “The Political Economy of Drought: Legacy and Lessons from 
Australia's Millennium Drought” (2017) 36(3) Economic Papers: A Journal of Applied 
Economics and Policy 289. 
45 Garry, above at 23. 
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drawn from the comparison between the United States and Australia presume that 
Australia provides a extensive example of water law reform that other countries can 
learn from. In previous studies the lessons from the Australian experience are 
categorised as the process of unbundling rights, eliminating ambiguity in the 
property associated with water rights and transparency in allocating risk.46 To date, 
comparative studies between New Zealand and Australia have addressed the 
implementation of natural resource management plans and public participation, but 
not specifically water allocation.47 Comparative studies on New Zealand water law 
include studies undertaken with the American water allocation system based on the 
beneficial use doctrine. 48  This research, therefore, contributes to the current 
comparative research on water allocation.  
Second, Australia provides a significant example of water law reform 
implementation as it implemented the legal framework for regulating water 
markets. As part of the reforms, states were required to shift from land-based water 
entitlements to separate or “unbundled” water entitlements. States had started the 
unbundling process as part of state water reform. The National Water Initiative 
2004 and Water Act 2007(Cth) consolidated the earlier unbundling by greatly 
extending the ability to achieve environmental water recovery through market 
based and sustainability reforms.  
This research examines the implementation of water law reform in selected 
Australian states. Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia provide examples 
of states that are in the Murray Darling Basin.  
Victoria is the most advanced in implementing the water law reforms. Victoria 
provides an example of environmental water allocations and the establishment of 
the Office of the Environmental Water Holder, which other states have not 
 
46 Garry, above at 23. 
47 Alan Curtis and others “The great experiment with devolved NRM governance: lessons from 
community engagement in Australia and New Zealand since the 1980s” (2014) 21(2) 
Australasian Journal of Environmental Management 175. 
48 Mike Walmsley (2016). Would a water market system coupled with a beneficial use doctrine 
similar to that of the western United States help foster sustainability of water resource allocation 
in New Zealand? (Doctor of Philosophy Dissertation, University of Waikato, 2016). 
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implemented. It provides a working example of how decisions about environmental 
water are made in a market based water allocation system. Victoria does have more 
use of irrigation for agriculture and horticulture and can show how pressure from 
increased demand for water can be managed. 
The political tensions that have become apparent between New South Wales and 
South Australia are very relevant to the long-term success of the reforms and can 
provide insight for New Zealand water allocation compliance issues. The issues 
relating to the implementation of the reforms in New South Wales and South 
Australia are the strongest examples of problems that can arise with the water 
reform process. It may even be an example of potential policy failure if the issues 
of water theft cannot be adequately dealt with. There are similar compliance related 
issues that exist in New Zealand already with the monitoring of water takes. The 
example of these two Australian states shows the path that minor water theft can 
lead to for water allocation.  
Western Australia provides an example of a state that relies on groundwater 
irrigation. The use of irrigated agriculture is not as extensive as some of the eastern 
states. However, the higher dependence on groundwater provides a useful case 
study when comparing with similar regions in New Zealand, such as the Canterbury 
Plains. The high demand for groundwater in Canterbury means that a comparison 
with another groundwater dependant state may provide useful alternative 
approaches that can be used in regions like Canterbury.  
Queensland, Northern Territory and Tasmania are not included as part of the state 
by state analysis although reference is made to relevant law and policy from those 
other states within the research.  
Third, water allocation in Australia based on the model following the National 
Water Initiative 2004 and National Water Act 2007(Cth) categorises water 
allocation into degrees of reliability. Under this model the final allocation delivered 
will depend on the share that is allocated within that particular catchment or water 
source. Generally, the share allocated to each water licence holder will be 
determined at the catchment level so that the same percentage of risk is taken by all 
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water users. The model of allocation followed in non-National Water Initiative 
states is generally more similar to the current New Zealand model of water permits 
where the water permit is issued with to individual water users. However, it is noted 
that market based systems are being gradually implemented in some states 
including Western Australia. Water allocation in Australia is based upon a “nominal 
value” of water; however, the actual amount will vary “depending on the water 
available” 49  which means that the Australian water allocation framework is 
structured to spread the risk of water scarcity broadly across users. In comparison, 
other water entitlement systems may spread the risk according to the seniority of 
the water entitlement.50  
Fourth, neither Australia nor New Zealand has a “beneficial use” doctrine as part 
of the current water allocation framework. Historically, although New Zealand did 
have a beneficial use test for the initial allocation of water51 and in Australia, the 
Water Act 1912 (NSW) did have provisions allowing the return of inactive licences, 
these provisions were not actively enforced.52 However, both Australia and New 
Zealand policy want to achieve the efficient allocation of water. In Australia, the 
1994 COAG Meeting and subsequent reforms are focused on improving the ability 
of water to shift to those highest value uses. In New Zealand, the current National 
Policy Statement Freshwater Management 2014 states that the “efficient” allocation 
of water should be considered in regional plan rules relating to water allocation 
Finally, any comparison between New Zealand and Australia needs to address the 
demand in both countries for water for agriculture:53  
 
49 National Water Commission Australia’s Water Blueprint: National Reform Assessment 2014 
(Australian Government, Canberra, 2014); National Water Commission National Water 
Commission 2009 Biennial Assessment  (Australian Government, Canberra, 2009) and HN 
Turral and others “Water trading at the margin: The evolution of water markets in the Murray 
Darling Basin” (2005) 41 Water Resour. Res. 1 at 2. 
50 At 2. 
51 See earlier discussion on water allocation under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 in 
Chapter Three. 
52 Turral above n 46, at 2. 
53 Rick Fisher and Shona Russell “Water Policy and Regulatory Reform in New Zealand” (2011) 
27(2) Water Resour. D. 387 at 397. 
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Australia exhibits water issues, which upon first impression appear somewhat 
similar to those in New Zealand. For example, agriculture remains the most 
expansive use of water in Australia, comprising about two thirds of all water used 
nationally. Water scarcity has prompted the implementation of a National Plan for 
Water Scarcity, which includes cap and trade allocation, money for engineering 
and infrastructure, and varying degrees of control over consumer use.  
The Australian experience in implementing water law reform to improve the water 
allocation and re-allocation framework provides useful insights for other countries, 
including New Zealand.  
The comparative legal method provides an evaluation of how two jurisdictions deal 
with a similar legal problem or issue. The New Zealand and Australian jurisdictions 
have a common legal heritage inherited from the United Kingdom. When applying 
the comparative legal method the law pertaining to the two jurisdictions which 
relates to the particular legal problem is compared.54 While it is also important to 
note that the constitutional structure of both countries is different, it is, however, 
also important to acknowledge that both jurisdictions have “devolved significant 
environmental responsibilities to lower levels of government”.55  
When undertaking a comparative analysis, other contextual factors such as large 
social movements or changes in government that bring further radical change can 
also be included. 56  In this research the most relevant factor is international 
instruments and their effect on domestic jurisdictions as governments implement 
international treaties.57 In the Australian context, international treaties have been 
significant in influencing the power of the Commonwealth to commit the states to 
act on specific environmental issues such as water allocation. In the New Zealand 
context, there is no influence of international law in the same manner as that found 
in Australia.  
 
54 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd ed, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 1998) at 2. 
55 Cameron Holley “International Environmental Law and Australia and New Zealand” in Shawkat 
Alam, Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan, Tareq MR Chowdhury and Erika J Techera (eds) Routledge 
Handbook of International Environmental Law (Routledge, New, York, 2012). 
56 At 230. 




 Chapter Overview 
Chapter One provides an overview of the research. It includes the research 
questions and overall research objective of comparing Australian and New Zealand 
water allocation.  
Chapter Two defines key terms that are relevant when analysing water allocation 
law and policy such as the concept of water scarcity. The scope of the literature 
includes broader international reports on freshwater, a resource which is 
increasingly seen as scarce in some regions. The concept of water stress and the 
interdisciplinary nature of water allocation require the inclusion of literature that 
explores economic concepts related to water allocation. These concepts are often 
referred to in policy documents that emphasise the need to allocate water in the 
most efficient manner. The literature review shows that water allocation is not just 
defined in physical terms but also in economic terms. The limitations of an 
economic perspective are also addressed in this chapter because the thesis focuses 
on water allocation law and policy and for the reason not all the issues in this area 
are based in economics. There are also legal issues which need a legal solution. The 
concepts and terms defined in this chapter provide an overview of current thinking 
in water allocation. 
Chapter Three provides the background of the research shows the change in public 
expectations regarding water allocation over time. At first, riparian rights were 
amended by statute to provide water for hydropower development and government 
projects. By the 1960s, New Zealand reached a point there was increasing public 
concern about water allocation. In response to concern about water allocation the 
Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 was enacted, which included a “balancing 
test” for water allocation in Keam v Minister of Works and Development.58 Then 
following an era of economic deregulation during the 1980s, the government took 
a significant step back from its role in control over water allocation. Following 
 
58 Keam v Minister of Works and Development [1982] 1 NZLR 319. 
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extensive environmental and economic reform the RMA was enacted with the 
purpose of achieving sustainable management of resources. Nonetheless, gaps in 
New Zealand water policy at a national level emerged under the RMA. 
Chapter Four identifies a gap in national policy development for water allocation 
from 1991 until 2011. It shows that the gap in water allocation policy at a national 
level resulted in water allocation by “default” rather than by “design”. In the 
absence of national guidance water policy for irrigation and water for other 
purposes was also split in accordance with the Resource Management Law Reform 
Project of the 1980s. Chapter Four examines the outcome of the factors that have 
combined to influence water policy from 1991 to 2011. This section includes the 
common law interpretation of the nature of property rights in a water permit, 
determining the order of water permit applications via the “first come, first served” 
rule and a general lack of appreciation that water allocation limits have been 
reached across New Zealand catchments.  
Chapter Five examines the development of water law and policy from 2011 
onwards. It examines the four reports of the Land and Water Forum discussion and 
their contribution to water allocation. It shows how the government has made an 
effort to address water allocation problems from since 2011. By identifying the 
problems with New Zealand water allocation Chapter three provides the basis for 
the comparisons that are then made in Chapter five. 
Chapter Six evaluates the Australian water law reform experience. The background 
to the Australian water law reform shows the impact of inter-state tensions in 
balancing competing water interests. This tension was reflected in the formation of 
the Australian Constitution. More recent developments in water law reform were 
only able to proceed once the COAG agreed in 1994 to advance the water law 
reform agenda and to place a cap on water extraction from the Murray-Darling 
Basin in 1997. The Murray-Darling Basin spans the states of Victoria, New South 
Wales, South Australia, Queensland and the Australian Capital Territory. The 
National Water Initiative 2004 confirmed the commitment to finding sustainable 
means to allocate water and to the implementation of water markets. The Water Act 
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2007 (Cth) is the regulatory framework for catchment-wide planning for the 
Murray-Darling River Basin. The Act effectively implements the 1994 COAG 
agreement across the states. In addition, this chapter documents the key points and 
contributing factors that influenced the final form of Australian water markets and 
documents its key features as contained in the regulation. It shows that Australia 
has advanced its implementation of water policy for markets through the use of 
regulation. For the purposes of comparison with New Zealand this chapter focuses 
on the states of Victoria, New South Wales, Western Australia and South Australia.  
Chapter Seven compares the Australian and New Zealand approaches to developing 
water allocation law and policy. It is pivotal chapter in answer the key research 
question regarding lessons that can be learnt from the Australian experience in 
water law reform. The chapter is structured so that there is a Comparative Analysis 
Table followed by the explanation of the key lessons. The value of this chapter lies 
in its focus on addressing current water allocation law and policy problems specific 
to New Zealand. The thesis has carefully set out what the specific problems for New 
Zealand water allocation are and how they are influenced by and have influence on 
other related factors. The comparative analysis draws upon the experience of the 
selected Australian states and how they have made efforts to implement the 
Australian Commonwealth Government law reforms.  
Chapter Eight concludes the research and summarises the key contributions of each 
chapter.  
 Summary 
This chapter has explained how the thesis’ answers the research questions. The 
focus of the thesis is squarely focused on the lessons for New Zealand from 
Australia regarding the development and implementation of water allocation law 
and policy. The next chapter provides a literature review of water allocation issues 
from an environmental and economic point of view. It is followed by chapters 
analysing New Zealand and Australian water law; these in turn form the basis of 
the comparative analysis and for the recommendations that are put forward in 
Chapter Seven.  
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CHAPTER TWO: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL CONCEPTS IN 
WATER ALLOCATION LAW AND POLICY 
 
1. Introduction  
This chapter addresses the research question by exploring environmental and 
economic concepts that are relevant to water allocation law and policy. First, it 
explores the definition and implications of water scarcity for water allocation. It is 
clear that growing populations, demand for irrigation water and climate change are 
potential factors influencing the projections of increasing global water scarcity. 
Relevant literature from a range of disciplines (science, agriculture, natural 
resources) contributes ideas to our overall understanding of water allocation. These 
ideas aid the critical analysis of New Zealand and Australian policy documents on 
water allocation in the subsequent chapters. 
Second, the chapter examines relevant literature on the use of economic terms and 
concepts that are referred to in water allocation policy. Economic analysis of water 
allocation regulation is a prominent feature of the Australian experience of water 
law reform. While the reforms were based on both policy to improve productivity 
and sustainability at times there is less emphasis on this point in the literature. 
Literature focused on a particular economic question related to the function of the 
water markets may unintentionally obscure the original intent behind expanding the 
use of markets in water allocation in Australia. One of the themes that emerge from 
the economics literature is the emphasis on water markets being a solution to water 
allocation problems.  The problem may be one of how research is contextualised. 
The cross disciplinary nature of water itself creates a challenge for researchers 
analysing water allocation. Holley states that there is a “considerable literature” on 
the topic of Australian water law reform and that it is “predominantly informed by 
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an economist lens”. 1  Economic concepts are relevant to explaining the issues 
around valuing water, allocating scarce resources between competing users and 
focusing on the efficient allocation of water. In some cases, economic modelling 
reclassifies water from a public good to an economic asset. This classification as an 
asset or a type of property has particular legal implications because the economic 
conceptualisation of water is different from the legal definition of water. Legally, 
water is a part of the commons or public property. Economic concepts and terms 
are relevant to water allocation law and policy because economic models, concepts, 
and interpretations are often a part of water allocation methods.  
However, it is important to make the distinction that economic solutions such as 
water markets are established and operated through regulation. Consequently, the 
limitations of economic analysis are that it does not answer legal questions about 
the function of regulation relevant to water allocation. Legal questions require legal 
answers based on an analysis of relevant regulation using conventional legal 
analysis. To that end a set of legal questions are provided at the end of the chapter 
which are drawn from the key themes in the literature analysed. 
 
2 Part I - Global Water Scarcity 
Water scarcity is a critical issue. A recent high profile example in early 2018 was 
the water scarcity issues experienced by Cape Town when it was predicted that the 
city would run out of water.2 While the issues in Cape Town were intertwined with 
other infrastructure, social, political and environmental issues, there is sufficient 
 
1 Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair “Water Markets and Regulation: Implementation, Success 
and Limitations” in Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair (eds) Reforming Water Law and 
Governance. From Stagnation to Innovation in Australia (Springer, Singapore, 2018) 141 at 143. 
2 Hugh Morris “Cape Town drought: What Happens When the City Runs Out of Water?” The 
Telegraph (5 February, 2018) states that Cape Town is a “water scarce region” and the six dams 
that provided water to the city were aleardy at a low level due to a “historic dry spell”. Then 
demand also increased at the same time due to “a booming population”. 
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research to show that water scarcity is an impending problem for other cities too.3 
As a starting point, it is important to understand that fresh water is a limited 
resource. Statistics show that of the total available amount of freshwater on Earth, 
approximately only 1 per cent of it is suitable for human use.4 Then of the 1 per 
cent that is suitable for human use there are further issues relating to water access 
and water quality. In addition, the distribution of water and rainfall patterns also 
contributes to water availability and scarcity. Projections of water scarcity referred 
to below confirm that the extent of water scarcity may vary but that this “wicked” 
problem will not resolve itself without policy interventions.5  
As the discussion below will show it is generally accepted that not all the water 
physically available should be allocated. The definition of water scarcity is complex 
and includes taking into consideration when water is available, the location of 
water, ease of obtaining access to water and water quality.6 Water scarcity can be 
measured on a scale of water availability per capita. The Falkenmark Water Stress 
Indicator provides a threshold of 1,700 cubic metres of renewable water annually 
for each person in a country as a minimum requirement.7 According to the indicator, 
countries below this threshold are experiencing “water stress”, countries with a 
level below 1,000 cubic meters have “water scarcity” and finally countries below 
500 cubic metres have “absolute scarcity”. The different measures are an indicator 
of physical water scarcity.  
 
3 A further eleven cities have been identified as “most likely to run out of drinking water – like 
Cape Town” including Sao Paulo, Bangalore, Beijing, Cairo, Jakarta, Moscow, Instanbul, 
Mexico City, London, Tokyo and Miami. See BBC “The 11 cities most likely to run out of 
drinking water – like Cape Town” (11 February 2018): In 2019, reports emerged that the city of 
Chennai, India was also running out of water, Kate Wheeling “Chennai, India, is running out of 
water. Other cities will be next” Pacific Standard (24 June 2019). 
4 Laurance Boisson de Chazournes and others “Introduction” in Laurance Boisson de Chazournes, 
and others (eds) International Law and Freshwater. The Multiple Challenges (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, 2013). 
5 Quentin R. Grafton “Responding to the ‘Wicked Problem’ of Water Insecurity” (2017) 31(10) 
Water Resour. Manag. 3023 and Junguo Liu and others “Water Scarcity Assessments in the Past, 
Present, And Future” (2017) 5(6) Earth's Future 545. 
6 Hugh Morris, above n 1. Once the level of water in Cape Town dams falls below 10 per cent the 
water is not fit for human consumption and municipal water supply taps will be turned off on a 
designated “day zero”. The availability of water is impacted by its quality.  
7 Falkenmark, MJ Lundquist and C Widstrand (1989). “Macro-scale water scarcity requires micro-
scale approaches: Aspects of vulnerability in semi-arid development” (1989) 13(4) Natural 
Resources Forum 258. 
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Water scarcity defined from a hydrological perspective makes a clear connection 
with the water cycle. Hydrological studies assert that both surface water and 
groundwater supplies are placed under increased pressure as demand increases. 
They confirm that groundwater supplies are particularly vulnerable as groundwater 
storage “provides a natural buffer against water shortage”.8 However, groundwater 
depletion is more difficult to observe in comparison to surface water depletion and 
demand for groundwater increases when surface water supplies are inadequate.9  
The more commonly used definitions of water scarcity in water allocation policy 
focus on economic water scarcity rather on than the physical water scarcity 
discussed above. Even within the literature on economic water scarcity there is “no 
commonly accepted definition of water scarcity”; however, there are factors that 
can be taken into consideration to measure water scarcity. 10  These include the 
human and environmental demand for water and whether there is adequate water 
available to meet those needs. Water availability also depends on the variable 
weather patterns. Economic concepts of water scarcity attempt to measure and 
model the demand and availability of water before it becomes physically scarce.  
There are several economic water scarcity indicators or models which can include 
a number of the different factors within their measurement.11 Some water scarcity 
indicators include the connection between water scarcity and climate change and 
are based on global climate models.12 In addition, the elements involved in water 
 
8 Inge de Graaf and others “A global-scale two-layer transient groundwater model: Development 
and application to groundwater depletion” (2017) 102 Adv. Water Resour. 53 at 53; and 
Stephanie L Castle, Brian F. Thomas, John T Reager, Matthew Rodell, Sean C. Swenson, and 
James S. Famiglietti “Groundwater depletion during drought threatens future water security of 
the Colorado River Basin” (2014) 41(16) Geophys. Res. Lett. 5904. 
9 J Van der Gun Groundwater and Global Change: Trends, Opportunity and Challenges 
(UNESCO, Paris, 2012); T. Gleeson, S. Jasechko, E. Luijendijk, M. Cardenas “The global 
volume and distribution of modern groundwater” (2016) 9(2) Nat. Geosci. 161; and G.M. Zuppi 
“The Groundwater Challenge” in Corrado Clini, Ignazio Musu and Maria Lodovica Gullino 
(eds) Sustainable Development and Environmental Management. Experiences and Case Studies 
(Springer, Netherlands, 2008) at 52. 
10 The material in this paragraph is drawn from Frank R. Rijsberman, “Water Scarcity: Fact or 
Fiction?” (2006) 80(1) Agricultural Water Management 5 at 5 where the author poses the 
question of “What is water scarcity?”. 
11 Junguo Liu, above n 4. 
12 Simon Gosling and Nigel W. Arnell. “A Global Assessment of the Impact of Climate Change on 
Water Scarcity” (2016) 134(3) Cilm. Change 371. 
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scarcity make it challenging to define and so differences in the scale of water 
scarcity make it hard to develop solutions.  
The definition and measurement of water scarcity are relevant to understanding the 
water law and policy of Australia and New Zealand as there are relative differences 
in the type of water scarcity experienced by each country. On the one hand, the 
Australian experience relates generally to physical water scarcity for the 
environment alongside economic water scarcity for irrigators and other users,13 
whilst, on the other hand, urban demand for water would be an example of water 
scarcity in relation to basic human needs. In contrast, New Zealand is experiencing 
problems with over-allocation and limited means to reallocate water to higher value 
uses.14  
 
Scientific analysis shows that water scarcity is increasing. However, the exact 
reasons proffered for this scarcity vary. One view is that water scarcity is increasing 
because of the growing demand for water that results from population pressure. 
More specifically, the argument is that the underlying factor driving demand for 
freshwater is global population growth and there is indeed some concern that 
population growth will exacerbate water policy challenges in the future:15  
We conclude that impending global-scale changes in population and 
economic development over the next 25 years will dictate the future relation 
between water supply and demand to a much greater degree than will 
changes in mean climate…  
 
13 See Water Act 2007 (Cth) and the Murray Darling Basin Plan which has a targeted reduction of 
water extractions in the Murray Darling Basin prompted in part by concerns about over-
extraction and physical water scarcity.  
14 See National Policy Statement Freshwater Management 2014 (revised 2017) which has put in 
place targets for regional councils to stop over-allocation.  
15 Charles J. Vörösmarty, Pamela Green, Joseph Salisbury and Richard Lammers “Global Water 
Resources: Vulnerability from Climate Change and Population Growth” (2000) 5477 Science 
284 at 287. 
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The extent of pressure from global population growth is apparent when considering 
the changes to water stress indicators. In the year 2000, research using water 
mapping projections estimated that 25 per cent of the world’s population was 
experiencing water stress.16 In contrast, by 2010, further research based on a global 
geospatial framework estimated that water security issues existed for 80 per cent of 
the world’s population.17 The degree of change between the statistics from the year 
2000 to 2010 suggests that the actual problem of water allocation increased rapidly 
during this time.18 One of the problems with measuring global water security is, 
however, the lack of uniform measures.  
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations identified agriculture 
as one of the “driving forces behind water scarcity”. “Unconstrained water use” in 
particular is linked to agricultural production:19 
Of all economic sectors, agriculture is the sector where water scarcity has 
the greatest relevance. Currently, agriculture accounts for 70 percent of 
global freshwater withdrawals, and more than 90 percent of its consumptive 
use. Under the joint pressure of population growth and changes in dietary 
habits, food consumption is increasing in most regions of the world. It is 
expected that by 2050 an additional 1 billion tonnes of cereals and 200 
million tonnes of meat will need to be produced annually to satisfy growing 
food demand. 
The growing demand for food from an increasing population will test the ability of 
countries to respond with appropriate water allocation law and policy. The 
depletion of aquifers is of particular concern because of the potential effects on 
sustainable food production.20 Water-stressed regions exporting crops irrigated by 
groundwater risk over-exploitation without careful management of their water 
 
16 Above. 
17 Charles J. Vörösmarty and others. “Global Threats to Human Water Security and River 
Biodiversity” (2010) 467 Nature 555. 
18 M.M. Mekonnen & A. Y. Hoekstra A.Y. “Four Billion People Facing Severe Water Scarcity” 
(2016) 2(2) Science Advances e1500323. In this study it is estimated that two-thirds of the 
global population experience “water stress” for at least one month of the year.  
19 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Coping with water scarcity - an action 
framework for agriculture and food security (United Nations, Rome, 2012). 
20 Carole Dalin, Yoshihide Wada, Thomas Kastner, and Michael J. Puma “Groundwater depletion 
embedded in international food trade” (2017) 543(7647) Nature 700. 
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supplies.21 Governments need to be aware of the volume of water that is exported 
through food production.  
These studies linking population growth to increased demand for water for food 
production provide a more comprehensive and connected understanding of factors 
influencing water scarcity. The increased demand for water is not simply from the 
demands of a growing global population. By taking into account the wider context 
of water demand from a growing population, it becomes more evident that more 
water is in fact needed to irrigate crops to feed the Earth’s growing population. As 
this population growth occurs, it will generally increase water scarcity if good water 
allocation law and policy do not exist.  
 
As water scarcity increases, freshwater allocation limits will be reached in some 
water-sensitive regions and so will pose problems for reaching sustainable 
development goals in those regions.22 The availability of water for human needs is 
a significant issue facing regions such as the Middle East and Africa. 23  The 
combination of growing populations and commitments to supply quality drinking 
water is a challenge in these regions. Despite the challenges of water scarcity, all 
countries must ensure that water quality standards are met because the lack of 
access to water also affects other aspects of human well-being including health.24 
The United Nations World Economic Social Survey has identified that the types of 
 
21Above. 
22 Jeffrey D Sachs The Age of Sustainable Development (Columbia University Press, New York, 
2015) at 189. 
23 World Bank World Bank Making Sustainable Commitments — An Environment Strategy for the 
World Bank (World Bank, Washington, 2011) at 112.  
24 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs  World Economic and Social Survey 
2013 at x states “About 1 billion people still live in slums lacking access to basic infrastructure 
and services such as freshwater, sanitation, electricity, health care and education”.  
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policies necessary to meet the human right to quality water should recognise the 
links between freshwater, food, energy, environment and the climate.25  
The scarcity of water lies at the core of any economic analysis of water allocation 
law and policy.26 The question of water allocation can be reframed as a question of 
how to allocate water efficiently amongst competing users. Tietenburg and Lewis’ 
economic analysis identifies the difference between surface and groundwater 
allocation because each water source raises a different set of issues about water 
allocation. For example, for efficient surface water allocation, there must be “a 
balance amongst a host of competing users” and “an acceptable means of handling 
the year-to-year variability in water flow”. 27  Within this criterion for efficient 
surface water allocation, there must also be regard for the consumptive and non-
consumptive users. The most critical factor in efficient surface water allocation is 
having the tools to deal with the seasonal variability of water supplies:28 
With respect to allocating among competing users, the dictates of efficiency 
are quite clear – the water should be allocated so that the marginal net benefit 
is equalized for all uses. 
Nevertheless, there cannot be efficiency in allocation until the scarce nature of 
water resources is addressed in water law and policy. Thus there are important 
decisions to be made about water allocation between sectors such as meeting the 
demands of competing needs of water for hydropower and irrigation.29  
 
 
25 General Comment 15 issued by the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights recognised the human right to freshwater for drinking and sanitation in 2002. 
Takele Soboka Bulto “The Human Right to Water: Invention or Discovery” (2011) 12 MJIL 1; 
Ioanna Mouratiadou,  Anne Biewald, Michaja Pehl, Markus Bonsch, Lavinia Baumstark, David 
Klein, Alexander Popp, Gunnar Luderer, and Elmar Kriegler “The impact of climate change 
mitigation on water demand for energy and food: An integrated analysis based on the Shared 
Socioeconomic Pathways” (2016) 64 Environmental Science & Policy 48. 
26 See discussion in Chapter Two on the scarcity of water and increasing demand.  
27 Tom Tietenberg & Lynne Lewis Environmental & Natural Resource Economics (10th ed) (New 
York: Routledge, 2016) at 205. 
28 At 205. 
29 Morgan Bazilian, and others “Considering the energy, water and food nexus: Towards an 
integrated modelling approach” (2011) 39(12) Energy Policy 7896 at 7899. 
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International law is challenged in its ability to deal with increasing global scarcity 
of water as human demand increases. The challenges are identified as developing 
good freshwater management practice, changes in hydrology and growing demand 
for freshwater.30 One solution put forward by the United Nations is to focus on 
water in the Sustainable Development Goals. In 2014, the United Nations released 
its revised goals for global development which include the sustainable use of 
water.31 The “water-energy-food nexus has become central to the discussions” on 
developing and implementing these goals.32  The United Nations Water branch 
provides support to countries implementing water reform and will monitor the 
goals.33 In September 2016, the United Nations released an “Action Plan” for water 
based on Sustainable Development Goal 6 for the “availability and sustainable 
management of water and sanitation for all”.34 Goal 6.4 measures the available 
quantity of water but it also needs to make a stronger link with water quality.35 The 
High Level Panel responsible for delivering Sustainable Development Goal 6 
includes political representatives, including the Prime Minister of Australia.36 The 
inclusion of political representatives therefore shows that water allocation is also a 
political problem.  
The High Level Plan on Water defined water needs broadly; these range from water 
for sanitation and safe drinking to planning for water for the future. The plan 
identified risks from adverse events such as droughts and floods that are more likely 
 
30 At 3. 
31 United Nations Introduction and Proposed Goals and Targets on Sustainable Development for 
the Post 2015 Development Agenda (2014); Théa Bounfour “International Water Law and the 
Sustainable Development Goals” (2016) 46(6) EPIL 380. 
32 Anik Bhaduri and others “Achieving Sustainable Development Goals from a Water Perspective” 
(2016) 4 Front. Environ. Sci. 64.  
33 “United Nations Water” is a United Nations inter-agency department for freshwater related 
issues established in 2003 by the United Nations High Level Committee on Programmes. 
34 United Nations High Level Plan on Water (United Nations, High Level Panel on Water, 2016). 
35 D. Vanham and others “Physical water scarcity metrics for monitoring progress towards SDG 
target 6.4: An evaluation of indicator 6.4. 2 “Level of water stress” (2018) 613 Sci. Total 
Environ. 218. 
36 United Nations, above n 32, at 4. 
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to occur in the future. In addition, demographic changes and decisions about how 
water is allocated will contribute negatively to the problem of water scarcity on a 
global scale:37 
Changes in human populations and settlements, as well as increasing 
demand for agriculture purposes will exacerbate scarcity problems, as will 
poor decisions on water allocation and use. 45% of total GDP is projected 
to be at risk due to water stress by 2050. 
This statistic on water allocation illustrates the extent to which freshwater allocation 
is a fundamental global issue. The United Nations is focused on finding solutions 
that rely upon good decision making to address water scarcity problems by taking 
into account the interrelationships in the water-energy-food nexus. 
Despite international commitments to addressing water scarcity, problems with 
developing targeted water policy remain:38  
The political commitments acknowledge[d] the important role water plays 
in sustainable development. However, the discourse of water and sustainable 
development homogenises the problem of water scarcity, when in fact the 
causes of scarcity are not uniform and not simply a matter to be solved 
through mechanisms to deal with economic goods.  
The water-energy-food nexus requires an analysis of factors such as the input of 
energy into water systems. A water system can be “energy intensive” in itself if 
water needs to be moved across long distances39 and includes, for example, the use 
of desalination plants which are recognised as an “energy intensive approach to 
freshwater production”.40 
On the other hand, it is also important to recognise water inputs into energy systems. 
Any decision to establish an energy plant should take into account the “total amount 
 
37 At 6. 
38 Naho Mirumachi “Water and Sustainable Development” in Michael Redclift & Delyse Springett 
Routledge International Handbook of Sustainable Development (Routledge, London, 2015) at 
137. 
39 Robert Wilkinson “The water-energy nexus methodologies, challenges and opportunities” in 
Douglas S. Kenney & Robert Wilkinson (eds) The Water-Energy Nexus in the American West 
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2011) at 5. 
40 Xuexia Jia and others “Analyzing the Energy Consumption, GHG Emission, and Cost of 
Seawater Desalination in China” (2019) 12(463) Energies 1. 
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of water, calculated on a whole-system basis”41 which, in practice, means that a 
commitment to increase biofuels should include the total amount of water used to 
grow the biofuel crop, if that is the source of the fuel.42 Many of these calculations 
are based on economic theory or models. The use of economics as a means to 
address water allocation issues is therefore examined in more detail in the next 
section.  
 
New Zealand and Australia have both made efforts to introduce principles of 
sustainability to their environmental law. 43  Australian studies have identified 
continued improvement in sustainability outcomes in a multi-level governance 
framework which relies heavily on effective state cooperation. 44  An empirical 
study of principles of ecological sustainability in water plans shows that 
sustainability was an important factor in developing plans for the Murray-Darling 
River Basin in Australia.45 New Zealand’s commitment to sustainability in the 
purpose section of the RMA, is well documented.46 On the other hand there are also 
accounts of the challenges to implementing sustainable water allocation particularly 
from a governance perspective.47 As in Australia, the implementation of water law 
 
41 Wilkinson, above n 38, at 7. 
42 At 7. 
43 Douglas E. Fisher The Law and Governance of Water Resources: The Challenge of 
Sustainability (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2009) for an analysis of sustainability in Australian 
water law and policy. 
44 Ganesh Keremane, Jennifer McKay and Zhifang Wu “Achieving ecologically sustainable 
development in multi-level water governance regimes: the case of the Murray Darling Basin” 
211 in Michael Kidd, Loretta Feris and Tumai Murombo (eds) Water and the Law Towards 
Sustainability (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2014). 
45 Above. 
46 Hon Simon Upton, “Stace Hammond Grace Lecture: Purpose and Principle in the Resource 
Management Act” (1995) 3 Waikato L. Rev. 17; Caroline Miller Implementing Sustainability. 
The New Zealand Experience (Routledge, New York, 2011); Bret C. Birdsong “Adjudicating 
Sustainability. New Zealand's Environment Court and the Resource Management Act” (2002) 
29(1) Ecology L. Q. 1 and Nicola Wheen “The Resource Management Act 1991: A Greener Law 
for Water” (1997) 1 NZJ Envtl. L. 165. 
47 Trevor Daya-Winterbottom “Sustainability, governance and water management in New 
Zealand” in in Michael Kidd, Loretta Feris and Tumai Murombo (eds) Water and the Law 
Towards Sustainability (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2014). 
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reform from the national to regional level are issues at the forefront of challenges 
to sustainable water allocation in New Zealand. 
 
 Part II – Economic Concepts of Water 
As described above, water allocation is a complex policy issue. Economic concepts 
are often used in water policy to discuss the nature of water allocation problems and 
potential solutions. One of the main problems of water allocation is that water is a 
common good or public resource. From an economic perspective, without 
restrictions on their use public resources are at risk of being over-exploited. 
Furthermore, once allocated those public goods take on private characteristics.  
One of the factors that can lead to over-exploitation is that demand for water will 
often exceed natural flows as “modern societies are rarely prepared to accept limits 
imposed on population numbers, agricultural productivity or industrial activity by 
reliance on natural flows”. 48  The following sections will address some of the 
common concepts that are used to define the water allocation problem in economic 
terms and also consider how particular solutions are proposed using economic 
analysis.  
Tietenburg’s conceptual framework for examining environmental problems 
provides useful criteria for identifying environmental problems in natural resource 
allocation.49 It distinguishes between the general understanding of natural resources 
and the economic understanding by emphasising that natural resources are 
reclassified or reconsidered from a public resource to an asset from an economic 
perspective. In other words, the environment provides assets or “raw materials” to 
 
48 Above at 241. 
49 Tietenberg, above n 26, at 15.  
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be used in the production process to create “consumer products”. 50  Further 
examples of direct or indirect benefits provided by the environment include 
breathing fresh air or drinking potable water. Within the ecological economics 
literature, these benefits are referred to as “ecosystem goods or services”.51 This 
economic approach to natural resource policy allows a discussion of the natural 
resource in terms of its contribution as an asset and gives it an economic value 
expressed in monetary terms. 
The next problem that arises regarding water allocation is that water is both an asset 
and a public good depending on its use. The ownership of water becomes a central 
point in distinguishing rights of access to water that is being allocated from the 
commons or a private asset. Constructions of property from an economic 
perspective include the following three categories: government ownership, 
common or group ownership and open access. Most relevant to water allocation is 
the third category of property, open access. Open access resources “…can be 
exploited on a first-come, first-served basis” and have given rise to what has become 
known popularly as “the tragedy of the commons”.52 The tragedy is that open access 
“destroys the incentive to conserve” the public resource.53  
Allocating private access or entitlements to open access resources raises particular 
challenges with regard to conserving the natural resource. These challenges are 
addressed in the literature on the “commons” and associated issues relating to 
property rights to these common pool resources. Hardin explained the tragedy of 
the commons by using the example of open access to National Parks:54  
What shall we do? We have several options. We might sell them off as 
private property. We might keep them as public property, but allocate the 
right to enter them. The allocation might be on the basis of wealth, by the 
use of an auction system. It might be on the basis of merit, as defined by 
 
50 At 16. 
51 At 17 states “One significant subclass of these, ecosystem goods and services, incorporate the 
benefits obtained directly from ecosystems, including biodiversity, breathable air, wetlands, 
water quality, carbon sequestration and recreation”. 
52 At 28. 
53 At 30. 
54 Thomas Hardin “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1960) 162 (3859) Science 1243-1248 at 1245. 
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some agreed upon standards. It might be by lottery. Or it might be on a first-
come, first-served basis, administered to long queues. These, I think, are all 
objectionable. But we must choose -- or acquiesce in the destruction of the 
commons that we call our National Parks 
As the quote above shows, Hardin believed the allocation of some private property 
rights to natural resources was essential to protect the commons. Hardin argued that 
without private property rights common resources would be overused to the point 
of depletion. 
 
A theme in the economic literature is the use of markets to determine both pricing 
and allocation of water. From a traditional economic perspective, market-based 
allocation “works best when the goods and services being traded are private in 
nature”.55 For example, in a market that trades in private goods, the seller can 
control the distribution and availability of the good. The goods are considered to be 
“excludable” as owners exercise their exclusive rights over their control. 
Contemporary water-related policy documents will include a reference to the value 
of water to a particular sector or in a cost-benefit analysis for a project.56 The values 
 
55 At 64. 
56 Ben Groom and Phoebe Koundouri “The Economics of Water Resource Allocation: Valuation 
Methods and Policy Implications” Ideas Working Paper Series RePec (Federal Reserve Bank of 
St Louis, St Louis, 2011). This paper is limited to focusing on the Kouris watershed in Cyprus. It 
provides an example of balancing competing demands through establishing value for water.  
  For an example of cost benefit approaches applied in New Zealand see Bill Kaye-Blake, Chris 
Schilling, Chris Nixon, and Killian Destremau Water management in New Zealand: A road map 
for understanding water value. NZIER Public Discussion Paper, Working Paper 2014/01 (New 
Zealand Institute of Economic Research, Wellington, 2014). Section 32 of the Resource 
Management Act 1991 also requires a cost benefit analysis to be carried out as part of the 
resource management plan making process.  
  An Australian example is Lisa Brennan McKellar, Marta Monjardino, Rosalind Bark, Glyn 
Wittwer, Onil Banerjee, Andrew Higgins, Neil MacLeod, Neville Crossman, Di Prestwidge and 
Luis Laredo Irrigation costs and benefits. A technical report to the Australian Government from 
the CSIRO Flinders and Gilbert Agricultural Resource Assessment, part of the North 
Queensland Irrigated Agriculture Strategy (Australian Government Department of Infrastructure 
and Regional Development, Canberra, 2013). 
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are generally expressed as pricing options for the cost of water.57 These traditional 
economic concepts do not take into account the nature of the resource itself. 
Ecosystem services do recognise the connections between resources and their role 
as both a “good” and a part of the natural environment:58 
Ecosystem services are not like other goods and services that move through 
our economy. They cannot be easily separated from their ecosystem bases, 
or moved around and delivered the way that other raw materials or services 
are physically delivered. In short, ecosystem services, while clearly of 
tremendous value, are ecologically, geographically, and economically more 
complex than any other kind of commodity or service, which has made 
tapping into their value a challenge that has yet to be met.  
Many of the complexities of how to allocate stem effectively from the nature of 
water as part of the commons or public good. Any policy that determines how water 
shall be allocated is effectively making a judgement between the value of the 
resource as a common good and as an economically productive unit. Applying the 
ecosystem services perspective shows the underlying distinction between and 
different role of water as a public resource and water as a private good or asset.  
From an economic perspective, the efficient allocation of water requires transfer 
and pricing mechanisms. The ability to transfer water relies upon a “well-structured 
system of water property rights”.59 There are three essential elements required for 
efficient property rights:60  
Exclusivity – All benefits and cost accrued as a result of owning and using 
the resource should accrue to the owner, and only to the owner, either 
directly or indirectly by sale to others. 
Transferability – All property rights should be transferable from one owner 
to another in a voluntary exchange.  
Enforceability – Property rights should be secure from involuntary seizure 
or encroachment by others.  
 
57 Ronald C Griffin Water Resource Economics. The Analysis of Scarcity, Policies, and Projects 
(MIT Press, Cambridge, 2016) at 303. 
58 J.H. Ruhl, Steven E. Kraft and Christopher L. Lant. The Law and Policy of Ecosystem Services 
(Island Press, Washington, 2007) at 13. 
59 Tietenburg, above n 26, at 210. 
60 At 22. 
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According to the classic economic approach, providing exclusive economic 
property rights increases the incentive to preserve the underlying resource. 
However, this is not the only possible construct of economic property rights. These 
structures provide the holders with certainty that they can transfer their water rights 
efficiently. In theory, those that receive a higher benefit from water would be able 
to purchase more rights from those that have a lower benefit. The ability to benefit 
from efficient water transfers is however hindered in practice by the pre-existing 
legal rights. Examples include the use of the prior appropriation doctrine in the 
United States.61  
According to Horbulyk, there are three prerequisites from an economic perspective 
for the “successful implementation of [water] policy reforms”.62 The first is the 
definition of property rights.63 Horbulyk states that where there is the potential to 
trade a water right the value of the right will depend on several factors including 
the security of those rights, transferability, and opportunity to bank water and 
whether there are further fees to pay. The second factor is separating revenue 
generation from improving water allocation outcomes. The example provided is 
that potentially water demand-sensitive pricing could be implemented for urban 
water users.64 The third factor is the “monitoring, evaluation and measurement” of 
policy reform.  
 
The limitations of economic-based solutions are that they cannot address the broad 
scope of other issues affecting water allocation that are not economic problems. 
Water allocation policy and law are included in natural resources literature more 
 
61 At 211.  
62 Theodore Horbulyk "Markets, Policy and the Allocation of Water Resources Among Sectors: 
Constraints and Opportunities" (2005) 30 (1) Can. Water Resour. J. 55-64.  
63 At 60. 
64 At 61. 
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generally and as specific texts on the subject.65 Some of the other themes explored 
in water allocation literature include: conflict over freshwater management, 66 
scoping the effects of market orientated efforts to manage natural resources from a 
governance perspective,67 exploring the relationship between water demand and 
social justice,68 the context of property rights in water allocation within indigenous 
cultures69 and the effect of public and private interests in natural resources law.70  
Despite freshwater scarcity being a global issue, the literature from each jurisdiction 
focuses on particular challenges that arise in that region. For example, when 
Australia experienced the Millennium Drought from 2001-2009 that experience 
triggered the more recent water law reform that followed. The drought had the most 
substantial impact in the state of Victoria.71 Academics such as Godden draw on 
lessons from a case study on water law reform in the Australian state of Victoria to 
show the complexity of resolving water allocation issues in the context of strong 
rural-urban water demand.72 The Australian water law literature also includes issues 
 
65 See Douglas E. Fisher Australian Environmental Law (Lawbook, New South Wales, 2003); 
Douglas E. Fisher Water Law (LBC Information Services, North Ryde, 2000): Kate Stoeckel, 
Romany Webb, Luke Woodward and Amy Hankinson Water Law (Lawbook Co, Australia, 
2012).  
66 Vandana Shiva Water Wars. Privatization, Pollution and Profit (South End Press, Cambridge, 
2002).  
67 J.T. Scholz and B Stiftel, (eds) Adaptive Governance and Water Conflict (RFF Press, 
Washington, 2005).  
68 Lee Godden “Water law reform in Australia and South Africa: Sustainability, Efficiency and 
Social Justice” (2005) 17(2) J. Environ. Law 181and P. Troy (ed) Troubled Waters: Confronting 
the Water Crisis in Australia’s Cities (ANU Press, Canberra, 2008). 
69 On the topic of water and indigenous people in Australia see Lee Godden “Realising capacity: 
Indigenous involvement in water policy and law reform in south-eastern Australia” (2010) 20 
(5,6) Water Law Special Issue – Contemporary Indigenous Peoples' Legal Rights to Water in 
The Americas and Australasia 243; For a discussion of co-governance in New Zealand see Linda 
Te Aho “Indigenous challenges to enhance freshwater governance and management in Aotearoa 
New Zealand — The Waikato River settlement” (2010) 20, (5,6) Journal of Water Law Special 
Issue - Contemporary Indigenous Peoples' Legal Rights to Water in The Americas and 
Australasia 285. 
70 Lee Godden “Property in urban water: Private rights and public governance” in P. Troy (ed) 
Troubled Waters: Confronting the Water Crisis in Australia's Cities (ANU Press, Canberra, 
2008) 157 and V Thampapillai “The Murray-Darling River Basin. Sustainable Development and 
Water Trade” (2006) 36(1) EPIL 42. 
71 Albert Dijk, and others “The Millennium Drought in southeast Australia (2001–2009): Natural 
and human causes and implications for water resources, ecosystems, economy, and society” 
(2013) 49(2) Water Resour. Res. 1040-1057. 
72 Godden, above n 69. 
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relating to property rights in water entitlements. The issues examined there include 
the question of whether the change of existing water access rights to a type of water 
licence was effective “property acquisition” from a constitutional perspective.73 
Fisher observes that these questions of property involve balancing public rights and 
private interests.74 Gray questions the presumption that strong property rights are 
needed for a market-based system of water allocation.75  These particular legal 
problems must have regard to the law and how it functions to allocate water. They 
cannot be solved by economics alone. 
In United States literature, Rose has identified that the right to water may be viewed 
as a constitutional right to property and that this right could potentially be eroded 
through various means.76 Rose observes that encroachment is challenged by water 
entitlement holders as an erosion of constitutional rights. However, these challenges 
may not arise in the same way in other countries where there is no constitutional 
right to property. Other United States-based literature includes precautionary 
lessons in balancing rights to freshwater resources which draw on the experience of 
the western United States.77 These discussions relating to water and the nature of 
property in water access entitlements show the tensions between the identification 
of water as a public resource and how that needs to be balanced with private access 
to use water. However, care needs to be taken when interpreting the application of 
particular concepts, such as property rights, in different jurisdictions such as 
Australia and New Zealand that do not provide for constitutional property rights in 
resource consents.  
 
73 Francine Rochford “Compensation for Regulation of Water Use – a Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective” (paper presented to New Zealand Centre for Environmental Law Conference, 
Auckland, April 2009); and ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (2009) 84 ALJR 87. 
74 Douglas E. Fisher “Water law, the High Court and techniques of judicial reasoning” (2010) 27 
(2) EPLJ 85. 
75 Janice Gray and Louise Lee “Water Entitlements as Property: A Work in Progress or Watertight 
Now?” in Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair (eds) Reforming Water Law and Governance. 
From Stagnation to Innovation in Australia (Springer, Singapore, 2018). 
76 Carol M. Rose “Property and expropriation: themes and variations in American law” (2000) 
Utah Law Review 1. 
77 Joseph Sax “Our Precious Water Resources: Learning from the Past, Securing the Future” in 
Trevor Daya-Winterbottom (ed) Resource Management Theory & Practice (Resource 
Management Law Association of New Zealand, Auckland, 2009). 
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Academics have examined Australian water law and policy reform within both legal 
and non-legal disciplines. Within the non-legal disciplines there is a greater 
contribution from economic studies which have explored the potential benefits of 
water markets to reallocate water in catchments such as the Murray-Darling 
Basin. 78  The economic literature examines the triggers for policy reform and 
provides a useful discussion on the background to the reforms.  
Again, within the category of legal analysis there are different perspectives and 
levels of analysis. These different levels relate directly to the structure of the legal 
system. Holley and Gunningham provide a clear statement of these levels. In 
particular, they state there has been a “shift” in the literature on water reform from 
traditional legal analysis of statutory law, to a broader consideration of regulations 
affecting water law, and finally to considering the effect of new institutional 
arrangements. 79 These levels are presented as being on a spectrum. As regards 
these three levels, the focus of this thesis is on the first and second levels of analysis. 
 
78 Lin Crase (ed) Water Policy in Australia. The impact of Change and Uncertainty (Routledge, 
Washington, 2008); Lin Crase, Leo O’Reilly and Brian Dollery “Water markets as a vehicle for 
water reform: the case of New South Wales” Aust. J. Agric. Resour. Econ.44(2) 299; Tim 
Cummins and Alistair Watson. “A hundred-year policy experiment: The Murray-Darling Basin 
in Australia” in John Quiggin, Thilak Mallawaarachchi and Sarah Chambers (eds) Water Policy 
Reform, Lessons in Sustainability from the Murray Darling Basin (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
2012); Edwyna Harris “Institutional Change and Economic Growth: The Evolution of Water 
Rights in Victoria, Australia 1850-1886” (2007) 26(2) Economic Papers 118; John Quiggin, J. 
and Poh Ling Tan Sustainable Management of the Great Artesian Basin: an analysis based on 
Environmental Economics and Law Murray Darling Program Working Paper3/M04 (University 
of Queensland, 2004); John Quiggin and others “Climate change, uncertainty, and adaptation: 
the case of irrigated agriculture in the Murray–Darling Basin in Australia” (2010) 58(4) 
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie  531; and Mac 
Kirby and others “Sustainable irrigation: How did irrigated agriculture in Australia's Murray–
Darling Basin adapt in the Millennium Drought?” (2014) 145 Agricultural Water Management 
154. 
79 Cameron Holley and Neil Gunningham “Next Generation Environmental Regulation: Law, 
Regulation and Governance” (2016) 12 Annu. Law Rev. 273 at 274. Holley has contributed 
extensively to the literature on water law and policy reform. Particularly in the area of water 
governance. For an examination of environmental governance in Australia see Cameron Holley, 
Neil. Gunningham and Clifford D. Shearing. The New Environmental Governance (Earthscan, 
New York, 2012); Janice Gray, Cameron Holley, and Rosemary Gail Rayfuse Trans-
jurisdictional Water Law and Governance (Earthscan, New York, 2016); Cameron Holley and 
Darren. Sinclair Reforming Water Law and Governance From Stagnation to Innovation in 
Australia. (Springer, Singapore, 2018); Riyanti Djalante, Cameron Holley and Frank Thomalla 
“Adaptive governance and managing resilience to natural hazards” (2011) 2(4) International 
Journal of Disaster Risk Science 1-14. In relation to the connection between governance and 
collaboration in the New Zealand context see Cameron Holley and Neil Gunningham “Natural 
resources, new governance and legal regulation: When does collaboration work?” (2011) 24 
New Zealand Universities Law Review 309.  
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It draws also upon the third level of institutional arrangements and governance, as 
appropriate.  
The method of analysing the water law and policy of each jurisdiction begins with 
a statutory analysis of “highly specific state-based law, that which is promulgated 
by parliament, implemented by agencies, and interpreted by the courts”.80  The 
regulatory analysis approach is as follows:81 
Regulation is a broader category and includes much more flexible and 
innovative forms of social control. For example, it may involve persuasion, 
self-regulation, and coregulation; it may use both commercial interests and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and it may invoke surrogates for 
direct government regulation—mechanisms that are only partially or 
indirectly related to state law. But it still involves the state as a central player 
because even mechanisms that are not reliant on legislation for their 
authority are negotiated directly with the state and operate in the shadow of 
the state. For example, Australia’s tradeable water permits, an economic 
instrument that relies heavily on market forces, nevertheless must operate 
according to statutorily defined caps and trading rules that are underpinned 
by agency enforcement. 
The analysis of water regulation in each state follows the definition above. The 
implementation of markets considers the policy drivers for reform. Water allocation 
methods are defined in statute and administered through planning regulation. The 
analysis includes the following: evaluation of the process of implementing water 
reforms through unbundling water take and use; methods for collecting water-
related information and data; the regulation of environmental water and the setting 
of limits on water allocation.82 In this regard much of the focus of the thesis accords 
with the definition of the regulatory approach defined by Holley and Gunningham 
in the quote above. The focus on statute and regulation is appropriate when 
examining water allocation law and policy in New Zealand which significantly 
remains behind Australia in terms of progress towards improved water allocation 
practice. The inclusion of materials that relate to water law and policy institutions 
and governance is more relevant in the chapter on Australia as the country has 
 
80 At 274. 
81 At 274. 
82 For example, the Water Act 2007 (Cth) contains extensive regulation of matters relating to water 
allocation in what has been described as a top-down legal framework. Australian states are 
required to implement this regulation through their own promulgation of laws at state level.  
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implemented markets for water allocation, legally recognised environmental water 
and developed water accounting standards as part of its law reform process.  
 
 Analysing Water Allocation Law and Policy in Australia and 
New Zealand 
The analysis of the water law and policy in New Zealand and Australia is 
summarised in the table below. The contents of the table draw upon the literature 





▪ What is the legal promulgation of requirements by Parliament? 
▪ Which specific Act or Acts of Parliament included provisions 
related to water allocation? (Including water for irrigation) 
▪ What is the intention of Parliament in passing the Act (as stated 
in the purpose of the Act and related Hansard and policy 
material)? 
▪ Is there a devolution of power included in the Act to make 
decisions regarding water allocation? 
▪ Which institutions have responsibility for administering and 
enforcing the Act?  
▪ How is power devolved and which areas of decision making are 
devolved? 
Unbundling ▪ At what stage of unbundling is the legal system? For example, 
has the separation of water from land occurred in the form of a 
statutory system of water allocation?  
▪ Then related to the first question, how has water take and use 
unbundled? For example, is there a legal separation between 
water take permits and water use entitlement? 
▪ Has unbundling progressed to the stage where the final water 
allocation in a unbundled system is based on a share of overall 
water available in a catchment?  









▪ Which Acts contain provisions relating to the storing of water 
information? (not just hydraulic information) 
▪ Is there a Water Register to record information regarding the legal 
definition of water rights, their ownership, the volume of water, 
transfer of water and related financial information such as security 
or collateral? 
▪ Is there a record of the amount of water actually taken as part of 
the collection of hydrometric information?  
▪ Which body is responsible for storing this information? 
▪ What kind of information is required for the water allocation 
method that operates in the jurisdiction? 
▪ If there are water markets, how is market-related information 
collected and disseminated?  
Water 
Planning 
▪ How are plans for water allocation meant to be developed as 
promulgated in Acts of Parliament?  
▪ How is the creation, administration and enforcement of rules in 
plans meant to be carried as stated in relevant Acts and 
regulations?  
▪ How is water planning actually carried out? 
Water 
Accounting 
▪ How is information from the legal processes of establishing 





This chapter has explored concepts referred to in water allocation law and policy. 
It sought to establish an understanding of those concepts by drawing upon current 
literature in relevant fields. The literature on water scarcity shows that some regions 
will experience greater water scarcity than others. However, the explanations of 
which regions are water scarce are hampered by the lack of comparable measures 
of water scarcity. The significance of this finding from the literature raises the 
question of whether water scarcity has been accurately measured on a global scale. 
The implications are that references to water scarcity in Australian and New 
Zealand policy documents are referring to very different types of physical versus 
45 
 
economic water scarcity. These differences are taken into account in the 
comparative analysis undertaken in the thesis.  
The chapter also showed that a considerable contribution to the understanding of 
water allocation problems and solutions is derived from studies based on economic 
theory. Economic theory has developed from the traditional approach to ecological 
economics which acknowledges the contribution of water as an ecosystem service. 
However, a major criticism of economic studies was raised in this chapter. That is, 
that while the economic studies make a valuable contribution to water allocation, a 
major drawback is that they cannot provide solutions to legal problems such as how 
to draft and implement law for water allocation. 
In order to answer the research question, the chapter shifted its focus to regulatory 
analysis. Based on the analysis of relevant literature it provided a set of questions 
which form the basis of the comparative analysis in this research. The questions are 
used to provide a standardised approach to the comparative analysis. The next 
chapter examines New Zealand water allocation law and policy using conventional 
legal analysis and is informed by the water allocation concepts which come from 




CHAPTER THREE - BACKGROUND TO NEW 
ZEALAND WATER ALLOCATION 1967- 1991 
 The Government as Developer of the Settler Economy 
A key theme in this chapter is the changing role of the government from a high 
degree of centralised control to embracing deregulation and devolution. This 
background is essential in terms of understanding the social and political context of 
water allocation in New Zealand, as historical events moulded the public perception 
of water allocation in contemporary New Zealand. This information also shows that 
New Zealand did have a sound water allocation law and policy before the RMA. It 
begins by examining the introduction of riparian rights at the time of settlement. 
The New Zealand government initially had significant control over water allocation 
because of its role as developer of the country’s infrastructure. There was a settler 
expectation that the government would have a crucial role in development. 
However, these public expectations of resource development changed over an 
extended period. The expectation of government development began in the early 
1800s when settlers were encouraged to emigrate to New Zealand with its abundant 
natural resources.1  Settlers arrived with expectations that the country’s natural 
resources provided opportunities for development and wealth.2 In this context, the 
settler government of New Zealand took on the role of developer of essential 
infrastructure to support industries such as mining, energy and agriculture.  
At first, riparian rights to take and use water applied in New Zealand. Riparian 
rights were based on owning or accessing the land adjoining the waterway. 3 
 
1 Rebecca Durrer “Propogating the New Zealand Ideal” (2006) 43 The Social Science Journal 173.  
2 Tom Brooking and Vaughan Wood “The Grasslands Revolution Reconsidered” in Eric Pawson 
and Tom Brooking (eds) Making a New Land. Environmental Histories of New Zealand 
(Dunedin, Otago University Press, 2013) states at 194 that New Zealand ranked from fifth to 
third highest in the world for its standard of living during the 1920s-1970s influenced by the 
promotion of pastoral farming practices; Donald Garden Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific. 
An Environmental History Nature and Human Societies (ABC-CLIO Inc, California, 2005).  
3 FM Brookfield Laws of New Zealand Water (online ed). Brookfield introduces the background 
of New Zealand water law and the effect of legislative changes; and Joshua Getzler A History of 
Water Rights at Common Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004). Rights based on prior 
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However, riparian rights were inadequate for securing the rights the New Zealand 
government needed for large-scale water power projects.4 Thus there was a gradual 
“displacement” of riparian rights in New Zealand as the government increased its 
control over water allocation.5 This displacement occurred through the enactment 
of ad hoc legislation to control water as needed for various industries or projects.6 
As the developer of essential infrastructure the New Zealand government 
maintained unhindered access to water for power generation, irrigation, or other 
bulk water projects for a significant period.  
 
 Weakening Government Control of Water Allocation in New 
Zealand and the Manapouri-Te Anau Development Act 1960 
Government control of access to water remained strong until the 1960s. A change 
occurred after public dissatisfaction with government control over water for a 
project proposed at Lake Manapouri.7 The Manapouri-Te Anau Development Act 
1960 gave extensive powers to the government to allocate water unilaterally for the 
project. The Act provided Consolidated Zinc Proprietary Limited with the power to 
raise lake levels based on an agreement signed with the New Zealand government. 
The Company needed the power for a proposed aluminium smelter. Eventually, the 
 
appropriation did not apply under the British common law system. Effectively water flowing by 
or though property provided a right to take and use water. The right to take or use water had no 
absolute limit, except that downstream users must not be greatly disadvantaged by the water 
take. 
4 John E Martin People, Politics and Power Stations (Electricity Corporation of New Zealand and 
Historical Branch (Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington, 1991). 
5 Nicola Wheen “A Natural Flow - A History of Water Law in New Zealand”, above n 1, at 72. 
For example, Highways and Watercourses Diversion Act 1858; The Goldfields Act 1862; The 
Mines Act 1877 and The Public Works Act 1882.  
6 Robert Ogilvie Buchanan “Hydro-electric power development in New Zealand” (1930) 75(5) 
Geogr. J. 444 at 450. The Electric Motive Power Act 1896, Water Power Act 1903, Public 
Works Act 1908 and the Water Power Works Act 1910 “progressively defined the attitude of the 
state to water power resources” and their development. 
7 Nicola Wheen “An Updated History of New Zealand Environmental Law” in Eric Pawson and 
Tom Brooking (eds) Making a New Land: Environmental Histories of New Zealand (Dunedin, 
University of Otago Press, 2013). Wheen traces the Save Lake Manapouri Campaign and its 
impact on New Zealand environmental law and policy in terms of increased public concern 
about environmental matters. This paragraph draws on material in her account.  
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government bowed to public pressure and a national petition not to raise the lake 
levels. The level of public protest showed increased public concern over the 
government’s control of water allocation. The turnaround in public opinion was 
also referred to by the Prime Minister in a letter to the Vice Chairman of the 
company stating that there will “almost certainly be agitation and pressure about 
the establishment of a major engineering project in one of New Zealand’s most 
attractive scenic resorts”.8  
There was further evidence of concern over government control of water allocation 
from within government departments during the 1960s. A 1963 interdepartmental 
report recommended establishing an independent national water authority and a 
licensing system for water users based on the best use of water.9 However, the 
recommendation was met with opposition from the New Zealand Electricity 
Department because it would erode its ease of access to water allocations required 
for dam building.10 In contrast, the other government departments supported the 
change and emphasised the need for statutory water allocation that balanced the 
needs of all water users. It was decided that change was needed and new legislation 
enacted by Parliament was introduced to change New Zealand water allocation 
from riparian rights to a system of statutory licences, as discussed below.  
 
 
8 Manapouri-Te Anau Development Act 1960 Schedule. Clause 28. (Repealed).  
9 Ministry of Works Law and Administration in Respect of Water. Report to Cabinet by the 
Interdepartmental Committee on Water (Ministry of Works, Wellington, 1963). The Minister for 
Works noted that the report was substantial and involved 10 government departments working 
over two years. It advised that responsibility for water under the Waters Pollution Act 1953, 
Mining Act 1926 and Public Works Act 1928 amongst others should come under a national 
water authority. 
10 At 14 stated the ease of access to water for “electricity production was built up on powers 
conferred by the Water Power Act 1903, now reproduced in PXIII of the Public Works Act 
1928”. The importance of these Acts was they they  “vested in the Crown the sole right to use or 
license the use of water resources for the generation of electricity”. The significance of the 
government use of their ease of access to water was that on that the value of the investment in 
hydropower was estaimated to be around $300 million. 
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 The Introduction of Statutory Water Allocation under the 
Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 
The Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 introduced a statutory scheme of water 
allocation in New Zealand replacing riparian rights and vesting the power to 
allocate water with the Crown. It established an independent body, the National 
Water and Soil Conservation Authority, to oversee water allocation. Importantly, 
the Act introduced a test for the beneficial  use of water that would apply to all 
water users, including government departments wanting water for large scale 
projects.11 Statutory rights to water under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 
1967 were classified as “natural rights” or “acquired rights”. Natural rights to water 
for reasonable domestic use could continue without needing a licence. 12 Only the 
second version of the Water and Soil Conservation Bill 1966 included domestic or 
“natural” rights to water.13  
Acquired rights, to dam or divert water, required a licence from the local catchment 
authority. The terms of the licence were, however, not treated the same as real 
 
11 Ministry of Works Law and Administration in Respect of Water. Report to Cabinet by the 
Interdepartmental Committee on Water (Ministry of Works, Wellington, 1963).The Minister for 
Works stated  that the report was substantial and involved ten government departments working 
over two years. In advised that responsibility for water under the Waters Pollution Act 1953, 
Mining Act 1926 and Public Works Act 1928 amongst others should come under a national 
water authority and water should be put to its “best” use. When enacted the test became the 
“beneficial” use test to show that there was some benefit from using the water as requested by 
the applicant. See also Keam v Minister of Works and Development [1982] 1 NZLR 319 and 
Stanley v South Canterbury Catchment Board (1971) Planning Tribunal 463,68. 
   One of the functions of the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority under s 14(m) of the 
Act was “To promote the best uses of natural water, including multiple uses, and to allocate 
natural water between competing demands”. Some of the functions relating to water allocation 
could be delegated to the Water Allocation Council under s15(c) of the Act. The Water 
Allocation Council was a statutory body set up under the Act.  
12 BH Davis “New Control Over Natural Water” (1968) NZLJ 105.  
13 See (9 September 1966) 348 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 2593 Mr Kirk (Leader of the 
Opposition). Domestic or natural rights to water were not specifically identified in the first 
version of the Water and Soil Conservation Bill 1966. It is only in the second version of the Bill 
that the rights to domestic water first appear. When the Bill was first introduced to Parliament, 
the Opposition questioned the lack of a provision for domestic water and specifically for those 
people who lived in rural areas and who used groundwater wells for domestic water supply. A 
related question was whether a licene would be required for domestic water takes “because this 
opens up the possibility that they may have to pay some fee for water that comes from a common 
source?”. Changes to the second version of the Bill confirmed that domestic water takes did not 
require a licence.  
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property and were not notified on Certificates of Title. Brookfield identified the 
lack of notification as a weakness within the water allocation regulation because 
water licences would not need to be under the Torrens system and registered on the 
Land Register. 14  Brookfield emphasised that the dangers of this omission for 
conveyancing were that: “In theory at least, no search of title to land will be 
complete without a search of the Board’s records”.15 The significance was that that 
records relating to land and water were not in one place. New Zealand water permit 
information continues to be recorded at a regional level and is still not linked to the 
Land Register. Under the RMA, security interests may be recorded on the Personal 
Property Security Register.16 Under current water allocation law it is fair to say that 
in theory no search of land title is complete without a search of regional council 
records and the Personal Property Security Register.  
 
 National Water and Soil Conservation Authority 
The National Water and Soil Conservation Authority had a significant statutory role 
in overseeing water allocation in New Zealand. It was a national body and included 
representatives from government, industry and non-governmental organisations. 
The Authority replaced regional catchment authorities responsible for freshwater 
planning under the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941.  
The Act brought back tiers of centralised control of water administration overseeing 
the growing body of statutory bodies established under various water-related 
statutes: these included the Municipal Corporations Act 1954, Counties Act 1956, 
Water Pollution Act 1953 and the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941.17  
 
14 FM Brookfield “The Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 and its Application: An Attempted 
Guide for the Practitioner” (1969-1972) 2 Otago L. Rev. 21 at 26. 
15 At 26. 
16 Personal Property Securities Act 1999 and Resource Management Act 1991, s 122(3). 
17 Davis, above n 27. 
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Section 14 of the Act also provided further guidance on the administrative role of 
the Authority. The Authority could maintain records relating to water availability 
and volume, compile a record of water takes across the country to forecast future 
demand, and “and of such other matters as may seem useful as a basis for allocation 
of natural water between competing demands”.18 Part of the Authority’s role under 
section 14(4)(a) was to “ensure that information was made available to interested 
local authorities”. These duties are relevant to the current discussion of water 
allocation problems which are elaborated in Chapter Three – Part II as concerns 
about the demise of long-term hydrological data collection. An analysis of key 
sections of the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 shows the Authority was a 
specialised decision-making body with responsibility for New Zealand freshwater 
and it played an essential role in determining water allocation applications of 
national significance.  
 
 Government Efforts to Control Water Allocation 
Political and economic events affected the course of New Zealand water policy and 
law during the 1970s as New Zealand embarked upon deregulating the economy. 
The changes were introduced in response to the reduction in traditional export 
markets in Europe19 and international oil shocks.20 In 1973, New Zealand’s energy 
forecasting body identified a potential energy “capacity shortfall” problem.21 New 
Zealand committed to developing domestic energy resources to reduce reliance on 
energy imports and the risk of an energy capacity shortfall. However, the projected 
 
18 Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, s 14(4)( a).  
19 Brian Easton The Commercialisation of New Zealand (Auckland University Press, Auckland 
1997) at 4-5. 
20 Barry Barton “From Public Service to Market Commodity: Electricity and Gas Law in New 
Zealand” (1998) 16(4) JERL 351-388. Improving security of domestic energy supply was 
precipitated by the oil shocks of 1970s which “triggered a period of enormous dislocation of the 
provision of energy worldwide”. 
21 Aynsley Kellow Transforming Power. The Politics of Electricity Planning (Cambridge 
University Press Melbourne, 1996) at 67. The demand projection was based on expansion 
potential that would require more power by 1978 for the Comalco smelter to operate.  
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energy shortfall did not eventuate, which meant New Zealand had an energy 
surplus.22 One solution to the energy surplus problem was to use the surplus in a 
series of large-scale, “Think-Big”, projects announced in 1980 by the third 
National-led government. 23  One of the incentives offered to potential private 
investors was easing the consents process for large-scale developments through the 
use of empowering legislation such as The National Development Act 1979 and the 
Clutha Development (Clyde Dam) Empowering Act 1982. The use of empowering 
acts was, however, unpopular with the public and the National Development Bill 
1979 was opposed on environmental and constitutional grounds, as will be 
discussed below.24 
 
The political and economic events during the 1980s provided not only the 
background to the RMA but also aspirations to move away from government 
control over resource allocation. It is, therefore, important to also examine the 
domestic policy factors that influenced the push back against government 
involvement in water allocation. The introduction of the “Think Big” policy 
solidified the government’s commitment to a hydropower dam on the Clutha 
River.25 The government choose to apply for a water allocation for the project under 
 
22 At 69. 
23 WR Derrick Sewell “The Politics of Hydro-Megaprojects: Damming with Faint Praise in 
Australia, New Zealand and British Columbia” (1987) 27 NRJ 497 at 498 states “The desire to 
create “mega-projects” was greater in situations where there is a perception of abundant 
resources coupled with an intention to develop those resources for economic benefit”. 
24 See Geoffrey Palmer “The Resource Management Act-How we got it and what changes are 
being made to it” Address to Resource Management Law Association Devon Hotel, New 
Plymouth 27 September 2013 for a first-hand account of the Parliamentary Debate and public 
opposition to empowering legislation. 
25 For a discussion of the investigations into hydro-power development in the Clutha Valley see 
Environmental Defence Society Incorporated v National Water and Soil Conservation Authority 
(1979) 7 NZTPA 385; P A Memon “Decision making for multiple utilization of water resources 
in New Zealand” (1989) 13 Environmental Management 553 at 555 stated that there was an 
assumption that demand for power would grow and the New Zealand Electricity Department 
began to consider the potential for a hydroelectric dam in the Clutha valley in 1963. The 
Department investigations “established in the minds of the officials involved the relative 
superiority, from a financial perspective, of the upper Clutha compared with other rivers and oil- 
or nuclear-fired thermal plants.” 
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the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 instead of using provisions in section 
23(7) of  the Act that would have provided the government with a clearer path to 
the water allocation by declaring that the project involved water of “national 
importance”. Initially, the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority granted 
water rights for the Clyde Dam.26  
However, on appeal, the High Court reversed the decision as the National Water 
and Soil Conservation Authority had erred in their decision. The Authority should 
have taken into account the end use of the electricity which had changed from the 
original proposal. Nevertheless, Parliament passed the Clutha Development (Clyde 
Dam) Empowering Act 1982 to obtain water rights for the project. From a legal 
perspective, the Act raised serious constitutional issues as Parliament had 
effectively passed legislation “to reverse an adverse decision in proceedings to 
which itself was a party”.27 The use of empowering legislation raised constitutional 
issues as the government sought to regain control of water allocation. The public 
reaction was to push back against the use of empowering legislation, leading to its 
becoming a campaign issue during the 1984 general election.  
 
 The Resource Management Law Reform Project 
In 1984, Labour won the general election and embarked upon extensive social, 
economic and environmental reform.28 Labour’s environmental law reform policy, 
the Resource Management Law Reform Project, was supported by environmental 
groups wary of central government involvement in natural resource planning.29 In 
 
26 Annan v National Water & Soil Conservation Authority & Minister of Energy (No2) (1982) 8 
NZTPA 369. The final recommendation of the Otago Catchment Board was for a low dam, not a 
high dam as desired by the government.  
27 FM Brookfield “High Courts, High Dam, High Policy: the Clutha River and the Constitution” 
(1983) New Zealand Recent Law 62 at 64; see also Wheen above n 19 for a discussion of the 
“Save Lake Manapouri Campaign”. 
28 Jane Kelsey The New Zealand Experiment: A World Model for Structural Adjustment (Auckland 
University Press with Bridget Williams Books, Auckland, 1995) at 2. 
29 Jon Barnett and Jonathan Pauling “The Environmental Effects of New Zealand’s Free-Market 
Reforms” (2005) 7(2) Environ Dev Sustain. 271. 
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the context of deregulation, the principle of sustainability was a check and balance 
on the exercise of power in managing natural resources.30 Early commentary on the 
RMA and water allocation predicted a “greener” approach for water law under the 
RMA, including the expectation that water allocation decisions would involve more 
substantive analysis.31 However, these predictions did not take into account the 
long-term effect of the features of the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 
disestablished during the RMLR. The next section describes these features.  
 
 The Abolition of the National Water and Soil Conservation 
Authority and Water Allocation Council 
During the 1980s’ reforms, the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority 
was disestablished. Its previous role of resolving conflicts was handed over to local 
water boards.32 There was a requirement for the Authority to act in the “public 
interest” and to take leadership when guiding the settlement of competing demands 
for water.33 The Authority was to “promote the adequacy of natural water at all 
times”34 in addition to its role of educating the public about the efficient use of 
water supplies35 and being an advisory body for local authorities.36 It is fair to say 
that the Authority represented an independent voice in water management matters. 
It was responsible for having oversight over all water resources, regardless of how 
the various government departments had developed water policy within their areas. 
Upon its abolition, there was no precise equivalent of a national water authority in 
 
30 Upton, “Stace Hammond Grace Lecture: Purpose and Principle in the Resource Management 
Act”, above n 1 at 17; Miller above n 1; Geoffrey Palmer Environmental Politics. A Greenprint 
for New Zealand, above n 1. 
31 Wheen “The Resource Management Act 1991: A Greener Law for Water”, above n 2. 
32 (24 February 1988) 486 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 2217. Speaker Dr Bill Sutton. 
33 Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, s 14(4)(b) To supervise and guide, as to it seems best in 
the public interest, the settlement of competing demands in respect of natural water: 
34 Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, s 14(4)(c). 
35 Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, s 14(4)(i). 
36 Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, s 14(4 (t) To advise public authorities and public bodies 
for the purpose of co-ordinating the policies and activities of any such authorities and bodies in 
respect of the maintenance or improvement of the quality of natural water. 
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New Zealand. The Authority did have the ability to delegate its function relating to 
water allocation to the Water Allocation Council. But the Water Allocation Council 
was also a statutory body set up under the Act and it was disestablished at the same 
time. 
 
 The Ministry of Works and Development and the New 
Zealand Electricity Department’s Role in Water Policy 
The Ministry of Works and Development was responsible for a wide range of 
infrastructure development within New Zealand, including irrigation schemes and 
electricity generation. The Ministry constructed and operated government irrigation 
schemes by investing $700 million from 1912 to 1987. 37  The rationale for 
constructing irrigation schemes during this era was “similar to that of the United 
States of America and Australia” in that it took the view that long-term investment 
in irrigation would be unattractive to private investors.38  
The Ministry of Works and Development was abolished in 1988 because its role as 
a developer did not fit with the economic deregulation that was occurring during 
the 1980s. As stated above, government control over the economy was strongly 
contested at this time. Given that the Ministry had clearly been influential in guiding 
the use of water allocation in large scale projects in the past, its abolition raised the 
question of how its functions would be reallocated across other government 
departments. From an analysis of policy influencing the change it is apparent that 
deregulation policy guided the reallocation of the Ministry’s functions as New 
Zealand moved from a “pioneering phase” in its development to a “service 
economy”.39 While the achievements of the Ministry’s programme of infrastructure 
 
37 Peter Farley Irrigation Scheming. A History of Government Irrigation in New Zealand, (Peter 
Farley, Waikanae, 2013) at 51 citing Audit Office, Report on Ministry of Works and 
Development Irrigation Schemes April 1987 (Audit Office, Wellington, 1987). 
38 Peter Farley and Benjamin M Simon “Privatizing Government Irrigation Projects in New 
Zealand” (1996) 32(3) J. Am. Water Res. Assoc. 585 at 586.  
39 (24 February 1988) 486 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 2219 Speaker Ken Shirley.  
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development were significant the government control over development was no 
longer seen as progressive economic policy. The Ministry had played an important 
role in developing water infrastructure for irrigation and hydropower the effect of 
its abolition on water resource is critically evaluated next.  
 
 The Split of Water Policy – Water for Irrigation  
Upon the abolition of the Ministry of Works and Development in 1988, 
responsibility for water policy was divided up amongst other government 
departments. This reallocation of responsibility for water allocation was based on 
the grounds of the function of water in the economy. As a result of this economic 
categorisation, the responsibility for water for irrigation was split off from water 
for the environment. Consequently, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
became responsible for managing water for irrigation:40 
Part XIX of the Public Works Act relates to irrigation. The proposal is to 
transfer irrigation to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Irrigation 
requirements are vital to the economy and are still based on the land and 
pastoral and horticultural production. The expertise lies with the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries and it is only sensible that irrigation…which is as 
much part of production as fertilisation, and any other aspect of horticulture 
and agriculture…should come within the one umbrella organisation, rather 
than be fragmented as has often been the case in the past. 
As a result of these institutional changes, irrigation policy development was 
separated from all other forms of water with the separation of irrigation water being 
an economic split, not an environmental one. The separation of water for irrigation 
from other water was the beginning of the fracturing of New Zealand water policy 
development. Nevertheless, the separation of water for irrigation still did not 
address issues that irrigators were concerned about. These issues related to water 
allocation within schemes and irrigation scheme operation to improve water 
transfers.41  
 
40 (24 February 1988) 486 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 2219 Speaker Ken Shirley.  




 The Irrigation Schemes Act 1990 and Government Divestment 
from Irrigation Schemes 
In 1990, further significant changes occurred to water allocation law in New 
Zealand with the privatisation of all irrigation schemes. The Irrigation Schemes Act 
1990 provided the government with the right to sell irrigation schemes to “to any 
person, including any local authority or other public or statutory body”. In this 
sense, New Zealand was an “unusual” example where the government passed 
specific laws allowing it to completely privatise and sell all assets in an irrigation 
scheme. 42  To sell the schemes to farmers, the government needed to address 
“significant liabilities” attached to “many” of the schemes regarding ongoing 
maintenance. The government determined that “for some schemes the liabilities are 
so large that we will be making substantial payments to the new owners”.43 A 
review of the performance of irrigation schemes in 2013 concluded that farmers 
were better able to manage the schemes than the Ministry of Works and 
Development.44  
Government investment in irrigation schemes was heavily criticised.45 The Audit 
Office urged government divestment as necessary to mitigate and avoid the cost of 
future maintenance work associated with irrigation scheme infrastructure. Both 
Labour and National supported the rationale for passing the Irrigation Schemes Act 
1990 and accepted that state divestment would bring benefits for both taxpayers and 
irrigators:46 
The irrigators were seen as the party with the strongest incentives to improve 
the efficiency of the operation of the schemes, and to make appropriate 
decisions on future investments. By selling the schemes to the users, not only 
 
42 Peter J Farley Short Report Series on Locally Managed Irrigation Report No.2. Privatization of 
Irrigation Schemes in New Zealand (International Irrigation Management Institute, 1994).  
43 Above.  
44 Farley, above n 50. 
45 (28 June 1990) 508, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, Speaker Hon. Clive Mathewson 
(Associate Minister for State Owned Enterprises). 
46 (28 June 1990) 508, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 2510 Speaker Hon Clive Mathewson 
(Associate Minister for State Owned Enterprises). 
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will a substantial burden be removed from taxpayers but also several benefits 
will accrue to the users. For the first time they will have full responsibility 
and accountability for the operation and future of the scheme, and debt levels 
will be reduced. They will make their own decision on the timing and level 
of future investments.  
 
The Maniototo irrigation scheme provides an example which illustrates the lack of 
efficiency in government-owned irrigation schemes. According to its supporters, 
the Maniototo scheme was to “bring progress and prosperity to a large area”.47 
However, Treasury questioned the reliability of cost estimates used in promoting 
the scheme to farmers and stated that the project appeared to be uneconomic based 
on their own analysis. 48  Despite this concern the Ministry of Works and 
Development insisted on continuing with the scheme and “decided that the 
increased stock-carrying capacity of the land would encourage growth in rural 
communities.”49 The Ministry believed that land use change and intensification 
would solve the problem of increased water costs. The Ministry’s perspective was 
challenged when in August 1983 the actual project cost was revealed to be much 
higher than initial estimates at $43.9 million, with a full cost for water charges at 
$143 per irrigated hectare.50 The problem was that most farmers could only afford 
to pay a maximum of $40 per irrigated hectare. The large gap between actual the 
actual project cost and what farmer could afford led to the demise of the project and 
the scheme was stopped. When the scheme ended those farmers who had already 
committed to joining it were compensated $1.5 million. Eventually, farmers then 
completed the scheme at the cost of $1.75 million, which was much lower than it 
would have cost to complete the scheme as a government project.51 The example of 
the Maniototo irrigation scheme supported the proposition for the privatisation of 
 
47 Otago Daily Times, (27 October 1976) original reproduced in Farley, above n 45 at 1.  
48 G Watson “Ministerial Responsibility and the Maniototo Irrigation Scheme” (1985) 6(1) Otago 
L. Rev. 158-74.  
49 Above.  
50 Above. 
51 Farley, above n 50 at 3. 
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all irrigation schemes, showing that farmers could run the schemes with greater 
efficiency than the government. 
A regulation which privatised government irrigation water schemes could also have 
gone further so as to detail the transfer of water permits within a scheme and provide 
greater certainty for irrigators in terms of their basic rights.52 Moreover, although 
within irrigation schemes water markets may have existed in a limited form, the 
account of water markets has been mostly left out of the literature of New Zealand 
water law, as this literature tends to focus on sustainability and the implementation 
of the RMA.53 
 
 
 New Zealand Political Context and the Resource Management 
Law Reform Project of the 1980s 
The New Zealand political and economic context is important in terms of 
understanding the enactment of the RMA and its inclusion of sustainability 
principles.54 Sustainability was a concept that was internationally prominent at the 
time when New Zealand was undertaking extensive environmental reform. During 
the 1980s, two independent reports identified shortfalls in New Zealand’s 
environmental administration. These reports were significant to environmental 
politics of the time because they brought attention to the ongoing issues associated 
with the government’s having a high degree of control over natural resource 
allocation. The first report was an international report by the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the second was a report 
published by the Nature Conservation Council based in New Zealand. The OECD 
 
52 Irrigation Schemes Act 1990. 
53 Miller, above n 1; Palmer, above n 1; Wheen, above n 2. 
54 Miller, above n 1; Geoffrey Palmer Environmental Politics. A Greenprint for New Zealand, 
above n 1at 19 notes the political context of the RMA is an important part of understanding the 
main policy drivers of the legislation: “As such it is impossible to understand the RMA without 
understanding the reform context from which it emerged”. 
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report identified the lack of an independent body to audit the environmental 
functions of the government. 55  The New Zealand government had become 
increasingly active in controlling environmental decision making. Initially, the 
OECD report’s concerns were not acted upon by the incumbent National 
government.56 Then, during the 1984 election, Labour listened to public concern 
about government control of resource allocation by campaigning for a change to 
environmental law amongst other notable policies. 57  In particular, Labour’s 
promise to repeal the National Development Act 1979 influenced the mood for 
widespread environmental reform.58  
The National Development Act was designed to provide a fast track and 
normal procedures would be suspended. The Labour Party in Opposition 
promised to repeal it, and this was done in 1986. Having accomplished the 
repeal we were faced still with the policy problem of what to put in its place-
how to make sense of the many statutes and procedures governing the 
issuing of consents. 
Upon winning the general election, Labour “acted quickly to ensure that these 
promises [to abolish the National Development Act 1979 and other empowering 
legislation] were upheld”.59 However, as pointed out in the quote above, a type of 
policy vacuum emerged in its place. The subsequent speed and extent of reform 
was notable as an extensive reform process was undertaken not just in 
environmental law but also in economic policy. This level of law reform was not 
something that had not been signalled during election campaigning. In essence, 
there was a dramatic shift regarding allocating natural resources, underpinned by 
 
55 OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Environmental policies in 
New Zealand: a review / by the OECD and its Environment Committee; undertaken in 1980 at 
the request of the Government of New Zealand. (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, Paris, 1981). 
56 Lloyd Burton and Chris Cocklin “Water Resource Management and Environmental Policy 
Reform in New Zealand: Regionalism, Allocation, and Indigenous Relations.” (1996) CJLP at 
81. 
57 The fourth Labour government committed New Zealand to a nuclear free zone as a signatory of 
the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty 1985 and New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, 
Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987. 
58 Geoffrey Palmer “The Resource Management Act-How we got it and what changes are being 
made to it” (paper presented to Address to Resource Management Law Association 27 
September 2013, New Plymouth, 2013). 
59 Burton and Cocklin above n 69 at 81. 
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the strong public desire that the government refrained from acting in many policy 
areas.  
The reforms of the fourth Labour government made changes to the economic and 
social structures of New Zealand. These wide-ranging free-market reforms were 
seen as somewhat of an experiment by political observers:60  
Export and domestic subsidies were eliminated. Import licences were 
abolished and dramatic tariff reductions imposed. The Closer Economic 
Relations (DER) free trade agreement with Australia, first signed in 1983, 
was expanded. Both Labour and National governments urged other members 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to open up their 
economies and create a level playing-field of free trade…New laws for 
business competition dispensed with considerations of employment and 
consumer well-being and focused on competitive efficiency within the 
deregulated marketplace.  
There was a definite shift away from central government involvement in economic 
policies, a move which had a broader effect on the economic and social well-being 
of New Zealanders.  
As we have seen, there is no doubt that the free market reforms affected New 
Zealand’s environmental policy during the 1980s.61 The changes to environmental 
policy occurred in the context of deregulation. The state sector was in the process 
of stepping back from its extensive control of many policy areas, including resource 
allocation. There was support from both environmentalists and the business sector 
for a devolution of power to the regions. Environmental groups were wary of central 
government involvement in natural resource planning and considered a devolution 
of power to regional levels as a means to address excessive government control. On 
the other hand, those supporting economic deregulation considered that the power 
of the market was enough to fulfil the allocative function that the government had 
exercised. Deregulation and removing government involvement from 
environmental decision making was a strong point that had the support of 
 
60 Kelsey, The New Zealand Experiment. A World Model for Structural Adjustment, above n 37, 
at 2. 
61 Above; and Barnett and Pauling, “The Environmental Effect of New Zealand’s Free-Market 
Reforms” above n 42.  
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developers and environmentalists alike, however, there was some concern that the 
reforms may have been skewed in favour of developers:62  
The “New Right” reforms, including the Resource Management Act, were 
primarily intended to facilitate “efficient” development driven by market 
forces and do not guarantee sufficient environmental protection. Rather, 
they have shifted the battleground from the national level (notably between 
the government and environmentalists) to the local government level and, 
especially, the Environment Court. In the latter arenas, the playing field 
tends to be tilted in favour of development interests, possibly even more so 
than at the national level. 
Under the RMA, government control over resource allocation would be replaced 
by market-based allocation, while the inclusion of sustainability objectives ensured 
the protection of natural resources.  
. 
The Bill was introduced to Parliament on 5 December 1989 by Rt Hon Geoffrey 
Palmer, Minister for the Environment. He stated that the objectives of the Bill were 
to introduce a system that “will promote sustainable management of natural and 
physical resources, and with that will provide for considerable greater efficiency in 
the planning and consent processes”.63 He made specific reference to water and the 
fact that water management would be subject to regional planning. 64  These 
references to water show that at the early stages of the Bill water was a key 
consideration. 
Labour, however, was not able to pass the Resource Management Bill 1989 before 
the 1990 General Election. The defeat of Labour and the delay in passing the Bill 
 
62 Ton Bührs and Peter Christoff “Greening the Antipodes? Environmental policy and politics in 
Australia and New Zealand” (2006) 41 AJPS at 236. 
63 (5 December 1989) 503 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates 14166 Speaker Rt Hon Geoffrey 
Palmer.  




allowed pressure groups an opportunity to provide more input into the creation of 
the Bill.65 
Because of the lack of time and internal dissention within its ranks during 
the final days in office in 1990, Labour was unable to pass the RMA. The 
Business Roundtable and the Maruia Society (an environmental group) 
appear to have influenced to a very significant extent the approach of the 
incoming National government to the bill. 
Pressure groups played an influential role in the creation of the RMA and the 
inclusion of sustainability.66 Their role at the Select Committee stage of public 
consultation was “clearly most dominant”. 67  The submission from the Mariua 
Society emphasised the need to include sustainable development as a concept that 
should be “paramount” in the Bill. 68  
 
Sustainable management of resources became the guiding principle of the RMA.69 
and an increasing awareness of environmental issues was also being promoted by 
the United Nations around the same time.70 In 1987, the concept of “sustainable 
 
65 P Memon and B Gleeson “Towards a New Planning Paradigm? Reflections on New Zealand’s 
Resource Management Act” (1995) 22 Environment and Planning B: Environment and Design 
109 at 115.  
66 At 116. Two members of the Society attended and reported back on the proceedings of the 
Canadian Institute of Resources Law Conference held in Ottawa during May 1989. The 
submission from the Mariua Society emphasised the need to include sustainable development as 
a concept that should be ‘paramount’ in the Bill. 
67 At 116. The Mariua Society was comprised of the former Native Forests Action Committee and 
the Environmental Defence Society. 
68 Constance D Hunt, Peter A Bobeff and Kenneth A Palmer “Legal Issues arsing from the 
Principle of Sustainable Development: Australia, Canada and New Zealand” (1991) 9 (1) JERL 
1. 
69 Bret C Birdsong “Adjudicating Sustainability. New Zealand's Environment Court and the 
Resource Management Act” (2002) 29(1) Ecology L. Q. 1. 
70 World Commission on Environment and Development Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development: Our Common Future (United Nations, Oslo,1987); see also 
Nicholas A Robinson “Origins and Implications of “sustainable development” in International 
Law” in Trevor Daya-Winterbottom (ed) Frontiers of Resource Management Law (Wellington, 
Brookers Ltd, 2012) at 71 for a discussion of the development of the World Charter for Nature as 
part of United Nation and International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources (IUCN) initiatives; for a discussion on other international instruments relating to the 
64 
 
development” gained international attention with the publication of the Brundtland 
Report, “Our Common Future”, which recognised the deteriorating state of the 
natural resources while emphasising the public nature of these global commons.71 
The Brundtland Report advanced the notion of “sustainable development” to 
address the scarcity of natural resources. The Brundtland Report stated that 
sustainable development is “development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”.72 
This concept of sustainable development envisioned the need to manage natural 
resources, so they remain available for future generations.  
Upon the enactment of the RMA, New Zealand became one of the first countries to 
implement sustainable management of natural resources in domestic law.73 Part II 
of the Act contains provisions relating to the overall purpose of the Act and its 
commitment to “sustainable management” and draws on the intergenerational 
aspects of the Brundtland definition in s5(2)(a): 
Section 5 
(1)  The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable management 
of natural and physical resources. 
(2)  In this Act, sustainable management means managing the use, 
development, and protection of natural and physical resources in a way, or 
at a rate, which enables  people and communities to provide for their social, 
economic, and cultural wellbeing and for their health and safety while— 
(a)  Sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding 
minerals) to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; 
and 
(b) Safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and 
ecosystems; and 
(c) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any  adverse effects of 
activities on the environment. 
 
concept of sustainability, see Peter Salmon and David Grinlinton (eds) Environmental Law in 
New Zealand (Thompson Reuters, Wellington, 2015) at 81-91. 
71 World Commission on Environment and Development, above n 82. 
   While the Commission did not “coin the term” it had a higher public profile than earlier work 
undertaken by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature; See Hunt,. Bobeff and 
Palmer, above n 77 at 2. 
72 World Commission on Environment and Development, above n 79 at 41. This extensive report 
documents the issues facing the world with regards to the effects of economic development and 
how to balance these with environmental degradation.  




The introduction of sustainability into New Zealand environmental law occurred in 
a particular political context, that of deregulation, and it influenced the 
interpretation and application of sustainability in the RMA. As has been shown 
earlier, during the 1980s the New Zealand public had reacted against extensive 
government control of natural resource development and allocation. During 
subsequent changes to environmental law public pressure groups were 
consequently instrumental in advocating for the inclusion of sustainability in 
environmental law reform.  
 
In light of the extensive nature of environmental law reform undertaken during the 
1980s the question of whether water markets were considered for water allocation 
is a pertinent one, particularly with regard to the context of environmental law 
reform in a country moving quickly towards a deregulated economy. There is 
evidence that water markets were considered to be of importance in the lead up to 
the RMA. The National government commissioned its report, chaired by Anthony 
Randerson (Randerson Report), upon coming into office following the 1990 general 
election.74 The report considered the “effect of the Bill” and whether it provided for 
the introduction of “economic instruments” for future resource management. The 
Randerson Report identified “water allocation” as being an area where economic 
instruments were of “particular importance”. 75  It stated that key issues to be 
considered in a transferable water rights system included setting minimum flows 
for quality of water; maintaining instream flow for uses such as conservation and 
equity issues for groups who “currently hold no rights whatsoever; security of 
tenure and marketability”.76 The Randerson Report stated that these issues were of 
 
74 The Review was announced on 16 November 1990 by the Minister for the Environment. The   
Review was published on 11 February 1991. Anthony Randerson and others Report of the 
Review Group on the Resource Management Bill (Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 
1991).  
75 At 95. 
76 At 96. 
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such “magnitude” that they could not be resolved within their review timeframe. 
Instead, the group recommended that “the issue [of economic instruments for water 
transfer] warrants full consideration at an early stage”.77 Despite this statement, 
these concerns were not acted upon and market instruments are not a part of water 
allocation under the RMA. 
 
 
Expectations of improved resource management outcomes were influenced by 
broad policy statements on the interpretation and application of Part II’s 
commitment to “sustainable management”. 78  However, one of the factors 
contributing to water allocation issues in New Zealand is that inadequate regulatory 
settings have hampered these expectations. Originally, resource allocation under 
the RMA was thought to be “permissive” and would work by limiting negative 
environmental effects.79 However, these predictions were made before the “first 
come, first served” rule took precedence for determining competing claims for 
water. Once Fleetwing Farms v Marlborough District Council was decided in 1997 
it was firmly established that substantive analysis of competing applications for 
water would not be undertaken.  
Later observations of the Act and the effect of the “first come, first served” rule for 
determining the priority of water allocation applications did not support the earlier 
optimistic view. Peart’s comparison of New Zealand’s situation with that in South 
Africa identified that “there are serious conflicts” with regard to how to allocate 
water across competing applicants in the regional planning processes.80 Barnett and 
 
77 At 96. 
78 Upton, above n 1. 
79 At 400.  
80 Raewyn Peart “Innovative approaches to water resource management: a comparison of the New 
Zealand and South African approaches” (2001) 5 NZJEL 127 at 132. 
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Pauling linked the RMA reforms to the context of economic deregulation and the 
effect of these reforms on the environment. They identified an “inadequate 
implementation of reformed environmental legislation”, which led to a negative 
effect on the environment combined with a growth in the dairy industry.81 The 
growth of the dairy industry increased demand for water for irrigation. Furthermore, 
the lack of a national policy statement created a gap in national policy guidance at 
the highest level. These factors will be detailed further in Chapter three of the thesis 
in order to show that New Zealand embarked upon a path of over-allocation 
following the enactment of the RMA.  
The RMA replaced the water management and allocation functions that had 
previously existed under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967. While the 
RMA’s water allocation provisions included rights under s14 to ensure access to 
individuals for domestic water without the need for a consent, those requiring a 
consent would be subject to rules according to a hierarchy of planning instruments. 
National policy statements would guide the planning instruments and the first 
National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management was issued in 2011.82  
 
 Summary 
This chapter introduced the background to the thesis. It addressed relevant 
developments in New Zealand water allocation and changing public perceptions of 
government control over water. Water allocation under the Water and Soil 
Conservation Act 1967 incorporated tests relating to the wise use of water before 
approving water permits. New Zealand also had a national Water and Soil 
Conservation Authority that had the power to decide on water permit applications. 
The repeal of this Act and subsequent enactment of the RMA occurred in the 
context of improving economic performance in a free-market economy. However, 
 
81 Barnett and Pauling, “The Environmental Effect of New Zealand’s Free-Market Reforms” above 
n 42 at 285. 
82 The second National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management was issued in 2014 and 
revised in 2017. 
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current water allocation problems stem from the change to water allocation under 
the RMA. In fact, it demonstrates that the situation would have been better if the 
Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 had not been repealed. The significance of 
the policy gap under the RMA is examined in the next chapter to show its impact 
on current water allocation problems in New Zealand. 
69 
 
CHAPTER FOUR- THE WATER ALLOCATION POLICY 
GAP IN NEW ZEALAND 1991-2011 
 Introduction  
This chapter evaluates the New Zealand water allocation framework under the 
RMA.1 The purpose of the RMA is to allocate natural resources, including water, 
based on a tiered hierarchy of policies and plans at the national and regional level.2 
At the top of the hierarchy, central government was “expected”, but not obliged, to 
prepare national policies in the form of National Policy Statements.3 However, a 
National Policy Statement for freshwater management was not prepared until 
2011.4 The lack of a National Policy Statement resulted in what can be termed a 
water allocation “policy gap” that existed from 1991, the date the RMA was 
enacted, to 2011. In addition, the policy gap was exacerbated because, at the local 
government levels of the framework, the regional councils responsible for regional 
plans—and who relied on the provisions of the RMA when embarking upon water 
allocation planning—either did not prepare them or failed to provide adequate 
 
1 For the purpose of this thesis the RMA does not have a water allocation framework stated in the 
traditional sense. The reference to the framework encapsulates the collective water policies and 
plans that were meant to be prepared following the provisions within the RMA. It has been 
described as both a “framework” and an “umbrella” statute. See Ceri Warnock and Maree 
Galloway Focus on Resource Management Law (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2015) at 145. 
2 Resource Management Act 1991, Part 4 of the Act states the “Functions, powers and duties of 
central and local government”. 
3 David Grinlinton “Legitimate planning guidance or potential constitutional vandalism? National 
Policy Statements after King Salmon.” (2015) 11 BRMB 83 at 83. 




guidance on water allocation.5 These policy gaps at both the national and regional 
level form the context for water allocation in New Zealand under the RMA. 6  
As a consequence of the failure to implement a comprehensive water allocation 
policy the “first come, first served” method of water has become the default method 
for competing water permit applications. 7  However, as will be shown in this 
chapter, a problem with the “first come, first served” method of water allocation is 
that it is inherently unsustainable in that it gives “preference to current rather than 
potential users” of water.8 In addition, despite the development of a national policy 
for water allocation in 2011, the “first come, first served” method continues to apply 
when determining priority between competing water permit applications.9  
This chapter introduces the national water policy gap, how it originated and its 
consequences for water allocation in New Zealand from 1991 until 2011. It 
describes how some regions reached water allocation limits and details the absence 
of long-term hydrological data. The chapter then provides an account of the water 
allocation provisions and case law under the RMA. It includes an account of 
relevant water allocation rules and policies in regional plans and the application of 
the “first come, first served” rule.10 
 
5 Establishing Regional Plans is one of the “functions” of regional councils under section 30 of the 
RMA. A key distinction in the New Zealand context is that a “function” does not confer a legal 
obligation to create the Regional Plan. District plans must have regard to regional policy and not 
be inconsistent with national policy statements. See Resource Management Act s 73(4). 
   Christina Robb Water Allocation a Strategic Overview (Ministry for the Environment, 
Wellington, 2001) at 12 states the weakness of regional plans as follows: Regional plans did not 
exist in all regions, if a regional plan was prepared they “varied “considerably in their form and 
scope”, that the values and objectives in regional plans are “unclear”, that there was a lack of 
“linkages between objectives, polices and methods”, monitoring issues were “often not 
addressed and that the regional plans focus more on the regulatory aspects of resource consent 
decision making. 
6 Robb, above at 12. 
7 Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council [1997] 3 NZLR 257 (CA). An evaluation 
of the development of the “first come, first served” precedent is provided later in this chapter. 
8 Robb, above n 5, at 9. 
9 National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management 2011. Revised in 2014 and reviewed in 
2017. 




 Water Policy - A Gap in National Guidance on Water 
Allocation Policies   
Water allocation limits in New Zealand are set by regional councils within regional 
plans under section 30 of the RMA.11 Section2 of the RMA defines water as “water 
in all its physical forms” including fresh water. Surface water allocation from rivers 
and lakes is based on environmental flow regimes which determine how much 
water can be allocated. The amount of water in a water body that can be allocated 
for take or use is also referred to as the allocable flow. 12  The setting of 
environmental flows involves the consideration of several factors under the RMA:13 
Decisions on the setting of environmental flows and water levels 
involve consideration of natural, community and development values 
associated with a water body and how these relate to flow and/or level. 
Environmental flow decisions determine how much water will stay in 
a water body, but that decision is influenced by existing and potential 
demands for water. Decisions are made within the framework of the 
RMA, national and regional policy statements, and the objectives and 
policies of relevant regional plans. 
Setting minimum flows relies upon information about the volume of water 
abstracted and monitoring data enables regional councils to predict how a 
 
11 Ministry for the Environment Water Programme of Action. Water Allocation and Use Technical 
Working Paper June 2004 (Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 2004) at 6.  
12 Brisbane Declaration “The Brisbane Declaration: Environmental Flows Are Essential for 
Freshwater Ecosystem Health and Human Well-Being” (2007) Declaration of the 10th 
International River Symposium and International Environmental Flows Conference, 3–6 
September 2007, Brisbane, Australia defined “Environmental Flows” as “the quantity, timing, 
and quality of water flows required to sustain freshwater and estuarine ecosystems and the 
human livelihoods and well-being that depend on these ecosystems”. 
13 In Ministry for the Environment Proposed National Environmental Standard on Ecological 
Flows and Water Levels (Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 2008) at 7 the term 
“environmental flow” is used as an alternative to “minimum flow” to recognise the range of 
“values” that contribute to setting of environmental flows. 
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catchment may respond to changes in abstraction.14 This information is then used 
to set allocation limits.  
Government policy documents on water allocation during the 2000s focused on 
how to manage increasing demand for water.15 Full allocation and over-allocation 
were recognised as issues in specific regions.16 Consultation on the Sustainable 
Water Programme of Action (SWOPA) identified problems with the setting of 
environmental flows such as not all water bodies having environmental flow 
limits.17 
The Sustainable Water Programme of Action (SWOPA) was a policy initiative to 
address the policy gap at the national level.18 It was one of four “priority work areas 
 
14 See Ministry for the Environment, above for the effect on surface water allocation. For the 
specific effect on groundwater abstraction and the monitoring of bores see AD Fenemor and CA 
Robb “Groundwater Management in New Zealand in MR Rosen and PA White (eds) 
Groundwaters of New Zealand (New Zealand Hydrological Society Inc., Wellington, 2001) 273 
at 279.  
15 Ministry for the Environment and Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Wai Ora: Report of the 
Sustainable Water Programme of Action Consultation Hui (Ministry for the Environment, 
Wellington, 2005) at 2 provides the background to the policy process for the Sustainable Water 
Programme of Action which was established in 2003 as the start of a process of public 
consultation and “creating partnerships between central government, local government, Maori, 
communities and key stakeholders”. A series of meetings were held as part of the public 
consultations process. The Wai Ora report was a collation of the minutes from the consultation 
meetings or “hui”.  
   Ministry for the Environment “Sustainable Water Program of Action – An Implementation 
Package” (n.d.) <www.mfe.govt.nz/more/cabinet-papers-and-related-material-search/cabinet-
papers/freshwater/sustainable-water-0> discussed the need to address the growing demand for 
water; Cabinet Paper “Regulatory impact statement for draft National Environmental Standard 
on Measuring Water Takes” (February 2008) CAB POL (08) 16 states the “overarching policy 
objective, of the Sustainable Water Programme of Action was to “provide for increasing 
demands on water resources and encourage efficient water management”.  
16 Lincoln Environmental Information on Water Allocation in New Zealand Report No 4375/1 
(Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 2000) at 35. 
17 Ministry for the Environment above n 13 at 15-17 identified the problems with environmental 
flow setting as “3.1.1 Resource consent decisions are being made on water bodies for which 
there is no environmental flow or water level in place”; “3.1.2 Existing environmental flows and 
water levels do not always clearly define the available water” and “3.1.3 Existing process for 
setting ecological flows for water levels is costly and contentious”. 
18 The SWOPA was released in 2004 with “extensive discussion” in 2005. Cabinet Paper Appendix 
1 Background on Sustainable Water Program of Action in New Start for Freshwater (n.d.). 
   Other initiatives to improve water quality included The Dairying and Clean Streams Accord 
2003; see Fonterra Co-operative Group, Local Government New Zealand, Ministry for the 
Environment and Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry Dairying and Clean Streams Accord 
(Ministry for the Environment, Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington, 2003). 
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under the Sustainable Programme of Action” introduced by the Labour-led 
government in 2003.19 In order to fully understand the national policy gap the 
purpose of the SWOPA was to investigate “some of the constraints of the current 
first in, first served system, particularly in situations where there is significant 
tension between competing uses and values for water”.20 The SWOPA Cabinet 
papers stated the “first come, first served” water allocation method was appropriate 
for regions where “security of supply was not affected”.21 On the other hand, it 
stated water scare areas experienced problems associated with the “first come, first 
served” method of water allocation, which was described as follows. 22  First, 
regional councils were constrained by the “first come, first served” rule even at 
times where there was a “goldrush” of applications for water. Second, applicants 
for water allocation applied for their water permits before water was needed in order 
to secure supply. Third, the rule did not include a reasonable water use requirement. 
Fourth, once water was allocated, there were limited means or provisions to transfer 
the allocation to another use for the duration of the consent. Finally, SWOPA was 
also intended to investigate whether water permits should be unbundled and 
consider the introduction of water pricing.23 The objective of the SWOPA included 
the development of “national direction” in the form of a:24  
• National Policy Statement on managing increasing demands for 
water;  
• National Environmental Standard for methods and devices for 
measuring water takes and use  
• National Environmental Standard on methods for establishing water 
flows. 
 
19 Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet Sustainable Development for New Zealand 
Programme of Action (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Wellington, 2003) at 3 stated 
the priority work areas were Quality and Allocation of Freshwater, Energy, Sustainable Cities 
and Investing in Child and Youth Development. 
20 Cabinet Paper Appendix 1 Background on Sustainable Water Program of Action in New Start 
for Freshwater (n.d.) at 5. 
21 Above at 28.  
22 Above at 28. The following points are a summary of points raised at 28. 
23 Above. 
24 Ministry for the Environment, Minister of Agriculture Sustainable Water Programme of Action 
– Implementation Package above n 15. The term “national direction” is used to describe the 
formation of National Policy Statements, National Environmental Standards and New Zealand 
Coastal Policy Statements in Resource Management Act 1991, Part 5, Subpart 1. In 2017, the 
RMA was amended to include National Planning Standards to “national direction” instruments. 
These statutory provisions for “national direction” are discussed below in this chapter. 
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SWOPA policy initiatives from 2003 until 2008 identified “gaps in current policy” 
and were only able to develop some “soft options” in the form of policy advice to 
regional councils.25 The SWOPA “failed”26 as it was unsuccessful in implementing 
a National Policy Statement for Freshwater or a National Environmental Standard 
for establishing water flows.27 A proposed National Environmental Standard for 
setting environmental flows was notified in 2008 but did not proceed further 
towards implemented. 28  The RMA does not include legal consequences for 
governments or government departments that fail to prepare national direction. 
Effectively the SWOPA failed to be implemented because of a change of 
government in 2008, when the National party won the 2008 general election and 
 
25 Rick M Fisher and Shona Russell “Water Policy and Regulatory Reform in New Zealand” 
(2011) 27(2) International Journal of Water Resources Development 387 at 388; and Andrew 
Hayward “Freshwater Management: Water Markets and Novel Pricing Regimes” (2006) 10 
NZJEL 215 at 220 describes the outcome of the SWOPA as providing only “vague” proposals 
26 Gary Taylor “Environmental Policy-Making in New Zealand, 1978-2013” (2013) 9(3) Policy 
Quarterly 18 at 21. 
27 The implementation of national policy was outlined in Ministry for the Environment, Minister of 
Agriculture Sustainable Water Programme of Action – Implementation Package above n 15. 
  The failure of implementation meant that water allocation issues remained unresolved. For 
example, Ministry for the Environment Environmental Stewardship for a Prosperous New 
Zealand. Briefing for Incoming Minister for the Environment November 2008 (Ministry for the 
Environment, Wellington, 2008) at 11 stated “Further economic development will require re-
allocation to higher value uses and/or more water storage and distribution systems to deal with 
variability in when and where water is available”.  
28 Instead, the setting of environmental flows was transferred to “A New Start for Freshwater” 
policy programme introduced in 2008; see Cabinet Paper “Implementing the New Start for Fresh 
Water: Proposed Official’s Work Plan” (n.d.) states: 
  The proposed officials’ work programme consists of 10 priority projects. These have been chosen 
as they are needed either to ensure the Government can respond to the Forum’s proposals or to 
tackle pressing issues with the current management system. Agreement is sought for the ten 
priority projects, which include a mixture of new and partially completed work: 
a) environmental flows and water measuring 
b) water quality limits 
c) proposed National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management 
d) allocation of water to maximise value 
e) over-allocation baseline and possible interim interventions 
f) supporting measures 
g) rural water infrastructure 
h) dependable monitoring and reporting 
i) aligning investment and improving uptake of water research 
j) best practice water governance. 
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appointed the Hon Nick Smith as Minister for the Environment.29 The incoming 
briefing for the Minister stated the problems with water allocation.30 The SWOPA 
lost momentum and instead an agreement was developed between environmental 
groups and non-government organisations interested in water, the Sustainable Land 
Use Forum.31 This Forum secured the support of the newly elected National-led 
government and led to the formation of the Land and Water Forum.32 By this time 
the National-led government had moved on to a new policy programme to address 
the water policy gap, “A New Start for Freshwater”.33 This programme and the 
Land and Water Forum followed the failure of the SWOPA, both are discussed in 
the next chapter. 
 
During the time in which the RMA has been in force, long-term hydrological data 
collection has occurred only irregularly.34 The lack of systematic data collection 
should have been addressed by the implementation of the Resource Management 
(Measurement and Reporting of Water Takes) Regulations 2010. 35  However, 
evidence shows that the implementation of the 2010 Regulations fell short in some 
regions. For example, a lack of monitoring of water takes was reported in the 
 
29 Hon Nick Smith held the Environment portfolio from 2008 until 2012 when he was replaced by 
Amy Adams. New Zealand Parliament “Hon Dr Nick Smith” 
<https://www.parliament.nz/en/mps-and-electorates/members-of-parliament/smith-nick/> 
30 Ministry for the Environment “Environmental Stewardship for a Prosperous New Zealand. 
Briefing for Incoming Minister for the Environment November 2008” (Ministry for the 
Environment, Wellington, 2008) stated that freshwater demand was increasing and further 
attention was needed to address water quality and allocation issues.  
31 Taylor, above n 26. This agreement was reached at the 2008 Environmental Defence Society 
Conference.  
32 Cabinet Paper, above n 28. National won the 2008 general election which ended nine years of 
Labour-led government in New Zealand.  
33 Cabinet Paper New Start for Fresh Water Cabinet Paper (2010) 
34 AD Fenemor, T Davie and S Markham “Hydrological Information in Water Law and Policy: 
New Zealand's Devolved Approach to Water Management” in J Wallace and P Wouters (eds) 
Hydrology and Water Law: Bridging the Gap (IWA Publishing, London, 2006). 
35 Resource Management (Measurement and Reporting of Water Takes) Regulations 2010, s 4 
states that takes above 5 cubic meters per second should be recorded and reported to the regional 
council. Under section 6 water permit holders must keep records of water taken on daily or 
weekly basis that can be consolidated into an annual amount. 
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Canterbury region. This region had the highest number of water take consents 
because the conversion of pastures to dairy farming has increased demand for 
irrigation.36 Lack of data and the absence of monitoring meant that potentially 
millions of litres of water have been taken illegally.37 Mitchell appeared critical of 
the lack of enforcement of water metering rules when he reported that: 38 
Information obtained by the environmental organisation Forest and 
Bird showed 376 serious breaches of water consents in the year to 
July, 2014, with another 23 requiring enforcement action. It said there 
have been cases where streams have run dry and in one case a farmer 
took 31 million litres more water than permitted in a six-week period. 
Other breaches were for either taking water while a river was 
restricted, taking more than the allocated amount, faulty water-
measuring devices or not submitting data to the council. 
A lack of regional council data collection on actual use was confirmed in national 
hydrological data reporting. In their first joint report on freshwater statistics based 
on regional council hydrological data, the Ministry for the Environment and 
Statistics New Zealand 39  reported that, although over half of water allocation 
consents were for irrigation, there was a lack of data on water use. 40  The 
implications of the lack of data collection for water allocation policy and planning 
are that regional councils are hampered by not knowing how much water is taken 
under each consent.  
More recently, New Zealand’s water allocation, and in particular the lack of data 
on water takes, has gained international attention. For example, in its 2015 
environmental performance report on New Zealand, the Organisation for Economic 
 
36 Erwin Corong, Mike Henson and Phil Journeaux Value of Irrigation to New Zealand. Economy-
wide Assessment (NZIER, AgFirst, Wellington, 2014) at 3. 
37 New Zealand Herald “Large-scale water theft in Canterbury – but no prosecutions” New 
Zealand Herald (20 June 2016); Charlie Mitchell “Over the line: Rivers being whittled away” 
www.stuff.co.nz (6 February 2017).  
38 Charlie Mitchell “Millions of litres of water illegally taken: Is Ecan doing enough? NZ Farmer 
(20 June 2016). 
39 Ministry for the Environment & Statistics NZ (2017) New Zealand’s Environmental Reporting 
Series: Our fresh water 2017. (Ministry for the Environment, Statistics New Zealand, 
Wellington, 2017). Prior to 2017 both the Ministry and the Statistics Department published 
separate reports. The Environmental Reporting Act 2015 s 10(1)(c) requires the joint publication 
of a report in specific areas including “the freshwater domain”.  
40 At 59. 
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Co-operation and Development (OECD) pointed out the lack of groundwater 
information stating: “No mapping exercise has been done to identify areas where 
scarcity of groundwater is becoming a problem”.41 The 2017 OECD report also 
raised concerns stating “rising freshwater pollution and scarcity in some areas” was 
one of the environmental challenges faced by New Zealand.42 The 2017 OECD 
report also recommended the use of economic instruments to manage water quantity 
and quality.43 Recommendations relevant to water allocation included: introducing 
“volumetric pricing to recover costs of water management and reflect environment 
impacts…and expand water markets”;44 and “experiment[ation] with natural capital 
accounting to provide a basis for valuing water resources and freshwater 
ecosystems, and quantifying costs and benefits of freshwater policy and 
management decisions”.45  
The points in relation to water markets have also been stated in more recent New 
Zealand policy from the Land and Water Forum, a subject which is discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter. It is important to recognise that introducing water 
markets would require the collection of historical water take information, not just 
information about how much water was consented to be taken. The Resource 
Management (Measurement and Reporting of Water Takes) Regulations 2010, 
therefore, need to be implemented and enforced successfully before water markets 
could be considered for New Zealand.  
 
41 OECD, above at 2. 
42 OECD Environmental Performance Review (OECD Publishing, Paris, 2017) at 3. Media 
Release: EDS commends OECD Environmental Performance Review of New Zealand (21 
March 2017) states The Director of the OECD Environment Directorate at the time the Report 
was published was Hon Simon Upton. He was “one of the architects of the Resource 
Management Act (along with Sir Geoffrey Palmer)”. 
   Later, Simon Upton was sworn in as New Zealand’s Parliamentary Commissioner for the 
Environment on 16 October 2017. Refer Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment 
“About us. The Commissioner”. 
43 Above. 
44 Above at 195. 
45 Above at 195. 
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 Statutory Framework - Water Allocation under the RMA  
As stated above, the absence of a national water allocation policy between 1991 and 
2011 contributed to the water allocation problems that existed in New Zealand 
during this period. At central government level the failure to create national policy 
“has left the RMA operating in a partial vacuum”.46 This policy gap is an example 
of the “failure of the RMA”.47  
The provisions within the RMA were intended to establish a regulatory framework 
for resource allocation, including water allocation. The following analysis of 
statutory provisions relevant to water allocation shows that the RMA is not 
designed to regulate a market-based system of water allocation. This point has great 
significance in light of any proposal to introduce market-based allocation in the 
future, as is discussed in the next chapter. The RMA provides the regulatory basis 
for various bodies that have administrative, judicial and decision-making roles 
relevant to water allocation.48 For this reason the following sections provide an 
account of the functions, powers and duties of central and local government under 
the relevant provisions of the RMA. Each section contributes to the understanding 
that the RMA does not include any foundation for market-based water allocation in 
its current form. At times this point is secondary to the perception that the RMA 
has failed to be implemented as intended.  
 
 
46 IH Williams “The Resource Management Act 1991: Well Meant But Hardly Done” (2000) 9 (4) 
The Otago L. Rev. 673 at 674. 
47 Geoffrey Palmer, QC “The Resource Legislation Amendment Bill, the Productivity Commission 
Report and the future of Planning for the Environment in New Zealand” (2018) 12(4) Policy 
Quarterly 71 at 72. Refers to the “failure” of the RMA in terms of the failure of central 
government and regional government to “make policy statements, set environmental standards 
that the Act provides for…”. Without the policy statements at both levels the inference is that the 
RMA resource allocation framework is incomplete. This is particularly a problem for water 
allocation planning as discussed in this chapter with policy gaps at both the central government 
and some regional government levels. 
48 Robb Water Allocation a Strategic Overview, above n 5, at 6. 
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 The RMA and the Allocation of Water 
The provisions of the RMA establish a hierarchical structure of policy guidance for 
resource allocation at the national and regional level. 49  Within this regulatory 
framework, the responsibility for resource allocation is split between local and 
central government (as stated in Part 4 of the Act) with devolution of power to the 
regional level.50 The Ministry for the Environment (which administers the RMA) is 
primarily responsible for developing national environmental policy. Adding 
complexity to matters is the fact that in addition to the Minister for the Environment, 
the Ministers of Conservation and Aquaculture also have roles in policy 
development. For example, the Minister of Conservation is responsible for the 
preparation of the New Zealand coastal policy statement under section 57 of the 
RMA. The Environmental Protection Authority and the Environment Court also 
have decision-making role. 51  For example, The Environmental Protection 
Authority has jurisdiction over projects of “national significance”. 52  The 
Environment Court can hold the first judicial hearing relating to Regional Plans and 
Policy Statements, resource consent applications, enforcement proceedings and 
declarations.53  
The RMA states the statutory process for setting “national direction” in the 
promulgation of National Environmental Standards, National Policy Statements 
and the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement. 54  RMA amendments to set 
 
49 The hierarchical structure was more of a “framework” than a “blueprint” because the details 
would be formed through the policy making process characterised as a “political struggle within 
a loose legal framework”. See I. H. Williams above n 46 at 674.  
50 Devolution of power was to address the pre-existing problems with “ad hoc” government 
intervention in environmental planning. Hon Simon Upton stated the problems with 
environmental law prior to the RMA as a “plethora of rules” with “conflicting objectives”. (4 
July 1991) 516 NZPD 3018, Hon Simon Upton. 
51 Resource Management Act 1991, s 42C states the functions of the Environmental Protection 
Agency. The current EPA was established by the Environmental Protection Authority Act 2011 
which replaced the EPA established under the RMA. The EPA decision on the Tukituku 
Catchment is discussed later in this chapter. 
52 Resource Management Act 1991 s 42C(c). 
53 Resource Management Act 1991, Part 11.  
54 Resource Management Act 1991, Part 5, Subpart I “National direction”. 
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“national direction” reflect the ongoing tension between balancing the needs of 
development while at the same time protecting the environment.55 For example, 
section 46A of the RMA was amended in 2017 to allow a “single consultation 
process” when developing “national direction” concurrently for the same 
environmental issue.56 The amendment means that National Policy Statements and 
National Environmental standards can be developed at the same time without 
requiring separate processes for public consultation. In theory, the change should 
“increase flexibility in the development of national direction”.57 Once the subject 
of “national direction” is determined the Minister may either follow the process in 
the RMA (sections 47 to 51) that sets out a board of inquiry process, or follow the 
method described in section 46A(4).58 Section 46A(4) outlines the steps required to 
prepare national direction. These include providing public notice of the proposed 
national direction and the reason “why the Minister considers that the proposed 
national direction is consistent with the purpose of the Act”.59  
The Minister may appoint a board of inquiry to “inquire into, and report on, the 
proposed national direction”.60 The Minister has the power to set the “terms of 
reference” for the board of inquiry61 and also has the power to suspend the board of 
inquiry “at any time” subject to providing public notice for the reasons for the 
 
55 For example The Resource Management Amendment Act 2005 was directly relevant to water 
allocation as it amended section 30 to add section 30(1)(fa) to amend the function of regional 
councils to make rules to allocate water; Amendments to planning such as The Resource 
Management (Simplifying and Streamlining) Amendment Act 2009 objective were specifically 
to address issues affecting the processing of resource consent applications from “vexatious and 
anti-competitive objections” to “improving the decision-making process for proposals of national 
significance and establishing an Environmental Protection Authority”. This amendment was to 
address criticism that resource consent processing took too long in some circumstances. See 
Resource Management (Simplifying and Streamlining) Amendment Act 2009 Regulatory Impact 
Statement.at 2. 
  The implication of amendments which aim to streamline decision making have been criticised by 
Palmer above at n 47 on the basis that the process results in an encroachment of central 
government in regional environmental decision making.  
56 Ministry for the Environment Resource Legislation Amendments 2017 – Factsheet 1 (Ministry 
for the Environment, Wellington, 2017) at 9.  
57 Above at 9. 
58 Resource Management Act 1991, s 46A(3). 
59 Section 46A(4)(a)(ii). 
60 Section 47(1). 
61 Section 47(2)(a). 
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suspension.62 The purpose of the public notification phase is to invite submissions 
on the proposed national direction.63 The role of the board of inquiry is to provide 
recommendations for the Minister on the proposed national direction.64  
In addition to these changes to the setting of national direction the 2017 
amendments also introduced provisions to allow national planning templates for 
regional planning.65 However, not all of these changes to the setting of national 
direction were welcomed by commentators. For example, Palmer is critical of 
amendments which dilute features of the RMA planning process, resulting in 
increased central government control over planning and encroachment on regional 
planning.66 In the past, without adequate national direction “New Zealand overshot 
the mark in terms of decentralization and local decision making”.67 The “balance 
of power” between the central government and regional government “did not come 
into fruition as planned”. 68 Palmer’s analysis attributes the failure of local 
government to adequately plan as follows: “Too often local government did not 
appreciate its duties under the Act and there was too much political interference”.69 
The duties that Palmer refers to includes having regard to the principles of 
sustainable management when formulating rules in regional plans.70 It remains to 
be seen whether the latest changes to the setting of national direction can address 
the pressing issues facing New Zealand water allocation. What is striking, however, 
 
62 Section 47A. 
63 Section 48. 
64 Section 51 outlines matters to be considered in the report.  
65 Sections 58B-58J. 
66 Geoffrey Palmer Protecting New Zealand’s Environment. An Analysis of the Governments 
Proposed Freshwater Management and Resource Management Act 1991 Reforms (New Zealand 
Fish and Game Council, Wellington, 2013) at 24 states the 2005 Amendments “expanded the 
function of the Minister for the Environment creating a new power for the Minister to direct plan 
changes” which was “universally opposed by all sectors”.  
67 Andrea P Sumits and Jason I Morrison Creating a Framework for Sustainability in California: 
Lessons Learned from the New Zealand Experience. A Report of the Pacific Institute for Studies 
in Development, Environment and Security (Pacific Institute, California, 2001) at v.  
68 Above. 
69 Palmer, above n 47, at 72: He goes on to observe “Political reactions that have led to numerous 
amending acts for the RMA over the years have made the legislation worse, not better. Constant 
fiddling debilitates both the act and administration”.  
70 Resource Management Act 1991, s 5. 
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is that there remain no legal consequences for government departments which fail 
to prepare national direction under the RMA.  
 
The “functions” of regional councils are to prepare plans with policies and 
objectives that further the purpose of the RMA.71 These statutory “functions” do 
not confer an obligation to create a regional plan72. Regional plans may address any 
of the functions stated in section 30.73 Section 30(1)(e) to (fa) states that regional 
councils may specify maximum or minimum flows and prepare rules for taking or 
using water. The water allocation function of regional councils was amended in 
2005 within a broader context to streamline environmental planning. 74  These 
sections provide regional councils with the means to develop rules in regional plans 
to allocate water.75 Examples illustrating how rules may be formulated in regional 
plans are discussed later in this chapter. 
Regional councils determine how much water can be allocated by setting limits on 
the amount of water that can be taken from a body of water. 76 Environmental flow 
 
71 Resource Management Act 1991, s 30, 63. The RMA was meant to implement sustainable 
management through the regional planning function of councils. See Trevor Daya-Winterbottom 
“Sustainability, Governance and Water Management in New Zealand” in Michael Kidd, Loretta 
Feris and Tumai Murombo (eds) Water and the Law Towards Sustainability (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, 2014). 
72 Robb Water Allocation a Strategic Overview above, n 5, at 12.  
73 Resource Management Act 1991, s 65 states that “A regional council may prepare a regional 
plan for the whole or part of its region for any function specified in section 30(1)(c), (ca), (e), (f), 
(fa), (fb), (g), or (ga)”.  
74 These changes were contained in s30(1)(fa) and s30(4) of the RMA. The Amendment began as a   
Bill focusing on Energy and Resources. It was formerly a part of the Resource Management and 
Electricity Legislation Amendment Bill 2005. Later the Bill was split into two; Resource 
Management Amendment Bill (No. 5) and the Electricity Amendment Bill (No. 3).  
75 Regional councils may classify a particular activity such as the taking of a set volume of water 
as a permitted, controlled, restricted discretionary, discretionary, non-complying or prohibited 
activity under Resource Management Act 1991, s 77A. Under section 123 of the RMA a water 
permit may be issued for a maximum term of 35 years. However, in practice regional councils 
are setting shorter terms. For a review of relevant permit and planning provisions refer to Bal 
Matheson and Daniel Minhinnick “Water” in Derek Nolan QC (ed) Environmental and Resource 
Management Law (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2018). 
76 TH Snelder, HL Rouse, P. Franklin, DJ Booker, N Norton, and J Diettrich. "The role of science 
in setting water resource use limits: case studies from New Zealand." (2014) 59 (3.4) 
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limits are placed on surface water bodies. In 2006, the Ministry for the Environment 
identified problems with the minimum flows, including that there were still some 
freshwater bodies for which “no specific environmental flows and water levels have 
been determined”.77  
Generally, regional plans do not “pre-allocate” water to specific uses. 78  One 
exception to this rule is the Waitaki Regional Water Allocation Plan (Waitaki Plan), 
which was established under a special Act. The Waitaki Plan is not the norm; rather, 
it is an example of ad hoc central government intervention in regional water 
allocation planning.79 The central government intervention in the Waitaki region 
occurred through the establishment of a statutory Water Allocation Board to 
“develop and approve a regional plan for water allocation”.80 The reasons used to 
justify the intervention cited the seriousness of water allocation issues in the region 
and the claim that any delay in waiting for changes in national water allocation 
policy would “sacrifice the interest of the people of the Waitaki catchment”.81 This 
type of ad hoc intervention is reminiscent of the previous “command and control” 
approach to water allocation which existed prior to the RMA.82 A further example 
 
Hydrological Sciences Journal 844 at 885 states these limits set “regulatory criteria that 
determine how water resources are allocated to environmental flow and out-of-channel use”. 
77 Ministry for the Environment Discussion Document on the Proposed National Environmental 
Standard on Ecological Flows and Water Levels (Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 
2006). 
78 Sinclair Knight Merz “Alternatives to the “first in, first served” approach to water allocation” 
Options to Improve Water Allocation Outcomes (Ministry for the Environment, Ministry for 
Economic Development and Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington, 2005) at 3.  
79 Above at 3. 
80 Resource Management (Waitaki Catchment) Amendment Act 2004, s 3, s 8; Resource    
Management Waitaki Catchment Amendment Bill 2004 (Select Committee Report 2002-2005 
Vol  XIV) at 1011 states “There is currently no regional plan for the allocation of water in the 
Waitaki Catchment, nor is there a minimum flow regime for the river”. 
81 Above at 1012. Above at 1023 the Opposition Party strongly objected to the Bill on grounds 
“that the rules are being rewritten for a huge state owned enterprise project”. The Opposition 
stated that  “These consents should be considered against the Part II provisions of the RMA 
unaltered”; For an academic analysis of Project Aqua see Claire Kilner “The RMA Under 
Review: A Case Study of Project Aqua” (2006) 58(2) Political Science 29 which states Project 
Aqua was regionally important but later abandoned due to concerns over access to water rights 
and rising costs.  
82 For a discussion of water allocation pre-RMA see the background section of Chapter One. It 
outlines the extent of control that government departments such as the Ministry of Works and 
Development had over water allocation. While there is no suggestion here that the intention of 
the government is to take full control over regional water allocation decisions, the need for 
intervention shows the failure of the RMA framework for water allocation in such regions. 
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of ad hoc or “unprecedented” government intervention was the appointment of 
Commissioners in the Canterbury region, which is described later in this chapter.83  
One of the features of the water allocation plan in Waitaki is the use of sector-based 
allocation. Sector-based allocation in the Waitaki region reduces “reliance” on the 
“first come, first served” method of water allocation. 84  Sector-based water 
allocation is described as “planned allocation”.85 The downside of the “planned 
allocation” approach lies in how to determine which sector gains an initial 
allocation and the volume of water to be allocated to each sector.86 The positive 
feature of “planned allocation” is that priorities for water allocation can be 
determined with a greater level of “sophistication” by varying sector allocations 
across seasonal demand patterns.87 Central government intervention in the Waitaki 
region raises the question of why the method of “planned allocation” for water 
sectors cannot be implemented in other regions.  
The preparation of regional plans requires a cost-benefit evaluation to be 
undertaken. The evaluation report forms part of the public consultation required 
under the RMA and is an important step in the plan making process.88 It is required 
under section 32 of the RMA for a proposed plan, plan change or variation in order 
to assess how the proposal meets the overall objective of the RMA. The evaluation 
should also consider alternatives to address the particular environmental issue and 
the efficiency of each option.89 The cost-benefit analysis includes a consideration 
 
83Christine Cheyne “Changing Urban Governance in New Zealand: Public Participation and 
Democratic Legitimacy in Local Authority Planning and Decision Making 1989-2014. (2015) 
33(4) Urban Policy and Research 416 at 426. 
84 Sinclair Knight Merz, above n 78, at 3. 
85 Above at 3.  
86 Above at 3.  
87 Sinclair Knight Merz, above n 78, at 3.  
88 For best practice guide on preparing a section 32 analysis see Ministry for the Environment A 
guide to section 32 of the Resource Management Act 1991. Incorporating changes as a result of 
the Resource Legislation Amendment Act 2017 (Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 
2017); Ann Winstanley, Annabel Ahuriri-Driscoll Maria Hepi Virginia Baker and Jeffrey Foote 
"Understanding the impact of democratic logics on participatory resource decision-making in 
New Zealand." (2016) 21(10) Local Environment 1171. 
89 Resource Management Act 1991, s 32 (1). 
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of financial and non-financial values. 90  The resulting evaluation report should 
“identify and assess the benefits and costs of the environmental, economic, social, 
and cultural effects” including economic growth and employment.91 Examples of 
costs include administrative costs, compliance costs, broader economic costs, social 
costs and environmental costs.92 Amendments to section 32 requirements in 2013 
added the consideration of “economic growth” and “employment”.93  However, 
such changes have been criticised as going too far in attempting to follow central 
government’s business and economic growth agenda.94 
Part 3 of the RMA details statutory restrictions on the use of resources. Section 14 
details the restrictions relating to the take and use of water, which specifically allow 
the “take” and “use” of water for personal use.95 Section 14(3)(b) allows water to 
be taken for the “reasonable” needs of people for “domestic needs” or “of a person’s 
animals for drinking water”. All other water allocations are restricted and subject 
to provisions in regional plans and may require a resource consent.96 Other statutory 
control over water takes in the RMA includes regional council power to issue a 
“Water Shortage Direction” for up to 14 days for any water body. 97  
From a legal perspective there is no inherent right to access water and the granting 
of a water permit is a lifting of this general restriction to take water from the 
commons. Section 122(1) of the RMA states a resource consent is “neither real nor 
 
90 Ross Wilson Cost Benefit Approaches to Valuing Nature: Case Studies in New Zealand 
(Auckland Council, Auckland, 2012) at 5. 
91 Resource Management Act 1991, s 32 (2). 
92 Quality Planning “Quality Planning Website Note on Section 32 Analysis” 
< http://www.qualityplanning.org.nz/index.php/35-plan-development/74-guidancenote-onsec32 > 
93 Resource Management Act 1991, s 32(2). 
94 Klaus Bosselman “Sustainability Alternatives: A German-New Zealand Perspective” (2015) 13 
New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 25 at 32. 
95 Resource Management Act 1991, s 14; Laws of New Zealand Water (online ed). These 
provisions are considered to be similar to rights to take water for domestic use that existed under 
the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 
96 Section 14(3)(a) allows the taking of water that has been “expressly allowed by a resource 
consent”. 
97 Statutory rights to suspend water takes during a shortage were carried through from the Water 
and Soil Conservation Act 1967 into the RMA under s329. The Water and Soil Conservation Act 
1967, s 23E gave specific powers to water boards to suspend water takes, “if, in the opinion of 
the Board, there is at any time a serious temporary shortage of water...”.  
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personal property”. However, there are exceptions to this general rule. Under 
section 122(2) there are three situations where the resource consent may vest as 
personal property. The first is when the resource consent holder dies and the 
resource consent vests with the “personal representative of the holder”. The second 
is if the consent holder becomes bankrupt and the resource consent is vested with 
the Official Assignee “as if it were personal property”. The third situation is where 
the resource consent is listed as property under the Protection of Personal Properties 
and Property Rights Act 1998. These situations show that there are a number of 
practical situations where a resource consent is clearly recognised as property.  
The RMA recognises property in a resource consent as “goods” in section 122(4) 
for the purpose of registration as collateral under the Personal Property Securities 
Act 1999. This section differs from the situations addressed under section 122(3) 
because it also allows a charge to be registered against the resource consent, which 
means that water permits can be provided as security for loans and the charge over 
the water permit can be registered as “goods”. Effectively water permit holders can 
deal with the permit as if it is property and there is a clear legal basis for them to do 
so. Barton supports the view that resource consents have been interpreted as a type 
of property by the Courts, but questions the correct use of property-related 
concepts.98 There is a concern that the application of property-related concepts to 
legal issues relating to resource consents may have gone too far. It is important to 
remember that the general rule in section 122(1) does not support the view that a 
resource consent provides the consent holder with property—these concerns are 
discussed in more detail in the case law analysed in this chapter. It is clear that 
under the RMA water permits cannot be owned or traded as they are in other 




98 Barry Barton “Property Rights Created Under Statute in Common Law Legal Systems” in 
Aileen McHarg, Barry Barton, Adrian Bradbrook, and Lee Godden Property and the Law in 




The rules for water transfers in regional plans must comply with the administrative 
requirements of section 136 of the RMA. Subject to complying with the relevant 
Regional Plan, section 136 allows for the permanent or temporary transfer of a 
water permit to another person or site within the same catchment or aquifer.99 When 
transfers occur, regional plans may require notification details of transfers such as 
location, duration, volume transferred and details of parties involved in the transfer 
to be provided to the councils.100 For example, in some regional plans, a water 
transfer may occur only if a portion of the allocation is surrendered in over-allocated 
catchments101 or there may be a requirement for a transfer to be efficient.102 Section 
136 does not require the collection of information about the price of the transfer.  
Irrigation schemes are self-regulated in New Zealand.103 The main water permit is 
held by the scheme operator while those accessing water does so by way of a 
contractual rather than a statutory entitlement. 104  In other words, the rights of 
 
99 Resource Management Act 1991, s 136(2). 
100 Waikato Regional Council Waikato Regional Council Variation 6 (Waikato Regional Council, 
Hamilton, 2012). Policy 3.4.3 Transfer of Water Permits. Water transfers can assist with 
achieving the efficient use of water.  
   Environment Southland Regional Council Proposed Southland Water and Land Plan 
(Environment Southland Regional Council, Invercargill, 2016). Policy 43 allows transfers 
subject to minimum flow and allocation rules.  
101 Bay of Plenty Regional Council Region-wide Water Quantity – Proposed Plan Change 9 
Version 3.8 (Bay of Plenty Regional Council, Tauranga, 2017). Policy WQ P13 states enabling 
transfers as a means to improve efficiency. WQ P23(e) requires a “portion of the allocated water 
to be surrendered” in over-allocated catchments. 
102 Greater Wellington Regional Council Proposed Natural Resources Plan For The Wellington 
Region 31 July 2015 (Greater Wellington Regional Council, Wellington, 2015). Policy P128 
encourages the transfer of water permits in the same catchment management unit so long as the 
transfer is reasonable and meets efficient use criteria in Schedule Q of the Plan.  
103 Irrigation Schemes Act 1990 resulted in the sale of government irrigation schemes to water 
users. For an account of the effect of this change refer to Chapter One. 
104 Central Plains Water Limited, “Central Plains Water User Agreement 2015” at Clause 25.3. 




individuals taking water from the scheme are determined under contract and subject 
to a range of individual statutes. For example, the Central Plains Water Scheme 
Water User Agreement refers to a range of different Acts which are used to 
determine the terms and conditions for water users in the scheme. Shareholders in 
the Central Plains Water irrigation scheme are issued ordinary shares by the volume 
of water taken. Central Plains Water Limited takes security over water provided to 
the shareholders. Transfers of water shares between shareholders are subject to the 
approval of the board. The approval process for water transfers is based on 
conforming to the terms of the Central Plains Limited Water Use Agreement. 
Under unregulated irrigation schemes irrigators are bound by contract with the 
irrigation scheme operator. Those contractual terms can limit the irrigator’s ability 
to transfer water. For example, Central Plains Water Limited Water Use Agreement 
2015 states “The Shareholder shall not be at liberty to assign, transfer, mortgage or 
charge the Shareholder’s interest in this Agreement without the consent of the 
Company”.[1] If the Company agrees to the transfer, the irrigation water will 
remain within the irrigation scheme. The irrigation infrastructure operator will hold 
the statutory entitlement without the need to notify changes to the regional council 
because it is presumed that the conditions of the resource consent do not change. 
 
Despite the lack of formal water registers in New Zealand, case law illustrates that 
regional councils have an important role in accurately recording information 
regarding water transfers. A case where negligence by the District Council was 
alleged was The Favourite Ltd v Vavasour.105 Vavasour held a water permit for 
vineyard irrigation. When Vavasour transferred the water permit to another party, 
The Favourite Limited argued that the water permit was incorrectly transferred. 
Vavasour, The Favourite Limited and the third party had private dealings regarding 
the water permit. The Favourite Limited unsuccessfully argued that the Council had 
 
105 The Favourite Ltd v Vavasour [2005] NZRMA 461.  
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a duty of care in transferring the new water permit holder’s details into its records 
because it disputed the validity of the transfer.  
The Court held that a duty of care was not owed by the Council in this case because 
it was unaware of the private dealings between the parties. In these situations the 
role of the Council was more like that of a “postbox”:106 
Section 136 therefore makes a distinction between the situation where 
the holder is transferring a permit to an owner or occupier and that 
where the holder is transferring the permit to another person on 
another site. Obviously (sees 136 (4), the council does have a role in 
the second situation. It does not flow from that that there is any 
obligation on the council to determine which category a purported 
transfer is in. Rather, in terms of s 136(2)(a) the council is, as Mr 
Radich, put it, a postbox. The council receives the transfer and notes 
its register accordingly. That the council has no active role is 
supported by s 136(3) which indicates that the transfer is ineffective 
until “received” by the relevant consent authority. 
This case confirmed that the role of councils is to receive and record the transfer, 
subject to the transfer being allowed in the regional plan.  
However, negligence by a council in the recording of water permit information is 
possible. Negligence by a council was found in Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd v 
Moorhouse where the Marlborough District Council was found liable in the High 
Court of incorrectly providing water permit information in a Land Information 
Memorandum (LIM). 107  The water permit information recorded in the LIM 
recorded a lower volume of water than the volume Altimarloch Joint Ventures 
Limited believed they were acquiring. It relied upon the information in the LIM 
when deciding to purchase the property and associated water permits. Damages of 
$400,000 were awarded in the High Court. The value of damages was quantified 
on the financial loss to the plaintiffs as a result of relying upon incorrect water 
permit information supplied in the LIM. 108  The Court of Appeal dismissed an 
 
106 At [30]. 
107 Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd v Moorhouse HC Blenheim CIV-2005-406-91, 3 July 2008; 
108 Altimarloch Joint Venture Ltd v Moorhouse HC Blenheim CIV-2005-406-91, 23 March 2009 
[recall judgment]. The vendors were also sued for misrepresentation under s6 (1) of the 
Contractual Remedies Act 1979. During the conveyancing process the vendors were not shown 
90 
 
appeal by the Council and maintained the equal apportionment of damages between 
the vendors and the Council.109 The Court of Appeal also confirmed the duty of 
care owed by the Council to the purchasers when providing a LIM under section 
44A of the Local Government Official Information and Meetings Act 1987. On 
appeal, the Supreme Court also confirmed that a duty is imposed on regional 
councils to provide correct information. The Supreme Court’s decision focused on 
the issues of how to determine the appropriate apportionment of liability between 
the regional council and other parties involved in the case. The Court held that 
damages were based on the cost of finding another source of water, not the 
difference in the value of the property purchased based on the diminution of the 
water permits.110  
This case shows that the recording of water permit information is subject to a high 
standard of care. Water permits are valuable assets. The value of water permits 
means that mistakes can be costly to remedy. Regional councils may be required to 
pay costs if negligence is proven on their behalf and they may not appreciate that 
they are the holders of information about increasingly valuable water assets. The 
issues described in this section are exacerbated by New Zealand’ not having a water 
register. In light of the duty of care imposed on regional councils to maintain correct 
records, a national water register, similar to the water register in Australia, should 
be considered. The feasibility of implementing a national water register will be 
discussed later in this thesis.  
 
 
the water permit documents which had been signed on their behalf. It was not until after 
settlement that the discrepancy regarding the extent of water rights emerged.  
109 Vining Realty Group Ltd v Moorhouse [2010] NZCA 104. 
110 Marlborough District Council v Vining Realty Group [2012] NZSC 11. The RMA does not 
include provisions in relation to royalties or the pricing of water. In comparison other resources, 
such as geothermal do have provisions that allow regional councils to charge a royalty but these 
are not currently put into effect. Hence in practice there is also no royalty on geothermal 
allocations either. See Katherine Luketina and Phoebe Parson “New Zealand’s Public 
Participation in Geothermal Resource Development” in Adele Manzella, Agnes Allansdottir and 
Anna Pellizzone (eds) Geothermal Energy and Society (Springer, Italy, 2019) at 211. 
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 Setting Minimum Flows - From National Direction to 
Regional Responsibility 
Regional councils can create rules to specify minimum flows (which are based on 
the quantity, level or flow of water) under section 30(1)(e) of the RMA. This section 
preserves the provisions for fixing minimum water flows originally contained in the 
Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967.111 A significant change to set minimum 
flows under the RMA was the devolution of this function to regional councils. 
Before the RMA, the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority set minimum 
flow levels. The Authority was required to consult “all interested bodies and 
persons known to the Authority”, but there was no right of appeal to the Authority’s 
decision on minimum flow levels.112 The most noteworthy cases relating to the 
setting of minimum flows under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 and the 
RMA are discussed below. These cases show a shift in factors that are taken into 
consideration when setting minimum flows.  
 
This case provides an insight into the relevant factors that were considered when 
setting minimum flow levels under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967. This 
case dealt with the question of whether the minimum flow set for the Wanganui 
River was fixed at an appropriate level by the regional water board. It is a significant 
case because of its timing, context and precedent value. A summary of the relevant 
features follows. 113 
 
111 The National Water and Soil Conservation Authority had the power to set permitted flow levels    
under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, s 14(3)(o).  
112 Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, s 14(3)(a). 
113 Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd v Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council W70/90 




In 1965, the Electricity Corporation reached an agreement with the local council to 
ensure that a minimum river flow was maintained and that water temperature would 
remain safe for fish. In 1977, (following a request from the NZ Canoeing 
Association), the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority was asked to fix 
a minimum flow for the river. The Authority had the statutory right to do so under 
section 14(3)(o) of the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967.  
The Authority then referred the request to the regional catchment board and 
requested a report under section 20(5)(b) of the Act. The report (with 17 public 
submissions) was received four years later. On 1 November 1983, the Authority 
fixed the minimum flow for five years, with an expiry date of 31 October 1988. The 
role, function and processes followed by the Authority in setting the minimum flow 
had a statutory basis in the Act.  
In March 1987, the catchment board again began the process to fix the minimum 
flow. A call for public submissions was made in February 1988. Twelve hundred 
and fifty submissions were received from around New Zealand. A month later, on 
31 March 1988, the Water and Soil Conservation Authority was abolished and the 
Rangitikei-Wanganui Catchment Board became responsible for setting the 
minimum flows on the Wanganui River.  
When the catchment board fixed the minimum flow on 18 October 1988, unlike the 
Authority, its decision was subject to appeal. The right of appeal was emphasised 
in the case as there was no precedent for setting minimum flows:114  
As a right of appeal from such decisions has only existed since April 1988, 
there has not yet built up any body of appeal decisions from which general 
criteria might be derived. Nor is there any judgment of a superior Court 
which bears directly on those questions.  
The Electricity Corporation appealed the decision on the basis that the minimum 
flow should be varied at particular points along the river to accommodate the 
electricity generation needs of its network. The Corporation also wanted to include 
provisions that would allow it to depart from the minimum flow where there was a 
 
114 At 22. 
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power shortage to “avert serious consequences for the nation”.115 Had the Authority 
not been abolished, it could have set the minimum flow based on the report of the 
catchment board, and there would have been no right of appeal. The Planning 
Tribunal was faced with a mammoth task of setting the minimum flow without the 
benefit of precedents or statutory criteria.116 The Planning Tribunal examined the 
relevant case law under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 to determine the 
criteria by which to determine the appropriate minimum flow. Following an 
extensive assessment of relevant case law, the Court found that a balancing test 
applied:117  
It was generally accepted by the parties that in setting minimum acceptable 
flow, the decision-maker is to follow a process similar to that approved in 
Keam’s case of evaluating and balancing all the relevant considerations.  
In determining an acceptable flow, future potential uses were not trumped by 
existing uses.118 The Court found that on balance the minimum flow that had been 
set could be adjusted at some points. These concessions were made only after 
careful consideration of the extensive arguments put forward by both sides. The 
Court was influenced more by arguments and evidence relating to the effect on 
fisheries and was less concerned with mitigating the business effect on the 
Electricity Corporation. This case confirmed that arguments based on legitimate 
expectation were not suitable for fixing minimum flow and that the ability to be 
granted a water consent was more of a privilege than a right. It also considered 
whether issues relating to claims under the Treaty of Waitangi that were before the 
Waitangi Tribunal required a stay in proceedings. However, on advice from the 
government, the Court was advised to continue with the case as the proceedings in 
the Waitangi Tribunal were to be determined as a separate matter. On appeal, the 
High Court affirmed the Planning Tribunal’s decision.  
 
115 At 11. 
116 At 22. “The Act does not state the criteria by which the minimum acceptable flows of rivers 
and streams are fixed”. 
117 At 68. 
118 At 81. 
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This case showed the process when setting minimum flow levels under the Water 
and Soil Conservation Act 1967. The procedural elements of fixing a minimum 
flow are important because they show that national guidance on water allocation 
policies was lost when the Water and Soil Conservation Authority was 
disestablished. By 1990, the relevant factors in fixing the minimum flow for the 
Wanganui River were: the law, Maori cultural and spiritual values, natural features, 
recreation and tourism, electricity generation, climate change and ways in which to 
balance these factors.  
 The Setting of Minimum Flows under the RMA 
Under the RMA minimum flows are subject to appeal. One of the earliest cases 
involved the setting of flows in the Otago Regional Water Plan. The plan was 
appealed on issues relating to minimum flow, mining rights and setting 
supplementary flow. 119  In these cases, the reduction in minimum flow was 
considered to “have the most immediate and critical importance to the irrigation 
groups before the Court”.120  
 
The key issue, in this case, was the setting of minimum flows in the Otago Water 
Plan.121  
In considering the minimum flow provisions of Schedule 2A the ORC 
has either reduced or maintained the minimum flows originally set in 
its notified water plan or deleted them in some cases altogether. For 
all other catchments not included in Schedule 2A the ORC has 
adopted a default minimum flow of the natural 7 day minimum flow 
occurring once in a 10 year period 
 
119 See Otago Water Resource Users Group v Otago Regional Council C88/2003, (4 July 2003) 
C21/2002 on mining privileges; Minister of Conservation v Otago Regional Council C71/2002, 
(25 June 2002) on minimum flows and Fish and Game New Zealand (Central South Island 
Region) v Otago Regional Council C79/2002, EnvC, (28 June 2002), the Kakanui Flows case 
will be discussed further below. 
120 Minister of Conservation v Otago Regional Council C71/2002, (25 June 2002) at [19]. 
121 At [8]. 
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The existence of mining privileges that were deemed to be permits under the RMA 
was a significant issue.122 Mining privileges had “dominated” water use in Otago 
and over time were used to take irrigation water.123 However, the Otago Regional 
Council lacked information regarding the abstractions based on mining privileges. 
Under section 414 of the RMA mining privileges were transferred to become 
“deemed permits”, which could become subject to regional plans if the permit 
holder “requests the regional council to make such a rule”. The Court acknowledged 
that this factor restricted the regional council’s ability to regulate deemed 
permits.124  
There are cases where the combined effect of mining privileges is to 
provide for an instantaneous abstraction of up to twice the mean 
annual flow (which is significantly higher than MALF). It is quite 
clear that if all mining privileges were exercised at once then certain 
water courses would be dry at least at various points along their 
lengths. The reason we stress this point is because it was accepted by 
all of the parties and it is clear to the Court that the water plan could 
not and will not by regulatory methods control mining privileges. We 
note specifically that section 414 of the RMA does not apply in these 
circumstances because the water plan provisions have not been 
included at the request of the [mining privilege] holder. The only 
control in such circumstances is section 329 of the RMA which 
enables short term control in extreme situations. We understand this 
provision has not been used in Otago to date. 
In this context, the ability of the Otago Regional Council to fix minimum flows 
across the catchment was an important means of controlling water allocation. Those 
catchments that had no minimum flow would effectively have uncapped water 
allocation.  
The Otago region catchments and sub-catchments were found to have unique 
characteristics. The Court was, therefore, reluctant to rely upon the information 
from one catchment and use it as a basis for setting minimum flows in another 
catchment. The minimum flows in the Otago Regional Water Plan were based on 
points where the flow was measured in particular catchments. The measurements 
 
122 At [18]. 
123 At [8]. 
124 At [23]. 
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included data from the 1999 drought in Otago and influenced the setting of 
minimum flows as follows:125 
The water plan Schedule 2A minimum flow figures have been 
included as a result of the ORC’s analysis of those measurements over 
a period of time relying particularly on the flows during the 1999 
drought. In respect of some of the smaller catchments, for example 
the Shag at the Goodward Pump with a flow of 28 l/s, flow levels are 
so low that questions of accuracy become critical. 
Later in the decision, under the heading “Effect of Minimum Flow Regimes on 
Farmers”, the Court found that the concerns of the farming community were that “a 
very finely balanced system for water allocation cannot cope with the significant 
retention of water for instream values”. 126  The value of water to the farming 
community in Otago was tied to the potential to improve financial outcomes. The 
Court heard evidence from witnesses supporting the view that the minimum flow 
should equate to the levels of the 1999 drought because these levels “indicated that 
the system could survive extreme conditions of low flows”. 127  This view was 
supported by the Otago Regional Council “on the basis of the evidence from the 
1999 drought”.128  The Court also acknowledged the collaborative approach of 
farmers outside the Otago Regional Plan. The farming community appeared to have 
a strong sense of ownership of the resource and decision making on how to share 
in times of scarcity, without regulation. It was put to the Court that “unreasonable 
minimum flows could simply lead to people utilising mining privileges or the like 
to their full extent”.129 This possibility put the Otago Regional Council in a difficult 
situation. The allocating authority was restricted in its ability to use regulatory tools 
to implement a water allocation plan under the RMA. While legally the Otago 
Regional Council could plan to increase minimum flows, in fact in practice, doing 
so could have exacerbated water allocation issues. In light of these circumstances, 
the Court concluded that “we accept that the ORC [Otago Regional Council] has 
 
125 At [43]. 
126 At [164]. 
127 At [164]. 
128 At [164]. 
129 At [169]. 
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adopted a methodology of seeking to co-operate with rather than directly regulate 
farmers”.130 
The Court held that the setting of minimum flows in the Schedule 2A catchments 
at the 1999 drought levels was acceptable. The Court agreed that this level was the 
lowest that the catchments could sustain. There were measuring stations in these 
catchments to record the minimum flows. However, the default minimum flows for 
other catchments was unacceptable and the Court required that measurement must 
be undertaken for these other catchments to determine the appropriate minimum 
flow. The unscheduled catchments would have a minimum flow regime established 
once they had been reviewed. The setting of minimum flows, in this case, should 
be distinguished on its specific facts because of the existence and effect of mining 
privileges as deemed permits under the RMA, a situation which may not exist or 
may not affect the setting of minimum flows in other regions. 
 
This case involved the setting of a minimum flow for the Kakanui River as part of 
the Otago Regional Water Plan. The Fish and Game Council and the Kakanui 
Ratepayers Improvement Society Ltd challenged the level of flow that was set. In 
setting the minimum flow, the Environment Court was guided by Part II of the 
RMA and the section 32 analysis required under the Act. The Environment Court 
noted the consensus between parties on particular points so that the “concerns relate 
more to the precise flow to be set at the appropriate measuring point, rather than the 
matters of principle underlying that”. 131  As a result, rulings were sought on 
supplementary flows and the Court was not asked to comment on the fact that the 
primary allocation of the river was already over-allocated.132 The Court expressed 
 
130 At [172]. 
131 Fish and Game New Zealand (Central South Island Region) v Otago Regional Council 
C79/2002, EnvC (28 June 2002), the Kakanui Flows at [27]. 
132 At [28]. 
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concern over the apparent lack of policing of the previous minimum flows regime 
under the Kakanui Catchment Management Plan.  
The Court found that applications for supplementary flow in the Regional Policy 
Statement should be amended to be a discretionary activity because the public-
interest element in making water allocations was of importance in the overall 
context of the catchment. One of the issues of concern raised by the Court was the 
“policing” of the earlier minimum flow by the Otago Regional Council. The final 
determination took into consideration the balancing of interests in the catchment, 
which included the fish habitat and concerns of landowners who used water for 
irrigation. A minimum flow level of 250 litres per second was set. However, if the 
flow fell below the minimum, the flow needed to revert to a higher level of 400 
litres per second before returning to the minimum flow level. This novel approach 
to fixing the minimum flow was presented as a self-monitoring mechanism to 
encourage water users to ensure that the minimum flow was maintained.  
 
The Otago Regional Water Plan has been revised since it became operative on 1 
January 2004. 133  The changes focused on improving the connections between 
groundwater and surface water and addressed governance and water quality 
issues.134 The connections between groundwater and surface water in Policy 6.4 
affirm the importance of integrated water management for the Otago region. There 
is an additional requirement for those renewing groundwater takes. The 
groundwater takes will be renewed only for the volume of water that had been taken 
in the preceding five years. A further distinction in the Otago Region is that 
rationing rules are included in the Plan. For example, Policy 6.4.12C states: “Where 
 
133 Otago Regional Council Regional Plan: Water for Otago (Otago Regional Council, Otago, 
2004). There have been 14 plan changes since the plan became operative in 2004. A list of the 
plan changes is available at Otago Regional Council “Regional Plan: Water” 
<https://www.orc.govt.nz/plans-policies-reports/regional-plans/water> 
134 At iii. 
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appropriate, to include in water permits to take water a condition that consent 
holders comply with any Council approved rationing regime”. 
 
Another example of setting minimum flows under the RMA is Waikato Regional 
Council’s Variation 6 to its Regional Plan. The plan change was necessary because 
water allocation was potentially going beyond sustainable limits.135 Variation 6 
included a range of changes to improve water allocation including the setting of 
minimum flows.136 The setting of minimum flows was challenged in Court as 
discussed below.  
Carter Holt Harvey v Waikato Regional Council related to Variation 6 which was 
appealed by 26 parties. 137 The issue before the Court was whether the minimum 
flow at points of the Waikato River was fixed at an appropriate level. The Waikato 
River has several hydroelectric dams; thus, balancing the needs of electricity 
generation with other demands for water was a key issue. In particular, the 
minimum flow setting upstream of the Karapiro Dam to maintain minimum flows 
for the Waikato Hydro Electricity Scheme was a contentious issues between the 
 
135 Carter Holt Harvey v Waikato Regional Council [2011] EnvC 380 at [3] stated:  
“Because of the demand for water for different uses within many parts of the Waikato region, the 
point has been reached where demand for water has the potential to exceed the sustainable 
supply. In some catchments the consents to take water already exceed the allocation limits. This 
has given rise to growing competition amongst present and prospective users of the region's 
freshwater resources. Variation 6 is the Council's attempt to meet this worsening situation”. 
136 Examples include improving environmental education in Rule 3.3.4.1. Voluntary water user 
groups are also encouraged with support from the Regional Council. The promotion of water 
groups under Rule 3.3.4.3 is to allow the groups to reach a point where they can be active in 
making decisions about allocation too. Rules, such as 3.3.4.9, are focused on establishing 
minimum flow levels and determining allocable flows. Rule 3.3.4.10 was important because it 
stated the methods over-allocation of water bodies would be phased out. The methods included 
stopping new allocations, encouraging voluntary reductions in water take or water harvesting, 
reviewing conditions of existing consents to gain efficiency, shared reductions across 
catchments, rostering water users, temporary restrictions under section 329 of the RMA, 
encouraging catchment groups to work on voluntary water take reductions and some further 
methods relating specifically to the dairy sector. 
137 Carter Holt Harvey v Waikato Regional Council [2011] EnvC 380. 
100 
 
hydroelectric company and other water users. The Environment Court stated that 
the setting of the minimum flow was effectively a decision between the existing 
allocation for the Waikato Hydro Electric Scheme to continue and irrigation. Those 
seeking more water for any use faced the prospect that further applications for water 
takes depended upon the ability to apply for a water permit. The chance of a water 
permit’s being issued increased if there was more water available in the catchment. 
In the absence of a transfer mechanism between competing users, the fixing of 
minimum flows, therefore, determined the flow allocation for the Waikato River 
and how much water was available for other economic activities relying on access 
to water.  
In setting the minimum flow for the Waikato River, the Environment Court 
considered a number of statutory requirements. Section 66(2) of the RMA required 
the regional council to take into consideration any proposed policy statements and 
relevant plans under other Acts. Section 67(3) required giving effect to any National 
Policy Statements. At this point, the relevant Acts included both the Waikato-Tainui 
Raupatu Claims (Waikato River) Settlement Act 2010, including Schedule 2 
containing the Vision and Strategy for the Waikato River and the Ngati Tuwharetoa, 
Raukawa, and Te Arawa River Iwi Waikato River Act 2010. This Act was part of 
a settlement process with the tribes of the Waikato region.138 The relevant National 
Policy Statements issued under s52 of the RMA were the National Policy Statement 
for Renewable Electricity Generation 2011 and the National Policy Statement for 
Freshwater Management 2011. 
The National Policy Statement on Freshwater Management 2011 directed regional 
councils to develop policies and plans to stop the over-allocation of freshwater. 
Variation 6 contained rules regarding the setting of minimum flows that took into 
account the needs of energy generation and irrigation. This decision considered the 
cost-benefit analysis of increasing the allocable flow above Karapiro, a point on the 
 
138 For further information on the Act and the settlement process see Linda Te Aho “Indigenous 
Challenges to Enhance Freshwater Governance and Management in Aotearoa New Zealand – 
The Waikato River Settlement” (2010) The Journal of Water Law 20; Jacinta Ruru “Indigenous 
restitution in settling water claims: the developing cultural and commercial redress opportunities 
in Aotearoa, New Zealand” (2013) 22 Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 311. 
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Waikato River. The Court held the allocable flow above Karapiro could be 
increased. Horticulture water users (represented by Horticulture New Zealand) had 
concerns about maintaining access to water at times when minimum flows were 
reached and sought priority in Variation 6 addressing minimum flows and water 
allocation. The key argument was that horticultural crops were less likely to be 
tolerant of drought conditions, which meant their water take should be prioritised. 
However, the arguments for priority were not accepted.  
The setting of a minimum flow can vary across catchments. Each regional council 
can determine the method and minimum flow for different water bodies. The 
challenge to the Waikato Regional Council illustrated the lack of precedent for 
setting minimum flow levels under the RMA.  
 
 Minor and Major Water Allocation in Regional Plans 
As explained above regional plans should include specific rules on water allocation 
such as rules for setting minimum flows. This section examines the other objectives, 
policies and rules that determine how water is allocated in regional plans. For the 
purpose of discussion in this section, the rules for water allocation in regional plans 
are categorised into those for minor and major water takes. 139  A comparable 
concept is that of “planned allocation” across different water sectors, as has been 
implemented in the Waitaki region.140 In the New Zealand context, the major water 
takes are a more significant part of the water allocation story and for that reason 
they deserve greater attention. Two major themes that emerge from analysing 
regional plans are the variation in water allocation policies and the lack of 
comprehensive rules for major water takes such as irrigation or municipal water 
 
139 In Australian water law major water takes are referred to as “bulk water” takes. 
140 Sinclair Knight Merz “Alternatives to the “first in, first served” approach to water allocation” 
Options to Improve Water Allocation Outcomes (Ministry for the Environment, Ministry for 
Economic Development and Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington, 2005). 
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supply. 141  It is also evident that some regions may not have prepared water 
allocation rules to prevent over-allocation.142  
Minor water takes include those takes permitted by Regional Plans and the RMA. 
Domestic water takes are one category of water take. However, minor water takes 
are not a significant part of water allocation in New Zealand.143 Domestic water 
takes are allowed under section 14(3)(b) of the RMA for an “individual’s 
reasonable domestic needs”. Domestic takes do not require a water allocation 
application to be made. Regional Plans have addressed domestic water takes by 
defining the domestic water needs in section 14(3)(b) in a number of ways. This 
includes varying interpretations of “reasonable” needs for domestic water use. For 
example, Horizon’s Regional Council has placed a daily limit of 300 litres per 
person for domestic water takes.144 In comparison, other regional councils have 
domestic water takes based on property or landholding, rather than a personal 
limit. 145  A further example of a minor take is dairy-shed washdown water. 
 
141 The Canterbury region is discussed below as an example of a region where water allocation 
plans were not prepared. The Bay of Plenty Regional Council Region-wide Water Quantity – 
Proposed Plan Change 9 Version 3.8 (Bay of Plenty Regional Council, Tauranga, 2017) It is 
under appeal from a number of parties including the Tauranga City Council. The Council is 
concerned about the potential effect of the proposed Plan affecting the ability for the Council to 
provide water for urban use into the future. It is arguing that the Proposed Plan is inconsistent 
with obligations as a future urban growth area under the National Policy Statement for Urban 
Development Capacity 2016. There are also concerns over the inconsistencies with Council 
obligations to provide safe drinking water under the Health Act 1956 and the Local Government 
Act 2002. See Tauranga City Council v Bay of Plenty Regional Council Notice of Appeal on 
behalf of Tauranga City Council Against Decision on Proposed Plan Change 9 (Region-Wide 
Water Quantity) (15 November 2018). 
142 Cabinet Paper “Improving the Resource Management Act 1991” (CAB Min (04) 30/10) at [26]. 
Cabinet Papers also stated that there was “uncertainty over water allocation issues in the absence 
of regional plans” in some areas. Examples discussed in this chapter include the Waitaki and 
Canterbury regions.  
143 Ministry for the Environment & Statistics NZ (2017) New Zealand’s Environmental Reporting 
Series: Our fresh water 2017. (Ministry for the Environment, Statistics New Zealand, 
Wellington, 2017) at 61 states the greatest “consented” use of water is from irrigation and hydro-
electricity. 
144Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council One Plan 2014 (Horizons Regional Council, 
Palmerstone North, 2014) at 5-2. 
145 Bay of Plenty Regional Council Region-wide Water Quantity – Proposed Plan Change 9 
Version 3.8 (Bay of Plenty Regional Council, Tauranga, 2017). Water Quality Rule 1 defines 
reasonable domestic needs as a restriction on property size to 5 hectares and the take is not more 
than 15 cubic metres per day.  
   Environment Southland Regional Council Proposed Southland Water and Land Plan 
(Environment Southland Regional Council, Invercargill, 2016). sets the restrictions on surface 
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Previously, dairy-shed washdown water was not subject to the level of control and 
information collection that is now being included in some regional plans.146  
 
 Major Water Takes and Irrigation in Regional Plans 
Some water takes which are actually minor in nature have a higher profile than the 
cumulative effect of water takes that are from a major water use sector.147 Regional 
council statistics show that water for irrigation accounts for over half of all 
consented water allocations in New Zealand.148 The lack of actual data on water 
takes has affected the perception of sector-based water use. In 2018, the Auditor 
General audited how freshwater is measured and recommended that central 
government must guide regional councils towards the more efficient use of water.149 
 
water takes at not more than 2000 liters daily and 250 liters per hectare daily, up to a total limit 
of 40 cubic meters daily per “landholding” under Rule 49(a)(i). 
  Greater Wellington Regional Council Proposed Natural Resources Plan For The Wellington 
Region 31 July 2015 (Greater Wellington Regional Council, Wellington, 2015) at Rule 136. For 
example, for a property greater than 20 hectares the limit on the volume per day is 20 cubic 
metres. On the other hand, properties less than 20 hectares have a daily limit of 10 cubic meters. 
   The current Canterbury Land and Water Regional Plan allows "small and community water 
takes" for surface water at specified volumes according to the flow of the waterbody in Rule 
5.111. Groundwater takes are permitted if the take is less than 100 cubic meters daily if the 
property is more than 20 hectares and the bore is less than 20 metres away from the property 
boundary under Rule 5.113.  
The Hawkes Bay Regional Management Plan republished in 2015 includes amendments for the 
Tukituki catchment. The take and use rules in the Plan in Rule 6.7.1 allows for domestic water 
take not exceeding 20 cubic meters daily per property. 
146 Regional Plans that have separate rules for dairyshed washdown water include Waikato 
Regional Council Regional Plan Variation 6 and the Bay of Plenty Regional Council Proposed 
Plan Change 9. 
147 Dominic Harris “Ecan accused of ‘bending the law’ over consents for water bottling plants”   
stuff.co.nz (16 March 2018) states that a water take consent by two companies in Canterbury is 
being challenged by campaigners, Aotearoa Water Action, in court. The companies had consents 
granted to take “8.8 billion litres of water a year” or “24 million litres a day”. The concerns 
raised relate to the sustainability of the consents and their potential to affect municipal water 
supply. However, in terms of volumetric comparison to consents for irrigation in regions. 
Concerns have also been raised about water permits being sold to overseas investors see Patrick 
Gower “Government ‘not concerned’ over massive water consent sale” Newshub (15 March 
2017).  
148 Ministry for the Environment & Statistics NZ (2017) New Zealand’s Environmental Reporting 
Series: Our fresh water 2017, above n 36, at 59 stated “More than half the water allocated (or 
consented) by councils is for irrigation, but we do not know how much of this is actually used”. 
149 Auditor General Monitoring How Water is Used for Irrigation (Auditor General, Wellington, 
2018). It confirmed that water meters had largely been installed in the six regional councils they 
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Water for irrigation has been a problem in some regions such as the Manawatu- 
Wanganui and Canterbury regions. The following analysis draws upon specific 
examples of regional plans that address water takes with reference to irrigation.  
 
The Horizons Regional Council Regional Plan, entitled One Plan, stated that while 
the Horizons Region has usually maintained adequate access to water for people’s 
needs water still needs to be managed in response to dairy farming 
intensification:150 
There has been a substantial intensification within the agricultural 
sector in recent years. This has contributed to a vibrant and booming 
regional economy but has also increased pressure on the Region’s 
water resources. There has been a significant increase in irrigation 
demand and the amount of nutrients leaching to surface water and 
groundwater. Although the impacts of agricultural intensification are 
less obvious than those caused by the major point source discharges 
and abstractions mentioned above, they have increased progressively 
over time.  
The intensification of agriculture was linked to both water quality and water 
quantity in the quote above. Water quality was a particular issue in the region.151 
The Horizons Regional Council has a policy of “reasonable and justifiable need for 
water” that must be met by applicants for certain water uses in Policy 5-12. Water 
for irrigation is subject a “reasonable use test” for their daily abstraction. In setting 
the reasonable use limit the Council can consider “consider land use, crop water use 
requirements, on-site physical factors such as soil water-holding capacity, and 
climatic factors such as rainfall variability and potential evapo-transpiration”. 
 
audited. The collection and use of data was the next step in improving the outcomes for water 
management based on that data.  
150 Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council One Plan 2014 (Horizons Regional Council, 
Palmerston North, 2014) at 5-2; Decision of the Environment Court Manawatu-Wanganui 
Proposed One Plan Appeals, Part 5 Surface Water Quality – Non Point Source Discharges; 
Andrew Day v Manawatu-Wanganui District Council 31 August 2012 [2012] EnvC 182. 
151 Horticulture New Zealand v Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council [2013] NZHC 2942 [24 
September 2013] at [20]. 
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These rules are linked the justification for water use to the characteristics of the soil. 
The basis for the Regional Council decision includes objective scientific measures 
and estimates. Objective scientific measures may assist in preventing speculative 
applications for irrigation water that go beyond the applicant’s reasonable needs.  
Further issues arose with the One Plan in 2017 when it was alleged that the Horizons 
Regional Council failed to implement water quality rules 14.2 and 14.4.152 The 
decision set a precedent for all regional councils to fully implement regional plan 
rules.  
Water allocation in Canterbury is a practical example of the failure of the RMA. 
Problems with Canterbury’s regional planning for water allocation were identified 
in 2007.153 Environment Canterbury had not developed a regional water allocation 
plan. Instead, Canterbury had “a long history of experimenting with CG 
[collaborative governance] approaches as a complement to its traditional regulatory 
role”. 154  The collaborative governance processes worked with non-government 
groups outside the statutory processes of the RMA and usually involved farmers 
voluntarily forming an irrigation collective.155 The first benefit of this approach is 
that such groups provide a means to encourage greater involvement in water 
allocation with benefits such as “greater flexibility to informally trade water 
amongst members”.156 The other benefit put to farmers in the Canterbury region 
 
152 Wellington Fish and Game Council v Manawatu Wanganui Regional Council [2017] NZEnvC 
37. Wellington Fish and Game Council, sought a declaration under section 310 of the RMA for 
the Court to investigate if a “power or function” under the Act was omitted or contravened. 
153 Minister for the Environment, Minister of Agriculture Appendix 1 Background on Sustainable 
Water Program of Action in New Start for Freshwater Cabinet Paper (n.d.). 
 These problems were “contrary” to the expectations of central government. See Ministry for the 
Environment Briefing Paper: Joint Ministers meeting with MAF and MfE Reference 08-B-0260 
(Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 2008). 
154 Cameron Holly and Andrew Lawson. "Implementing environmental law and collaborative 
governance." (2015) Implementing Environmental Law 238; The Canterbury Water 
Management Strategy was an example of collaborative governance developed with the guidance 
of the Canterbury Mayoral Forum and published in November 2009.  
155 Above at 244. 
156 Above at 245. 
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was to “stave off regulation”.157 In theory, collaborative governance provides more 
“flexible and cheaper regulations”, can bring together divided communities, “offers 
environmental outcomes that are as good as or better than top down regulation” and 
can expand democratic participation.158 However, the experience in Canterbury 
challenges these theoretical assertions.  
In 2010, the Minister for the Environment and Minister of Local Government 
initiated the review of Environment Canterbury.159 The review found problems with 
the implementation of the RMA by Environment Canterbury. It found “a significant 
gap, characterised as “enormous and unprecedented”, between what needs to be 
done in Canterbury to appropriately manage water and ECan’s ability to do so”.160  
One of the key omissions was that Environment Canterbury did not have a statutory 
plan for water management:161 
It is not compulsory under the RMA for regional councils to develop 
statutory plans for the management of fresh water. However, it is 
surprising, given the complexity of Canterbury’s ground and surface 
water resources and the degree of demand for access to these 
resources, that ECan [Environment Canterbury] does not have an 
operative first-generation plan for managing water in the region. 
A possible reason for the lack of progress was stated in another research paper, 
published before the Review Group Report, identifying a policy gridlock on water 
modelling. 162  The gridlock involved perceived differences between water 
allocation models. “The centre of Canterbury’s struggle over water management is 
 
157 Above at 245 citing interview NZI, Government.  
158 Ann Brower "Is collaboration good for the environment? Or, what’s wrong with the Land and 
Water Forum?" (2016) 40(3) NZJE 390. 
 159 Rt Hon Wyatt Creech (Chair), Doug Martin Greg Hill and Doug Low. Investigation of the 
Performance of Environment Canterbury under the Resource Management Act and Local 
Government Act (prepared for Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 2010). 
160 At [6]. 
161 Above. 
162 Edward P Weber, Ali Memon and Brett Painter “Science, Society, and Water Resources in New 
Zealand: Recognizing and Overcoming A Societal Impasse” (2011) 13 J. Environ. Pol. Plann.49-
6. Quotes used in this paragraph are at 50. 
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the science that maps the hydrological characteristics of the region”.163 On the one 
hand, the “Aqualinc” model “supports the continuing withdrawal of 
groundwater”.164 On the other hand, Environment Canterbury, environmentalists 
and urban residents tended to find greater validity in the computer modelling, i.e. 
the “bathtub” model. The “bathtub” model supported the idea that water takes in 
one aquifer impacted regional water availability. Consequently, the different 
scientific models resulted in a “science impasse” with each side “convinced that 
their respective approach should guide water management decisions and policies”. 
165 The Review Group report did not go into detail regarding the scientific debate 
between Environment Canterbury and development interests, nor the negative 
impact it was having by stalling water allocation planning.166 
The Review Group report also identified the slow processing of resource 
consents.167 First, the expansion of the dairy industry in the region increased the 
number of resource consent applications. Second, when Environment Canterbury 
notified the Natural Resources Regional Plan in 2004 the Plan contained 
“sustainable take limits” which increased the number of water consent applications. 
Third, as water allocations reached sustainable limits in some areas the “first-come 
first-served” rule created a “gold rush” effect. For Environment Canterbury the 
“first come, first served” priority rule led to applicants wanting to ensure they had 
access to water by applying for consents first. The demand for water “was 
exacerbated by the boom in dairy farming and other rural production (which 
required irrigated land), and the competing demands of energy generators” and as 
a result “water became a very valuable resource”. 168  Environment Canterbury 
should have anticipated the land use changes to dairy conversion and the “gold 
 
163 At 50. 
164 At 50. 
165 At 50. 
166 At 36 states that policy development was restricted by a conservative approach and the 
processing of resrouce concent applications was influenced by the perception that “the 
organisation (resource consenting) is science led rather than science informed”. 
167 At 27. 
168 At 27. 
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rush” effect that followed.169 Due to the increased numbers of consent applications, 
consents were “bundled” but without using s37A(2) of the RMA that allows for an 
extension of processing time where applicants agree to an extension. 
Staffing issues also hindered the processing of water allocation applications. 
Incomplete or substandard applications under section 88 of the RMA were accepted 
to help facilitate “improvement without formally seeking additional information via 
s92 of the RMA”.170 While this practice showed an effort to work with applicants, 
it also slowed the processing of applications. The lack of qualified staff in planning 
and resource management was recognised as “not unique to ECan but was being 
experienced across the country”.171 The Review Group report described planning 
and policy development within Environment Canterbury as “narrow and 
conservative”.172 While the Review Group report was critical of staffing issues and 
the lack of a wider planning approach, it did not delve into the scientific “impasse” 
affecting water allocation planning. 
 
These problems with Canterbury water planning and consent processing resulted in 
direct central government intervention. The purpose section of the Environment 
Canterbury (Temporary Commissioners and Improved Water Management) Act 
2010 in section 3(a) was to “provide for the replacement of the elected members of 
the Canterbury Regional Council with commissioners who will act as the Council’s 
governing body”. The role of the Commission was stated in section 3(b) of the Act 
as addressing “issues relevant to the efficient, effective, and sustainable 
management of fresh water in the Canterbury region”. The Act gave central 
 
169 At 27. 
170 Creech and others above n 154. 
171 At 27 Fn 10. 
172 At 36. The views of external parties are cited in stating “officers” reports on plans are poor – 




government power to control the situation. Section 10 allowed the Minister for the 
Environment to appoint between four and seven Commissioners to replace the 
elected board of Environment Canterbury. Section 22 suspended the 2010 and 2013 
election of Commissioners to the board. The nature of central government’s ad hoc 
intervention in Canterbury resonates with the concerns that Palmer raised over a 
return to centralised planning for water allocation, something that the RMA was 
designed to mitigate.173 Had national direction and regional plans in place, the 
Canterbury experience would have been the antithesis of water allocation under the 
RMA framework. Without the complete water allocation framework, Canterbury 
became a prime example of water over-allocation under the RMA. Over-allocation 
and water for irrigation are intertwined in the Canterbury region.  
 
The current Regional Freshwater Plan prepared by the Taranaki Regional Council 
implements the requirements of the National Policy Statement Freshwater 
Management 2014 through a Progressive Implementation Programme for a Draft 
Freshwater Land and Management Plan.174 The Progressive Implementation Plan 
details the progress that has been made on planning for water allocation and water 
quality issues. Taranaki Regional Council has also prepared further plans that 
address aspects of the National Policy Statement Freshwater Management 2014. In 
2017, the Regional Council released the Taranaki Regional Requirements for Good 
Farm Management, which addressed issues relating to dairy effluent, wetland 
protection and riparian management. The Regional Council aims to fully implement 
the National Policy Statement Freshwater Management by the year 2025, or 2030.  
 
173 See Palmer, above n 42. 
174 First released in 2015 as the Taranaki Regional Council Implementation Programme for the 
National Policy Statement Freshwater Management (Taranaki Regional Council, New 
Plymouth, 2015). The Implementation Program was revised in 2018 in response to the review of 
the National Policy Statement Freshwater Management 2014.Taranaki Regional Council 
Progressive Implementation Programme for the National Policy Statement Freshwater 
Management (Taranaki Regional Council, New Plymouth, 2018). 
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The current Regional Freshwater Plan is extensive and includes the method 
and reasoning for adopting a particular policy approach. In Chapter 5 of the 
Plan, “The Use and Development of Freshwater”, the contextual summary 
acknowledges the various industries that rely upon water in the region 
including municipal water supply, hydroelectric power generation, water 
used in primary production industries such as freezing works, dairy and 
petroleum.175 While the document does not specifically mention water takes 
for irrigation, the summary does provide a detailed view of freshwater issues 
facing the region. However, there is no ranking of the issues in terms of their 
importance. In comparison, some of the other Regional Plans lack a detailed 
context such as the one provided by Taranaki.176 Policy 6.1.5(b) is unique in 
that it attempts to deal with competing demands for surface water as follows: 
b) where there are competing uses for water, or in catchments identified in 
Policy 6.1.2, the degree of community or regional benefit from the taking, 
use, damming or diversion as distinct from private or individual benefit 
needs to be taken into account. 
The case law on competing claims to water clearly does not allow for a comparative 
assessment of competing applications. 177  However, in the Taranaki Council 
Regional Freshwater Plan there is a specific rule allowing the consideration of 
competing use when processing an application for surface water takes.  
The “Explanation” for Policy 6.1.5 is reproduced in full below because it is such a 
departure from rules in other regional plans, which generally do not focus on 
competing applications in such a direct manner. This section is also included 
because of the case law regarding competing applications and the emphasis on the 
priority rule for applications to be determined under the “first-come, first-served” 
precedent.178 
Policy 6.1.5 sets out a number of specific matters which the Taranaki 
Regional Council will take into account in assessing resource consent 
applications for the taking, use, damming or diversion of water. These 
matters in the main relate to determining water allocation priorities among 
competing users and means whereby water users can avoid, remedy or 
mitigate any adverse environmental effects of the activity. The Taranaki 
Regional Council will consider the need to ensure that surface water is 
available for reasonable domestic needs, and for stock watering and 
 
175 Taranaki Regional Council Regional Freshwater Plan (Taranaki Regional Council, New 
Plymouth, 2001) at 37. 
176 For example, the Northland Regional Council decided not to take this approach as indicated in 
the introduction to its Regional Plan. In terms of specific water allocation issues the Water 
Resources Plan states the “potential for conflict between competing users” at times when there 
are lower flow levels. 
177 See discussion below in this Chapter at “10 Determining Prorities for Freshwater Allocation”. 
178 Above. A full account of the “first-come, first-served” included below. 
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firefighting purposes. Where there are competing uses for water, the 
Taranaki Regional Council will consider the degree of community or 
regional benefit from the activity as distinct from private benefits or benefits 
that arise primarily to individuals. Where there are no competing uses, the 
Taranaki Regional Council will allocate water on a ‘first-come, first-served’ 
basis. In either event, water allocated may be transferred to other water users 
in accordance with Policy 6.1.9. Policy 6.1.5 requires further, that applicants 
justify the need for the water sought, ie, that the volumes sought are 
reasonable having regard to the intended use and local conditions, and that 
water be used efficiently with a minimum of waste. The Taranaki Regional 
Council will also take into account what alternative water supplies, or water 
collection or storage methods have been considered.  
The policy statement above maintains that where there are no competing 
applications for water take the “first-come, first-served” rule applies. However, if 
the surface water body is approaching a situation where granting one application 
may exclude another, then wider community benefits can be taken into 
consideration 179  However, the “first-come first-served” precedent does not 
distinguish between applications in the manner that the rule has on the basis of 
competing uses 180  The “first-come, first-served” precedent requires regional 
councils to process applications in the order that they are received, without making 
comparisons with other potential applications. Making comparisons with other 
water permit applications conflicts with the “first-come, first-served” precedent. 
From a legal perspective, such a conflict is problematic.  
 Determining priorities for water allocation 
New Zealand does not have a specific list of priorities that determine the outcome 
of water allocation applications. As explained above, regional councils set the 
guidelines for water allocation. These rules specify when water allocations are 
allowed or require an application for a resource consent to be lodged with the 
regional council. Regional councils are not required to provide a list of priorities 
 
179  The taking and use of groundwater is addressed separately in the Water Resources Plan. 
Groundwater availability is under less stress than surface water. The take and use of groundwater is 
regulated to ensure that it’s take and use remains within the sustainable extraction limit for the 
aquifer. Rule 46 of the Plan permits the take of water of up to 50 cubic metres per day. The Taranaki 
Regional Council has not included the competing water takes rule (used for surface water allocation) 
in the groundwater allocation rules.  
180 See discussion below in this chapter “How does New Zealand determine priorities for water 
allocation and why is it important?” 
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for water allocation. As a result of the lack of guidance on priority, the issue of 
priority between competing applications may be litigated in court. This section 
examines how the court determines issues of priority between competing 
applications. It shows that ultimately, the court is not considering the merits of one 
application against another because the RMA does not allow for this type of 
comparison to occur. The analysis also shows the development of precedent with 
its reliance on property-type concepts. 
 
Fleetwing Farms v Marlborough District Council was the first case under the RMA 
to consider the treatment of competing applications for the same resource.181 In this 
case, the Marlborough District Council received two competing applications for 
mussel farming in the same area of seabed. Granting one application would exclude 
the other. Initially, Aqua King filed a resource consent application in September 
1992 to establish a marine farm in Port Underwood. The Marlborough District 
Council requested further information from Aqua King before the application could 
be processed.182  Then, in November 1992, Fleetwing Farms’ application for a 
mussel farming in the same area of Port Underwood was also accepted by the 
Council. 183  Later, the Council advised Fleetwing Farms it made an error in 
accepting both applications for the same area of water. Eventually, both 
applications were heard and declined on the same day.  
In the litigation history of this case, it proceeded on appeal to the Environment 
Court, High Court and Court of Appeal before being reconsidered by the 
Environment Court. The Court of Appeal directed the Environment Court to 
reconsider the applications to determine which applicant had priority under the 
 
181 Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council [1997] 3 NZLR 257 (CA). 
182 Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council W101/97 [1997] EnvC 362 (26 
November 1997) at 3. 
183 Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council [1996] NZRMA 369 (HC). 
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relevant administrative provisions of the RMA.184 The Court of Appeal found that 
the statute provided timetabled requirements for resource consent processing and 
provided a careful analysis of relevant sections to show that a comparative analysis 
is not allowed under the RMA.185 This assessment guided the Environment Court 
in determining which applicant had priority where the applications were for the 
same resource and similar activity.  
The Environment Court considered the role of sustainable management in 
determining which applicant had priority:186 
The purpose of the Act is the promotion of sustainable management 
of natural resources – in this case the coastal marine area of Jerdens 
Bay. So what is required of a consent authority in processing 
applications for the allocation of natural resources is prompt 
advancement of, or active support for, the form of management set out 
in the timetabling provisions. 
The Environment Court also considered whether the merits of one application 
should be compared to those of another potential applicant. The Court considered 
the previous law, the Marine Farming Act 1971, where the likelihood of financial 
success of an applicant’s proposal was relevant in deciding whether or not to grant 
a resource consent.187 However, the Environment Court found that the RMA did 
not contain a similar requirement to consider the financial success of an application. 
The Court concluded that there was “nothing in the Act to warrant refusing an 
application on the ground that another applicant would or might meet a higher 
standard than the Act specified”. 188  Specifically, the RMA “does not regulate 
competing applications”. 189  In the absence of a statutory rule for determining 
 
184 Fleetwing Farms Limited v Marlborough District Council W101/97 [1997] EnvC 362 (26 
November 1997) at 3.The decision as to priority between Fleetwing Farms and Aqua King was 
referred back to the Environment Court following the Court of Appeal decision in Fleetwing 
Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council [1997] 3 NZLR 257 (CA).  
185 Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council [1997] 3 NZLR 257 (CA). 
186 Fleetwing Farms Limited v Marlborough District Council W101/97 [1997] EnvC 362 (26 
November 1997) at 8. 
187 Marine Farming Act 1971, s 8(3). 
188 At 8. 
189 Fleetwing Farms Limited v Marlborough District Council W101/97 [1997] EnvC 362 (26 
November 1997) at 8. 
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priority between competing uses for water allocation, priority by time emerged as 
the method by which priority between competing applications for a resource 
consent would be determined. Thus, the first applicant to have a complete 
application ready to be accepted for lodgement by the regional council should be 
the first to be heard, a situation which is referred to as the “first-come, first-served” 
rule for water allocation. In subsequent cases, the Court has applied this precedent 
as parties focus on the administrative aspects of the RMA. The following decisions 
show the development of this priority rule for water allocation and its implications. 
 
On 29 March 2001, Geotherm Group applied for a resource consent to develop a 
geothermal power station. Contact Energy, the second respondent, applied the next 
day for a resource consent to access geothermal fluids in a different location but 
from the same resource, the Wairakei geothermal field. Both applicants were asked 
for further information. Contact Energy’s application was the first to be ready for 
public notification, while Geotherm Group was the first to meet the requests for 
further information. The Waikato Regional Council followed the precedent in 
Fleetwing Farms v Marlborough District Council in determining that Contact 
Energy’s application was the first to be ready for public notification, which meant 
it should be heard first. The Environment Court confirmed that Contact Energy had 
priority. 190  The High Court confirmed that priority should be given to the 
application that is first in time ready for notification. The High Court declined to 
make the declarations sought by Geotherm Group that it had priority because it had 




190 Geotherm Group Ltd v Waikato Regional Council (2002) 9 ELRNZ 75 (EnvC). 
191 Geotherm Group Ltd v Waikato Regional Council (2003) 9 ELRNZ 335 (HC). 
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The Court applied the non-derogation principle in determining the outcome of this 
case. An existing water permit allocating all the water in the catchment to Meridian 
Energy, a power generation company, was challenged by a later applicant wanting 
water for an irrigation scheme. The plaintiff, Aoraki Water Trust, effectively 
challenged the “first-come, first-served” precedent established in Fleetwing Farms 
v Marlborough District Council, as discussed above. In March 2003, Aoraki Water 
Trust lodged an application to take water from Lake Tekapo for an irrigation 
scheme.192 Meridian Energy already held a consent to take all the water from Lake 
Tekapo for electricity generation. On 31 March 2003, Meridian Energy sought a 
declaration under s 311 of the RMA to provide certainty regarding the extent of 
rights granted under the water permit it held. 
The legal arguments from both parties were based on the nature of property rights 
in a water permit. On the one hand, Aoraki argued that the nature of rights in 
Meridian’s water permit did not prevent it from applying for water from Lake 
Tekapo too. Aoraki argued that the nature of the rights held by Meridian Energy 
were “no more than a privilege and permission” subject to “natural events” and 
“any later grant of permits to others”.193 Aoraki argued there was a distinction 
between a “water right” and “water permit” and a “water permit” issued under the 
RMA was “not a property right”:194 
A water permit is not a property right because, although it carries a 
valuable economic right, it is not freely transferable, does not usually 
give an exclusive right to the water specified in the permit, and cannot 
guarantee its availability. Its economic value and limited 
transferability does not thereby convert the permit into a property right 
because, as noted, the effect of a grant to take natural water is to make 
lawful what would otherwise be unlawful. In this context s 122, which 
declares that a resource consent is neither real nor personal property 
except in limited circumstances, is relevant.… 
 
192 Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy [2005] 2 NZLR 268 (HC).  
193 At [22]. 
194 At [22]. 
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In response, Meridian submitted that a water permit was a “legal determination” 
allocating all the water flowing through the catchment into Lake Tekapo. 195 
Meridian’s contention of an exclusive right to water under the water permit was 
also based on property rights arguments. It argued that once the Council issued the 
water permit, the permit holder was “immune from enforcement procedures relating 
to the permitted activity”.196  
The Court decided against Aoraki. From a practical perspective, the Court found 
that accepting Aoraki’s position, to reject the “first-come, first-served” priority rule, 
would place limits on councils’ ability to manage water allocation.197 The Court’s 
second line of reasoning examined the status of a water permit in property law. 
However, section 122(1) of the RMA expressly states that “A resource consent is 
neither real nor personal property”. In applying property law concepts to a water 
permit, the Court determined that a further allocation of a water permit to Aoraki 
would derogate from the water permit held by Meridian Energy. 198 The Court 
applied the property law principle of “non-derogation” from a grant in determining 
Meridian Energy’s position as the exclusive holder of water in Lake Tekapo, which 
confirmed its rights under its water permit. Lake Tekapo was fully allocated by the 
water permit held by Meridian Energy. The Court’s decision confirmed the 
exclusive nature of Meridian Energy’s access to the water allocated under the 
permit.  
The decision was later critiqued by Barton for confusing property rights in a 
resource consent with the water itself and conflicting with the requirement under 
section 122 of the RMA.199 There were sufficient administrative provisions that 
would have resulted in the same legal outcome without relying upon property 
 
195 At [23]. 
196 At [25]. 
197 At [28]. 
198 At [34]. 
199 Barry Barton “The Nature of Resource Consents: Statutory Permits or Property Rights” paper 
presented to New Zealand Law Society Environmental Law: National Issues Intensive 
Conference, July 2001, 51. 
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rights.200 It is important to understand that the non-derogation principle would not 
be followed in later cases, as discussed in Hampton v Canterbury Regional Council 
below. In Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy it is evident that the Courts were 
taking an approach which was not a part of the RMA water allocation framework. 
The evidence supporting the fact that there was a divergence from the RMA each 
time property law concepts were applied is the link with transferability. The 
inclusion of property-related concepts in allocation water would only have made 
sense from legal policy development if there was a concurrent development of 
transferability mechanisms for water permits.201 Under the RMA, transferability of 
water permits has limited statutory recognition. Hence, it was always the 
administrative provisions of the RMA that underpinned water allocation, not 
property law-related concepts.  
The principle of non-derogation was also considered in Southern Alps Air Ltd v 
Queenstown Lakes District Council.202 The facts of this case are summarised as 
follows. Southern Alps Air Limited, a commercial jet boat operator, applied for a 
resource consent to operate on Lake Wanaka and the Wilkin River. The regional 
council declined the application. The Environment Court decision also denied 
Southern Alps Air the resource consent. The Environment Court decision was based 
on two grounds: safety principles and non-derogation of the water permit.203 The 
High Court reversed the Environment Court ruling on two grounds: the nature of 
rights in a resource consent and the application of maritime rules that could assist 
in addressing safety issues. In the High Court, River Jet argued that legal acceptance 
 
200 Barry Barton “Different kinds of argument for applying property law to resource consents” 
(2016) RMJ 1 at 1. 
201 Above at 2:  
   The grant of these incidents of property recognised the advantages of private ordering. 
Transferability might have its benefits, but Parliament did not try to create a world in which 
consents can be freely traded independently of the site for which they were granted. 
Transferability is to be evaluated against the public law criteria of the Act, not in protection of 
the economic interests of the consent holder. 
202 Southern Alps Air Ltd v Queenstown Lakes District Council (2007) 13 ELRNZ 221; [2008]   
NZRMA 47 (HC). 
203 Southern Alps Air Ltd v Queenstown Lakes District Council [2007] NZRMA 119 (EnvC). 
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of the non-derogation argument “was not a question of law, but rather one of fact 
and degree”.204 The grant of a further consent would inhibit the river jet from being 
able to operate without any restrictions on the timing of activities. The High Court 
held there would be no significant derogation if a further resource consent were 
granted.205 In reaching this decision, the Court considered Dart River Safaris v 
Kemp but distinguished it on its facts, concluding that it had limited precedent value 
because it did not have a “derogation assessment”.206 However, the decision in 
Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy was found to be relevant and the High Court 
found that a derogation needs to be significant. The case was then referred back to 
the Environment Court for reconsideration. The Environment Court declined 
Southern Alps Air’s resource consent again on the basis that the aggregate effect 
on amenity values would be too high. The Environment Court also observed the 
following:207 
If the Queenstown Lakes District Council wishes to increase 
competition on the Wilkin River, the remedy is at least partly in its 
hands — for future applications on other rivers anyway. It should give 
single operators fewer trips and make them both for limited terms and 
non-aggregative. 
In this instance, an initial application for a resource consent was lodged in 2005 and 
the final decision of the Environment Court was received in 2010. The extensive 
litigation history gave rise to significant costs for both the parties. Nevertheless, the 
principle of non-derogation was confirmed. This case advanced the non-derogation 
principle by clarifying that for derogation of a water permit to occur there must be 
a significant derogation.  
 
 
204 Southern Alps Air Ltd v Queenstown Lakes District Council (2007) 13 ELRNZ 221: [2008]  
NZRMA 47 (HC) at [33]. 
205 At [47]. 
206 Dart River Safaris v Kemp & Anor [2000] NZRMA 440 (HC). 
   Southern Alps Air Ltd v Queenstown Lakes District Council (2007) 13 ELRNZ 221[2008]: 
NZRMA 47 (HC).at [37].  
207 Southern Alps Air Ltd v Queenstown Lakes District Council [2010] EnvC 381: ENV-2006-
CHC-7, 8 November 2010 at [102]. 
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This case concerned competing applications for water from the Waimakariri and 
Rakaia Rivers. Central Plains Water Trust had applied to take water in 2001, an act 
which the Canterbury Regional Council later determined required notification. 
However, the Trust could not proceed with the notification until a further resource 
consent for the proposed water use was filed. In 2005, Ngai Tahu Properties filed a 
complete water take and use application to irrigate 5700 ha of land to convert 
forestry to pasture. 208  The Environment Court granted Ngai Tahu preliminary 
consent in a decision issued on 20 April 2006, which acknowledged that if Central 
Plains Water Trust had priority, then Ngai Tahu’s conditions of consent would limit 
their access to water. 209  Ngai Tahu then filed for a declaration from the 
Environment Court that it had priority.210 The key issue before the Courts was 
which application had priority on the basis of being the first to file or the first 
application ready for public notification. The Environment Court followed 
Geotherm v Waikato Regional Council in holding that the notification stage was a 
trigger for determining priority between the parties. The Environment Court found 
that when Central Plains Water Trust’s application was put on hold by the 
Canterbury Regional Council that meant Ngai Tahu was first in reaching the 
notification stage and had priority over Central Plains Water Trust:211 
The notion of “first come first served” was claimed in argument to 
favour the approach to priority espoused on each side. For CPWT, a 
modest proposal was said to be likely to require less research and 
preparation time, thus enabling an applicant to submit its consent 
applications relatively speedily, by contrast with an applicant seeking 
to promote a relatively large and complex scheme. We accept that that 
may appear unfair from a level playing field perspective, but it may 
also be argued that a large project is likely to generate greater effects, 
so that priority should not attach merely because the proposal is large 
in scope. An element of “unfairness” might be thought to arise were 
such an applicant allowed to proceed without the consent authority 
having an appropriate understanding of the nature of the proposal in 
question. 
 
208 Re Ngai Tahu Property Ltd Christchurch C104/06, (EnvC) (21 August 2006) at [2]. 
209 At [6]. 
210 Above. 
211 At [80]. 
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The Environment Court granted the declaration confirming Ngai Tahu had priority. 
The subsequent appeal by Central Plains Water Trust in the Environment Court was 
unsuccessful. The High Court also found in favour of Ngai Tahu.212 However, the 
issue of a larger development being trumped by a later less complex proposal 
continued to be of relevance. Leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal was granted 
with the acknowledgement that not only were matters of law requiring confirmation 
but also because the scale of the proposed development meant many parties would 
be affected by the outcome of the decision.213  
In the Court of Appeal, counsel for both sides accepted the “first-come, first-served” 
rule and presented arguments based on procedural issues.214 It was confirmed that 
“priority is on a first come, first served basis” and the Court held that the priority 
rule by the earlier time of application is “subject to exception”.215 However, as 
neither party made submissions challenging the appropriateness of the “first-come, 
first-served” rule this point was not addressed further by the Court. Consideration 
of larger developments was perceived as being in the public interest, which should 
not be “trumped or significantly interfered with by later small, simpler inconsistent 
proposals that can be made comprehensively without needing to proceed in 
stages”.216 Central Plains Water Trust was part of a larger irrigation development 
that would proceed in stages. Similar constraints did not bind the later applicant 
regarding the size and scale of its resource consent application. The Court of Appeal 
found in favour of Central Plains Water Trust reversing the decision of the lower 




212 Central Plains Water Trust v Ngai Tahu Properties Ltd (2006) 13 ELRNZ 63 (HC). 
213 Central Plains Water Trust v Ngai Tahu Properties Ltd Christchurch CIV-2006-409-2116, 8 
February 2007 (HC). 
214 Central Plains Water Trust v Ngai Tahu Properties Ltd [2008] NZCA 71; (2008) 14 ELRNZ 
61; [2008] NZRMA 200 at [7]. 
215 At [26] and [27] per Baragwanath J. 
216 At [59]. 
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The Court has expressed that it considers the “first-come, first-served” principle as 
a “working solution” to the legal problem of how to determine priority between 
competing water allocation applications:217 
[89] There can scarcely be a more difficult and important issue in this day 
and age than the allocation of priority to water rights as applications are 
made for resource consents. As matters stand in New Zealand, because there 
is not a distinct statutory solution our courts have had to step in 
“interstitially” and come up with a working solution. As a very general 
proposition, the issue is presently determined by a “first come first served” 
approach. What has caused difficulty in this particular case is the application 
of that formula, which was evolved in a relatively simple context in 
Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council [1997] 3 NZLR 257, 
to a vastly more complex context.  
The “simple context” referred to in the quote above in Fleetwing Farms v 
Marlborough District Council was that both applicants were commercial 
competitors applying for a resource consent for essentially the same type of activity, 
marine farming. As both applicants were applying for similar purposes, it would 
not be correct to compare one application with another because the effects of 
granting a permit to either applicant would be the same or similar. However, in 
Central Plains Water Trust v Ngai Tahu Properties the applicants were not taking 
water for the same use and it is “arguable that Fleetwing does not deal with the 
situation where the applicants are not similar commercial competitors”.218 
The Supreme Court issued an interim judgment advising that the Court wished to 
hear arguments on whether the Fleetwing Farms v Marlborough District Council 
principle applied the grounds a consent authority should decide priority between 
competing applications.219 However, before the decision was issued, the parties 
reached an agreement.  
 
 
217 Central Plains Water Trust v Ngai Tahu Properties Ltd [2008] NZCA 71; (2008) 14 ELRNZ 
61; [2008] NZRMA 200 at [89]. 
218 At [37]. 
219 Ngai Tahu Property Ltd v Central Plains Water Trust [2008] NZSC 24. An amicus curiae was 
also to be appointed in order to address these issues. 
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Simon Hampton (Simon) held a resource consent (granted in 2004) to take water to 
irrigate his land. An initial application made by Simon was amended to include his 
cousin’s, Robert Hampton’s (Robert), neighbouring farm. In 2008, Simon applied 
for a portion of the resource consent to be transferred to a third party. Initial 
documents showed that Robert’s land would no longer receive irrigation water.220 
However, Robert was later granted a servient consent that allowed him to take water 
when Simon was not irrigating his land. The consent granted to Robert meant that 
Simon was no longer able to transfer the water to the third party. Simon applied for 
a judicial review of the decision.  
In the High Court, Simon argued that the grant of the second consent to Robert had 
affected his rights under s136 of the RMA to transfer his consent to another site. 
On this point, the Court found that there was no guarantee that the consent would 
be transferred and that any transfer was still subject to meeting the requirements in 
the relevant regional plan. 221  Simon’s main argument was that there was a 
derogation from his grant under the resource consent. The Court distinguished the 
facts of Aoraki v Meridian Energy on the basis that it was dealing with a situation 
where the resource was already fully allocated and where the grant of another 
consent would reduce the amount available to Meridian Energy.222 In this case, 
Simon’s ability to take water was not affected by the fact that Robert was able to 
take water as a servient consent. At all times Simon would be able to take the full 
amount of water as specified in his resource consent:223 
Intrinsically the water is not owned by anyone let alone the consent holder, 
it is managed by the respondent through the Act, and the relevant water plan. 
Upper limits are put on what can be taken by each permit holder. The 
respondent’s role throughout is to ensure that the amount of water granted 
in a consent is reasonable and meets the reasonable irrigation needs of the 
recipient property or properties specified in the application. In this case there 
is no limit placed on Simon’s consent, nor is it in effect varied by Robert's 
consent which is a pure back-stop and subservient right. The two for 
 
220 Hampton v Canterbury Regional Council (Environment Canterbury) [2013] NZRMA 482 (HC) 
at [13]. 
221 At [71]. 
222 At [80]. 
223 At [84]. 
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example cannot operate simultaneously, and Simon’s right to draw water for 
use clearly takes priority. There has been no derogation from Simon’s grant 
here. 
The High Court dismissed Simon’s appeal for a judicial review of Environment 
Canterbury’s decision. Simon appealed the High Court’s decision in the Court of 
Appeal. 
In the Court of Appeal, the two issues of the ability of Simon to transfer the consent 
to a third party and non-derogation from a resource consent were put before the 
Court. The Court of Appeal confirmed the discretionary nature of regional council 
decision-making powers. Simon could not expect that the transfer would occur 
because “any right of transfer was clearly contingent on the grant of a consent to do 
so”.224 On the point of non-derogation, the Court addressed the decision in Aoraki 
v Meridian Energy, as discussed above, confirming that the decision was correct in 
the circumstances of a fully allocated catchment. The Court went on to astutely 
distinguish the facts of Simon’s consent. In addressing the non-derogation 
argument, the Court focused first on the question of the nature of property rights in 
the resource consent by referring to s122(1) of the RMA. The Court stated that a 
claim to property would only exist where the facts show that “contrary to s 122(1) 
of the Act, Simon’s resource consent is seen as conferring a property right”.225 A 
further observation was that Simon had not agreed to charge Robert for the water 
linked to Robert’s land:226 
Accepting, as he must, that under CRC042233.3 the water taken could only 
be used to irrigate Robert’s land, any detriment he suffered by the grant of 
CRC11062 was simply an inability to charge Robert for any water taken 
from the bore on Simon’s land and used on Robert’s land. 
It is relevant that Simon was unable to secure payment for the water that would be 
used by Robert. An alternative option for Simon was to enter into a contract with 
Robert, instead of a third party, to sell the water.  
 
224 Hampton v Canterbury Regional Council (Environment Canterbury) [2015] NZCA 509; (2015) 
18 ELRNZ 825; [2016] NZRMA 369 at [86]. 
225 Hampton v Canterbury Regional Council (Environment Canterbury) [2015] NZCA 509; (2015) 
18 ELRNZ 825; [2016] NZRMA 369 at [89] 
226 At [89]. 
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The Court of Appeal looked closely into the findings in Aoraki Water Trust v 
Meridian Energy focusing on the arguments around the concept of property and 
non-derogation. Meridian Energy argued its consents should be retained on the 
grounds of legitimate expectation. The application of legitimate expectation was 
declined by the Court of Appeal with regard to Simon’s circumstances, as explained 
above. Hampton v Canterbury Regional Council (Environment Canterbury) stated 
that the application of property law concepts and non-derogation to resource 
consents were “problematic” to rely upon.227 The Court made several observations 
about the development of rights to water allocation. It confirmed that natural water 
could not be “owned as property” and recognised that s21 of the Water and Soil 
Conservation Act 1967 vested the right to use natural water with the Crown. Finally, 
it traced the right of the Crown control of natural water in s354(1)(b) of the RMA. 
The Court of Appeal goes further to identify that reasoning relating to the nature of 
property in a resource consent in Aoraki v Meridian Energy was incorrect:228 
In the circumstances, the statement made in Aoraki (drawing a parallel with 
profits à prendre) that a water permit allows the holder to remove “property”, 
even though “owned by the Crown”, is incorrect. For the same reason it was 
not correct to rely on the non-derogation principle on the basis it was 
common to all relationships which confer a “right in property”. 
The Court of Appeal turned to statutory provisions including s122 of the RMA that 
declares there is neither real nor personal property under the Act except for 
circumstance where the Act provides these rights in limited circumstances.229 The 
analysis of the Court showed that the Act provides for situations where a resource 
consent holder may exercise property-like rights, but that these are limited to those 
situations where the statute defines the rights. An application for leave to appeal the 
decision in the Supreme Court by Simon was dismissed. The matter was not of 
 
227 Hampton v Canterbury Regional Council (Environment Canterbury) [2015] NZCA 509; (2015) 
18 ELRNZ 825; [2016] NZRMA 369 at [99] – [103]. 
228 Hampton v Canterbury Regional Council (Environment Canterbury) [2015] NZCA 509; (2015) 
18 ELRNZ 825; [2016] NZRMA 369 at [103] Citing Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy 
[2005] 2 NZLR 268 (HC) at [35]-[36]. 
229 Hampton v Canterbury Regional Council (Environment Canterbury) [2015] NZCA 509; (2015) 
18 ELRNZ 825; [2016] NZRMA 369 at [105]. 
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“general importance” and the arguments raised against the Aoraki judgement 
“criticisms do not undermine the Aoraki decision itself”.230  
 
The question of property in a resource consent has generated debate. The debate 
centres on the question of the interpretation of Section 122 of the RMA. This section 
states that a resource consent is “neither real nor personal property”. Fraser focused 
on the use of economic concepts to understand the apparent disconnect between a 
resource consent which has value to the holder and how the holder of that resource 
consent can protect his or her interests within the consent.231 Barton’s analysis of 
property rights in a resource consent focuses more closely on s122 and its 
interpretation by the Court in order to show that property law-related concepts are 
not always appropriate when determining the nature of a resource consent.232 These 
commentaries certainly illustrate the problems that affect water allocation in New 
Zealand. It has been suggested that Hampton v Canterbury Regional Council 
(Environment Canterbury) was a “missed opportunity to nudge informed debate 
about them”.233 The Court made several important observations about the public 
nature of rights in natural water. It also confirmed that the principle of “first-come, 
first-served” did apply to comparable applications with similar effects.  
Other resource consent applications are defined by the purpose of the activity. The 
difference with water allocation, however, is that while the water take may be the 
same for competing applications the use of that water take may be different. New 
Zealand has bundled water permits and this is a relevant factor in considering how 
to allocate water to competing applications. Hampton v Canterbury Regional 
 
230 Simon Hampton v Canterbury Regional Council [2016] NZSC 50 at [7]. 
231 Laura Fraser “Property Rights in Environmental Management: The Nature of Resource 
Consents in the Resource Management Act 1991” (2008) NZJEL 12.  
232 Barry Barton “The Nature of Resource Consents: Statutory Permits or Property Rights” (paper 
presented to New Zealand Law Society Environmental Law: National Issues Intensive 
Conference, July 2009) 51. 
233 Trevor Daya-Winterbottom “New Zealand-freshwater allocation: Property rights, non-
derogation from grant and legitimate expectation” (2015) 25(1) Journal of Water Law 38 at 40. 
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Council (Environment Canterbury) clarified this point. The Court could not go 
beyond and look into the substantive reasoning for the ordering of priority because 
the statute does not allow it to do so. Just as Simon Hampton should have provided 
for a contract to charge Robert for the water applied to Robert’s land, it is the role 




This chapter has contributed to the thesis by providing the key elements of water 
allocation law and policy under the RMA. It has shown that the “architects” of the 
RMA envisioned a structure for resource allocation in New Zealand that was 
devolved to the regional level and complete in its formation. The reality was 
something quite different. The regional council responsibility to formulate rules and 
policy in regional resource allocation plans was a “function” of the councils under 
section 30 of the RMA. This meant that there was no legal obligation on regional 
councils to prepare plans within a set time limit, or even at all. At the top of the 
tiered hierarchy of plans contained within the RMA, it was national policy that 
would have provided guidance for regional councils. However, the national policy 
for water management was not promulgated until 2011 and the lack of a national 
policy led to a significant policy gap at the highest level from 1991 until 2011. 
Consequently, the inability to provide national guidance has significantly hampered 
the setting of priorities for water allocation in New Zealand. 
In light of the policy gap, the administrative provisions within the RMA gained 
greater importance in guiding regional council decision making. The interpretation 
of these administrative provisions in the case of Fleetwing Farms v Marlborough 
District Council established the “first come, first served” precedent. The precedent 
is problematic in situations where regional water allocation is close to full allocation 
or over-allocated. It is challenged on the basis of being a method of water allocation 
that is inherently unsustainable because it does not allow regional councils to 
consider alternative uses for water. It also does not allow regional councils to 
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compare one application to another. As a result, it is highly questionable whether 
New Zealand has achieved a method of sustainable or good water allocation 
because potential future use and demand for water cannot be taken into account in 
regional council decision making. 
The analysis of regional plans also showed the level of variability and lack of 
adequate planning for water allocation. In some regions where water allocation 
plans were not formulated central government has intervened. The most spectacular 
intervention has occurred in the Canterbury region. The case study of the 
Canterbury region illustrated problems with the current system of water allocation 
under the “first come, first served” precedent. It remains to be seen whether the 
National Planning Templates introduced through amendments to the RMA in 2017 
will improve the guidance for regional water planning and thus to achieve a greater 
consistency where appropriate.  
Finally, the legal implications of continuing to apply the “first come, first served” 
precedent is that a property rights approach has been applied to address competing 
claims for water allocation. In comparison, section 122 of the RMA does not convey 
property rights in the issuing of water permits. In reconciling these conflicting legal 
positions, the common law has been required to address the appropriateness of 
applying property law concepts to determining water allocation applications. Over 
time the Court has moved towards reinstating the common law position that water 
is not property of the water permit holder in New Zealand. Rather the water permit 
conveys a right to access water which is a public good. 
This chapter provided a detailed account of the problems facing New Zealand water 
allocation under the RMA, with a focus on the legal context. The next chapter will 
build upon the understanding of New Zealand water allocation law and policy by 
assessing more recent attempts to address the water allocation problems identified 
in this chapter. The distinguishing point for the next chapter is that efforts to address 
water allocation problems from 1991 onwards take place once the national level 
policy gap has been filled by the National Policy Statement for Freshwater 
Management 2011 (revised in 2014 and reviewed in 2017). 
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CHAPTER FIVE - NEW ZEALAND WATER 
ALLOCATION LAW AND POLICY 2011 – 2018 
 
 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the government response to water allocation problems 
identified in the previous chapter. The overarching problem was the consequences 
of the water allocation policy gap at the national and regional level from 1991 to 
2011.1 During the period of the policy gap “limited guidance” on water allocation 
policy came from central government putting regional councils under pressure to 
make “almost all the most technically and politically difficult decisions on water 
management”.2 The previous chapter showed that the policy gap, together with 
water allocation under a “first come, first served” method3 contributed to further 
over-allocation in some catchments.4 Central government responded with policy 
programmes to address these water allocation issues; these are the focus of this 
chapter. 5  Thereafter further policy programmes including the Land and Water 
 
1 See Christina Robb Water Allocation a Strategic Overview (Ministry for the Environment, 
Wellington, 2001) which identified the problems with the lack of adequate regional planning for 
water allocation; Lincoln Environmental Information on Water Allocation in New Zealand 
Report No 4375/1 (Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 2000) for a more general 
discussion of water allocation issues; Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet Sustainable 
Development for New Zealand Program of Action (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
Wellington, 2003) for a policy program for sustainable development in New Zealand which 
addressed freshwater allocation.  
2 New Start for Freshwater Cabinet Paper at [16] 
<https://www.mfe.govt.nz/sites/default/files/new-start-for-fresh-water-paper.pdf> 
3 Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council [1997] 3 NZLR 257 (CA) established the 
“first come, first served” precedent. It was followed in Geotherm Group Ltd v Waikato Regional 
Council (2003) 9 ELRNZ 335 (HC) and Central Plains Water Trust v Ngai Tahu Properties Ltd 
[2008] NZCA 71; (2008) 14 ELRNZ 61; [2008] NZRMA 200, where both parties accepted the 
application of the “first come, first served” rule. 
4 Cabinet Paper Appendix 1 Background on Sustainable Water Program of Action in New Start for 
Freshwater (n.d.) at 28 outlined the limitations of the “first come, first served” method of water 
allocation particularly in regions where there was increased competition for water.  
5 The formation of “national direction” under the RMA can occur in the form of National Policy 
Statements, National Environmental Standards, and the New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement. 
See Resource Management Act 1991, Part 5, Subpart I “National direction”. In 2017, the Act 
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Forum were developed.6 Eventually, in 2011 the first national policy instrument to 
address water allocation was promulgated, the National Policy Statement 
Freshwater Management 2011. 7  These policy initiatives are now examined in 
further detail to measure their level of success in addressing New Zealand’s water 
allocation problems. This chapter will argue that sufficient steps have not been 
taken to address water allocation problems that emerged during the policy gap. The 
starting point of this analysis is the Land and Water Forum.  
 
 The Land and Water Forum  
The Land and Water Forum (the Forum) was the most promising and high profile 
water policy programme put forward by the government. 8  The Forum was 
established in 2008; it was based on collaborative governance principles to 
encourage participation in policy making from government and non-government 
stakeholders. 9  Collaborative governance is environmental decision making 
 
was amended to introduce national planning templates. However, national planning templates 
have not been used yet to implement water allocation planning on a national level.  
  An initial policy programme, the Sustainable Water Programme of Action (SWOPA), was 
released in 2004 with “extensive discussion” in 2005. Cabinet Paper Appendix 1 Background on 
Sustainable Water Programme of Action in New Start for Freshwater (n.d.).  
  Russell. M Fisher and Shona Russell “Water Policy and Regulatory Reform in New Zealand” 
(2011) 27(2) International Journal of Water Resources Development 387 at 388 noted the 
SWOPA was only able to develop some “soft options” for addressing water allocation issues in 
New Zealand; Andrew Hayward “Freshwater Management: Water Markets and Novel Pricing 
Regimes” (2006) 10 NZJEL 215 at 220 described the SWOPA as providing only “vague” 
proposals. 
6 The Forum has produced five reports since 2008. Each of these reports is discussed in this 
chapter.  
7 Central government guidance on the national direction for water allocation was contained in the 
National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management 2011. (Revised in 2014 and reviewed in 
2017). 
8 Ann L Brower “Is collaboration good for the environment? Or, what’s wrong with the Land and 
Water Forum?” (2016) 40(3) NZJE 390. In 2018, the Labour coalition government asked the 
Land and Water Forum to prepare a fifth report to respond to water quality issues. Land and 
Water Forum Land and Water Forum advice on improving water quality: preventing 
degradation and addressing sediment and nitrogen – May 2018 (Land and Water Forum, 
Wellington, 2018) at 4.  
9 The policy programmes prior to the establishment of the Forum are detailed in the previous 
chapter Land and Water Forum Terms of Reference for Land and Water Forum Project (Land 
and Water Forum, Wellington, 2009). The Forum was established in 2008, initially under the 
name the Sustainable Land Use Forum as part of the New Start for Freshwater Programme and 
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involving a broad range of stakeholders using processes that encourage greater 
consensus between the parties. 10  The National-led government adopted a 
collaborative governance approach to water policy development after “increasing 
difficulty in establishing a consensus” across the government and non-government 
stakeholders involved in water policy development. 11  One of the barriers to 
establishing a consensus between parties was that “adversarial processes” were 
dominant in the administration of water permit and allocation processes.12 The 
adversarial stance influenced the level and tone of initial mistrust amongst 
stakeholders. 13  The Forum began with building trust between the participants 
before embarking on policy development. 14  The Forum published recom-
mendations in a series of reports discussed below. From a legal perspective, the 
Forum recommendations do not bind government because the Forum fell outside 
the processes for establishing “national direction” under the RMA.15 The lack of 
legal status is a significant drawback of the Forum in terms of influencing changes 
to water management.  
 
 
later renamed the Land and Water Forum; Guy Salmon and others (2008) “Collaborative 
governance on environmental policies affecting rural land owners: comparing Nordic and New 
Zealand practices” paper presented at the Yale University UNITAR conference on 
environmental governance. 
10 Elizabeth Eppel “Collaborative Governance Case Studies: The Land and Water Forum” (2013) 
Working Paper 13/05 Institute for Governance and Policy Studies, School of Government, 
Victoria University of Wellington at 27. 
11 Above. 
12 Melissa Robson and others “The Collaboration Lab: The Transformative Role of Collaboration 
in Managing our Land and Water” in L. D. Currie and M. J. Hedley (eds) Scient and policy: 
nutrient management challenges for the next generation. Occasional report No. 30. (Fertilizer 
and Lime Research Centre, Massey University, Palmerston North) at 2.  
13 Eppel, above n 10, at 7.  
14 Above.  
15 Resource Management Act 1991, Part 5, Subpart I “National direction”. 
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 First Report of the Land and Water Forum – Identifying 
Problems with Freshwater Allocation 
The First Report of the Land and Water Forum, A Fresh Start for Fresh Water (the 
First Report) focused on water law and policy problems stemming from a lack of 
national guidance and deficiencies in regional policy and planning.16 For example, 
the First Report stated that there was an “absence of strategic process” in managing 
water and issues such as “agriculture, tourism, energy, biodiversity, landscape and 
land use”.17  
The lack of “strategic processes” can be traced back to New Zealand’s institutional 
reforms of government departments responsible for water allocation during the 
1980s. For example, two critical institutional changes occurred. First, the 
government divided water policy development across departments. It was divided 
as follows: The Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries was responsible for irrigation 
water,18 while the Department of Conservation had responsibility for freshwater 
fisheries 19  and the Ministry of the Environment had overall responsibility for 
national water policy development under the RMA. Second, national oversight was 
lost when the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority was abolished in 
1988 and its functions regionalised to water boards.20 Together these two factors 
have led to the lack of strategic oversight as stated in the First Report because the 
national leadership in water allocation was lost.  
 
 
16 Land and Water Forum Report of the Land and Water Forum: A Fresh Start for Fresh Water 
(Land and Water Trust, Wellington, 2010) at vi. 
17 At viii. 
18 Ministry of Works and Development Abolition Act 1988. See discussion on the abolition of the 
Ministry of Works and the redistribution of its functions across government depatments in 
Chapter Three.  
19 Conservation Act 1986, s 6(ab). Section 6(ab) was inserted, on 10 April 1990, by section 4 of 
the Conservation Law Reform Act 1990. The Conservation Law Reform Act 1990 also 
established the New Zealand Fish and Game Council.  
20 Water and Soil Conservation Amendment Act 1988. 
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The First Report stated there were “inconsistencies in our data collection, 
monitoring and analysis” stemming from the lack of hydrological information.21 
One of the causal factors was that “scientific research on water has fallen by about 
one third since the late 1990s” and “no single organisation is tasked with providing 
leadership” in this area.22 Before the promulgation of the RMA, the National Water 
and Soil Conservation Authority collected national hydrological data.23 Following 
the abolition of the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority in 1988 its 
water-related research functions were spread across eight Crown Research 
Institutes.24 A competitive funding model diverted research resources away from 
the collection of long-term hydrological data resulting in a “smaller” hydrometric 
network “with a more variable distribution of sites, less commitment to QA and 
incomplete national archiving of data”. 25  Problems also exist with measuring 
freshwater quality; moreover, the use of averages across different water bodies did 
not fairly represent the true state of water quality in New Zealand.26 These gaps in 
water information contributed to a situation in which there is “no complete, up-to-
date picture of what proportion of water bodies is allocated”.27 Ultimately the scale 
of over-allocation across catchments is not known “and there is no clear baseline 
from which to measure future progress”.28  
 
 
21 First Report of the Land and Water Forum, above n 16, at viii. 
22 Above. 
23 Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 s 14(k). 
24 AD Fenemor, T Davie and S Markham “Hydrological Information in Water Law and Policy: 
New Zealand's Devolved Approach to Water Management” in J Wallace and P Wouters (eds). 
Hydrology and Water Law Bridging the Gap (London, IWA Publishing) at 11.  
25 At 11 
26 Mike Joy (2014, June). The Demise of New Zealand’s Freshwater; Politics and Science. At 
Hamilton Branch of the Royal Society. Also presented at; Christchurch Branch of the Royal 
Society; Wanaka Branch of the Royal Society; Invercargill Branch of the Royal Society and 
Rotorua Branch of the Royal Society.  
27 Cabinet Economic Growth and Infrastructure Committee “Implementing the New Start for Fresh 




Recommendation 28 of the First Report of the Land and Water Forum stated that 
“economic opportunities are lost” due to the lack of direction in water allocation 
when applying the “first come, first served” method of allocation. Furthermore, “an 
absence of limits has resulted in a “water rush” in some catchments as applicants 
seek more water than they need”. The result is that combined with a “inflexible 
water permit transfer system” there is a reduction in water availability for “future 
uses”. It continued by emphasising a lack of transparency in the lack of application 
of water allocation rules by councils in water permit application decision making. 
The “first-in, first-served” method of water allocation contributes to the problem of 
over-allocated catchments with calls for “A more flexible system for transferring 
water permits should be put in place only once over-allocation of water has been 
managed”. 29  The First Report proposed changes; these included changes to 
conditions of consents as they expire so that consents are issued for a shorter 
duration, changing regional plan criteria for allocation decisions to include 
“efficiency and community consideration” or establishing a payment system for 
tendering or auctions of scarce water supplies.30  The third option would mean 
significant changes to water allocation in New Zealand as it is essentially a 
recommendation for market-based water allocation.  
Following the publication of the First Report, the government responded with 
national direction on water policy and a significant commitment to funding 
irrigation projects. The purpose of the close examination of national policy here is 
to show that there was not a close alignment between the recommendations of the 
First Report and national direction provided. 
 
 
29 Land and Water Forum Report of the Land and Water Forum: A Fresh Start for Fresh Water, 
above n 16, at 3. 
30 Land and Water Forum, above n 16, at xi.  
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 National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management 2014 
In 2011, the National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management was 
promulgated. It was revised in 2014 and amended in 2017. Its statutory role is 
providing “national direction” on water policy issues relating to water quality and 
water allocation as follows.31 Objectives B1 to B4 require regional councils to 
phase out over-allocation. 32  Policy B3 and B4 require regional councils to 
encourage efficient allocation and use. Objective B5 states communities can 
provide for their “economic well-being, including productive economic 
opportunities”. Policy B6 is most relevant to over-allocation by requiring “every 
regional council [to] set [ting] a defined timeframe and methods in regional plans 
by which overallocation must be phased out”.33 The methods that may be used to 
phase out over-allocation include “reviewing water permits and consents to help 
ensure the total amount of water allocated in the freshwater management unit” does 
not exceed the limit or cap. However, these examples of “national direction” do not 
address the concerns raised in the First Report regarding the reallocation of water 
and easing the water transfer process. As a result, gaps remain in the national 
direction of water allocation law and policy in New Zealand at the highest level.  
 
 
31 Resource Management Act 1991, ss 45-55. 
32 Policy B1 requires implement the National Policy Statement by having regard to climate change 
and connections between water bodies. Under Policy B2 regional councils making or amending 
regional plans should ensure they “provide for the efficient allocation of fresh water to activities, 
within the limits set to give effect to Policy B1”. 
33 The National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management 2014 also requires addressing over 
allocation to manage water quality too. National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management 
2014 (Amended 2017) at 5.  
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 Funding for Freshwater ‘Clean Up’ and Irrigation after the 
First Report 
The government established two funds following the Land and Water Forum’s First 
Report. These funds were the Fresh Start for Freshwater Clean-Up Fund and the 
Irrigation Acceleration Fund (IAF).34  
The purpose of the IAF was to support irrigation projects. The $35 million Irrigation 
Acceleration Fund (IAF) was established on 1 July 2011 with the potential to 
increase to $400 million.35 The IAF was projected to increase farm production on 
irrigated land in Canterbury, Otago and Marlborough by 64.1%, 12.2% and 6.8% 
respectively. In comparison, the benefits to other regions were projected to range 
from 0.4% to 3.6%.36 The projected benefits for Canterbury far outweighed those 
for any other region. The rationale for the IAF was the anticipated economic 
benefits of irrigation and the perception that private investors would not invest in 
irrigation schemes without government support.37  
However, statistics refute the perception that privately funded irrigation was 
declining. Agricultural production statistics compiled by Statistics New Zealand 
showed that total irrigated land increased significantly from 2007 to 2012. 38  
The total irrigated land in New Zealand increased by 102,000 hectares 
between June 2007 and 2012, new information from the 2012 Agricultural 
 
34 Land and Water Forum Second Report of the Land and Water Forum. Setting Limits for Water 
Quality and Quantity (Land and Water Trust, Wellington, 2012) at xii; For access to policy 
documents leading to the implementation of the Clean Up Fund and the Irrigation Acceleration 
Fund see the Ministry of Environment (2014) Funded projects for Fresh Start for Fresh Water 
Clean-up Fund<http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/water/freshwater/fresh-start-for-fresh-
water/cleanup-fund.html> 
35 Office of the Minister for the Environment. Office of the Minister of Agriculture Fresh Start for 
Fresh Water. – High Level Government Response to the Land and Water Forum Report CAB; 
David Carter 9 May, 2011 Budget 2011: Lifting investment in irrigation 
<http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/budget-2011-lifting-investment-irrigation> 
36 NZ Institute of Economic Research Inc and AgFirst Consultants NZ Ltd Value of irrigation in 
New Zealand: An economy-wide assessment final report to the Ministry for Primary Industries 
(Ministry for Primary Industries, Wellington, 2014) at 8. 
37 Above. 
38 Statistics New Zealand (2013) “Big increase in irrigated land supports more agricultural 
production” Agricultural Production Statistics: June 2012 (final) – Media Release. 
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Production Census shows. “Canterbury had the biggest increase in irrigated 
area, with an extra 60,000 hectares since 2007…”. 
The justification of the IAF relied upon an economic analysis to support the need 
for a fund. Statistics on the growth of irrigation challenge the assertion that 
government-funded irrigation was necessary.  
Furthermore, there was negligible support for irrigation funding for new dams in 
the First Report. It stated that the financing of irrigation schemes should ultimately 
be self-sufficient because “there is no magic bullet for financing rural water 
infrastructure projects that should sustain themselves on their own expected rate of 
return”. 39  The report acknowledged problems with dam development and 
recommended policy changes focused on early collaboration to avoid the problems 
of “litigious and slow” dam development.40 Improved allocation decisions were 
meant to create “new water” in rural infrastructure:41  
Improved rural infrastructure can provide a range of advantages for the 
economy, including through energy production and irrigation – and also for 
the environment. More reliable access to water can substantially increase 
primary production, including on dry-land farms. It can lead to more 
efficient and diverse use of water (higher value crops, for example) and 
reduce contamination of water bodies. It can produce energy savings and 
may allow the replenishment of aquifers and the restoration of streams 
Clearly “improved” rural irrigation infrastructure is entirely different from the IAF 
funding proposals for building new dams. The IAF was also meant to improve 
energy production and irrigation in existing irrigation schemes.  
Under the IAF, Crown investment was limited to being a “minority partner” 
investing on “commercial terms”.42 Private investors would take over half of the 
risk in a proposed irrigation scheme. However, there were schemes where the public 
funding threshold of 50% was exceeded as local government bodies also began 
investing in IAF schemes. The Ruataniwha Water Storage Scheme provides an 
 
39 First Report of the Land and Water Forum, above n 15, at 42. 
40 Land and Water Forum Report, above n 15, at ix. 
41 At xii. 
42 Ministry for Primary Industries Irrigation Acceleration Fund (IAF) Guidelines for Applicants 
(Ministry for Primary Industries, Wellington, 2010) at 8. 
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example of the limitation on public investment. The Hawkes Bay Regional Council 
(HBRC) wanted to invest $80 million in the Ruataniwha Dam project, with the total 
cost estimated at $275 million.43 Project success depended upon securing resource 
consents for the dam in its proposed form, including a land swap involving 
conservation land.44 The Tukituki Catchment Proposal Board of Inquiry’s Draft 
Report and Decision was issued on 15 April 2014.45 It granted resource consents 
needed for the project to continue, subject to maintaining key water quality 
parameters.46 As already noted, a land swap proposal involving conservation land 
was part of the scheme. The Department of Conservation had agreed to trade 22 
hectares of the Ruahine Forest Park which had conservation park status. Initially, 
the land swap decision made by the Director-General of the Department of 
Conservation was upheld in the High Court.47 However, in the Court of Appeal and 
Supreme Court, the High Court ruling was overturned by majority decisions.48 In 
response to the ruling, the Hawkes Bay Regional Council decided to write off its 
investment in the scheme and not to proceed further.49  
 
As discussed above the IAF projects could be controversial political issues. Public 
interest in water issues and proposed irrigation schemes was also high. In the 2017 
 
43 Hawkes Bay Regional Council Ruataniwha Water Scheme HB Today Public Meeting 6 August 
2015 at slide 13. Available at <http://www.hbrc.govt.nz/assets/Document-Library/RWSS-
Documents/Ruataniwha-slides-6-August-public-meeting.pdf> 
44 Deloitte Peer Review of the Ruataniwha Water Storage Scheme Business Case (Hawkes Bay 
Regional Council, May 2014). 
45 Radio New Zealand “Final dam submission decided by officials” Radio New Zealand News (17 
September 2013)  
46 Board of Inquiry into the Tukituki Catchment Proposal Final Report and Decision of the Board 
of Inquiry into the Tukituki Catchment Proposal In Relation to Matters Referred Back by the 
High Court June 2015. 
47 Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc v Minister of Conservation [2016] 
NZHC 220, (2016) 19 ELRNZ 370 
48 Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc v Minister of Conservation [2016] 
NZCA 411, [2016] 3 NZLR 828; Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc v 
Minister of Conservation [2017] NZSC 106. 
49 Simon Hendery “Council writes off $14m investment in failed Ruataniwha dam project” NZ 
Farmer (30 August 2017). 
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general election water issues became one of the major voting concerns.50 A water 
royalty was proposed by the Labour party, while the National opposed the royalty.51 
Farmers were particularly concerned about the possibility of a levy on their water 
use with some farmers asserting that it might be an extra unaffordable cost.52 In 
October 2017, upon coming to power, the Labour-led coalition government 
committed to ending irrigation funding. No further new agreements for irrigation 
schemes would be entered into and funded by Crown Irrigation Investments 
Limited.53  
 
 The Second and Third Reports of the Land and Water Forum 
The Second Report of the Land and Water Forum focused on water quality issues 
while the Third Report focused on water allocation more specifically and how to 
transfer water to “highest value use” for the benefit of society.54 Proposals for the 
strengthening of water rights were put forward in Recommendation 25 of the Third 
Report in order to improve the transfer of water permits.55 The Third Report also 
states that freshwater reallocation requires the establishment of “clear limits” to 
prevent over-allocation.56 Limits would encourage users to be more efficient so that 
 
50 Charlie Mitchell “Political parties sense opportunity on water issues” Stuff NZ (14 July 2017). 
51 Nicole Sharp “Election 2017: Water royalty point of divergence” Otago Daily Times (8 
September 2017); Patrick Gower “Public, politicians divided over water tax” Newshub (7 
September 2017). 
52 Anusha Bradley “Pressure on Labour’s water tax” RadioNZ (13 September 2017). 
53 Labour, New Zealand First, New Zealand Labour Party & New Zealand First Coalition 
Agreement 52nd Parliament (2017). 
54 Land and Water Forum Second Report of the Land and Water Forum. Setting Limits for Water 
Quality and Quantity (Land and Water Trust, Wellington, 2012); Land and Water Forum Third 
Report of the Land and Water Forum: Managing Water Quality and Allocating Water (Land and 
Water Trust, Wellington, 2012) at 36. 
55 At 36. Recommendation 25 states “The design of the allocation system should remove 
administrative barriers to transfer and trading”.  
56 At 95.  
  2. Initial allocation will be important in some under-allocated catchments, and where new water 
is created. However, it is likely that many catchments will be fully- or over-allocated once all use 
is accounted for within the allocable quantum. The goal of achieving efficiency in the allocation 
regime in this case will focus on the ability for the water to move between uses over time. 
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water is “set free” to allow further expansion, or “involve consideration of storage 
and other related infrastructure”.57 
155. A regime based on limits requires easily transferable water consents to 
allow users to make investment decisions and to adjust their use to maximise 
profitability. To achieve this, users’ authorisations need to be clear, secure 
and enforced. This will support investment certainty and will allow users to 
manage more effectively within a limit. Clear, secure and enforced consents 
will also protect users from their entitlements being undermined by over-
allocation.  
These statements set out a pathway to improvements in water allocation that involve 
changes to property rights and methods of market-based water allocation.  
 
 Fourth Report of the Land and Water Forum – Water 
Markets  
In November 2015, the Land and Water Forum published its Fourth Report. It stated 
that improving water transfers “is important for minimising the costs of reducing 
over-allocation” and for shifting water to “the best economic uses”. 58  It 
recommended a cap on water allocations by setting extraction limits. This “limits 
based regime provides a framework that will allow markets to develop, and provide 
signals about when to invest in infrastructure” regarding investment viability.59 
Recommendation 57 addressed the issue of water markets for water allocation as 
follows:  
Recommendation 57 The Government should: 
a) monitor the emergence of markets for the transfer of water and 
discharge consents 
b) consider whether any market dominance or efficiency problems 
arise 
c) address them through the provisions of the Commerce Act 
where possible 
d) develop a specific response that targets the problems that arise 
if they are not able to be dealt with by the Commerce Act. 
 
57 At 95. 
58 Land and Water Forum Fourth Report of the Land and Water Forum (Land and Water Forum 
Trust, Wellington, 2015) at x. 
59 Above at [92]. Ministry for the Environment Next steps for fresh water: Summary of 
submissions. (Wellington: Ministry for the Environment). ME1248 June 2016 at 4 
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While these statements are succinct, the policies and regulations required to 
implement water markets are complex. Recommendation 57 represents a clear 
indication that New Zealand’s central government should consider how to 
implement water markets. The amendments to the National Policy Statement in 
2017 did not specifically include a focus on water markets despite the 
recommendations to do so in the Fourth Report of the Land and Water Forum. As 
a result, the disconnect between the Land and Water Forum recommendations and 
national direction in government policy mean that gaps remain in addressing 
problems with New Zealand’s water allocation framework.  
 
 National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management 2017 
Amendments 
Amendments to the National Policy Statement in 2017 can be traced back to 2016, 
that is to the Next Steps for Freshwater proposals.60 The Next Steps for Freshwater 
public consultation document asked for public submissions on “technical efficiency 
standards” and “good management practice standards” (Proposal 2.5) to reduce 
over-allocation. 61  Proposal 2.4 in the Next Steps for Freshwater consultation 
document provided a range of options to improve water transfer including 
unbundling consents, establishing a public register of consents and “model plan 
provisions specifying where and in what circumstances transfers are permitted”. 
The document then focused on the benefits of water transfers, rather than 
elaborating on methods to achieve those transfers.62 The Submission Summary 
Report stated that Proposal 2.4 was based on recommendations from the Fourth 
 
60 The 2017 Amendments were preceded by the Clean Start for Freshwater policy programme 
undertaken in 2016. 
61 At 25. 
62 At 24. 
…Enabling such transfers will increase incentives for existing users to invest in efficiency 
improvements beyond those specified in the technical efficiency standards, and transfer excess 
water or discharge allowances to others. It will also provide incentives for existing users to 
temporarily transfer water or discharge allowances if they do not need them for a while. Doing 
so would increase the economic value that we get from the available resource. 
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Report.63 The public submissions separating water take and use were split in terms 
of their support for or against the proposal. Some public submissions questioned 
the capability of the market to deliver on water transfers. There was general support 
for a public water register. While in general there was support for the use of markets 
to allocate water, submitters had reservations about pricing mechanisms and 
potential market failure.64 Clearly, in this instance, the government has consulted 
on the establishment of water markets and some of the associated changes that 
would be required to implement change. 
The Clean Water document issued in February 2017 then sought public submissions 
on proposed changes to the National Policy Statement. 65  Most of the changes 
addressed water quality issues. Objective B5 and Policy B8 discussed below were 
the key changes in the water quantity area. Amendments made in 2017 added 
Objective B5: 
Objective B5 To enable communities to provide for their economic well-
being, including productive economic opportunities, in sustainably 
managing freshwater quantity, within limits 
As a result, the 2017 Amendments to the National Policy Statement Freshwater 
Management do not address water allocation. 
 
 
63 At 27. 
 The proposals were originally built on recommendations presented by LAWF in the group’s 
third and fourth reports. Recommendation 25 from LAWF’s third report stated that 
“water…needs to be easily transferable between users, to allow it to move to its highest valued 
use…The design of the allocation system should remove administrative barriers to transfer and 
trading”. The discussion of this recommendation also describes that consents should be 
standardised, making provisions for trading these consents. LAWF’s fourth report also discusses 
how to facilitate transfers, saying that lack of access to information creates a barrier to transfers 
64 At 28. 
65 Ministry for the Environment Clean Water 90% of Rivers and Lakes Swimmable by 2040 
(Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 2017) ME1293. 
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 The Fifth Report of the Land and Water Forum 
At the request of the Labour-led coalition government the Fifth Report focused on 
specific issues related to water quality.66 The report specifies the “steps members 
of the Land and Water Forum assert are needed to manage [water] within limits and 
avoid further degradation”.67 The focus of the Fifth Report is to improve water 
quality. It stated that a Land and Water Commissioner office should be established 
to oversee the implementation of steps to improve water quality. A Land and Water 
Commissioner could also potentially have a role in implementing water allocation 
policy in the future. Overall, the Fifth Report makes a strong argument for greater 
direction at the national level.  
Further environmental policy analysis with relevance to water allocation was 
released in 2019 by the Environmental Defence Society. 68  The Reform of the 
Resource Management System Synthesis Report provides a non-government 
analysis of environmental law and policy development in New Zealand. It proposes 
four different models for future environmental law reform. One of the models 
proposed includes the enactment of an Allocation Act that would include allocation 
of water and other natural resources. 69 The difference would be that the allocation 
function of the RMA would be transferred to a new Act. 
 
 
66 Land and Water Forum Land and Water Forum advice on improving water quality: preventing 
degradation and addressing sediment and nitrogen – May 2018 (Land and Water Forum, 
Wellington, 2018) at 4.  
67 At 1.  
68 Greg Severinsen and Raewyn Peart Reform of the Resource Management System The Next 
Generation Synthesis Report (Environmental Defence Society, Auckland, 2019).  
69 At 21. 
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 National Policy Statement Freshwater Management 
Implementation 
Regional councils are still in the process of implementing the National Policy 
Statement Freshwater Management 2014.70 Regional councils must give effect to 
National Policy Statements by implementing them in regional plans.71 The National 
Policy Statement Freshwater Management 2014 has been referred to as relevant 
policy in the following cases. In Li v Auckland Council the Court referred to the 
National Policy Statement as one of the relevant policies in determining that a 
rezoning application for land in the Okura catchment should be declined.72  In 
Pierau v Auckland Council an application to stage a music festival at Te Arai Point, 
a coastal area, was declined after taking into consideration statutory planning 
documents including The New Zealand Coastal Policy Statement 2010, the 
National Policy Statement Freshwater Management 2014, the Hauraki Gulf Marine 
Park Act 2002 and relevant provisions of the regional and district plan.73  The 
proposal was assessed under the National Policy Statement Freshwater 
Management 2014 to determine if there were any water quality issues; both parties 
agreed there were none.74 The National Policy Statement Freshwater Management 
2014 is at the top of the planning framework for determining applications relating 
to water quality. However, it has little policy guidance that is directly relevant to 
water allocation.75 Furthermore, there are no cases which show the application of 
 
70 Regional councils that have not already implemented the National Policy Statement Freshwater 
Management 2014 were required to prepare implementation plans. See Ministry for the 
Environment National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management Implementation Review: 
National Themes Report (Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 2017). See also Ministry for 
the Environment Briefing for the Incoming Minister. Water. (Ministry for the Environment,  
Wellington, 2017) at 10 states “That there has been some public criticism that progress has been 
slow in some regions”. 
71 Environmental Defence Society Incorporated v New Zealand King Salmon Co Ltd [2014] NZSC 
38. 
72 Li v Auckland Council [2018] NZEnvC 87. 
73 Pierau v Auckland Council [2017] NZEnvC 90. 
74 At [50]. 
75 See Hokio Trusts v Manawatu-Wanganui Regional Council [2017] NZHC 1355 [2017] NZRMA 
543; Eyre Community Environmental Safety Society Inc v Christchurch Regional Council [2016] 
NZEnvC 178 was focused on dam safety management, not water allocation; Sustainable Matata 
v Whakatane District Council [2016] NZEnvC 16; Creswick Valley Residents Association Inc v 
Wellington City Council [2015] NZEnvC 149  stated that the National Policy Statement 
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water allocation methods being affected by the national direction in the National 
Policy Statement Freshwater Management 2014. 
 
 Summary 
The previous chapter examined the lack of guidance in water allocation which 
created a water allocation policy gap for almost 20 years. This chapter argued that 
the government did not implement water policy recommendations from the Land 
and Water Forum Reports to address the problem of water allocation. While the 
work of the Land and Water Forum has influenced national direction on water 
management in the National Policy for Statement Freshwater Management 2014, 
the National Policy Statement has not gone far enough to address the issues that 
were raised. Other initiatives such as the funding for irrigation have been 
unsuccessful in providing an answer to the problems of increased demand and how 
to reallocate water. Clearly, gaps remain in the area of water allocation law and 
policy.  
Currently, national policy direction does not provide a clear mandate for 
contemplating water markets or payment for access to water. In comparison, 
Australia has embraced water markets as a critical part of its water law reform. The 
Land and Water Forum Report recommendations which support the introduction of 
water markets to improve water allocation place New Zealand at a crossroads. For 
this reason, Australia is a prime example of how to implement water reform in terms 
of how to introduce markets and improve water allocation. New Zealand can learn 
from the Australian experience. To that end, the following chapter will examine 
how Australia dealt with its water scarcity problems by improving the ability to 
transfer water rights through water markets.  
 
Freshwater Management 2014 was a relevant consideration when addressing the issue of water 
contamination from earthworks but there was no evidence presented on the Policy Statement. 
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CHAPTER SIX - AUSTRALIAN WATER 
ALLOCATION LAW AND POLICY 
 
  Introduction 
This chapter examines Australian water allocation law and policy. Australia has 
undertaken extensive and complex water law reform in the last 20 years. In order 
to fully understand the Australian water law reform experience, this chapter, 
therefore, begins by examining the historical legacy of separate colonies which 
exercised a high degree of control over water allocation within their respective state 
boundaries. Some colonies preferred irrigation based settlement but it was not until 
Federation that it became more viable. The late 1800s drought was a important 
factor influencing the support for irrigation to be developed further.  
The policy of irrigated settlement was promoted by the colonies despite the 
challenges of a drier climate during the 1800s. The research begins by explaining 
the limitations of riparian rights to allocate water in irrigated settlements and the 
process of replacing riparian rights with statutory water allocation.  
In 1901, with the formation of the Commonwealth Government of Australia, 
colonies were reluctant to relinquish their control over valuable water resources. 
An analysis of constitutional powers shows the Commonwealth lacked overt 
authority to allocate water. Consequently, it had to rely upon other constitutional 
powers to implement water law reform. Ultimately, the lack of a clear constitutional 
authority for the Commonwealth to allocate water led to tensions between the states 
and the Commonwealth. Hence, the implementation of water reform across all 
states by the Federation was somewhat hindered by constitutional issues. The states 
preferred to develop their water resources according to the policy context of each 
state. The progress in implementing water allocation policy from a Federal level 
has been complex and tied closely to the idea of “cooperative federalism” where 
policy actions are tied to grants from the Commonwealth. 
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The incentive for the more recent reform was due to the recognition that the Murray-
Darling Basin, in particular, was experiencing problems with over-allocation and 
water scarcity. The nature and severity of the Millennium drought exacerbated the 
problem of over-allocation. The Commonwealth responded by formulating water 
policy objectives at the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) meeting in 
1994. The meeting was a milestone for water law reform as all Australian states 
began to work collectively to address water allocation problems. Following the 
1994 COAG meeting, the National Water Initiative 2004 supported the adoption of 
water markets for water allocation in the form of a cap and trade model. Ultimately, 
water policy indicated that water trading would facilitate the return of increased 
environmental water flows to the Murray-Darling Basin in order to improve the 
health of the catchment. The Water Act 2007 (Cth) implemented the objectives of 
the National Water Initiative 2004. This chapter critically evaluates the 
implementation of the Act to measure the effectiveness of implementation against 
stated water allocation law and policy objectives.  
There has been some concern raised about the effectiveness and implementation of 
the water reforms and, in particular, whether the Water Act 2007 (Cth) achieves its 
statutory objectives. One of the contentious issues is whether buying back water 
from irrigators has been successful in delivering the volumes of water needed to 
improve the health of the Murray-Darling Basin. The buybacks were necessary 
because the cap and trade model alone was clearly not on tract to deliver the 
environmental water needed to improve the health of the Basin alone.1  
Finally, the implementation of the wider package of reforms including the NWI, 
Water Act 2007 (Cth) and the Murray-Darling Basin Plan are analysed with regards 
to the changes that they brought about in unbundling, water planning, water 
transfers through markets, The changes in the Basin states of Victoria, New South 
 
1 Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair “Rethinking Australian Water Law and Governance: 
Success, Challenges and Future Directions” (2016) 33(4) EPLJ 275; Cameron Holley and Darren 
Sinclair “Governing regulatory markets: Achievements, limitations and the need for reform” 
(2016) 33(4) EPLJ 301; Kate Owens “Reimagining water buybacks in Australia: Non-
governmental organisations, complimentary initiatives and private capital” (2016) 33(4) EPLJ 
342 and Rebecca Nelson “Broadening regulatory concepts and responses to cumulative impacts: 
Considering the trajectory and future of groundwater law and policy” (2016) 33(4) EPLJ 132 
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Wales, South Australia, Queensland are analyse as a model against the Western 
Australia context. The analysis shows the regulatory processes followed in each 
state to implement law reform. The analysis of how the Act has been implemented 
is core to the comparative analysis in the next chapter.  
 
 Water Policy Development in the Murray-Darling Basin 
British settlers in Australia had to adapt to the arid and variable climate that 
confronted them when they arrived. 2  Despite the arid conditions, Australian 
colonies nevertheless encouraged irrigation-based settlement during the 1880s 
because it made unproductive land suitable for farming.3 Consequently, schemes 
based on irrigated settlement increased the demand for and rate of irrigation.4 In 
theory, the positive aspect of irrigated settlement was that it would result in a 
systematic settlement in rural areas.5 However, in practice, obstacles to irrigated 
settlement emerged in the form of introduced weeds, drought and settlers’ lack of 
experience of farming on irrigated land. 6  Despite the drawbacks of irrigated 
settlement, it remained an important feature of early colonial development and the 
 
2 James Beattie, Emily O’Gorman and Matthew Henry “Climate, Science, and Colonziation: 
Histories from Australia and New Zealand” in James Beattie, Emily O’Gorman and Matthew 
Henry (eds)) Climate, Science, and Colonization: Histories from Australia and New Zealand 
(Palgrave, New York, 2014). Settlers had to replace their expectations of a regular seasonal 
climate with the more variable climate patterns of Australia. See Martin Mahony and Georgina 
Endfield. “Climate and colonialism” (2018) 9.2 Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate 
Change 510. 
3 Lin Crase, Suzanne O’Keefe and Brian E Dollery. “The fluctuating political appeal of water 
engineering in Australia” (2009) 2(3) Water Alternatives 440 at 441-442. 
4 Leonie Seabrook, Clive McAlpine and Rod Fensham “Cattle, crops and clearing: Regional 
drivers of landscape change in the Brigalow Belt, Queensland, Australia, 1840–2004” (2006) 78 
Landscape and Urban Planning at 373.  
5 RT Kingsford “Ecological Impacts and Institutional and Economic Drivers for Water Resource 
Development--a Case Study of the Murrumbidgee River, Australia” (2003) 6 Aquatic Ecosystem 
Health & Management at 75.  
6 Seabrook and others, above n 4. 
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colonies to irrigation from the early 1900s even thought it only became more viable 
after Federation.7  
 
 
One obstacle to irrigated settlement was the application of common law riparian 
rights to water allocation. The riparian doctrine was inherited from the British 
common law.8 Under the riparian doctrine, surface water was a public resource and 
landowners adjoining a stream or river could establish rights to access water.9 
Riparian rights were use-based rights and did not confer ownership of water.10 From 
1840 to 1860 there were no changes made to the doctrine because the price of water 
was low due to low population density.11 However, as demand grew, it became 
apparent that the variable Australian rainfall patterns combined with riparian rights 
 
7 Lin Crase “An introduction to Australian water policy” in Lin Crase (ed) Water Policy in 
Australia. The impact of Change and Uncertainty (Routledge, Washington, 2008) at 4. States 
pushed beyond environmental limits to encourage irrigated settlement. See Donald W. Meinig 
“Goyder's Line of Rainfall: The Role of a Geographic Concept in South Australian Land Policy 
and Agricultural Settlement” (1961) 34(4) Agricultural History 207 and Alex Gardner, et. al.  
Water Resources Law. (LexisNexis Butterworths, Chatswood, NSW, 2018) 
 
8 Australian Courts Act 1828 (Imp) s 24.  
9 Mason v Hill (1833) 5 B. & Ad. 1 110 ER 114; for a comprehensive account of the development 
of the riparian doctrine in common law see Joshua Getzler A History of Water Rights at Common 
Law. Oxford Studies in Modern Legal History (Oxford University Press, New York, 2004); John 
Tisdell “The evolution of water legislation in Australia” in K William Easter and Qiuqiong 
Huang (eds) Water Markets for the 21st Century (Springer, Dordrecht, 2014) (pp. 163-178) at 
164. 
10 Under the riparian doctrine water was part of the “commons” or common property. Landowners 
beside a waterway could only use the water if there was not negative effect on downstream users. 
Dunn v Collins (1867) 1 SALR 126.  
11 Edwyna Harris “Institutional Change and Economic Growth: The Evolution of Water Rights in 
Victoria, Australia 1850-1886” (2007) 26(2) Economic Papers 118 at 121. 
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were inadequate to secure irrigators reliable access to water. 12  In Gardner v 
Kidman, the Court stated:13 
These rules are very old. They have been applied in England in innumerable 
cases to determine and define rights and obligations in relation to streams 
along the banks of which men have been settled for centuries, using the 
waters and enjoying the benefits of their flow. The conditions of settlement, 
of climate and of geography in which this body of customary law developed 
are very different from those prevailing in many parts of Australia. And this 
is to be borne in mind when particular decisions of English courts are 
brought forward as analogies. But it is beyond doubt that these rules are a 
part, and an important part, of the common law that Australia has inherited 
The riparian doctrine did not apply to groundwater unless it was known to flow in 
a defined channel, which seldom occurred naturally. 14  Hence, landowners had 
unrestricted rights to exploit groundwater if there was no legally defined channel.15 
The absence of common law on the groundwater resources of the Great Artesian 
Basin means that it, however, was not subject to the riparian doctrine.16  
In the Australian context, having only use-based rights to surface water was 
important because it facilitated wider water distribution in irrigation schemes.17 
Accordingly, the needs of downstream users were not relevant. As the riparian 
doctrine developed further to include rights for potential users of water, its 
 
12 Above at 121 states that demand after the Victorian goldrush ended. The gold rush has 
effectively doubled the population resulting in a labour surplus when the gold rush ended. At 
first land reform was undertaken to increase the population density in rural areas. The reform 
allowed any person to claim up to 320 acres of land except for freehold land. As a result of the 
land reform there was a shift to the dominant use of land being intensive crop farming which 
replaced grazing; Tim Cummins and Alistair Watson. “A hundred-year policy experiment: The 
Murray-Darling Basin in Australia” in John Quiggin, Thilak Mallawaarachchi and Sarah 
Chambers (eds) Water Policy Reform, Lessons in Sustainability from the Murray Darling Basin 
(Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2012) at 12.  
13 Gardner v Kidman [1962] HCA 27; 108 CLR 12. 
14 Dunn v Collins (1867) 1 SALR 126 and John Quiggin. and Poh Ling Tan Sustainable 
Management of the Great Artesian Basin: an analysis based on Environmental Economics and 
Law Murray Darling Program Working Paper3/M04 (University of Queensland, 2004). 
15 Jennifer McKay, J Groundwater as the Cinderella of water laws, policies, and institutions in 
Australia (2006) International Symposium on Groundwater Sustainability 322 at 324. 
16 Quiggin and Tan, above n 14, at 9. 
17 Sanford D. Clark and Ian A Renard “The Riparian Doctrine in Australian Legislation” (1970) 7 
MULR at 477; Poh-Ling Tan Legal Issues Relating to Water Use. In Property: Rights and 
Responsibilities Current Australian Thinking (Land and Water Australia, Canberra, 2002). 
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limitations in Australian irrigation schemes became apparent.18 Having regard for 
potential downstream users of water had negative implications for irrigated 
settlements because such consideration could potentially restrict how much water 
upstream users could take. For example, the English case Mason v Hill held the 
“natural flow” of surface water should be maintained irrespective of actual use by 
downstream landowners. The level of concern over the potential effect of the 
precedent limiting irrigated settlement helped trigger water law reform in 
Australia.19  
The colony of Victoria established a Royal Commission on Water Supply 1884-
1886 (Vic) to investigate alternatives to the riparian doctrine.20 It was chaired by 
Alfred Deakin who drew upon the experience of the Western United States, Egypt, 
India and Italy.21 The Royal Commission recommended abolishing the riparian 
doctrine and replacing it with state control over water with a formal licensing 
system. 22  Subsequently, the Victorian government reformed water law by 
establishing licences which linked water allocations to land.23 As a result of reform, 
the riparian doctrine was replaced with a statutory system of water allocation which 
provided greater certainty to irrigators and vested water rights with the Crown.  
The reform also included institutional changes. These changes included the 
establishment of irrigation trusts, rules for the irrigation trust administration and 
collection of rates to invest in irrigation infrastructure.24 Other Australian states 
 
18 Peter Davis “Australian and American Water Allocation Systems Compared” (1968) 9 Boston 
College L. Rev. 647 at 649.  
19  Clark and Renard, above n 17, at 479. 
20 Harris, above n 11. There was also extensive lobbying from farmers clubs and irrigation leagues 
for irrigation reform which put the government under pressure to respond with the Royal 
Commission. 
21 John Tisdell “The evolution of water legislation in Australia” in K. William Easter and 
Qiuqiong Huang (eds) Water Markets for the 21st Century (Springer, Dordrecht, 2014) (pp. 163-
178) at 164. 
22 At 165-166. A Royal Commission appointed in New South Wales also recommended vesting 
water rights with the state and abolishing the riparian doctrine.  
23  Lee Godden “Water Law Reform in Australia and South Africa: Sustainability, Efficiency and 
Social Justice” (2005) 17(2) J. Environ. Law 181-205. The linking of water rights to land was to 
ensure that water speculation was limited. See Edwyna at 123. 
24 Harris, above n 11, at 125. 
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soon followed Victoria’s example with water reform and the vesting of the water 
rights in the Crown. The move was a fundamental change to water law in Australia 
because, while improving the planning for water allocation, problems with the 
riparian doctrine were addressed.25 States considered it imperative to have water 
law and policy to support irrigation and building their state economies. 
The connection between land settlement and irrigation in the colonies is more than 
just an interesting point in Australian environmental history. The connection set the 
context for Australian problems with water allocation law and policy. Within states, 
economic progress was linked to the successful implementation of irrigated 
settlement schemes. Laws were reviewed and amended to support the expansion of 
irrigated settlement schemes. Arguably, these early concessions to support 
irrigation are slowly being pulled back to align with restoring the environmental 
health of the Murray-Darling Basin. For instance, one of the positive aspects of 
water law reform is that the state of Victoria was an early leader in responding to 
calls for change in water allocation. As the subsequent discussion in this chapter 
will show, Victoria retains its advantageous position as being a leader in water 
allocation law reform in Australia.  
 
One of the “legacies” of colonial water policy is that the states “continue to hold 
sway over national water policy formulation today”.26 States indeed continue to 
dominate policy development at the national level. The discussion that follows 
reflects the legacy of colonial water policy as it was then, and remains today, closely 
tied to the economic output of each state. Within this policy context, the states must 
ensure that they do not push their demand for water beyond environmental limits. 
How the states balance their demand for water against each other, and the 
 
25 Rights in Water Conservation and Utilization Act 1910 (Qld); Water Act 1917 (NSW);  
26 Lin Crase “An introduction to Australian water policy” in Lin Crase (ed) Water Policy in 
Australia. The impact of Change and Uncertainty (Routledge, Washington, 2008) at 4. 
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environment, is reflected in the constitutional tug-of-war over water allocation 
issues.  
The drafting of the Australian Constitution raised concerns about the availability of 
water and the potential effect on individual colonies. Following the Federation 
Drought of 1895-1902 water would have been a high priority for colonies. The topic 
of control over water management was debated for weeks and showed the 
importance of water to states.27 The debate addressed how existing navigation and 
irrigation rights might be affected if a Commonwealth government was formed. 
State access to water for irrigation was crucial for development and states were 
reluctant to relinquish control of water resources to the Commonwealth. The 
Australian Constitution 1901 records the final concessions made by the states.  
The states kept as much control as possible over the use of water resources. As a 
result, the Australian Constitution directly refers to water or natural resources only 
in sections 98 and 100.28 Section 98 of the Australian Constitution states: 
The power of the Parliament to make laws with respect to trade and 
commerce extends to navigation and shipping, and to railways the property 
of any State. 
Section 100 states: 
The Commonwealth shall not, by any law or regulation of trade or 
commerce, abridge the right of a State or of the residents therein to the 
reasonable use of the water of rivers for conservation or irrigation. 
Section 98 extends the scope of section 51(i) with regard to trade and commerce to 
include navigable rivers and rail. Section 100 was included to appease states’ 
concerns about the extent of Commonwealth power over navigable rivers.29 The 
states were concerned about the growing importance of irrigation and whether 
section 98 of the Constitution could override state interest in other uses of water.30 
 
27 Paul Kildea and George Williams “The Constitution and the Management of Water in 
Australia's Rivers” (2010) 32 Sydney L. Rev. 595 at 601. 
28 Jacqueline Peel and Lee Godden “Australian Environmental Management: A 'Dams' Story” 
(2005) 28 University of New South Wales Law Journal 668 at 670. 
29 Kildea and Williams, above n 27, at 601. 
30 At 601. 
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Their concerns were unfounded. As the use of rivers changed from navigation to 
irrigation, the power under section 98 became irrelevant.31  In effect, the states 
retained a great deal of control over water resources and the Commonwealth did 
not have the direct power to implement water allocation policy across Australia.  
Indigenous Australians have been excluded from water law and policy development 
because the legal recognition of indigenous rights did not occur until the 1990s.32 
Nevertheless, the decision in Mabo v Queensland confirmed that the indigenous 
rights of Aboriginals to land and water were not abolished by the colonial 
acquisition of sovereignty and could be recognised in common law.33 The Murray-
Darling Basin Authority guided the inclusion of indigenous communities in water 
planning34 and there has been a slow progression in the inclusion of indigenous 
values in water planning. During the more recent reforms, indigenous communities 
were rarely included in water planning;35 Although, consultation with indigenous 
communities has improved much more work needs to be done to include indigenous 
communities in water allocation strategy.36  
 
 
31 At 601.  
32 Elizabeth Macpherson and others “Lessons from Australian Water Reforms: Indigenous and 
Environmental Values in Market-Based Water Regulation” in Cameron Holley and Darren 
Sinclair (eds) Reforming Water Law and Governance. (Springer, Singapore, 2018).  
33 Mabo v Queensland [No 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1, 36 at 59-60. Confirmed that the legal doctrine of 
terra nullius could not apply where the land was already inhabited. As a result, customary law 
could apply and indigenous land entitlements remained. In order to prove customary claim to 
water a connection with the water as per traditional custom must be proven before a claim is 
successful. 
34 Murray-Darling Basin Authority A yarn on the river – getting Aboriginal voices into the Basin 
Plan. Murray-Darling Basin Authority (MDBA, Canberra, 2011). 
35 National Water Commission National Water Commission 2009 Biennial Assessment (NWC, 
Canberra, 2009). It also commissioned a further report in 2013 NWC A review of Indigenous 
Involvement in Water Planning (National Water Commission, Canberra, 2014) 
36 Australian Government A Module To Support Water Planners And Managers Develop And 
Implement National Water Initiative Consistent, Inclusive Water Planning And Management 
Processes That Support Indigenous Social, Spiritual and Customary Objectives. (National Water 
Commission, Canberra, 2017). 
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 Early water-sharing agreements between states  
Tension has existed between federal and state systems for allocating water from the 
time of the Australian colonies. There are “long‐standing tensions between the two 
layers of government that go much wider than water policy and management”.37 
This tension has been most evident in the Murray-Darling River catchment.38 Many 
communities and farms are dependent on the water in the Murray-Darling Basin.39 
Indeed, the Murray Darling Basin contains 65% of irrigated land in Australia and 
produces 39% of total agricultural production.40 Consequently, the greatest demand 
for Basin water is from irrigation.41 Tension arises from the fact that the Murray-
Darling Basin is an important source of agricultural production and also that there 
is a need to balance these demands with environmental, cultural and social factors 
too.42  
Prior to the more recent water law reforms, there were earlier attempts to address 
this tension by encouraging greater co-operation between Murray-Darling Basin 
states. 43  The first attempts to manage the political tension were via inter-
government agreements for water sharing between states in the early 1900s. The 
Inter-State Royal Commission 1902 examined the legal basis for water rights 
 
37 Daniel Connell and Quentin Grafton “Water Reform in the Murray Darling Basin” (2011) 
47(12) Water Resour. Res. 1. 
38 Above. 
39 For an overview of the history of the Basin and its development see Murray Darling Basin 
Authority Guide to the Proposed Basin Plan (MDBA, Canberra, 2010). 
40 At 13. 
41 Australian Bureau of Statisitcs 4610.0—Water account, Australia, 2015–16 (ABS, Canberra, 
2016); Australian Bureau of Statistics 4618.0—Water use on Australian farms, 2015–16 (ABS, 
Canberra, 2017). 
42 John Quiggin and others “Climate change, uncertainty, and adaptation: the case of irrigated 
agriculture in the Murray–Darling Basin in Australia” (2010) 58(4) Canadian Journal of 
Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie 531; Mac Kirby and others 
“Sustainable irrigation: How did irrigated agriculture in Australia's Murray–Darling Basin adapt 
in the Millennium Drought?” (2014) 145 Agricultural Water Management 154; Australian 
Bureau of Statistics Gross Value of Irrigated Agricultural Production, 2015-16 (ABS, Canberra, 
2017). 
43 Daniel Connell and R Quentin Grafton “Planning for water security in the Murray-Darling 
Basin” (2008) 3(1) Public Policy 67 at 69. 
155 
 
exercised by New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia.44  In doing so it 
considered the application of the riparian doctrine to surface water takes by states. 
It soon became clear that the states preferred a political solution to water sharing 
rather than debating points of law on the application of riparian rights.45 The River 
Murray Waters Agreement (RMWA) 1914 between New South Wales, Victoria 
and South Australia resulted in the creation of the River Murray Commission in 
1917 (RMC) which would oversee the water sharing agreement. 46  The RMC 
managed water sharing (and the associated costs) between states in the Murray-
Darling Basin.47 The Agreement focused on the development of infrastructure for 
water storage.48 One shortcoming of the Commission was that its commissioners 
acted in the interest of the state governments that appointed them.49 Even today 
balancing the collective needs of the Murray-Darling Basin catchment and 
individual state interests remains one of the problems facing water allocation law 
and policy in Australia.  
 
The state commitment to the RMWA was put under pressure by developments, 
which increased demand for water. The period from 1917 to the early 1970s saw 
the expansion of Australian water infrastructure.50 In particular, the development of 
 
44 Sandford Clark “The River Murray Question: Part II Federation, Agreement and Future 
Alternatives” (1971) 8 MULR 215 at 217. 
45 At 224.  
46 River Murray Waters Act 1915 (Cth). 
47 Kildea and Williams, Williams “The Constitution and the Management of Water in Australia's 
Rivers” above n 27, at 598. The agreement was implemented the following year by New South 
Wales, South Australia and Victoria by passing legislation in 1915. 
48 Connell and Grafton, “Water Reform in the Murray Darling Basin” above n 37, at [10] states 
“Like all subsequent intergovernmental agreements, including the most recent reforms in 2007, it 
excluded land use issues, which remain the preserve of the states”. 
49 Paul Kildea and George Williams “The Constitution and the Management of Water in 
Australia's Rivers” (2010) 32 Sydney L. Rev. 595 at 598.  
50 John Williams “Water reform in the Murray-Darling Basin: a challenge in complexity in 




further irrigation infrastructure increased the demand for water in Australia. 51 
Unfortunately, irrigation investment after World War II was based on erroneous 
environmental assumptions about soil and hydrology.52 These irrigation schemes 
lacked regulatory guidance53 and the financial viability of irrigation schemes was 
also an issue. Private investors often initiated irrigation schemes, but public funds 
were spent on water supply infrastructure.54  During the 1940s some states co-
operated to construct large dams.55 The downside of this construction was that 
water allocation within these schemes became increasingly complex to manage. 
There was broad discretion in the application of administrative criteria for 
managing the dams,56 with the result that dams became oversubscribed and that 
dam managers exercised their discretion when making complex water decisions 
during water shortages.57 These factors exacerbated problems with over-allocation 
within the larger schemes.  
 
The failure of the existing water-sharing agreements between states (such as the 
RMWA) became apparent as more evidence of over-allocation in the Murray-
 
51 The River Murray Waters Agreement 1915 was amended in 1934 to reflect the use of water for 
irrigation and the construction of water infrastructure. See River Murray Waters Agreement 
Amendment Act 1934; John Pigram Australia's Water Resources: from Use to Management 
(CSIRO Publishing, Collingwood, 2007) at 128; M Leah and LM Gibbs, “Just add water: 
Colonisation, water governance, and the Australian Inland” (2009) 41 Environ. Plan. A 2964–
2983; Jason Alexandra “Evolving governance and contested water reforms in Australia’s Murray 
Darling Basin” (2018) 10(2) Water 113. 
52 Trevor Langford-Smith and John Rutherford Water and Land; Two Case Studies in Irrigation 
(Australia National University Press, Canberra, 1966) at 3; Bruce Thom “Professor Trevor 
Langford-Smith, 1916–2011” (2012) 43 Australian Geographer 93. 
53 Poh-Ling Tan Legal Issues Relating to Water Use. In Property: Rights and Responsibilities 
Current Australian Thinking (Land and Water Australia, Canberra, 2002) at 18. 
54 At 18. 
55 Examples include the 1946 New South Wales and Queensland Border Rivers Agreement Snowy 
Mountains Hydro-Electric Power Act 1949 (Cth). This era was described as “cooperative 
federalism” particularly in writing that discusses the constitutional issues associated with passing 
of Commonwealth Acts affecting state activities for resource development. See James Crawford 
“The Constitution and the Environment” (1991) 13 Sydney L. Rev. 11-30. 
56 Tan, above n 53, at 19. 
57 At 19.  
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Darling Basin emerged, with over-allocation becoming increasingly apparent in the 
1970s and 1980s as the Murray-Darling catchment began to show the 
environmental effects of over-allocation. Tan explains that there was “significant” 
over-allocation in some states which had not been measured accurately.58  The 
actual over-allocation was worse than anticipated because not all water takes were 
fully utilised, which meant that if the full volumes of water allocated in permits 
were actually taken, then water demand would have exceeded water supply to a far 
greater extent that was the case.  
The environmental effects of over-allocation became increasingly apparent in the 
Murray-Darling Basin during the 1980s. In 1981, the mouth of the Murray River 
closed for the first time since water flow records had been maintained.59 The closing 
of the Murray symbolised the failure of water allocation policy to provide 
sustainable allocation. By the early 1980s, the pressure from growing development 
and demand for water in the Murray-Darling Basin contributed to the failure of the 
RMWA.60 In response, the River Murray Commission was replaced by the Murray 
Darling Basin Ministerial Council, the Community Advisory Committee and the 
Murray-Darling Basin Commission.61  
 
 Commonwealth Utilisation of ‘External Affairs’ Power 
The Commonwealth government responded to over-allocation by encouraging 
increased co-operation between the states within its limited formal powers under 
the Constitution.62 This section begins by discussing the Commonwealth heads of 
 
58 At 20. 
59 Australian Government, Murray Darling Basin Authority A Path to Water Reform. Timeline of 
Water Resource Management in the Murray-Darling Basin (Murray Darling Basin Authority, 
Canberra, n.d.). 
60 Daniel Connell and Quentin Grafton “Planning for water security in the Murray-Darling Basin” 
above, n 43 at 68. 
61 At 68. The River Murray Commission was originally established as part of the River Murray 
Waters Agreement.  
62 Douglas E Fisher Australian Environmental Law Norms Principles and Rules (3rd ed, Lawbook 
Co, Sydney, 2014). 
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power in the Constitution.63 The Commonwealth government faced the problem of 
coordinating a response to over-allocation within the constitutional framework. The 
policy response needed to cover state and natural catchment boundaries. The 
Tasmanian Dam case discussed below is relevant to understanding the use of 
constitutional power to address environmental issues. The analysis in this section 
shows that the lack of a clear constitutional mandate at a Commonwealth level has 
been a problem in Australian water allocation law.  
Australian water law reform at the Commonwealth level relied upon the 
implementation of international law through the “external affairs” power in 
s51(xxix).64 It was used to implement international treaties and agreements into 
domestic law. The “external affairs” power is defined in broad terms and as a result 
“the range of topics the Commonwealth can regulate via the external affairs power 
has expanded considerably”.65 The expansion of the external affairs power includes 
international agreements such as the World Heritage Convention signed in 1974 
and the Ramsar Convention signed in 1975.66 
The Ramsar Convention required signatories to identify and list significant 
wetlands. These wetlands must then be protected to encourage their “wise use”, as 
stated in Article 3 of the Convention. The implementation of the Convention has 
been through the provision of the Murray-Darling Basin Plan discussed below. The 
legal requirement to implement the Convention is found in section 20(a) of the 
Water Act 2007 (Cth), which requires the Act to give effect to “relevant 
international agreements”. Failure to give effect to international agreements would 
 
63 These powers include the overseas and interstate trade power, the trading corporations’ power, 
race power and the external affairs power; see George Williams, Sean Brennan and Andrew 
Lynch Blackshield, & Williams Australian Constitutional Law and Theory Commentary and 
Materials (6th ed, The Federation Press, Sydney, 2014). 
64 The legal status of the Water Act 2007 (Cth) and the use of constitutional powers was reviewed 
by the Australian Government Solicitor. See Australian Government Solicitor AGS, Swimming 
in New Waters: Recent Reforms to Australian Water Law, Legal Briefing No. 90, 21 July 2009. 
65 Patrick Keyzer Principles of Australian Constitutional Law 4th ed (LexisNexis, Chatswood, 
2013) at 198. 
66 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage Treaty 
Series No. 1037 (1972); and Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as 
Waterfowl Habitat. Ramsar (Iran) Treaty Series No. 14583 (1971) and Jonathan La Nauze and 
Emma Carmody “Will the Basin Plan Uphold Australia’s Ramsar Convention obligations?” 
(2012) Australian Environment Review 311.  
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violate the Murray-Darling Basin Plan itself in accordance with constitutional 
law.67  
The World Heritage Committee accepted nominations of heritage sites from each 
government. In the case of Australia, this was the Commonwealth government. The 
implementation of the Convention was subject to political debate and created 
divisions between Commonwealth and state-level governments as they pursued the 
green vote.68  
 
The Tasmanian Dam case was a high-profile case which illustrated these political 
tensions and how they raised constitutional points of law.69 In particular, the legal 
question was whether the Commonwealth government had the power to rely upon 
its “external affairs” constitutional power to implement international environmental 
conventions within states. The Hydro-Electric Commission of Tasmania followed 
a policy of “hydro-industrialisation” to improve state development.70 In 1967, the 
Commission proposed the first stage of a dam which included flooding Lake 
Pedder. Although the proposal was met with strong public resistance, the first stage 
of the dam was constructed.71  
In 1979, the Hydron-Electric Commission tabled the second part of its dam proposal 
for the Franklin River. Again, there was public resistance to the proposal. In 1983, 
the incoming Commonwealth government pledged to stop dam construction if 
 
67 Confirmed in Victoria v Commonwealth (1996) 187 CLR 416; 138 ALR 129; 70 ALJR 680; 
BC9603985. Confirmed the precedent in Commonwealth v Tasmania [1983] HCA 21; 158 CLR 
1; 57 ALJR 450; 46 ALR 625. 
68 Peel and Godden “Australian Environmental Management: A 'Dams' Story”, above n 28, at 672. 
69 Commonwealth v Tasmania [1983] HCA 21; 158 CLR 1; 57 ALJR 450; 46 ALR 625. 
70 Bruce Davis “Adaption and Deregulation in Government Business Enterprise: The Hydro-
Electric Commission of Tasmania 1945-1994” (1995) 54(2) AJPA  252-261 at 254; and Ben 
Boer “World Heritage Disputes in Australia” (1992) 7 J. Environ. Law Litig 248. 
71 Pamela F. Walker 1987. The United Tasmania Group (Honours dissertation, University of 
Tasmania). The world’s first green party was formed to lobby against the dam proposal. 
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elected.72 The new government passed the World Heritage Properties Conservation 
Act 1983 (Cth) overriding state power to approve the dam project.73 The Act was 
based on the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage, which was ratified by Australia in 1974.74 In passing the Act, the 
Commonwealth relied upon s51(xxvi) to make rules for people “of any race, for 
whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws” and the power to govern 
“external affairs” under section 51(xxix) of the Constitution. Before the Tasmanian 
Dam case, the extent of the Commonwealth’s external affairs power was unclear.75 
The Tasmanian Dam case, therefore, confirmed the wide powers of the 
Commonwealth.76 Further decisions also confirmed the “external affairs” power 
and its use to implement international treaties.77 
The legal status of the Commonwealth government to implement water law reform 
was reviewed early in the reform process. The Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs References Committee confirmed that greater transparency was required on 
 
72 Peel and Godden “Australian Environmental Management: A 'Dams' Story”, above n 28, at 672. 
73 Barry Cohen, Minister for Home Affairs and Environment, Parliamentary Debates (Parliament 
of Australia 21 April 1983) at 42 Discussing the “World Heritage Properties Conservation Bill 
1983”: 
   My concern has been increased following a conversation with Mr Peter Waterman, formerly the 
Head of the South West Tasmania Resources Survey…who has just returned from the World 
Heritage area on the Franklin River, evidenced large amounts of grading equipment being brought 
into the World Heritage area to speed up road and associated construction. Of greater concern than 
even this physical damage is the biological damage which is resulting from this movement of 
unwashed equipment. Mr Waterman says that a plant disease known as Phytophthora cinnamomi 
has been introduced to the area and is already wreaking savage effect on the plant life. 
74 Adopted by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 
General Conference at its 17th session in Paris on 16 November 1972. Convention Concerning 
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage UNTS. 1037 (1972). 
75 Fisher, above n 62, at 109.  
76 The earlier case of Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168 had confirmed that laws 
passed by the Commonwealth to implement international treaties must be reasonable and 
appropriate. See also Keyzer, above n 29, at 210: 
 However, any notion that there was an additional requirement of international concern as 
suggested by Stephen J in Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168 was removed by the 
Tasmanian Dam case (1983) CLR 1. 
77 Richardson v Forestry Commission of Tasmania (1988) 164 CLR 261; Queensland v 
Commonwealth (1989) 167 CLR 232; Victoria v Commonwealth [1996] HCA 56; 187 CLR 416; 
138 ALR 129; 66 IR 392 considered in relation to the application of international labour 
conventions being implemented at state level; Also cited in JT International SA v 
Commonwealth of Australia; British American Tobacco Australasia Limited v The 




the development of water law reform. With regard to the exercise of constitutional 
power by the Commonwealth government it stated:78 
4.11 The committee agrees that the ambiguities in the provisions of the 
Water Act, in relation to the development of the Basin Plan, have largely 
resulted from the absence of a clear constitutional power for the 
Commonwealth over water regulation in Australia. In the committee's view, 
the basis upon which the Water Act is established is unsound: there are clear 
question marks over the adequacy of the constitutional heads of power 
(namely, the external affairs power), as well as the limited state referral 
powers, upon which the Act relies. 
The lack of clear constitutional power and its effect on the law reform process are 
detailed in the section below which evaluates the implementation of the Water Act 
2007 (Cth) and the creation of the Murray-Darling Basin Plan.  
There is strong evidence to suggest that drought also drives the development of 
water reform policy. Many studies link the law reform initiatives in Australia to 
preceding droughts.79 The current water reforms “have their parallels to reform in 
the early twentieth century” as both reform processes had to respond to extreme 
droughts.80 The common factor is that in drought conditions states are more willing 
to co-operate on water policy.81 During the 1990s drought and evidence of further 
environmental problems in the Murray-Darling catchment showed that more urgent 
action was needed to address over-allocation. During the “Millennium Drought” 
from 1997 -2009 precipitation in Australia was recorded at its lowest level since the 
1900s.82  Prior to the Millennium Drought, drought was considered a “climatic 
 
78 Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee A Balancing Act: provisions of 
the Water Act 2007 (Australian Commonwealth Government, Canberra, 2011) at 63. 
79 Wilson Sousa Júnior and others “Water: Drought, crisis and governance in Australia and Brazil” 
(2016) 8(11) Water 493; Amir Aghakouchak and others “Australia's drought: lessons for 
California” (2014) 343(6718) Science 1430; Mac Kirby “Sustainable irrigation: How did 
irrigated agriculture in Australia's Murray-Darling Basin adapt in the Millennium Drought?.” 
(2014) 145 Agricultural Water Management 154; Anthony S Kiem “Drought and water policy in 
Australia: Challenges for the future illustrated by the issues associated with water trading and 
climate change adaptation in the Murray–Darling Basin” (2013) 23(6) Global Environ. Chang. 
1615; Matt Kendall “Drought and its Role in Shaping Water Policy in Australia” in Kurt 
Schwabe and others (eds) Drought in Arid and Semi-Arid Regions (Springer, Dordrecht, 2013) 
451. 
80 Daniel Connell and Quentin Grafton “Water Reform in the Murray Darling Basin”, above n 37, 
at 2. 
81 At 2. 
82Albert van Dijkand others  “The Millennium Drought In Southeast Australia (2001–2009): 
Natural and Human Causes and Implications for Water Resources, Ecosystems, Economy, and 
162 
 
abnormality” from a policy perspective and responses to drought were managed as 
part of disaster relief policies and funds.83 However, the use of disaster relief policy 
soon changed with the more prolonged drought, issues with the drought support 
payments and the perception that the government should develop a strategic 
response to the problem of droughts that were extreme.84  
The Millennium Drought placed the Commonwealth government under pressure to 
respond to water allocation in a coordinated manner. A strong policy response was 
required to address the problems with water allocation exacerbated by drought. The 
Millennium Drought was so severe that individual state responses alone could not 
solve the water allocation problems of the Murray-Darling Basin.85 Although states 
were more willing to work together to address water allocation problems under 
drought conditions, water policy implementation had to start at the Commonwealth 
level and permeate down to state and regional levels.86 This approach was different 
from the previous efforts to address water allocation problems through water 
sharing agreements described above.  
Despite the severity of drought, the Commonwealth government remained reluctant 
to make full use of its external affairs power as upheld in the Tasmanian Dam case. 
 
Society” (2013) 49 Water Resour. Res. 1040. See also Murray Darling Basin Authority 
“Developing the Basin Plan. History of Water Management in the Basin” 
<https://www.mdba.gov.au/basin-plan-roll-out/basin-plan/developing-basin-plan> 
   It took the severe federation drought (1895 to 1902) to bring the states together to start to agree 
on the management of the Murray. A conference in Corowa in 1902 provided the catalyst, 
eventually resulting in the River Murray Waters Agreement commenced in 1915 by the 
governments of NSW, Victoria, South Australia and the Australian Government. 
83 LC Botterill, DA Wilhite (eds), From Disaster Response to Risk Management: Australia's 
National Drought Policy (Springer, Dordrecht, 2005).  
84 See Anthony Kiem “Drought and water policy in Australia: Challenges for the future illustrated 
by the issues associated with water trading and climate change adaptation in the Murray–Darling 
Basin” (2013) 23(6) Global Environ. Chang. 1615 for a discussion of the historical drivers of 
water policy responses to drought.  
85 Matthew Heberger “Australia’s Millennium drought: Impacts and responses” in Peter Gleick 
(ed) The World’s Water Volume 7. The Biennial Report on Freshwater Resources (Island Press, 
Washington, 2012) 97.  
86 In 1993, the Council of Australian Governments commissioned a report chaired by Sir Eric Neal 
to consider water resource issues. See Policy Council of Australian Governments Sir Eric Neal 
Report of the Working Group on Water Resource Policy to the Council of Australian Governments 
(Australian Government, Canberra, 1994).  
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Instead, it opted to follow a policy of “cooperative federalism” which meant 
working with states to implement environmental policy.87 While, on the one hand, 
cooperative federalism may have been a tactical response to gain state support to 
implement much-needed water reform.88 On the other hand, consensus between 
states was critical to ensure the progress of such extensive environmental reform. 
Cooperative federalism was thus best for the long-term success of implementing 
water allocation law reform because it established a foundation of mutual respect 
and trust.  
 
 The COAG Water Reform Framework 1994 and “cooperative 
federalism” 
In 1993, the COAG commissioned The Working Group Report on Water Resources 
Policy to investigate water resource problems.89 The Report stated that problems 
existed in the water industry in terms of the unsustainable use of water, inefficient 
service delivery, inadequate provision for upgrading infrastructure in rural areas, 
barriers to moving water to higher-value uses and the need for clarity around the 
role of water industry institutions. 90  The Working Group Report on Water 
Resources Policy’s recommendations were incorporated into the COAG Water 
Reform Framework 1994.91  
 
87 Gerry Bates Environmental Law in Australia (5th  ed, New South Wales, LexisNexis, 2002) at 
73.  
88 Crawford “The Constitution and the Environment”, above n 55, at 27. 
89 Policy Council of Australian Governments Sir Eric Neal Report of the Working Group on Water 
Resource Policy to the Council of Australian Governments (Australian Government, Canberra, 
1994). 
90 Above. The Report’s concerns were summarised in The Council of Australian Governments. 
Water Reform Framework 1994 at 2.  
91 The Council of Australian Government (COAG) COAG Water Reform Framework 1994- 
Attachment A: Water Resource Policy (Communique, 25 February 1994) at 1:  
  The key objectives of the Council's deliberations were to assist in bringing about a more 
competitive and integrated national market and more efficient and effective arrangements for the 
delivery of services in areas of shared responsibility. 
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Another critical factor influencing Australia’s water law and policy reform was 
concurrent competition policy reform. An Independent Committee of Inquiry 
examined National Competition Policy in 1993 resulting in National Competition 
Reforms.92 The committee focused on developing a national competition policy in 
areas where traditionally the public sector had maintained ownership and control; 
the committee was also critical of public monopolies such as in the gas, electricity 
and water industries.93 The National Competition Reforms drove the changes to 
water markets and states were given three “tranche” payments to meet obligations 
relating to implementing gas, electricity and water reforms.94  
 
 The COAG Water Reform Framework 1994 Objectives 
The COAG Water Reform Framework 1994 objectives stated that a Water 
Framework was required to ensure “an efficient and sustainable water industry”. It 
stated that the framework should include pricing, based upon “full-cost recovery” 
and that future water schemes should be assessed for their economic and ecological 
sustainability. Unbundling of property rights, in the sense of a fully unbundled 
water allocation system, was also a significant objective as unbundling would 
change how water entitlements were defined so that the risk of the final water 
allocation would be spread across all water users.95  
 
92 Commonwealth of Australia National Competition Policy Review Report (the Hilmer Report) 
August 1993. Following the Inquiry three intergovernmental agreements were signed in 1995: 
the Competition Principles Agreement, the Conduct Code Agreement and the Agreement to 
Implement the National Competition Policy and Related Reforms. 
93 At 5. 
94 Productivity Commission Impact of Competition Policy Reforms on Rural and Regional 
Australia, Report No. 8 (Productivity Commission, Canberra, 1999) at 94. 
 Implementation of the NCP programme is split into three tranches. At the end of each tranche — 
in July of 1997, 1999 and 2001 the Commonwealth makes the competition grants available to the 
States and Territories if they are viewed as having made satisfactory progress with the reforms. 
Assessments are undertaken by the NCC, which monitors each jurisdiction’s progress and makes 
recommendations to the Commonwealth Treasurer. The Commonwealth Government, not the 
NCC, decides the amounts of competition grants actually paid 
95 Objective 4(a) stated a “separation of water property rights from land title and clear specification 




The “Environmental Water Holder” in Objective 4(b) was a novel concept, 
effectively giving legal rights to the environment in order to participate in the water 
market. This chapter assesses the role of the Environmental Water Holder in further 
detail as part of the Victorian case study discussed below. Objective 4(d) addressed 
water quality based on “scientific information” to determine the “health and 
viability” of water catchments.  
The effects of over-allocation were recognised in Objective 4(d) which required 
“substantial progress made by 1998 to provide a better balance in water resource 
use including appropriate allocations to the environment in order to enhance/restore 
the health of river systems”. Further measures to prevent over-allocation included 
specific reference to “significant future irrigation” in Objective 4(f). Such irrigation 
projects would require “appropriate assessments” in order for “natural resource 
managers to satisfy themselves that the environmental requirements of the river 
systems would be adequately met before any harvesting of the water resource 
occurs”.  
The creation of water markets was stated in Objective 5 of the COAG Water Reform 
Framework 1994 which required states to implement markets within catchments 
and across political boundaries. Water trading arrangements would begin with the 
“necessary institutional arrangements…no later than 1998” as stated in Objective 
5(b). Water trading and the commitment to institutional arrangements for water 
markets to operate in each state were a significant requirement of the COAG Water 
Reform Framework 1994.  
The significance of the National Competition Reforms in the context of water 
reform was that this approach emphasised the market value of water. These market-
based concepts were reflected in water policy and conversely water policy was 
included in the competition policy. For example, the COAG Water Reform 
Framework 1994 objectives were incorporated into the 1995 National Competition 
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Policy agreements.96 States were required to implement water, competition and 
other policy as required. The competition reforms supported the marketisation of 
water. Hussey and Dovers state the importance of competition reform as follows: 97 
National Competition Policy drove reform in many policy domains, and the 
“Council of Australian Governments water reform” of the 1990s, were a 
leading example. These reforms focused on productivity, reduction of state 
subsidies, user-pays, separation of policy and provision, privatization and 
corporatization of functions, break-up to allow competition, use of market 
and property right mechanisms and importantly provision of flows to the 
environment. 
The competition reform context also provided an additional level of accountability 
as state progress in implementing the reforms was monitored.98 
 
  The Establishment of the National Water Commission 
The 1994 COAG reforms and Water Reform Framework 1994 indicated a change 
in water policy towards greater use of markets for reallocation. Fully-allocated 
catchments need to manage water to shift water use from low-value to high-value 
use. Thus, the Australian water policy included the use of water markets as a 
solution to the problem of over-allocation. However, obstacles to the establishment 
of water markets included political opposition from those holding existing 
allocations and the complexity of regulating market rules for trading water. 99 
 
96National Competition Council “Assessment of government’s progress in implementing the 
National Competition Policy and related reforms 2005 (Commonwealth Government of 
Australia, Melbourne, 2005) at xvi. 
97 Karen Hussey and Steven Dovers “Trajectories in Australian Water Policy” (2006) 135 Journal 
of Contemporary Water Resources and Education 36 at 39. 
98 Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair “Australia’s Water Reform Journey – from Stagnation to 
Innovation” in Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair (eds) Reforming Water Law and 
Governance. From Stagnation to Innovation in Australia (Springer, Singapore, 2018) at 11. The 
implementation of the reforms was overseen by the National Competition Council. 
99 Thomas Garry “Water Markets and Water Lessons in the United States: Lessons from Australia” 
(2007) 4(2) MqJICEL 23.  
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Institutional changes were required to overcome these problems. 100  The 
establishment of the National Water Commission in 2004 was, therefore, one of the 
most important policy contributions of the National Water Initiative 2004. 101 
Before examining the role of the Commission in more detail other aspects of the 
National Water Initiative are also relevant to fully understanding the role of the 
Commission.  
The NWI was instrumental in addressing the imbalance between surface water and 
groundwater allocation. Prior to the NWI, there was a far greater emphasis on 
surface water rights. The NWI addressed the imbalance by providing for the 
recognition of and planning for groundwater at the same level as surface water. The 
extent of groundwater inclusion in the NWI leads to the observation that “What is 
most notable about the NWI is not that groundwater is mentioned, but that its 
mention is pervasive”.102 The NWI sought to recognise the connection between 
groundwater and surface water as a single source in clause 23(x), which indicates 
that the NWI had a clear focus on both surface water and groundwater. 
The NWI also needed to address the historical legacy of water allocation regulation 
that had resulted in “the complexity of current water property rights”.103 More 
specifically, Australia’s historical water allocation policy had resulted in different 
licences, permits and irrigation rights to water between states, which needed to be 
addressed as part of reform.104 The different approaches taken by states to defining 
water rights created variations in entitlements to water as these approaches 
depended upon state water allocation policy. The practices taken by different states 
 
100 Rowan Roberts, Nicole Mitchell and Justin Douglas “Water and Australia's Future Economic 
Growth” (2006) 1 Economic Round-Up 53 at 65.  
101 K Stoeckel and H Abrahams (2007) “Water reform in Australia: The National Water Initiative 
and the role of the National Water Commission” in K Hussey and S Dovers (eds) Managing 
Water For Australia: The Social and Institutional Challenges. (CSIRO Publishing, Melbourne, 
2007). 
102 Barbara Cosens “Governing the Freshwater Commons: Lessons from Application of the 
Trilogy of Governance Tools in Australia and the Western United States” in Cameron Holley 
and Darren Sinclair (2018) Reforming Water Law and Governance. From Stagnation to 
Innovation in Australia (Springer, Singapore, 2018) at 289. 
103 At 65.  
104 At 65. 
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in regulating property rights in water were a barrier to the implementation of the 
NWI,105 given that he NWI was attempting to standardise water allocation methods 
and policy as far as practicable to operate a mature water market.106 One of the first 
steps to achieve standardised water policy was set out in the COAG Water 
Framework 1994 and the NWI which both stated that water rights should be 
unbundled.107 In order to facilitate unbundling states were encouraged to follow the 
NWI directive to separate water take and use. However, the directive did not 
prescribe the method for states to unbundle. As a result, different types of water 
property entitlements exist across states. Unbundling was controversial because it 
“marked a significant change in the governance of water as a common pool resource 
within Australia”.108  
As shown above the NWI was attempting to bring about ambitious change to water 
allocation in Australia. In light of the constitutional barriers to state co-operation 
discussed earlier in the chapter, it was important that there was independent 
oversight of the water reform implementation. It is in this context that the role of 
the National Water Commission should be considered.  
The National Water Commission was one of the most important institutions to 
emerge from the National Water Initiative 2004.109  It was a strong element of 
 
105 ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth [2009] HCA 51 (9 December 2009) challenged 
the replacement of existing water rights with a water licence under the Water Management Act 
2000 (NSW). The Court held that the change to the water right was not an acquisition of 
property from original water right holders and did not necessitate any payment in compensation 
for the loss of water.  
106 Connell and Grafton, above n 80, at 5. The NWI reform needs to be considered in light of the 
broader competition reforms which sought to make the Australian economy more competitive.  
107 The NWI also required water metering requirements in paragraphs 87-89 which required a 
consistent approach to metering. Water meter requirements in the Australian Government 
National Framework for Non-Urban Water Metering Policy Paper (Department of 
Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, Canberra, 2009) provided for 
annual government audits in addition to self-audits. An audit could review meter details, 
installation, maintenance, verification and compliance. 
108 Lee Godden “Environmental Markets and Property in Water” in Aileen McHarg, Barry Barton, 
Adrian Bradbrook and Lee Godden (eds) Property and the Law in Energy and Natural 
Resources (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) at 427. 
109 Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair “Introduction to this Special Issue. Rethinking Australian 




Australian water law reforms, which was tied to its role as an “independent 
watchdog” and the ability to provide advice to both the COAG and Commonwealth 
Government on water issues.110 Section 7 of the National Water Commission Act 
2004 stated the Commission’s functions, including undertaking audits requested by 
the COAG to determine “whether parties to the NWI are implementing their 
commitments under the NWI”.111 Every three years the National Water Commission 
had the statutory power to “assess the progress of parties to the NWI towards 
achieving the objectives and outcomes of, and within the timelines required by, the 
NWI” and report these to the COAG with recommendations on how to improve 
outcomes.112 There was a further function to “monitor areas that are significant for 
achieving the objectives and outcomes of the NWI” 113  The National Water 
Commission could research water policy related matters including the sustainable 
management of water.114 These functions consolidated the responsibility for the 
implementation of the National Water Initiative and the water policy direction 
contained within it.  
The independent review function of the Commission, contained in the National 
Water Commission Act 2004, is a distinctive feature of the Australian water reforms 
that New Zealand does not have. As part of carrying out their statutory review 
function, the National Water Commission reviewed the implementation of the 
National Water Initiative several times.115 In its final report in 2014, it provided an 
account of a decade of water law reform concluding that substantial work remained 
 
110 Poh-Ling Tan (2007), “How do water markets function in droughts and other hard questions: 
Learning from law reform in Australia” presented at Legal Aspects of Water Sector Reforms 
Geneva, International Environmental Law Research Centre at 8. 
111 Water Commission Act 2004 (Cth) s, 7 (1)(a) Repealed. 
112 Water Commission Act 2004 (Cth) s, 7 (1)(b) Repealed. 
113 Water Commission Act 2004 (Cth) s, 7 (1)(d) Repealed. 
114 Water Commission Act 2004 (Cth) s, 7 (1)(i) Repealed. 
115 These reports include National Water Commission Australian Water Markets Report 2010-11 
(Australian Government, Canberra, 2011); National Water Commission Murray Darling Basin 
Plan Implementation: Initial Report. Report No 1 Part 3 of the Water Act 2007(Cwth) 
(Australian Government, Canberra, 2007); and National Water Commission The National Water 




outstanding in implementing the reforms.116 One of the areas of concern was that 
the Commonwealth was that “the Commonwealth is drawing back from its 
leadership role to a significant extent”.117 
The abolition of the National Water Commission was announced in the 2014 
budget, initially without clear guidelines on the redistribution of its functions.118 
The Commission’s audit and three-year assessment function were transferred to the 
Productivity Commission. The National Irrigators Council supported the abolition 
of the National Water Commission “on the basis that it would reduce the number 
of government agencies that are involved in the process of water reform”. 119 
Arguments in favour of abolishing the National Water Commission included budget 
constraints and efficiency in government  
The Opposition was highly critical of the decision to abolish the Commission. It 
stated the Commission had an important role to play in auditing, monitoring, 
indigenous rights that have goodwill and institutional knowledge. 120  It was an 
“independent voice on often very difficult, controversial, and highly contested 
policy areas”.121 The Opposition was concerned that the expertise and experience 
of National Water Commission in water reform would be lost when abolished.122 . 
Despite these concerns the in 2015, the Commonwealth disestablished the National 
Water Commission citing concerns related to the cost of having a separate body to 
carry out the monitoring function of the Commission.123 
 
116 National Water Commission Australia’s Water Blueprint: National Reform Assessment 2014 
(Australian Government, Canberra, 2014) at [5.1]. 
117 At [5.1]. 
118 Parliamentary Debates (26 May 2015) above n 26 at 4496. 
119 At 4496. 
120 At 4504. 
121 Parliamentary Debates (26 May 2015) National Water Commission (Abolition) Bill 2015 
Butler at 4493. 
122 At 4496. 
123 National Water Commission (Abolition) Act 2015 (Cth); Parliamentary Debates (26 May 2015) 
National Water Commission (Abolition) Bill 2015 Butler at 4491. 
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The reasoning behind the disestablishment of the National Water Commission 
illustrated that the water policy rhetoric in Australia had shifted. It shifted from 
focusing on the restoration of the Murray-Darling River Basin through a collective 
approach (as indicated in the National Water Initiative) to a greater focus on costs 
of providing government services. This shift in the implementation of the reforms 
has been described as a transition from “innovation to stagnation”.124 In support of 
this view, the Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists was also critical stating 
that Australian governments were taking a step back in water reform. In their 
opinion moving away from the water reform agenda initiated a decade earlier was 
a mistake:125 
It appears that our Australian governments are walking away from strategic 
water reform at the very time when we should be preparing for the next 
inevitable drought 
It was shortsighted to abandon strategic water reform by abolishing the 
Commission. The Commonwealth Government invested significant funds and 
effort to implement water law reform. Overcoming constitutional barriers to water 
law was very difficult. Then independent voice of the National Water Commission 
was instrumental in bringing transparency to implementing reform across states, 
and also reviewing progress. Australia should not have abolished the National 
Water Commission.  
Once the review function of the National Water Commission was transferred to the 
Productivity Commission. The Productivity Commission released its first review 
report in 2018.126 A notable submission to the review was from academics and 
practitioners working in the water law and policy area. 127  They collectively 
 
124 Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair (eds) Reforming Water Law and Governance. From 
Stagnation to Innovation in Australia (Springer, Singapore, 2018). 
125 Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists Statement on the Future of Australia’s Water 
Reform (Wentworth Group, Online, 2014). The Wentworth Group is an independent group of 
scientists, economists and business people. One of its programs is focussed on national water 
reform.  
126 Productivity Commission Murray Darling Basin Plan: Five-year assessment. Productivity 
Commission Inquiry Report No.90 (Australian Government, Canberra, 2018).  
127 The submitters included Dr Emma Carmody, EDO NSW,Professor Barbara Cosens, University 
of Idaho, Professor Alex Gardner, University of Western Australia, Professor Lee Godden, 
University of Melbourne, Dr Janice Gray, UNSW Sydney, Associate Professor Cameron Holley, 
UNSW Sydney, Dr Bruce Lindsay, Environmental Justice Australia,  Dr Liz Macpherson, 
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expressed concern regarding the progress of the reforms citing the end of the 
Millennium drought and the abolition of the NWC as two factors contributing to 
the perception that the government was no longer interested in water law reform.  
 
In addition to the NWI discussed above, a further policy initiative undertaken in 
2004 was the Living Murray. The Living Murray First Step confirmed that a more 
systematic approach was needed to address over-allocation and environmental 
degradation of the Murray-Darling Basin. 128  The Murray Darling Basin 
Commission proposed several initiatives to improve the health of the Murray-
Darling Basin as part of the Living Murray policy.129 It put forward proposals to 
increase environmental flows to levels to the Murray-Darling Basin and ranked the 
proposals in terms of whether they had a low, moderate or high chance of success. 
The proposals were developed with the input of a scientific reference panel which 
found that an increase of 1630GL of environmental flows had a moderate chance 
of improving the environmental health of Murray-Darling Basin. Overall, the 
Living Murray was a significant improvement in terms of the level of coordination, 
investment and commitment to environmental health of the Murray-Darling 
Basin.130 The difference between the Living Murray and the NWI was that the 
Living Murray was developed as part of the Murray-Darling Basin Commission 
policy, while the NWI was developed at the state level.  
 
University of Canterbury and University of Melbourne, Dr Rebecca Nelson, University of 
Melbourne and Stanford University, Erin O’Donnell, University of Melbourne, Dr Lily O’Neill, 
University of Melbourne, Dr Kate Owens, University of Sydney, Dr Darren Sinclair, Australian 
National University. See Emma Carmody and others Submission To The Inquiry Into The Reform 
Of Australia's Water Resources Sector 17 April 2017 
128 Murray-Darling Basin Commission The Living Murray Environmental Watering Plan 2006–
2007 (MDBC, Canberra, 2006). 
129 Scientific Reference Panel for the Living Murray Initiative Cooperative Ecology Ecological 
Assessment of Environmental Flow Reference Points for the River Murray System (Interim 
Report) (Murray–Darling Basin Commission, Canberra, 2003). 
130 Daniel Connell and Quentin Grafton “Water Reform in the Murray Darling Basin”, above n 37 






The implementation of a cap on water extraction was an important step in 
addressing the over-allocation problem in the Murray-Darling Basin. The cap was 
also critical in establishing water markets in Australia because it indicated that the 
catchment was fully allocated. 131  The process of establishing a cap on water 
extraction from the Murray-Darling Basin began in 1995 with the Murray-Darling 
Ministerial Council limiting surface water diversion in response to over-
allocation.132 At first, the cap was temporary. However, it became permanent in 
July 1997.  
On the one hand, the cap is viewed positively as the most important decision of the 
Ministerial Council because all states agreed to it voluntarily.133On the other hand, 
there was criticism that the cap would not be an effective policy to address over-
allocation because the extraction limits were based only on prior use when they 
should have been based on sustainable limits that took into account environmental 
needs.134 Connell and Grafton conclude the cap failed because it was not fully 
implemented.135 The cap depended on the states’ willingness to implement it in 
order for it to be successful; however, the Commonwealth had no legal mandate for 
 
131 Viki Waye and Christina Son “Regulating the Australian Water Market” (2010) 22 J. Environ. 
Law 431 at 437; John Quiggin “Why the Guide to the Proposed Basin Plan failed, and what can 
be done to fix it” in John Quiggin, Thilak Mallawaarachchi and Sarah Chambers (eds) Water 
Policy Reform, Lessons in Sustainability from the Murray Darling Basin (Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, 2012). 
132 The Ministerial Council commissioned an audit of the Basin in 1995. Following the audit, it put 
in place a temporary cap on water extraction.  
133 John Scanlon “A hundred years of negotiations with no end in sight: Where is the Murray 
Darling Basin Initiative leading us?” (2006) 23 EPLJ 1 at 6. 
134 At 6. 




“states to resource the necessary compliance work”.136 In support of this position, 
Connell and Grafton give the example of the cap’s not being extended to include 
groundwater, even though there was a policy to do so. Connell and Grafton contend 
that the failure of the cap was symptomatic of the “general failure” of the Murray-
Darling Ministerial Council to implement policy to improve the environmental 
health of the Murray-Darling Basin.137  By the early 2000s, there was growing 
concern that the initial momentum in water policy from the early 1990s was 
declining.  
The voluntary cap transitioned into mandatory sustainable limits under the Water 
Act 2007 (Cth). The Act required the establishment of “environmentally sustainable 
limits” as part of the Murray-Darling Basin Plan.138  The policy incentives for 
capping surface water diversions were to improve the overall environmental health 
of the Murray-Darling River Basin and encourage water trading.139 The move to 
mandatory sustainable limits was part of a broader Commonwealth response to 
encourage states to renew their commitments to advancing water policy. The 
provisions of the Water Act 2007 (Cth) reflect a desire to make improvements to 
the allocation of water in the Murray-Darling Basin. The Water Act introduced a 
range of new policy measures that states were required to implement in accordance 
with the Act.  
The Water Act 2007 (Cth) required states to legally recognise the environmental 
water.140 While states such as Victoria have embraced the concept and established 
the Victorian Environmental Water Holder as a separate entity, other states have 
not followed through in the same manner as is discussed in the case studies that 
 
136 Jennifer McKay, (2008) “The Legal Frameworks of Australian Water: Progression from 
Common Law Rights to Sustainable Shares” in Lin Crase (ed) Water Policy in Australia. The 
Impact of Change and Uncertainty (RFF Press, Washington, 2008) at 48. 
137 Connell and Grafton “Planning for water security in the Murray-Darling Basin”, above n 47, at 
69 and Daniel Connell Water Politics in the Murray-Darling Basin. (Federation Press, Sydney 
2007).  
138 Water Act 2007 (Cth), s 20(b). 
139 A Horne, J Freebairn and E O’Donnell “Establishment of environmental water in the Murray 
Darling Basin: An analysis of two key policy initiatives” (2011) 15(1) AJWR 7 at 8. 
140 At 8. 
175 
 
follow in this chapter. In this regard, Australia is a leader in water policy 
development. Environmental water is not a feature of New Zealand water law. 
Comparative studies on water law show there is a “greater acceptance” of the 
concept of environmental water by the Australian government than in other 
countries such as the United States.141  
 
 Commonwealth Water Law and Policy - The Water Act 2007 
(Cth)  
The Commonwealth’s national policy programme included the enactment of the 
Water Act 2007142 The regulation and implementation of Australian water reforms 
deserve closer attention and the Act is central to the recent reforms.143 The Act has 
a national rather than state focus in that it takes a top-down approach to implement 
the reforms. From a constitutional perspective, the Act gives effect to international 
agreements while reducing over-allocation and protecting ecological values.144 The 
objects of the Act emphasise economic interests, water security and cost-effective 
policy development. These objects form the basis of the Commonwealth’s direction 
to states on water allocation law and policy development. The enactment of the 
 
141 Benjamin Docker and Ian Robinson “Environmental water management in Australia: 
experience from the Murray-Darling Basin” (2014) 30 Int. J. Water Resour D. 164 at 168. This 
observation was made specifically in relation to America.  
142 Department of the Environment Water Heritage and the Arts (DEWHA), Water for the Future 
Policy Program (Canberra, Australian Commonwealth Government, 2010); Operational aspects 
of the Act are contained in Intergovernmental Agreement on Murray–Darling Basin Reform 
2008 and the 2013 Intergovernmental Agreement on Implementing Water Reform in the Murray 
Darling Basin 2013. The Act incorporates the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement in terms of its 
reference to water sharing and inter-state water transfers in Schedule D of the Act.  
143 Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair “Water Markets and Regulation: Implementation, 
Successes and Limitations” in Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair (eds) Reforming Water Law 
and Governance. From Stagnation to Innovation in Australia (Springer, Singapore, 2018) 101; 
Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair “Compliance and enforcement of water licences in NSW. 
Limitations in law, policy and institutions. (2012) 15(2) Australian Journal of Natural Resources 
Law and Policy 149. David Mercer, Linda Christesen and Michael Buxton “Squandering the 
future—Climate change, policy failure and the water crisis in Australia” (2007) 39(2-3) Futures 
272.    
144 Water Act 2007 (Cth), Part 1 Section 3. 
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Water Act 2007 (Cth) was designed to revive state commitment and interest in 
implementing the water law reforms initiated in the early 1990s.  
 
The Murray-Darling Basin Authority was established under the Water Act 2007 
(Cth) to administer the Murray-Darling Basin Plan and ensure that states complied 
with sustainable diversion limits. It was expected that the sustainable diversion 
limits would improve the environmental health of the Murray-Darling Basin by 
increasing the volume of environmental water in the catchment, an expectation 
which is evaluated below. Amongst other functions, the Authority is responsible 
for preparing environmental watering plans.145  
Murray-Darling Basin Plan provides the overarching legal framework for water 
allocation in the Murray-Darling catchment and it works in conjunction with state 
level water resource plans to achieve Basin objectives.146 Part 2 of the Act limits 
water extraction through the establishment of sustainable diversion limits. Part 2 
states the core requirements regarding the contents of the Murray-Darling Basin 
Plan in order to reach the limits set down. These requirements include planning for 
environmental water to be returned to the Murray-Darling Basin. The Murray-
Darling Basin Authority must accredit water resource plans within the catchment 
as evidence that states comply with the Act. Human needs for drinking water are 
also taken into consideration. The Murray-Darling Basin Plan must identify critical 
human water needs and how to meet them, issues which are important in the arid 
and variable Australian climate.  
Limitations in the scope of the Murray-Darling Basin Plan mean that it only controls 
the management, allocation and trading of water. It does not control land use. 
 
145 Water Act 2007 (Cth), s 172 states the functions of the Authority. 




Section 22(10) states that the Murray-Darling Basin Plan has “no effect” on land 
use planning or the “control of pollution”. In effect, the Murray-Darling Basin Plan 
focuses on water allocation issues, not water quality and land use planning. In 
comparison to the New Zealand situation, these limitations on land use planning are 
a point of distinction. The Murray-Darling Basin Plan is administered by the 
Murray-Darling Basin Authority. The lack of control over land use planning 
represents one of the gaps in dealing with water allocation issues in the Basin. 
Sustainable diversion limits aim to increase the volume of environmental water to 
the Murray-Darling Basin. The methods employed to reach these sustainable 
diversion limits have divided opinion in terms of whether the right balance is 
achieved between human consumptive needs and environmental needs. In 
particular, there are concerns that the sustainable diversion limits should be 
reformed to include consideration of climate change.147 Returning water to the 
Murray-Darling Basin is contentious because of this “trade-off” between competing 
demands for water.148  
 
 
An important question in the formulation of the Murray-Darling Basin Plan is how 
much water is needed to restore the Murray-Darling Basin to a healthy state. 
Estimates of how much water needs to be returned to the Murray-Darling Basin 
have changed over time. For example, initial research undertaken by the Wentworth 
Group stated that 4350GL were required to be returned to the Murray-Darling Basin 
in order for there to be a good chance of success in restoring its environmental 
 
147 James Pittock, John Williams and Quentin Grafton. “The Murray-Darling Basin plan fails to 
deal adequately with climate change” (2015) Water 26. 
148Kevin Goss “Environmental flows, river salinity and biodiversity conservation: managing trade-
offs in the Murray–Darling Basin” (2003) 51(6) Aust. J. Bot. 619. 
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health.149 In 2010, the Wentworth Group provided a further detailed report stating 
that 440GL was the volume needed to restore the health of the Murray-Darling 
Basin.150 In 2010, the Murray-Darling Basin Authority also provided a figure to 
restore Basin health, which differed from those of the Wentworth Group. The 
Authority stated that 3860GL were needed for there to be a reasonable likelihood 
of success in restoring the health of the Murray-Darling Basin. When this figure 
was released to the public in the first Basin Plan, there was shock in the irrigation 
community as it realised the degree of change that was needed to restore Basin 
health.151 Once sustainable diversion limits were adjusted to include social and 
environmental impacts, the final figure of targeted water to return to Murray-
Darling Basin environment in 2012 was 2750GL. However, there was a lack of 
transparency in determining this final figure and, as a result, a 2013 Senate Inquiry 
into the management of the Murray-Darling Basin Authority recommended that a 
transparent explanation of the 2750GL figure should be given to the public.152 A 
further problem with the 2750GL figure is that it only applies to surface water and 
that there has been a fivefold rise in the volume of groundwater extraction.153 In 
2017, the Murray-Darling Basin Authority proposed revising the sustainable 
diversion limit.154  The consultation Draft Determination Report stated that the 
 
149 Wentworth Group Submission to the Senate Inquiry into the urgent provision of water to the 
Coorong and Lower Lakes (Wentworth Group, Sydney 2008); The Australian Water Information 
Dictionary published by the Australian Government Bureau of Meteorology defines one gigalitre 
as “1,000 megalitres, which also is 1,000,000,000 litres (one billion litres)”. 
150 Wentworth Group Sustainable diversions in the Murray–Darling Basin: an analysis of the 
options for achieving a sustainable diversion limit in the Murray–Darling Basin (Wentworth 
Group, Sydney 2010). 
151 John Williams “Water reform in the Murray–Darling Basin: a challenge in complexity in 
balancing social, economic and environmental perspectives” (2017) 150(1) J. Proc. R. Soc. NSW 
68 at 79.  
152 The Senate Parliament of Australia, Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References 
Committee: the management of the Murray–Darling Basin, March 2013 (Australian 
Commonwealth Government, Canberra 2013). 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Rural_and_Regional_Affair
s_and_Transport/Completed_inquiries/2012-13/mdb/report/index. 
153 James Pittock, John Williams and Quentin Grafton. “The Murray-Darling Basin plan fails to 
deal adequately with climate change” (2015) Water 26 at 27; Jason Alexandra “Risks, 
uncertainty and climate confusion in the Murray–Darling Basin reforms” (2017) 3(03)Water 
Economics and Policy 1650038;  James Pittock “The Murray–Darling basin: climate change, 
infrastructure, and water” in Cecilia Tortajada Increasing Resilience to Climate Variability and 
Change (Springer, Singapore, 2016) at 41-59.  
154 Murray-Darling Basin Authority Sustainable Diversion Limit Adjustment Mechanism: Draft 
Determination Report (Australian Government, Canberra, 2017). 
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Murray-Darling Basin was on track to meet its target of 2750Gl of water being 
recovered annually on average and effectively 605GL less water needed to be 
diverted to the environment. The basis for the determination was that the Authority 
was overseeing several projects that would deliver the 605GL to the environment. 
The decision of the Authority to change the sustainable diversion limits is highly 
questionable. In particular, the scientific basis of the Authority’s Draft 
Determination Report was criticised in the South Australian Royal Commission 
into the Murray-Darling Basin Plan.155 
Moreover, in 2012 the Commonwealth government added a commitment that 
450GL also to be returned to the environment, a figure which was agreed to by 
Basin states in 2018.156 The 450GL was subject to ensuring that socioeconomic 
criteria were met before returning the water to the environment.157 The situation 
outlined above shows the ongoing tension between balancing the needs of water for 
the environment and the community. The criteria state that projects must be made 
public, that they should not harm social or environmental outcomes and that there 
should be clear timing for project completion. However, of greater importance to 
the achievement of 450GL environmental water return are the criteria on irrigation. 
For example, criterion six states: 
Programs or projects do not have negative third party impacts on the 
irrigation system, water market or regional communities  
a. Where a proposed project is located within an irrigation network, the 
proponent must provide evidence that the relevant network operator or water 
corporation is involved in or aware of the project.  
b. The relevant government or proponent must consult industry bodies, 
irrigation network operators/, local governments or regional development 
organisations, on a strategic regional approach which will focus on ensuring 
there is a mix of water efficiency projects in a region in ways that address 
industry, network/system and local/regional priorities, future needs and risks 
and may include research and extension services.  
 
155 Bret Walker Murray-Darling Basin Royal Commission (Government of South Australia, 
Adelaide, 2019). 
156 Murray-Darling Basin Authority “Murray-Darling Ministers Meet in Melbourne” Communique 
(14 December 2018).  
157 This paragraph draws on the material in “Efficiency Measures – Agreed Criteria” in the 
Murray-Darling Basin Authority’s “Murray-Darling Ministers Meet in Melbourne” Communique 




c. The socio-economic assessment of programs or projects must consider 
impacts not just on participants, but for broader regions 
The requirements under criterion six, and other criteria requiring consultation with 
community and industry leaders, are challenging to navigate because projects need 
to be both efficient and to return water to the environment. Furthermore, the 
Ministerial Council’s extra criteria pose a challenge to the legal basis of the Water 
Act 2007 (Cth) and the Commonwealth’s power to implement its water allocation 
policy across states in a systematic manner. The criteria are damaging to the 
Commonwealth and state collaboration that was been undertaken to enable 
Australia to develop its Basin Plan in the first place.  
The setting of sustainable diversion limits is subject to extensive complexity. The 
complexity arises not only from developing proper policy but also political 
interests.  
 
While main method of meeting sustainable diversion limits is through planning 
instruments, another method of reaching targets is through the Commonwealth 
purchase of water entitlements. In the Murray-Darling Basin the Australian 
government has undertaken the “world’s biggest buy-back of water rights” costing 
approximately 2.5 billion Australian dollars.158 The buy-backs generally occurred 
through the government’s purchasing of water allocations by entering the water 
market.159 Water buy-backs were meant to assist with improving the environmental 
health of the Murray-Darling Basin. However, it has been difficult to measure the 
direct correlation between water entitlement buy-backs and the health of the 
Murray-Darling Basin.160Water buy-backs have been the most contentious issue for 
 
158 Quentin Grafton and Sarah Wheeler “Economics of water recovery in the Murray-Darling 





the rural community.161 There were strong protests against the perceived effect of 
buy-backs on the rural economies where buy-backs occur. 162  It is unlikely, 
therefore, that further water-backs will occur.163  
Instead, government policy has shifted towards acquiring environmental water by 
investing in infrastructure improvements to save environmental water.164 However, 
the shift towards investing in infrastructure is now subject to criticism on a number 
of grounds.165  
An alternative non-government approach to water buy-backs is the Murray-Darling 
Basin Balanced Water Fund. 166  The Fund was established by the Nature 
Conservancy on a “counter cyclical” basis so that at times of scarcity more water is 
allocated to irrigators and in times when there is more water available it is allocated 
to wetlands.167  
If fully implemented the Murray-Darling Basin Plan would see an increase in the 
volume of water that is classified as environmental water. Successful 
implementation of the Plan is fraught with various challenges that are detailed in 
this chapter as states such as South Australia question the actions of upstream states 
and the commitment of those states to fully implementing the reforms including the 
Basin Plan. This section examines how the administration of environmental water 
 
161 Katherine Owens “Reimagining Water buybacks in Australia: Non-governmental organisations, 
complementary initiatives and private capital” (2016) 33(4) EPLJ 342 at 343. 
162 Above. 
163 Grafton and Wheeler (2018), above n 158. 
164 At 348. 
165 John Williams “Water reform in the Murray–Darling Basin: a challenge in complexity in 
balancing social, economic and environmental perspectives” (2017) 150(1) J. Proc. R. Soc. NSW 
68. 
166 Information Memorandum The Murray-Darling Basin Balanced Water Fund (19 October 
2015) 3 12. 
167 Ben Carr and others “The Murray-Darling Basin Balanced Water Fund and the Environmental 
Water Trust–using markets and innovative financing to restore wetlands and floodplains in the 
Murray-Darling Basin for financial, social and environmental outcomes” Proceedings of the 8th 
Australian Stream Management Conference, 31 July-3 August 2016. 2016. 
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was dealt with under the reforms. The issue of the administration of environmental 
water was carefully considered during the National Water Initiative and the Living 
Murray policy programme. As a result of these policy programmes the Water Act 
2007 (Cth) established the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder (CEWH) 
to be the repository of environmental water management. The CEWH is responsible 
for managing water acquired through water buy-backs and improvements to water 
infrastructure.  
O’Donnell’s research on the role of environmental water managers such as the 
Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder has provided interesting insight into 
their roles. 168  The research was based on interviews with staff at a range of 
environmental water bodies which had separate legal personality. Her findings 
confirmed that the role of the environmental water managers was constrained by 
their own interpretation of their rights and ability to be the “voice” of environmental 
water. In fact, the environmental water managers were unlikely to see their legal 
personhood as an opportunity to advocate for the environment in this manner. The 
role of environmental water managers was perceived as one where they were to 
deliver water to the environment, much like irrigators. O’Donnell stated that this 
interpretation of environmental water manager powers potentially prejudiced the 
ability of the environment to have an advocate for environmental water as 
Parliament intended. Further evaluation of environmental water is included in the 
case study of states within this chapter. 
 
The Water Act 2007 (Cth) regulates water charges. Water charge rules are 
legislative instruments which may be created by the Minister under Part 4, Division 
1, Section 92(2). Anti-competitive behaviour within the markets is addressed by the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). Section 99 states that 
 
168 Erin O’Donnell “Competition or Collaboration? Using Legal Persons to Manage Water for the 
Environment in Australia and the United States” (2017) 34(6) EPLJ 503. 
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the ACCC monitors and enforces the water market rules. The Minister for the 
Environment must consult the ACCC before making any rules.169  
Water charges and compliance issues related to market rules, under Part 4 and Part 
4A of the Act, are monitored by the ACCC. Section 94 requires the ACCC to 
monitor and report on compliance with the water market rules. Section 137 
reinforces the distinction between the market compliance function of the ACCC 
and the functions of the Murray-Darling Basin Water Authority. In comparison, the 
Authority is responsible for the enforcement of matters contained in Part 2 of the 
Act. Part 2 of the Act that relate to water management issues. The institutional split 
follows the market-based method of water allocation. For example, the higher-level 
management of water remains with the Authority. It is the role of the Authority to 
prepare the Murray-Darling Basin Plan as required by the Water Act 2007 (Cth). 
Unlike New Zealand, the institutional split of water for irrigation is not at the 
highest level of water management. Water allocation policy is developed in an 
integrated manner. The Authority prepares the Murray-Darling Basin Plan in 
consultation with Basin states, officials of the Murray-Darling Basin committee, 
the Murray-Darling Basin Community Committee and the ACCC.  
New Zealand does not have policy or laws regarding the establishment of water 
markets, the definition of rights for water products, and the role of the Commerce 
Commission in water market. These issues will be considered in detail in the next 
chapter.  
 
 Property in Water Entitlements – ICM Agriculture v The 
Commonwealth  
The ICM Agriculture case provided an opportunity for the High Court of Australia 
to examine the legal basis for water allocation by the Commonwealth 
 
169 Water Act 2007 (Cth), s 93. 
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government. 170  The main issue was whether there had been an acquisition of 
property under just terms under section 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution 
when irrigators were required to convert their water right to a water permit under 
the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW).171 The acquisition of property under just 
terms has a strong legal foundation.172 Four main requirements must be considered 
when determining whether section 51(xxxi) applies: first, whether what is acquired 
by the Commonwealth is classified as “property”; second, whether the property has 
been acquired; third, whether, if the property has been acquired, the compensation 
provided is on “just terms”; and fourth, whether the property has been acquired for 
a reason supported by the Commonwealth’s power to make laws in that particular 
area.173 The first point was accepted in this decision. The second point on whether 
there had been an acquisition of property was the most pertinent in the case.  
ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd (ICM) was an Australian agricultural company. It 
challenged the replacement of its existing water rights with a water licence under 
the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) because the New South Wales 
government was changing the previous groundwater bore licences that had initially 
been issued to ICM under the Water Act 1912 (NSW). The change from the existing 
licence under the old legislation to the new licence under the new legislation 
effectively reduced the amount of water available to ICM. ICM was offered 
“structural adjustment payments” by the state acting through the National Water 
Commission.174 The Schedule of the Water Management Act 2000 required the 
preparation of Water Sharing Plans. Thus the effect of the Water Sharing Plans was 
to reduce water entitlements over 10 years.175 The Funding Agreement was entered 
into by the National Water Commission on behalf of the Commonwealth.176 ICM 
 
170 D E Fisher “Water law, the High Court and techniques of judicial reasoning” (2010) 27(2) 
EPLJ at 85.  
171 Section 51(xxxi) of the Australian Constitution states: 
 The acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person for any purpose in respect of 
which the Parliament has power to make laws.  
172 Keyzer above n 29, at 217. 
173 Keyzer above n 29, at 218 identified these four points.  
174 ICM Agriculture v The Commonwealth at 1. 
175 At 2.  
176 National Water Commission Act 2004 (Cth).  
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argued that the payment amounts were inadequate and they “would not amount to 
‘just terms’ within the meaning of s51(xxxi) of the Constitution”.177 The majority 
judgment accepted the point that the state should not acquire property other than on 
“just terms”. This conclusion led to further examination of further legal issues. The 
Court then had to consider whether the change in the plaintiff’s bore licence 
involved an “acquisition of property other than on just terms within the meaning of 
s51(xxxi).178 
The plaintiffs argued that their existing bore licences issued under the Water Act 
1912 (NSW) were property. The Court considered the reliance on arguments based 
on English common law and drew attention to the replacement of the riparian 
doctrine by the Irrigation Act 1886 (Vic). Because the riparian system did not cope 
well with the water scarcity experienced in the Australian climate, states used 
legislative power to vest the ownership of water with the Crown.179 The importance 
of recognising the effect of these earlier Acts was that they vested the “right to “use” 
and “control” water with the Crown.180 The vesting of water with the Crown had 
implications for the issue of whether or not property had been acquired on just 
terms.  
The Court held that the change to the water right was not an acquisition of property. 
It disagreed with the plaintiffs who argued that the “property” they had acquired in 
their bore licences under the Water Act 1912 (NSW) had been eroded. The Court 
was effectively asked to consider whether those statutory water entitlements 
resulted in the creation of property.181 Then, if there was an element of property, 
whether this had been acquired by the State when it replaced the bore licences 
issued under the Water Act 1912(NSW).  
 
177 ICM Agriculture v The Commonwealth at 1.  
178 At 8. 
179 The Water Rights Act 1896 (NSW) section 1(1) and Water Act 1912 (NSW) s 6 used similar 
expression.  
180 ICM Agriculture v The Commonwealth at 10. Specific legislation on bores was also addressed 
in the Artesian Wells Act 1897 (NSW) and The Water and Drainage and Artesian Wells 
(Amending) Act 1906 (NSW). 
181 Fisher n 70 at 91. 
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The Court held that the granting of a bore licence issued under the Water Act 1912 
(NSW) and its replacement with water entitlements under the Water Management 
Act 2000 was not an “acquisition” of property by the State. The reasoning of the 
Court was based on the following assertions. First, the physical nature of 
groundwater makes it a public resource which meant the State did not gain anything 
from limiting the use of water.182 Second, since 1966, a licence had been required 
for the right to take water:183 
The rights the plaintiffs had under their bore licences (in particular, their 
right to extract certain volumes of water) did not in any sense “return” to the 
State upon cancellation of the licences. The State gained no larger or 
different right itself to extract or permit others to extract water from that 
system. 
It was clear that the “State always had the power to limit the volume of water being 
taken from that resource”184  The Court held that “there was no acquisition of 
property”. Nor had the State acquired anything by replacing bore licences. Fisher 
observes the strong position of the State in managing common resources on behalf 
of the community as follows:185 
The State was and always had been – certainly under the arrangements by 
which the State exercises its exclusive right to use and control of water 
resources – able to control the use of water resource as the common 
resources or common property of the community. This had probably been 
the position under the common law and certainly was the position under the 
legislation. 
Fisher provides an important observation, particularly the fact that the underlying 
position of the common law was, in reality, the vesting of water in the State as a 
 
182 ICM Agriculture v The Commonwealth 87 at [149] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell. In paragraphs 
[142-148] the four points considered in reaching this conclusion are addressed. The first is that 
water is not like other minerals that can be depleted. The implication of this physical aspect of 
water is that water control is not just about extraction and use. Water control also includes 
“ensuring its continuing availability”. Secondly, bore licences are “creatures of statute” and none 
of the licences that was replaced were confirming a prior common law right. Hence these types 
of statutory licences were “inherently susceptible to change or termination”. Thirdly, it is 
somewhat misleading and legally incorrect to attach property-like terms to groundwater because 
the groundwater in the aquifer is not property in a legal sense until it is controlled by a water user 
in pipes and so on. In making this point the Court relied upon the precedent in Embery v Owen 
and Blackstone. The final point was to take into account the State’s rights over water. These 
rights are vested with the State. 
183 At [150] per Hayne, Kiefel and Bell. 
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common resource. The starting point for a discussion on the nature of property in a 
water entitlement should be to acknowledge the status of water as a common 
resource.186 This decision set a strong precedent for other licence holders in New 
South Wales. The decision confirmed that the government could reduce 
entitlements without this reduction’s being an acquisition of property which would 
have otherwise triggered the requirement for “just compensation”. 
  
 Water Accounting 
The Australian water reforms addressed the issue of how to value water. To that 
end. Valuing water also required the development of reliable measurement of water 
takes and water accounting.187  The National Water Initiative 2004 specifically 
required states to implement water accounting, which meant that water accounting 
was considered early on in the water reform process.188  The purpose of water 
accounting was to facilitate benchmarking to create consolidated water accounts at 
state and national levels.189 Water accounting would form the basis for measuring 
progress towards restoring the health of the Murray-Darling Basin. It was clear that 
to achieve the objective of comparable water accounts, the water accounting system 
needed to be standardised in that standardised water accounts would allow a 
 
186 See Janice Gray and Louise Lee “Water Entitlements as Property: A Work in Progress or 
Watertight Now?” in Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair (eds) Reforming Water Law and 
Governance. From Stagnation to Innovation in Australia (Springer, Singapore, 2018) 101 for an 
examination of property theory and whether the National Water Reforms and the existence of 
water markets are dependent on ascribing property rights to water. The authors question whether 
it is possible to transfer water entitlements without secure property rights.  
 Spencer v Commonwealth of Australia [2015] FCA 754; 240 FCR 282 also followed ICM 
Agriculture v The Commonwealth confirming property rights were not acquired under the 
Natural Resources Management (Financial Assistance) Act 1992 (Cth) (the NRM Act) and the 
Natural Heritage Trust of Australia Act 1997 (Cth).  
187 Dustin Garrick and others “Valuing water for sustainable development” (2017) 358 
Science1003–1005.  
188  Australian Commonwealth Government Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water 
Initiative 2004 (Department of Environment and Energy (Cth), Canberra, 2004). 
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credible comparison between states to measure compliance with water entitlements 
and contribute to water trading information.190  
In the Australian context, water accounting also had broader constitutional 
implications. As described above, each state was required to implement water law 
reform under the Water Act 2007 (Cth) and to reduce water allocation to sustainable 
limits. Compliance with sustainable limits of water allocation and the calculation 
of water savings needed to be measured in a comparable manner. Ultimately, it is 
the perception of the integrity of water accounting systems which is important for 
state support of water reforms. States need to be able to rely upon water accounting 
information to compare and measure their performance in collectively moving 
towards improving the health of the Murray-Darling Basin.  
Specific provisions relating to environmental water accounting are also included. 
Environmental water is recorded in a register which includes information on 
“source, location, volume, security, use, environmental outcomes sought and 
type”.191 Environmental water as defined in paragraph 35 is given the same legal 
status and security as other water entitlements.192 The Australian water accounting 
system includes environmental water as part of its accounts.  
Water accounting standards form the foundation for water accounting in Australia. 
In 2006, the National Water Accounting Development project established water 
accounting as a discipline.193 The Water Accounting Standards Board (WASB) was 
established to guide the development of Australian Water Accounting Standards.194 
The WASB included experts from the fields of financial accounting, water 
management and policy. 195  In 2009, the Water Accounting Standards Board 
 
190 Above at s 82(2). 
191 Above at s 85(i). 
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193 Maryanne Slattery, Keryn Chalmers and Jayne M Godfrey “Beyond the Hydrographer’s 
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published the Water Accounting Conceptual Framework. 196  The Conceptual 
Framework informed the creation of the Australian Water Accounting Standards. 
In order to prepare accounts showing changes in the use of water this framework 
recognised concepts relating to the creation of water assets and liabilities for a water 
entity. The Conceptual Framework stated that a “water entity” was not defined in 
legislation: 
12. Legislation does not define the concept of a water report entity; nor does 
it prescribe who shall prepare general purpose water accounting reports in 
most cases. However, the Water Act 2007 requires the Bureau of 
Meteorology (Bureau) to compile and maintain water accounts for Australia, 
including a set of water accounts to be known as the National Water Account 
even though the Bureau is not directly responsible for national water 
management and distribution. This requirement demonstrates that the 
preparer of general purpose water accounting reports does not need to be the 
water report entity for which those water accounting reports are prepared. 
This is most obvious where the water entity is physical in nature. 
The water reporting entity could be an “irrigator” or an “environmental water 
holder”.197  
The communication of water information in the form of water accounts was a 
significant conceptual and practical progression from considering such information 
as hydrological data. The users of water information vary and so the Conceptual 
Framework emphasised standards and a standardised language that would allow 
different stakeholders in the water industry to communicate more effectively with 
each other.198 Water information is not just for water management; it is also needed 
by those who participate in water markets. States implementing water reforms rely 
 
196 Water Accounting Standards Board Water Accounting Conceptual Framework for the 
Preparation and Presentation of General Purpose Water Accounting Reports (Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra, 2009); Water Accounting Standards Board, Water Accounting Conceptual 
Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of General Purpose Water Accounting Reports 
(Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2014). 
197 Water Accounting Standards Board, Water Accounting Conceptual Framework for the 
Preparation and Presentation of General Purpose Water Accounting Reports (Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra, 2014) at 16. 
198 Businesses can also use the information to assess the level of risk to their business operations. 
Katherine L. Christ and Roger Burritt “The role for transdisciplinarity in water accounting by 




on having comparable water accounting standards to measure and report on 
progress on their own water reform processes. 
 
 Summary of Commonwealth Water Law and Policy Reform 
As we have seen, assessments of the Australian water reforms by academics and 
practitioners state that the reforms have been successful in addressing a number of 
problems that were facing Australian water allocation, but that, nevertheless, 
according to the Productivity Commission Review publically released during 
January 2019, further improvements can be made.199  
As stated earlier in this chapter, Australia has addressed constitutional barriers to 
implementing water law reform. The Water Initiative 2004 and the Water Act 2007 
(Cth) have been central to the reform process and the establishment of water 
allocation through a market-based system. The Productivity Commission Review 
evaluated the effectiveness of implementing the National Water Initiative across 
Australia. It found that market-based water allocation has improved the ability to 
respond to droughts in a more flexible manner because the transfer of a range of 
water products creates another asset for businesses. Empirical research also 
confirms that markets have assisted with the “resilience” of agricultural enterprise 
in Australia and that water trading has had a positive effect on regional GDP of 
states in the Murray-Darling Basin.200  
However, the regulation of markets is an ongoing point of contention during the 
water reform process. Regulation includes both compliance and enforcement and 
regulation of water markets should improve equity and efficiency for the 
environment. A key point that the Productivity Commission Review stated was the 
 
199 Productivity Commission Murray Darling Basin Plan: Five-year assessment. Productivity 
Commission Inquiry Report No.90 (Australian Government, Canberra, 2018).  
200 Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair “Governing water markets: Achievements, limitations and 
the need for regulatory reform” (2016) 33(4) EPLJ 301 at 310. In an extensive review of the law 
and empirical research involving over 4000 participant Holley and Sinclair provide insight into 
the operation of water markets. 
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need for states to take greater responsibility for implementing the reforms. The 
reasoning was that the Murray Darling Basin Authority had too many conflicting 
roles to implement and monitor compliance with the Basin Plan. These conflicting 
roles had the potential to affect the effectiveness of the Murray Darling Basin 
Authority to implement reform. Problems with ensuring compliance were also cited 
as an “overwhelming concern” at Chapter Twelve of the Review. There compliance 
issues focused on New South Wales and its “absence of a culture of compliance”.201 
The Review acknowledged the work that was being undertaken to address 
compliance problems and stated that a review of all states showed water take 
compliance was improving.202 
The following section examines how the requirements of the Water Act 2007 (Cth) 
have been implemented in states. In this section the meaning of the term “water 
allocation” can vary. The term “licence” is also used to describe rights that are 
comparable to a water allocation that is tied to land. The Australian water law 
reform process has resulted in the creation of many more water products because a 
volumetric allocation does not represent a guaranteed amount of water that may be 
taken. In fact, it is the starting point or maximum amount that may be delivered on 
the basis of the water licence. The actual allocation is more likely to be made on a 
seasonal basis once the actual amount of water that can be allocated is ascertained. 
Consequently, the benefits of unbundling are that it assists in managing the risks of 
water allocation. The creation of many more water products in Australia also brings 
more complexity to its water law and policy. 
A further issue that emerges when examining the different states is the lack of 
compliance with water regulations, a situation which could undermine the water 
law reform process that the Commonwealth has undertaken. Details such as 
accurate metering are required at state level to ensure that water theft does not 
 
201 Productivity Commission, above n 199 at 304; Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair 
“Compliance and Enforcement of Water Licences in NSW: Limitations in Law, Policy and 
Institutions” (2012) 15(2) Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 149 found 
increased monitoring of water licences could assist in preventing unintended effects of a lack of 




occur.203 Hence, it appears that the accurate monitoring of water information relates 
to the integrity of the water market. 
A further issue at the state level is the regional impact of water trading. For example, 
in some catchments, there may be more trade out of a catchment than is desired by 
the community. Markets do not address wider social concerns and impacts on 
communities.204 Nor do they always deliver the environmental outcomes that are 
desired. Moreover, water markets may still allow people to acquire a windfall gain. 
Finally, the water markets do not operate “equally” or in a standardised manner 
across Australia. The lack of standardised market practices, in turn, affects the cap 
and trade system of market implementation. The implementation of national water 
allocation law and policy at the state level is not uniform. The differences between 
states can be “profound” because of “the legacy of ostensibly independent state 
control”.205 These differences are evident in the evaluation of how the National 
Water Initiative 2004 and the Water Act 2007 (Cth) were implemented at state level. 
 
 Water Allocation Law in Victoria 
As we have seen, each state was required to implement the water reforms. The state 
of Victoria is a leader in implementing water reforms that “most fully replicate[s] 
the goals of the National Water Initiative”.206 The system of creating new water 
products varied according to the reliability of supply, level of supply and duration 
and was described by Godden as part of the unbundling process. Furthermore, 
Godden also stated that the Victorian response to the National Water Initiative was 
“a best practice model”.207 The Water Act 1989 (Vic) is the primary source of water 
law in Victoria. The Act sets out the requirements for water allocation, water trading 
 
203 Above. 
204 At 319. This aspect was more prominent for indigenous communities. 
205 Lin Crase “An introduction to Australian water policy” in Lin Crase (ed) Water Policy in 
Australia. The impact of Change and Uncertainty (Routledge, Washington, 2008) at 6. 
206 Lee Godden “Environmental Markets and Property in Water above n 108, at 429. 
207 At 309. 
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and the creation of sustainable water management plans. Water allocation 
categories in the Act are distinguished as bulk entitlements, environmental 
entitlements, water shares and water licences. A further significant development in 
Victoria was the establishment of the office of the Environmental Water Holder. 
While the previous section outlined the key aspects of water law in the Australian 
Commonwealth, this section will detail water allocation in the state of Victoria 
focusing on the Water Act 1989 (Vic). 
 
The purpose section of the Water Act 1989 (Vic) focuses on the problem of over-
allocation and water management.208 The Act provides “for integrated management 
of all elements of the terrestrial phase of the water cycle”. Hence integrated water 
management acknowledges the water cycle, and not just fresh water in a lake or 
under the ground. Section 1(c) requires the “orderly, equitable and efficient” use of 
water, which connotes a level of management required across the state. Section 1(d) 
requires water to be “properly managed for sustainable use for the benefit of present 
and future Victorians”. The rights of water holders and their entitlements and the 
needs of consumers are specifically indicated as key policy areas.209 The reference 
to consumers of water is extended to include “recourse for persons affected by 
administrative decisions”.210 Environmental protection is described as requiring 
“formal means” to protect in-stream values and to “provide for the protection of 
catchment conditions”.211 The detailed purpose provisions also acknowledge the 
changing role of water governance as the Act will “replace many forms of detailed 
administrative supervision by the Authorities with general supervision by the 
Minister for Environment, Climate Change and Water, through approved corporate 
plans and express directions”.212 In these ways, the purpose section provides a clear 
 
208 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 1. 
209 Section 1(g) and s 1(h). 
210 Section 1 (i). 
211 Section 1(j) and s1(k). 
212 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 1 (l) 
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yet detailed indication of the regulatory role of the Water Act 1989 (Vic) in the 
management of water in the Victorian region.  
The Victorian Water Register contains the details of water-related entitlements and 
allocations of water in declared and non-declared systems.213 The purpose of the 
Water Register is to “facilitate reporting in relation to records and information about 
water related entitlements” and to provide public records about ownership and use 
of those entitlements. 214  The Minister is responsible for “establishing and 
maintaining” the Water Register. The Water Register records water-use licences, 
water-use registrations, bulk entitlements, environmental entitlements [as described 
below], the amount of water allocated to water shares in declared systems and works 
licences.215 Details recorded regarding water shares include the class of reliability 
of the share. Information regarding the transfer of water shares in s84J is 
supplemented by Market Rules which provide further guidance such as 
identification requirements for individuals applying to transfer water shares. 216 The 




As part of fully unbundling water rights, distinctions were made between the right 
to take and use water and the delivery of water. These distinctions confirm the 
 
213 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 84B. 
214 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 84B. 
215 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 84C(2). 
216 Victorian Water Register, “Trading Rules” Available at < http://waterregister.vic.gov.au/water-
trading/trading-rules> 
217 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 84C. Available online at Victorian Water Register  
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understanding of unbundling as being a compound process. The water allocations 
have been unbundled into bulk water takes, environmental water, water shares and 
water licences. To begin with this section examines water allocation in water shares 
and water licences. It will show that the fully unbundled methods of water allocation 
determined the final volume of water delivered at a higher level; not the level of the 
individual water licence holder. 
An irrigator must hold a water use licence before taking water for irrigation.218 A 
water licence records the details of the licence holder, a description of the land 
specified in the licence, any conditions on the licence and when the licence is 
valid.219 The purpose of the licensing system is to reduce the adverse effects of 
irrigation on unsuitable land by controlling where irrigation can occur.  
The relevant allocation principles in granting water licences include limiting the 
adverse effects of irrigation at the location of the water take. The adverse effects 
include reducing the effects of salinity, managing groundwater infiltration, 
protecting biodiversity and reducing the cumulative effects of water use. 220 
Delivery licences are also attached to the land but are separate from use licences. 
Delivery licences allow for the delivery of water to an irrigation area.221 A delivery 
licence will give a degree of security to a landowner regarding the ability to have 
water delivered through infrastructure at times of high demand. Delivery shares are 
tied to the land. 
“Water shares” determine the amount of water that can be taken from a “declared 
water system”.222 Declared water systems are declared under section 6A of the Act 
and are a regulated water system. Section 33G requires water shares to be issued 
for a particular zone, state the maximum volume allowed to be taken and state the 
 
218 Section 64J. 
219 Section 64L(2). 
220 Section 64U. 
221 Section Sch15(4). 
222 Section 33F. A declared water system is as declared by the Minister under s6A. There are 
approximately 134 Declared Water Supply Catchments in Victoria. Department of Economic 




“class of reliability” of that water share. Other matters that must be stated are in 
section 33H(a) about whether the water share is held as joint tenants or tenants in 
common. Section 33H(b) states that it must be specified whether the water share is 
associated with land specified in a water use licence. Section 33AM provides 
further guidance on matters to be considered when a water share is associated with 
land based on the reasonable likelihood of water being able to be supplied to land. 
The requirements that must be included in a water share are comprehensive and 
include matters that go beyond recoding hydrological information to private 
arrangements as to how the water shares are held.  
The Act also states the circumstances in which a water share must not be issued in 
section 33I. Of note is the provision in 33I(c) where a water share must not be issued 
if it “would be in conflict with any relevant bulk entitlement”. This provision clearly 
shows that bulk entitlements have priority over water shares. If forms one of the 
principles that must be taken into account when issuing water shares.  
The principles of against which a water share is issued are contained in section 33J. 
This section is divided into two parts. First under section 33J(1), where there is a 
bulk entitlement in the zone or a “permissible consumptive volume has been 
declared” the Minister must ensure that the issue of a water share is “consistent” 
with the pre-existing bulk entitlement and it is “not likely to have” an effect on other 
water shares, environmental entitlements and “the needs of other potential 
applicants”. Again as shown above issuing of further water shares are constrained 
and subject to these other factors including bulk entitlements and future applicants.  
The second category of principles in relation to issuing water shares focuses on 
situations where section 33J(1) does not apply. In other words, situations where 
there is not a pre-existing bulk entitlement or declaration of a permissive 
consumptive volume. Under section 33J(2)(a) to (k) the requirements for the second 
category of water shares is even more detailed than the first category. The Minister 
“must consider” the “existing and projected availability of water”, “existing and 
projected quality of water”, any potential “adverse effect” that is likely to occur on 
existing uses of water, waterways or aquifers and other water shares already owned 
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by the applicant. Environmental concerns that must also be considered include “the 
need to protect the environment”, “conservation policy of the government”, any 
adverse effect there could be on maintaining the environmental water reserve, “the 
needs of other potential applicants”, “any relevant report or statement prepared 
under any Act”, findings and submissions provided to relevant investigations or 
inquiries under any Act and other matters that the Minster “thinks fit to have regard 
to”. These detailed provisions show that the Minister has broad and extensive 
obligations to take into account these principles of allocation as the Act states these 
principles “must” be considered when issuing a water share.  
Declared water systems are commonly water storage dams for irrigation. A “water 
share authorises the taking of water under the water allocation for the share during 
the season for which the water allocation is allowed”.223 A water share will specify 
the location and rate at which water is taken.224 Section 33S allows the transfer of 
water shares to another user.225 Section 33T allows for the partial or full transfer of 
a water share for a fixed period. Section 33U allows for the assignment of the full 
water share or a part of it to any person. Water shares are recorded on the Water 
Register and may be sold, mortgaged or leased. The Water Register is essential to 
provide accurate information to water market participants.  
 
The Act effectively provides the framework for various water products and makes 
a distinction for water takes that are of a higher volume.  While accounts of 
Australian water allocation focus on the use of markets to reallocate water, it is 
equally important to understand how legislation defines water rights in a unbundled 
system.226 The example of bulk water entitlements shows how different categories 
 
223 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 33F(2). Provides specific guidance regarding shares owned by more 
than one person 
224 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 33F(2)(a) and s33F(2)(b). 
225 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 33S(2). 
226 See Lee Godden “Environmental Markets and Property in Water, above n 108, at 413. 
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of water products can be developed in legislation. Section 34(1)(a) defines bulk 
entitlements as any water corporation holding licences for “water supply or 
irrigation”, a person holding a water licence, an electricity generation company or 
Minister for Conservation and Forest Lands.227 The bulk entitlement may be held 
by a company, the Environmental Water Holder, or another body.  
Applications for bulk entitlements are made to the Minister for Environment, 
Climate Change and Water must satisfy the principles for bulk water allocation as 
stated in section 40.228 Under section 40(1) the Minister “must have regard to” the 
report of any panel that they appoint, submissions received, “the existing and 
projected availability of water in the area” and any “adverse effects” on existing 
water uses, waterways and aquifers. Further considerations that must be taken into 
account include drainage, maintaining environmental water and existing water 
allocations made to the applicant.   
In terms of protecting the environment section 40(1)(g)  requires the Minister to 
consider the “need to protect the environment, including the riverine and riparian 
environment”. Section 40(1)(i) requires the Minister to consider the “conservation 
policy of the government”. Section 40(1)(j) requires consideration of  “government 
policies concerning the preferred allocation or use of water resources”. These 
sections provide a clear indication that decisions relating to bulk water applications 
are made once the Minster has taken these environmental matters into account. 
The Minister must also consider “the purpose for which the water is to be used” and 
“the needs of other potential applicants”.229 These are part of statutory requirements 
for the Minister to follow which consider future as well as current applications for 
the same water. As a result there is a clear statutory power for bulk water 
applications to be compared with other potential applications. The matters outlined 
in section 40 allow the Minster to exercise broad discretion in considering other 
 
227 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 34(1) also makes provision for those holding licences under the Water 
Industry Act 1994, the Electricity Act 2000 and the Conservation, Forests and Lands Act 1987. 
228 Formerly referred to as the Minister for Water. 
229 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 40 (l) and s40 (m). 
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hydrological factors and “any other matter that the Minister thinks fit to have regard 
to”.230 It is significant that the Minister for Environment, Climate Change and 
Water may consider other information related to the current application to judge 
whether the application is approved. Such extensive comparisons are not possible 
under the current “first come, first served” method of water allocation in New 
Zealand, which will be examined in the next chapter.  
Once granted, bulk entitlements may be defined according to volume, stream flow 
or a share of the volume or stream flow.231 Bulk entitlements measured as a share 
of storage should include the method for calculating the entitlement. The bulk 
entitlement may specify the “obligations of the storage manager, the resources 
manager and the environmental manager” associated with the bulk entitlement 
holder; these can include decisions about releasing flows for the environment.232 
The bulk entitlement can record information in relation to whether the entitlement 
can be transferred in addition to any financial obligations of the Water Authority 
which holds the bulk entitlement.233  The bulk entitlement may state the water 
accounting methods and whether credits are available to the Authority if water is 
returned to the water source. The conditions that may be specified with a bulk 
entitlement under section 43, as described above, provide the Minister for 
Environment, Climate Change and Water with statutory power to ensure that 
compliance with other water policies in water management, allocation and reporting 
are met by the bulk entitlement holder.  
 
Environmental water in the state of Victoria is held by the Environmental Water 
Holder (Water Holder), which is a separate body corporate independent of any 
department. An application for environmental water may be made by the Minister 
 
230 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 40(o). 
231 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 43(a). 
232 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 43(c). 
233 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 43 (d) and s 43(e). 
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or the Water Holder.234 Allocations for environmental water have been changed to 
“environmental entitlements” so that environmental water is on a par with other 
water entitlements in the water market.235  
Previously, environmental water in Victoria was held by the Victorian Department 
of Sustainability and Environment (DSE). O’Donnell’s review of the establishment 
of the Victorian Environmental Water Holder states that three key factors 
influenced the establishment of the independent office of the Victorian 
Environmental Water Holder.236 First, the increased “propertization of water rights 
[which] began with the Water Act 1989 establishing tradable water rights”.237 The 
propertisation of water rights influenced the need to allocate water to the 
environment in order to participate in the water market. The creation of 
environmental water rights was based on the premise that water is a public good 
and “poorly adapted to participate in the market based system that allocates clear 
property rights to private goods”. 238  This point was also recognised at the 
Commonwealth level by the NWI. The second policy driver was to improve the 
management outcomes of a larger pool of environmental water to be held together 
by the Water Holder. The third, and most influential policy driver, was the 
challenges posed to the concept of environmental water during the extreme drought 
Victoria experienced from 2006 to 2009. The drought and its challenge to the idea 
of environmental water deserves closer scrutiny.  
 
 
234 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 48C.  
235 Water Act 1989 (Vic), Part 4, Division 1A. 
236 This paragraph and the discussion on the Victorian Environmental Water Holder draws 
extensively on the work of Erin O’Donnell “Institutional Reform in Environmental Water 
Management: The New Victorian Environmental Water Holder” (2011) 22 Journal of Water 
Law 73 at 76 and Erin O’Donnell and Elizabeth MacPherson “Challenges And Opportunities for 
Environmental Water Management in Chile: An Australian Perspective” (2011) 23 Water Law 
24. 
237  O’Donnell (2011), above, at 76. 
238 At 77. 
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Decisions about water allocation during the drought showed the subordinate 
position of environmental water compared to other water uses. In particular, its 
subordination illustrated the conflict of interest of government departments when 
allocating water in times of extreme scarcity. For example, the Victorian Minister 
for Water had the power to declare a water shortage and “qualify any rights to water 
whether or not they relate to the same area”.239 The term “qualify” is defined as 
“suspend, reduce, increase and otherwise alter”.240 O’Donnell states that the effect 
of the Minister for Water’s qualifying of 12 river basins effectively reduced the 
environmental flows.241 
In a democratic society, it is probably generally accepted that the role of the 
Minister for Environment is to present a balanced overall perspective from 
the Government on environmental matters. However, when that Minister 
holds environmental water, the question arises as to whether the Minister for 
Environment can represent environmental interests and concerns fairly? 
At the time of low water flow, the Minister stated that the environment “needed to 
shoulder some of the burden during drought years” and that more water should be 
allocated for consumptive use.242 At that time, the Yarra River was at 35 per cent 
of its normal flow.243 The Environmental Defenders Office of Victoria (EDO), a 
non-governmental organisation, reported on the potential to reform the 
environmental water reserve in light of this perceived conflict of interest.244 The 
EDO stated that, despite water reform, “environmental water in Victoria is still of 
insufficient volume and not properly accounted for, and the majority of it is not a 
secure entitlement”.245  
While the environmental water reserve improved the legal framework for 
environmental water it had, however, “fallen short of expectation and the needs of 
 
239 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s33AAA. 
240 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s33. 
241 O’Donnell (2011). above n 126, at 80. 
242 At 80 citing Rachel Kleinman “Dead fish fear for the Yarra” The Age (13 November 2007).  
243 At 80. 
244 Environmental Defenders Office “Reforming the Environmental Water Reserve How 
amendments to Victoria’s Water Act could restore river health” (Environmental Defenders 
Office, Melbourne, 2010). 
245 At 4. 
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the environment, particularly in light of climate change”.246 The Environmental 
Defenders Office recommended that environmental water should be converted to 
“environmental entitlements” to place environmental water on equal grounds with 
consumptive entitlements. In addition, it recommended that the ability to reduce 
environmental entitlements should be subject to a transparent process that included 
public notification. The EDO submitted that it was important for the office of the 
Victorian Environmental Water Holder to remain independent from the government 
in exercising powers to manage environmental water. Furthermore, the Report was 
critical of the lack of alignment with earlier policy objectives identified in the 2004 
White Paper on Victoria’s water law reform to improve outcomes for environmental 
water.247 
 
As we have seen above, in response to the problems regarding environmental water, 
the Victorian government established an environmental water holder in 2010. It is 
a separate body corporate with “perpetual succession” and powers to “sue and be 
sued in its corporate name”.248 The Water Holder usually has three Commissioners 
with experience in environmental management, sustainable water management, 
economics or public administration. 249  If the Minister recommends that a 
Commissioner should be removed for not fulfilling his or her duties, then reasons 
must be provided to the House of Parliament within five sitting days. 250  This 
removal process assists in maintaining transparency in the appointment and 
removal of the Water Commissioners. Division 4 of the Act outlines the 
accountability of the Water Holder to the government. The Minister may give 
written directions to the Water Holder but must not direct the particular use of 
 
246 At 4. 
247 Above. The “White Paper” is Department of Sustainability and the Environment, Securing Our 
Water Future Together: Victorian Government White Paper (2004). 
248 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s33DB(2)(a) and s33DB(2)(c). 
249 Section 33DF(2). 
250 Section 33DH(2). 
203 
 
water. By distinguishing the independence of the Water Holder, a higher level of 
accountability exists to improve the outcomes for environmental water. The Water 
Holder must actively plan how it will act to meet objectives in the next financial 
year.251 This “corporate plan” should detail the governance, functions and reporting 
of the Water Holder.252 The Minister retains discretion over the contents of the 
Water Holder’s corporate plan by having the legal ability to direct changes “to vary 
the plan as the environment Minister thinks fit”.253  
 
The Environmental Water Holder may acquire water through a Ministerial 
allocation under the Act or by participating in the water market. The acquisition of 
water in the water market is discussed below. This section considers the situations 
where the Minister may declare that there is an environmental water entitlement or 
allocation. Under section 46C the Ministerial allocation may be initiated by the 
Minister or at the request of the Water Holder. In making the declaration the Minster 
must consider the following principles which are matters to be considered under 
section 48F. That is the report from any panel appointed by the Minister in relation 
to the environmental water allocation, the potential “adverse effect that the 
allocation or use of water” could have on existing uses, the “conservation policy of 
the government”, “government policies concerning the preferred allocation or use 
of water resources”, maintaining the environmental water reserve, whether the 
allocation is from a heritage river system, any relevant Sustainable Water Strategy 
developed under the Act, any other matter the Minster believes is relevant and 
ensuring that giving effect to relevant water management plans. This exhaustive list 
is comprehensive and gives broad discretionary power to the Minister in 
determining whether an environmental water entitlement should be declared under 
the Act.  
 
251 Section 33DY. 
252 Section 33DY(2)(b). 




The Victorian Environmental Water Holder is a participant in the water market and 
has a public trading strategy.254 It is important to note that s33DE states that the 
“Water Holder has the power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done 
for, or in connection with” the holder’s duties. However, there is no further specific 
guidance on the matters that the Water Holder should consider when making 
decisions under the Act. For example, while the Water Holder can sell water, high-
volume sales could have a disproportionate effect on the water market. The 
Commissioner can manage this potential negative effect by adopting a plan to avoid 
“any significant adverse impacts on the market”.255 The requirements to consider 
the adverse effects on the market are not explicitly contained within the Water Act 
1989 (Vic).  
At the same time, the Water Holder has been criticised for not having the legal 
ability to sell excess water each season to irrigators.256 The Act requires that the 
money received from the sale of excess water is to meet the objectives of the Water 
Holder in section 33DC; this section states that the Water Holder should act to 
maintain environmental water and improve the overall health and condition of 
environmental water. These are broad objectives. A Liberal MP, Dr Sharman Stone, 
has advocated for the Water Holder to do more with proceeds from the sale of 
environmental water other than making further purchases of environmental water. 
Examples of other use of the proceeds from the sale of environmental water include 
paying for the cost of storing environmental water in dams, which is estimated to 
be $25 million. 257  These more recent concerns about the management of 
 
254 Victorian Environmental Water Holder Water Allocation Trading Strategy 2018-2019. 
(VEWH, Melbourne, 2018) has indicated that it can sell water to norther regions if 
environmental water needs are met.  
255 Victorian Environmental Water Holder “VEWH water sale in northern Victoria - March 2015” 
(2015) Available at <http://www.vewh.vic.gov.au/news-and-resources/news/vewh-water-sale-in-
northern-victoria-march-2015> 
256 Warwick Long “Liberal MP wants Murray-Darling water sold to irrigators so government 




environmental water suggest further changes may occur and that water allocation 
policy will continue to develop in response to new challenges.  
The water market has also increased the value of water. There is increasing concern 
about water takes whereby licences in Victoria and other states are used for 
commercial water bottling purposes.258 In Victoria, the Stanley rural community 
took legal action over their concerns that water takes for bottling was occurring on 
one property of 16 acres that initially held water licences to irrigate orchards. The 
volume allocated was 50 megalitres of surface water. Upon application, the 
allocation was amended to 19 megalitres of groundwater and 31 megalitres of 
surface water. The Stanley Rural Community Inc. group argued that the take 
contravened section 47 of the Planning and Environment Act 1987(Vic) which 
limited the rights granted under section 8(4)(a) of the Water Act 1989(Vic).259 
However, the Victorian Supreme Court determined that planning law did not 
override water licences issued under the Water Act 1989(Vic) and the use of water 
for water bottling was legal. 
 
 New South Wales Water Law and Policy 
New South Wales has a range of natural and regulated surface (released from dams) 
water.260 Its experience of water law reform is important because most of the state’s 
water is used for irrigation.261 New South Wales was faced with the problem of how 
to allocate water to more efficient uses and environmental needs. The 1994 COAG 
Water Reform Framework required states to implement water reform. New South 
Wales, therefore, had to “create a legislative framework that allocates water 
 
258 Narelle Towie “Greed took over”: The farmers fighting bottled water giants for their water” 
The Guardian (30 April 2019). 
259 Stanley Rural Community Inc v Stanley Pastoral Pty Ltd [2017] VSCA 385; 54 VR 676. Water 
mining has gained increasing attention across Australian states as an emerging problem.  
260 Deborah Curran and Sharon Mascher “Adaptive Management in Water Law: Evaluating 
Australian (New South Wales) and Canadian (British Columbia) Law Reform Initiatives” (2016) 
12(1) McGill International Journal of Sustainable Development Law at 91.  
261 Lin Crase, Leo O’Reilly and Brian Dollery “Water markets as a vehicle for water reform: the 
case of New South Wales” Aust. J. Agric. Resour. Econ. 44(2) 299 at 300. 
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efficiently while simultaneously recognising the legitimate claims of the 
environment to this resource”.262 In comparison to Victoria, the water allocation 
rules in New South Wales “provide a relatively lower reliability of supply in many 
river valleys than in any other states”. 263  Problems with New South Wales 
implementation of water reforms were stated as early as 2005 when the National 
Competition Commission assessed state progress on implementing a range of 
competition reforms including the water reforms. The Commission raised concerns 
about the assessment of environmental water and whether it was based on the best 
scientific evidence.264 
Irrigators were particularly affected by the changes to water allocation in New 
South Wales. There were two types of irrigation schemes. The first type was 
“Irrigation Areas” which were on Crown land and where the irrigation 
infrastructure and land were both owned by the State. The second type was 
“Irrigation Districts” constructed on private land. The amount of water available 
under both was “one foot per acre of irrigable land (3 megalitres per hectare) but 
with a maximum entitlement limit”.265  
 
In Irrigation Areas land was allocated to irrigators to encourage settlement. Those 
who were within the Irrigation Area were granted “water rights” under the Irrigation 
Act 1912 (NSW), an Act which has now been repealed. Section 12 stated the nature 
of water rights under the Act: 
12 Water rights 
 
262 Above at 300. 
263 HN Turral and others “Water trading at the margin: The evolution of water markets in the 
Murray Darling Basin” Water Resour. Res. 41 (2005) 1 at 1. 
264 National Competition Council “Assessment of government’s progress in implementing the 
National Competition Policy and related reforms 2005 (Commonwealth Government of 
Australia, Melbourne, 2005) at xxi. 
265 Paul Taylor, Tony McGlynn and Warren Martin “The influence of privatisation on irrigation 
water rights in NSW” Paper for presentation at the Regional Conference of the International 
Association for the Study of Common Property, Brisbane, Australia, September 2001 at 5.  
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(1)  The Ministerial Corporation shall each year, at the times and in the 
quantities fixed by it, supply water in pursuance of the water rights which  
are attached to the land of any occupier: 
(a)  to the boundary of any land held by any one person bona fide in the 
person’s own interest, and 
 (b)  to such other points as may be agreed upon. 
This water right was not legally guaranteed. The amount of water delivered 
depended on the administrative decision of the state. The “number of water rights 
attached to a landholding, were determined administratively by reference to the 
ability of a land holder to support a family” and how productive the land may be.266 
As a result of administrative decision making the actual water right as a legal 
entitlement was not the same as the volume of water received. The methods for 
determining the amount of water received were based on internal administrative 
processes of the New South Wales government. This scheme “took on the 
perception” of a water right even though there was no legal guarantee of a supply 
of water. The water rights could have been removed by the Government without 
compensation by ending Irrigation Areas or by repealing the Act.267 After all, the 
right to water relied on the statute and any rights flowing from the Act were 
creatures of statute.  
The second type of irrigation scheme in New South Wales was “Irrigation Districts” 
where water infrastructure was owned by the state. Access to water in Irrigation 
Districts was under the Water Act 1912. The Irrigation Districts differed from 
Irrigation Areas because of their larger size:268 
The Irrigation Districts contained larger landholding at the outset, designed 
for pastoral enterprises, and it was intended only a part of each landholding 
would be irrigated…The “Partial Area” policy also meant the irrigation 
practices were scattered and no initially as intensive as is the case today in 
those areas.  
The Irrigation Districts were initially established on a less intensive scale.  
 
 
266 At 13.  
267 At 13.  




There were significant institutional changes in the water sector in New South 
Wales. Before the water law reforms, irrigation schemes were owned by the public 
sector. As described above, the amount of water available in an irrigation scheme 
depended upon the administrative decision making of the state. The proposal to 
privatise irrigation schemes raised concerns about the legal structure of new private 
institutions and how access to water would be defined. The privatisation of 
irrigation schemes was driven primarily by irrigators.269 Privatisation was a two-
step process of consolidating the existing schemes into five schemes before 
privatisation under the Irrigation Corporations Act 1994 (NSW). Division 3 of the 
Act was very systematic in providing a statutory basis for the transfer of assets and 
the negotiations that would precede the transfer.270 The Irrigation Corporations Act 
1994 was repealed on 1 January 2001 by the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW). 
Core provisions relating to the operation of Irrigation Corporations are now 
included in Chapter 4 of the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW).271  
There are several critical elements in the privatisation process that New South 
Wales undertook but which New Zealand did not. These points are summarised in 
the work of Taylor and others.272 The NSW government retained its regulatory 
oversight of private irrigation schemes in order to maintain the social and economic 
goals of the schemes and to ensure that the use of water was in the state interest. 
The regulatory oversight included measures to protect irrigators’ rights following 
privatisation. The New South Wales government wanted to limit its exposure to the 
future costs of maintaining irrigation schemes. It would step back from its role in 
the daily administration and delivery of water. Maintaining the financial viability 
of the schemes would be in the hands of the new irrigation companies. Finally, the 
 
269 At 2. 
270 Irrigation Corporations Act 1994 (NSW). Division 3 makes reference to any debts owing to the 
state and where the funds will be deposited.  
271 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 116. 
272 Taylor, McGlynn, and Martin “The influence of privatisation on irrigation water rights in 
NSW” above, n 265 at 10-11.  
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New South Wales government wanted to ensure the long-term sustainability of the 
privatised irrigation schemes. In comparison, New Zealand did not maintain 
regulatory oversight of its irrigation schemes once they were privatised under the 
Irrigation Schemes Act 1990. These issues will be explored in more detail in the 
next chapter. 
Land and Water Management Plans were a part of the water licensing requirements 
of the irrigation schemes in New South Wales. Plans were to be prepared with the 
irrigation community with government assistance and with funding to implement 
the plans in the long term. The Land and Water Management Plan provided the 
government with ongoing policy oversight of the operation of the irrigation scheme. 
The New South Wales government did not step back from irrigation schemes as 
emphatically as New Zealand did in 1990.273 Furthermore, the New South Wales 
approach to privatising irrigation schemes was much more systematic in its 
implementation. 
 
The Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) was passed as the primary legislation 
governing the management and allocation of water to implement the COAG 
reforms.274 The Act promoted the ecologically sustainable development of water 
resources. The Act aimed to achieve improvements in water quality and to provide 
greater certainty to water licence holders to assist with water transfers. The Act 
contains provisions relating to Water Planning which are extensive and detailed. 
The “principles” of the Act are stated in section 5 and can be summarised as follows. 
 
273 See also Irrigation Corporations Act 1994, s 53.  
An irrigation corporation licence is subject to:  
(a)  the conditions imposed on the irrigation corporation licence from time to time by 
or under thisAct; and  
(b)  such other conditions as are imposed on the irrigation corporation licence by the 
Ministerial Corporation when the irrigation corporation licence is granted and as 
are notified in writing to  the licensee, whether or not the conditions are 
specified in the licence. 
274 It progressively replaced the Water Act 1912 (NSW). 
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Protection is required for floodplains, wetlands, animal and plant habitats to prevent 
further degradation and water quality from “all water sources” should be protected. 
There is an important reference to the “cumulative impacts of water management 
licences and approvals and other activities on water sources and their dependent 
ecosystems” in section 5(d). The inclusion of cumulative effects of licences is 
important. The section maintains a focus on the environment and how the 
environment may be affected by the granting of several licences. Again, this focus 
on the environment is something that does not feature in New Zealand water 
allocation statutory requirements.  
The remaining subsections in section 5 focus on cultural, social and economic 
aspects of water specify that:  
(e) geographical and other features of Aboriginal significance should 
be protected, and 
(f) geographical and other features of major cultural, heritage or 
spiritual significance should be protected, and 
(g) the social and economic benefits to the community should be 
maximised, and 
(h)  the principles of adaptive management should be applied, which 
shouldbe responsive to monitoring and improvements in 
understanding of ecological water requirements. 
Section 5(3) of the Act states principles for water sharing which include protecting 
“dependent ecosystems” and “basic landholder rights”. Section 5(4) states 
principles in relation to water use which include avoiding “soil erosion, compaction, 
geomorphic instability, contamination, acidity, waterlogging, a decline of native 
vegetation or, where appropriate, salinity and, where possible, land should be 
rehabilitated”. The use would also “be consistent with the maintenance of 
productivity of land in the long term and should maximise the social and economic 
benefits to the community”. The remaining principles in section 5 relate to drainage, 
floodplain management and carrying out controlled activities. Overall, the 
principles contained in section 5 of the Act capture the critical water management 
issues faced by New South Wales. These objectives and principles influence how 
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the Act defines water rights. The Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) abolished 
common law rights to water.275 
The principles of the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) and the Murray-Darling 
Basin Agreement are implemented through a State Water Management Outcomes 
Plan.276 The State Plan ensures that sustainable diversion limits are met as required 
under the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement. Section 6(2) of the Water 
Management Act 2000 (NSW) states the specific aims of the Plan: 
6 (2) The objects of a State Water Management Outcomes Plan are as 
follows: 
(a) to set the over-arching policy context, targets and strategic outcomes 
for the management of the State’s water sources, having regard to: 
(i) relevant environmental, social and economic considerations, and 
(ii) the results of any relevant monitoring  programs, 
(b) to promote the water management principles established by this Act, 
(c) to give effect to any State government policy statement in 
 relation to salinity strategies. 
The State Water Management Outcomes Plan Order 2002 (NSW) addresses the 
objects as described above. The Order sits at the top of the hierarchy of a State Plan 
which is then reliant upon the preparation of regional Water Management Plans:277  
Management plans developed under the Water Management Act 2000 
should provide for the monitoring of performance of relevant local 
management targets and this information will be collated and reviewed to 
assess performance against the SWMOP targets. The Minister may provide 
guidance on objectives, strategies and performance indicators for this 
purpose (as required in a management plan under Section 35 (1) of the Act). 
The monitoring and assessment of the long term outcomes, however, will be 
designed and undertaken through statewide programs and targeted local 
activities which ensure that sampling and analysis is carried out at a scale 
and density appropriate to deliver meaningful and cost effective information. 
The State Water Management Outcomes Plan has a lifespan of five years. Water 
management committees may be established to carry out a specific task, including 
the preparation of the Regional Water Management Plan. The “core provisions” of 
 
275 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 393. 
276 The Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 6(3)(a) contained the requirement to give effect to 
“government obligations arising under any inter-governmental agreement to which the 
government is a party, such as the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement set out in Schedule 1 to the 
Water Act 2007 of the Commonwealth…”. The Act is administered by the New South Wales 
Office of Water.  
277 State Water Management Outcomes Plan Order 2002 (NSW), Chapter 1, Part 6. 
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these plans are stated within the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW).278 This 
process provides uniformity to the creation of the regional water plans. 
The water allocation system in New South Wales in based on a system of granting 
water access licences. Section 56 of the Act states the features of a “water access 
licence”. The Act allows the holder access to a “share component” to take water at 
specified times and locations. The share component as stated in section 56(2) may 
be fixed at a maximum volume, a proportion of water or storage capacity, a specific 
proportion of dam inflow or a specific number of units. The “water access licence” 
may be assigned to a category of licence as stated in section 57(1): 
(1) There are the following categories of access licences: 
(a)regulated river (high security) access licences, 
(b) regulated river (general security) access licences, 
(c) regulated river (conveyance) access licences, 
(d) unregulated river access licences, 
(e) aquifer access licences, 
(f) estuarine water access licences, 
(g) coastal water access licences, 
(h) supplementary water access licences, 
(i)  major utility access licences, 
(j)  local water utility access licences, 
(k)  domestic and stock access licences, 
(k1) floodplain harvesting (regulated river) access licences, 
(k2) floodplain harvesting (unregulated river) access licences, 
(l) such other categories of access licence as may be prescribed by   
the regulations. 
(2) Subcategories of any category of access licence may be prescribed by 
the regulations. 
In comparison to Victoria the New South Wales approach to bulk water 
entitlements does not separate the bulk water applications within one category. 
Instead section 57(1) provides for bulk water licences as major utility licences in 
s57(1)(i). Rules for bulk water access entitlements are includes in water 
management plans prepared under section 20 of the Act, as discussed below. There 
are separate provisions relating to irrigation schemes under Chapter 4 of the Act.  
 
278 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW). Part 3 of the Act contains the sections that relate to the 
“core provisions” to be included in a Water Management Plan for water sharing, water use, 
drainage management, floodplain management, controlled activities and aquifer interference 
activities and environmental protection.  
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The different categories of water access licences reflect the degree of security in 
accessing the various water categories and also their distinctive characteristics. 
Applicants for a new water access licence may apply for a licence under section 61 
of the Act. Section 61(1) requires the Minister to have regard to the relevant water 
management plan, The Minister must have regard to section 63(2)(b) in ensuring 
that harm will not be done if the licence is granted.  The method by which the final 
allocation is made is based on the Office of Water calculating how much water is 
likely to be available for the next year. The main requirement for new water access 
licence applications is that the category of licence is provided and the application 
is complete under section 63. Those who may be purchasing water in the water 
market will also a water access licence before being able to use the water as they 
intend. Hence the key principles that determine water allocation between water 
access licences is dependent on the priority prescribed under the Act. 
Section 58 states the priority between water licence categories. There are three 
general categories that the water access licences can be grouped into. These are 
allocations for domestic stock and town water supply, high security access licences 
and general security access licences:279  
58   Priorities between different categories of licence 
(1)  For the purposes of this Act, the following priorities are to be observed 
in relation to access licences: 
(a)  local water utility access licences, major utility access licences 
and domestic and stock access licences have priority over all other 
access licences, 
(b)  regulated river (high security) access licences have priority over 
all other access licences (other than those referred to in paragraph 
(a)), 
(c)  access licences (other than those referred to in paragraphs (a), 
(b) and (d)) have priority between themselves as prescribed by the 
regulations, 
(d)  supplementary water access licences have priority below all 
other licences. 
(2)  If one access licence (the higher priority licence) has priority over 
another access licence (the lower priority licence), then if the water 
allocations under them have to be diminished, the water allocations of the 
higher priority licence are to be diminished at a lesser rate than the water 
allocations of the lower priority licence. 
(3)  In relation to the water management area or water source to which it 
applies, a management plan may provide for different rules of priority to 
those established by subsection (1). 
 
279 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 58(1)(a). 
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(4)  If a management plan so provides for different rules of priority, those 
different rules are taken to have been established by this section. 
The provisions of section 58(2) show that priorities between the different types of 
water access licences are also relevant at times of scarcity. For example, domestic 
stock and town water supply access licences have the highest level of priority. 
Followed by high security access licences and general access licences. The final 
allocation of water will be based on the priority stated in section 58. Those access 
licences with a lower priority would have diminished water allocation at times when 
there is less water available to be allocated.  
The principles for water allocation under a licence are determined by water sharing 
plans.  Section 20(1) of the Act states that water management plans “must deal 
with” environmental water rules, identify the water needs in an area, identify the 
“requirements for water for extraction under water licences”, establish “access 
licence dealing rules and establish a “bulk access regime”. Section 20(2) elaborates 
on the bulk water access regime stating that the management plan must be 
consistent with water availability limits, establish rules for access to water, 
recognise the “effect of climatic variability” and can establish priorities for water 
allocation in situations where there is a reduction in water availability. However, 
under section 20(3) any rules that are prepared in relation to priorities for water 
allocation must be consistent with the statutory direction in section 58 as discussed 
above.  
The allocation water under a water management plan may be suspended under 
section 49A if there is a water shortage, or under section 49B if there is an extreme 
weather event.  
The actual allocation under the water access licence is subject to an annual 
determination. Water use licence holders are advised of the percentage of the water 
that is allocated under each category. Water sharing plans prepared under the Act 
are also relevant to the process as they state the limits at which particular water 
access licences will be able to access water. The allocations for domestic stock and 
town water supply, high security access licences and general security access 
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licences will differ. For example, domestic and stock water takes under a water 
management plan may be at 100% while irrigator may be provided with a direction 
to stop pumping water once the minimum flow of the river falls below a certain 
level.  
The duration of a water access licence is perpetual under section 69. Initially, water 
access licences had a duration of 15 years with major utilities having a licence 
duration of 20 years.280 Licence holders could apply for a renewal of their licence 
within 12 months of the licence expiring. These original provisions were not in 
accordance with the National Water Initiative 2004 objective to strengthen water 
rights. Nonetheless, the change to effective perpetual ownership does not mean that 
there is a guarantee to a fixed amount of water being delivered. The water access 
right ensures access to an annual share of water, an amount which may fluctuate. It 
is also important to note that the Minister may impose further conditions upon the 
water access licence holder under section 67. This provision also indicates that 
although the holder of the licence may have perpetual ownership, the holder’s 
licence remains a licence subject to the Crown being able to exercise its power to 
manage the underlying water resource in the future.  
The New South Wales Office of Water holds significant power in terms of 
investigating potential breaches of water allocation licences. Part 1, Division 6 of 
the Act addresses enforcement by the Court. Part 2 includes other enforcement 
powers focusing on the power of authorised officers to obtain information, enter 





280 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s 69 and 70 were amended in 2004 to a perpetual licence. 
281 Water Management Act 2000(NSW) ss 339-339G. For a comprehensive overview of 
compliance provisions in the Act, see Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair “Compliance and 
Enforcement of Water Licences in NSW: Limitations in Law, Policy and Institutions” (2012) 




Section 71 of the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) requires that a “Water 
Access Licence Register” is maintained at state level. Section 71A requires the 
following details of the licence to be recorded on the Register: 
(1) The following matters relating to an access licence (including a 
replacement access licence) or a holding in an access  licence 
must be recorded in the General Division of the Access Register: 
(a) Ministerial action in relation to the licence or holding, 
(b) any general dealing in the licence or holding, 
(c) any dealing on default in relation to the licence or               
holding, 
(d) any caveat lodged in relation to the licence or holding, 
(e) any security interest held over the licence or holding, 
(f) any devolution of the licence or holding as referred to in           
section 72, 
(g) any alteration in co-holder’s tenancy arrangements in              
relation to the licence or holding, as referred to in              
section 73, 
(h) any other matter prescribed by the regulations. 
(2) The following matters are to be recorded in the Assignment Division 
of the Access Register in such manner  as the Minister considers 
appropriate: 
(a) any assignment dealing in an access licence, 
(b) any other matter prescribed by the regulations. 
These detailed provisions provide a clear statutory indication of when and what 
type of information is relevant to the Registrar. From a public interest perspective, 
the inclusion of information on Ministerial action is essential, particularly where 
allegations of Ministerial intervention arise.282 From the licence holder’s financial 
point of view the ability to view information regarding security interests is also 
important. The provisions relating to changes to a licence are comprehensive. They 
provide information on a state level to any potential purchaser of a water licence or 
to any financial institution relying upon the licence as security.  
 
 
282 Laini Kirkman “Peter Harris served with Summons over water use in Barwon-Darling River” 




New South Wales is required to account for environmental water. This state has 
taken a different approach from Victoria as it has not consolidated environmental 
water under a State Environmental Water Holder. Instead, New South Wales 
manages “planned” environmental water in water sharing plans and “Held” 
environmental water in environmental water licences. The New South Wales Water 
Resource Plans Roadmap 2016-2019 indicates that the water sharing plans, which 
are referred to as “Water Resource Plans”, will be implemented in 22 regions by 
2019.283 The Plans will determine how water is shared between consumptive users 
and the environment. The underlying purpose of the Plans is to meet the 
requirements of states under the Murray-Darling Basin Plan so that limits on water 
extraction are in place by 2019. The process for creating each Plan is set out in the 
Roadmap 2016-2019. Three months are allowed to measure and evaluate the risks 
of any existing plans. Then, a 6-15-month period is provided for the consultation 
phase – including public submissions. Once a draft plan is published a further six 
months can be used to reach a Final Plan stage. Finally, the plan must be accredited 
by the Murray-Darling Basin Authority. The creation and implementation process 
is detailed and provides a sound structure for water plan implementation.  
New South Wales’ progress on meeting the environmental water targets has been 
heavily criticised in the Murray-Darling Basin Authority’s December 2018 progress 
report.284 The progress report states that New South Wales is “behind schedule” 
with 20 plans under development. It concedes that the state is making an effort to 
invest in water planning. New South Wales is currently operating under old plans 
which include the Barwon-Darling Plan This plan was subject to criticism following 
the media attention it received as a result of the Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation’s (ABC) 2017 Four Corners programme in which it was alleged that 
 
283 NSW Department of Primary Industries Water “Delivering Water resource Plans for New 
South Wales Roadmap 2016-2019. (November 2016).  
284 Murray Darling Basin Authority Water Resource Plan = December 2018 Quarterly Report 
(Australian Government, Canberra, 2018) at 7. 
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unchecked water theft was occurring.285 Following the programme, the New South 
Wales Department of Industry responded to the concerns that had been raised. In 
its response, the Department emphasised that it was working on a new set of water 
plans that would be accredited. Of greater significance was the written confirmation 
that the Department had spoken to irrigators about “walking away” from the water 
reforms:286 
Have you ever discussed with irrigators and/or their representatives plans 
for NSW to walk away from the Murray-Darling Basin Plan? 
 
Yes – it is prudent for the NSW Government to consider all possible 
scenarios for the implementation of the Basin Plan, and to ensure the best 
possible outcome is achieved for NSW irrigators, the environment and 
regional communities. 
While NSW has considered alternative scenarios, we have also publicly 
advocated the benefits of the Basin Plan in its current form. In particular, we 
have explained to stakeholder groups the importance of seeing the plan 
through. 
The legal ramifications of the Four Corners’ investigation are discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter. The South Australian government also responded to the 
ABC programme’s allegations with a Royal Commission which examined the 
issues raised in it.287  The Royal Commission found serious problems with the 
administration of water, confirming that the constitutional barriers could undermine 
state co-operation in implementing the reforms. Evidence of environmental stress 
in the Murray-Darling Basin corroborate those concerns. Such evidence includes 
reports showing that the Native fish stocks in New South Wales have also been 
dying in the region in large numbers, a situation which indicates that surface water 
flows are at dangerous levels.288 Importantly, the seriousness of the allegations of 
water theft have the potential to undermine the progress that the reforms have made 
in implementing water law reform.  
 
285 Australian Broadcasting Corporation Four Corners Program – Pumped (Monday 24 July 
2017). 
286 New South Wales Department of Industry Response to ABC 4 Corners Inquiry (20 July 2017). 
287 Bret Walker Murray Darling Basin Royal Commission (Government of South Australia, 
Adelaide, 2019). 
288 Anne Davis “Hundreds of thousands of native fish dead in second Murray-Darling incident” 




 Water Law and Policy in South Australia 
The Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) is the primary legislation 
affecting water allocation in South Australia. It was introduced to “promote 
sustainable and integrated management of the State’s natural resources” and it 
forms the basis for market-based water allocation as required under the National 
Water Initiative 2004 and Water Act 2007 (Cth).289 It repealed the Animal and Plant 
Control (Agricultural Protection and Other Purposes) Act 1986, the Soil 
Conservation and Land Care Act 1989 and the Water Resources Act 1997. This 
section will describe the key features of the water allocation provisions within the 
Act.  
Plans for water management and allocation are a core part of the Natural Resources 
Management Act 2004 (SA). The state of South Australia is divided into eight 
regions which each have their own Natural Resources Management Boards.290 
Within each region “A regional NRM board may, by notice in the Gazette, designate 
an area within its region as an area within which an NRM group will operate”.291 The 
Board appoints the Natural Resources Management Group members. Section 48 of 
the Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) requires that the NRM Group 
composition includes up to seven members with the collective “knowledge, skills 
and experience” to meet the Group’s obligations. The process for appointing the 
Board is a form of “government assisted self-organisation”.292 
 
289 Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA), long title. 
290 Sectiom 45. 
291 Section 44(1).  
292 Barbara Cosens “Governing the Freshwater Commons: Lessons from Application of the 
Trilogy of Governance Tools in Australia and the Western United States” in Cameron Holley 
and Darren Sinclair (2018) Reforming Water Law and Governance. From Stagnation to 
Innovation in Australia (Springer, Singapore, 2018) at 288. 
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The selection process for Group members “must” include public notice asking for 
expressions of interest.293 The appointments are subject to consultation with the 
relevant council, Primary Producers SA Inc. and the Conservation Council of South 
Australia. 294  Section 52 states the function of Natural Resource Management 
Groups. Section 52(1)(a) requires the Group “to be actively involved in the 
development and implementation of any relevant regional NRM plan at the local 
level…” It is also required to educate the community on the “importance of integrated 
and sustainable natural resources management” and provide advice to the regional 
NRM Boards.  
The NRM Group is an integral part of managing natural resources in South Australia 
by being involved in the creation of natural resource management plans. The Board 
appointment process reflects the top-down approach of the water reforms. There is, 
however, concern that this approach may decrease local capacity to respond to drought 
because some legitimacy has been lost in the process of removing the pre-existing 
governance bodies.295 
 
Water allocations in South Australia are managed through the operation of a water 
licence system. The water licences issued under the Natural Resources Management 
Act 2004 (SA) provide for an ongoing right to take water; however, the actual 
allocation received will depend on how much is eventually allocated. Under section 
152 water allocations can be obtained under a licence, interstates water entitlements 
or forest water licences.  
Water licences can provide for a “water access entitlement” which specifies the 
volume of water that can be taken. 296  Under section 146(2) a “water access 
 
293 Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) s, 48(2)(a). 
294 Section 48(2)(b). 
295 Roberts, Mitchell and Douglas “Water and Australia's Future Economic Growth”, above n 100. 
296 Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA), s 146(1). 
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entitlement” gives access to a share of water from a “consumptive pool” to the 
licence holder. The entitlement is subject to certain conditions under section 146(3) 
as follows: 
 (3) A water access entitlement is subject to— 
(a) a determination of the Minister under subsection 
(4); and 
(b) any other provision of this Act that operates with 
respect to the licence or the water access 
entitlement; and 
(c) the conditions attached to the licence. 
(4) The Minister will from time to time, by notice in the 
Gazette, determine the volume of water that is to be made 
available from a consumptive pool for allocation under this 
Act during a period specified by the Minister. 
The principles relevant to granting a water access licence are stated in section 147 
of the Act. The Minister must ensure that granting the licence would not be 
“contrary to the provisions of the relevant water allocation plan” or that the 
application is for access to contaminated water that would present a public health 
risk.  
A water licence or water access entitlement may be transferred subject to the 
approval of the Minister.297 The Minster retains the right to “vary any condition” of 
the water licence to the extent that the transfer may “require a reduction in the size 
of a dam, or require other work to be undertaken with respect to a dam, wall or 
structure, to match the effect of the transfer”.298 An exception to the water licensing 
requirement is water taken for personal domestic or household use, which does not 
require a licence and includes water for domestic stock.299  
The Water Register records South Australia’s water licence information. The 
Register may not include information “that, in the opinion of the Minister, should 
be kept confidential for safety or security reasons”. 300  Information that is 
 
297 Section 150. 
298 Section 150(13)(d). 
299 Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA), s 124(4). 
300 Section 226(3) and Schedule 3A. 
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“commercially sensitive” may also be protected from public inspection.301  The 
water licence is personal property and changes in ownership or use of the licence 
as collateral are recorded on the Water Register.  
The Irrigation Act 2009 (SA) regulates water for irrigation purposes. It defines the 
irrigation water rights and basic requirements for irrigation trusts. Irrigation trusts 
hold the water right on behalf of the irrigators. It is a statutory requirement under s 
29 of the Act to fix the amount of water that each member holds. The method for 
determining the amount of water is also stipulated in sections 29(4) and 29(5) as 
follows: 
(4)  An irrigation right must be fixed on a fair and equitable basis after 
 having regard to—  
  (a) the nature or type of crops growing on relevant land; and  
  (b) such other matters considered relevant by the trust.  
(5)  An irrigation right—  
(a) may be expressed as a volume or units (subject to the 
operation of the Natural Resources Management Act 2004 
and any reduction in the amount of water that may be 
available to the trust under that Act); or  
(b) may be constituted in some other manner authorised by 
the regulations. 
It should be noted that such provisions relating to the nature of crops grown on land 
are not included in New Zealand. In the case of South Australia the rights held by 
irrigators in an irrigation trust under the Irrigation Act 2009 (SA) may be converted 
to a water licence under the Water Management Act 2005.302 
 
 
The Department of Environment, Water and Natural Resources must prepare a State 
Natural Resources Management Plan. The State Plan is required to demonstrate how 
the overall “objects” of the Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA) will be 
 
301 Section 226(3a). 
302 Irrigation Act 2009 (SA), s 32(1)(c) 
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achieved.303 Further guidance in section 74 of the Act requires an assessment of natural 
resources at a state level, identification of risks to natural resource degradation and of 
measures to address how ongoing monitoring and evaluation will be carried out. These 
requirements are an excellent legislative tool to ensure that current information about 
natural resources is recorded and evaluated. The State Plan contains policy that guides 
the creation of further regional plans by NRM Boards:304 
At the centre of the NRM system is the State NRM Plan which provides the 
strategic blueprint for NRM boards and agencies to develop their own 
specific plans. 
NRM Boards are required to prepare Regional Natural Resource Management 
Plans. The Plan must have regard to the objects of the Act and also include the 
methods that will be used to improve the health of natural resources, conservation 
and land drainage issues.305 
The NRM Board is also required to prepare a separate Water Allocation Plan for 
“prescribed” water resource in their region. Under section 76(4) it must include the 
following: 
(4) A water allocation plan must— 
 (a) include— 
(i)  an assessment of the quantity and quality of water 
needed by the ecosystems that depend on the water 
resource and the times at which, or the periods 
during which, those ecosystems will need that 
water; and 
(ii)  an assessment as to whether the taking or use of 
water from the resource will have a detrimental 
effect on the quantity or quality of water that is 
available from any other water resource; and 
(aab) include— 
(i) an assessment of the capacity of the water resource 
to meet environmental water requirements; and 
(ii) information about the water that is to be set asi 
for the environment including, insofar as is               
reasonably practicable, information about the              
quantity and quality, the time when that water is              
expected to be made available, and the type and              
 
303 Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA), s 74. 
304 Government of South Australia Our Place. Our Future. State Natural Resources Management 
Plan South Australia 2012 – 2017 (Government of South Australia, Adelaide, 2012) at 3. 
305 Natural Resources Management Act 2004 (SA), s 75. 
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extent of the ecosystems to which it is to be              
provided; and 
(iii) a statement of the environmental outcomes 
expected to be delivered on account of the 
provision of environmental water under the 
plan;…. 
These statutory requirements for a water allocation plan ensure a level of 
comparability across the Water Allocation Plans. The Plans should address issues 
relating to water quality and quantity and if a water take has a detrimental effect on 
water quality that should also be taken into account. There is limited scope for the 
NRM Boards to avoid addressing the issues that are stipulated under the Act.  
 
Water allocation plans are an important part of water allocation law in South 
Australia because they include the provisions to meet the sustainable diversion 
limits under the Murray-Darling Basin Plan. Water Allocation Plans that cover the 
Murray-Darling Basin located in South Australia must also meet the following 
requirements: 
87—Promotion of River Murray legislation and IGA 
To the extent that a plan applies to the Murray-Darling Basin or in relation 
to the River Murray, the plan should— 
(a) seek to further the objects of the River Murray Act 2003 and the 
Objectives for a Healthy River Murray under that Act; and 
(b) be consistent with— 
(i) the terms or requirements of the  Murray-Darling Basin 
Agreement, and any relevant resolution of the Ministerial 
Council under that agreement; and 
(ii) any relevant provisions of the Basin Plan under the Water 
Act 2007 of the Commonwealth, (insofar as they may be 
relevant). 
The objects of the River Murray Act 2003 (SA) contained in section 6 stress the 
importance of using “all reasonable and practicable measures” to ensure that the 
River Murray is protected and restored. It also requires developing “mechanisms” 
protect the River Murray “while at the same time providing for the economic, social 
and physical wellbeing of the community”. Those activities which have an adverse 
effect on the River Murray should be “regulated or brought to an end”.  
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Furthermore, any plans should “promote the principles of ecologically sustainable 
development in relation to the use and management of the River Murray”. The 
“aspirations of indigenous peoples with an association with the River Murray” and 
their contribution to ecologically sustainable development should also be 
considered. Community interests and a commitment to the health of the River 
Murray are also indicated. The Act addresses the Administration and 
Implementation Strategy for the Act which must set priorities to show how the 
Minister will meet the objects of the Act.306 The provisions set clear expectations 
that the River Murray Act 2003 (SA) must be implemented.  
Under section 76(b) the water allocation plan may “set out the principles associated 
with the determination of water access entitlements”. The Water Allocation Plan 
for the River Murray Prescribed Watercourse was adopted in accordance with 
section 80(3)(a) of the Act in February 2019.307 The Plan includes the provisions 
for environmental water and the basis for making the South Australian Water 
Allocation Statement.308 The South Australian approach is guided also by the use 
of plans that determine how much water is allocated under an access licence. In that 
respect it is similar to New South Wales. However, a key difference is that the 
planning provision closely regulate the formation of plans.  
 
 
306 River Murray Act 2003 (SA), s 21(1) 
(1) The Minister must prepare and maintain a plan to be called the River Murray Act 
Implementation Strategy.  
(2) The Implementation Strategy must—  
(a) set out the priorities that the Minister will pursue in order to achieve the objects of this Act and 
to further the implementation of the ORMs; and  
(b) set out strategies that the Minister intends to adopt to meet those priorities; and (c) take into 
account the State Natural Resources Management Plan and the Planning Strategy, and may 
include other matters as the Minister thinks fit.  
(3) The Minister must review the Implementation Strategy at least once in every five years 
307 Department of Environment and Water Water Allocation Plan for the River Murray Prescribed 
Watercourse (South Australia Government, Adelaide, 2019).  
308 Department of Environment and Water South Australia’s River Murray Water Allocation 
Statement ((South Australia Government, Adelaide, 2019) was issued on 15 July 2019 which 
provides water information for the next season. The allocations in the document are based on 




 Water Law and Policy in Western Australia 
Not all Australian states have been successful in implementing the more recent 
water reforms. In 2005, Western Australia was the “only jurisdiction to have 
significant outstanding obligations on water industry legislation”. 309  Western 
Australia responded to the changes required under the 1994 COAG Agreement by 
amending the Rights in Water and Irrigation Act 1914 (WA).310 In the year 2000. 
The amendment allowed the unbundling of water licences so that water licences 
could be traded separately from land.  
The Act was administered by the Water Resources Management Commission until 
the Commission was abolished. 311  The function of the Commission was to 
administer water resources management under various Acts, including the Country 
Areas Water Supply Act 1947 (WA), the Metropolitan Water Authority Act 1982 
(WA), the Metropolitan Water Supply, Sewerage and Drainage Act 1909 (WA) and 
Part III of the Rights in Water and Irrigation Act 1914 (WA) which dealt with water 
licensing. The Commission merged the Western Australian Water Resources 
Council, the Water Resources Division of the Water Authority, the Hydrogeology 
and Groundwater Resources Branch of the Department of Minerals and Energy and 
the Waterways Commission.312  
The establishment of the Commissioner was an effort to centralise water 
management In that “The Commission has power to do all things necessary or 
convenient to be done for or in connection with the performance of    its 
 
309 National Competition Council Assessment of government’s progress in implementing the 
National Competition Policy and related reforms 2005 (Commonwealth Government of 
Australia, Melbourne, 2005) at xxxi. Ten per cent of its payments from the Council were 
suspended and the matter deemed to be more appropriate for the National Water Commission.  
310 Rights in Water and Irrigation Amendment Act 2000 (WA). 
311 The Commission was established under the Water and Rivers Commission Act 1995 (WA). 
312 State Records Office of Western Australia, AU WA A898 - Water and Rivers Commission 
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functions”. 313  Since 2007, the functions of the Commission, including the 
administration of the various Acts it was responsible for, was transferred to the 
Western Australia Department of Water.314  
 
The take and use of water is subject to obtaining a licence under the Rights in Water 
and Irrigation Act 1914 (WA). Section 5C states that taking water without a licence 
is an offence and specifies a penalty of $10,000 and a further $1,000 per day. The 
ability to take water for domestic needs and stock which are not “raised in intensive 
conditions” is recognised in section 26GZI for both surface water and non-artesian 
groundwater. Section 5D refutes any claims based on customary use rights.  
The principles for granting a water licence are contained in Schedule 1 Section 7 of 
the Act. The Minister has broad discretion to refuse a licence application. The 
Minster must have regard to “all” the matters in Schedule 1 Section 7(2) including 
whether the application is “in the public interest”, “ecologically sustainable”, 
“environmentally acceptable”, could affect current of future water needs, would be 
detrimental to others in the Minster’s opinion, could have another source of water, 
keeps within local practices and bylaws, or is consistent with planning instruments.  
 
Once a licence has been issued under section 5C it must be recorded on the Water 
Register. The Water Register is a public register that may be made available in 
electronic form.315 The Register must include “the nature of the instrument” or 
licence, “period for which it is in force”, business name and address, “legal 
description of the land on which, it is situated”, security interests, whether a person 
 
313 Water and Rivers Commission Act 1995 (WA) s, 11. 
314 Rights in Water and Irrigation Amendment Act 2007 (WA). 
315 Rights in Water and Irrigation Amendment Act 2007 (WA) 26GZI. 
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dealing in a security interest has prior convictions under the Act and any other 
matters required by regulations.316 
The Western Australian approach was to add to the existing water law framework. 
This type of water allocation and licensing follows a “traditional approach”.317 This 
traditional type of entitlement is generally a fixed entitlement. Any change in the 
entitlement requires far greater legislative effort; “A change in a collective limit 
may provide the basis to amend individual entitlements but this will require the 
exercise of a Ministerial discretion on a case-by-case basis”.318 Western Australia 
has retained basic structures for the unbundling of water and registering licences. It 
does not take the water sharing approach that is currently in place in Victoria and 
New South Wales (as described above) where changes to collective entitlements 
are more easily spread across all licences. Western Australian licences do not have 
the same features as their Victorian and New South Wales equivalents where the 
amount of water actually received depends upon the allocation made to the 
collective on a seasonal basis.  
 
Plans for water are addressed under Division 3D of the Act. Plans are classified as 
regional, sub-regional and local area management plans under section 26GV. The 
Regional Management Plan prepared by the Minister of Water Resources guides 
the management of water in that region by defining “water resource values, 
including environmental values as well as the use and integration of water.319 The 
preparation of sub-regional plans is also the responsibility of the Minister of Water 
Resources. Sub-regional plans provide information on “how rights in respect of 
water are to be allocated to meet various needs, including the needs of the 
 
316 Rights in Water and Irrigation Amendment Act 2007 (WA) 26GZJ. 
317 Michael Bennett “Adjusting Collective Limits on the Use of Natural Resources: Approaches in 
Australian Fisheries and Water Law” (2015) 34(1) UTLR 68. 
318 At 68. 
319 Rights in Water and Irrigation Amendment Act 2007 (WA), s 26GW(2). 
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environment” amongst other matters. 320  Sub-regional management plans are 
prepared for monitoring and reporting as stated in section 26GX(3): 
A sub-regional management plan is to specify the monitoring and reporting 
(which is to occur at least once in every 7 years) to be carried out by the 
Minister to ensure, as far as is practicable, that the objects of this Part are 
achieved in the implementation of the plan. 
The hierarchy of plans is based upon their function and the need to follow the 
regional plan.321  
The public is able to participate in the creation of a plan at the initial stages of plan 
development. The Department of Water has a crucial role in water allocation 
planning in Western Australia. Plans will take into account demand for water for 
particular consumptive uses such as irrigation or hydropower. For example, in the 
review of the Ord River Plan the setting allocation limits for irrigation involved 
balancing the needs of irrigators with that of hydropower operators. The criteria that 
were considered in setting the allocation limits for each consumptive use are 
described as follows:322 
Allocation limits represent the annual volume of water that can be taken for 
consumptive use (such as irrigation) from each subarea. The allocation limits 
are based on the current dam infrastructure with its existing commitments to 
irrigation, hydropower and the environment. Future climate is assumed to 
be similar to that experienced in the past as global climate models do not 
indicate a clear wetting or drying trend for the Kimberley.  
The description of the creation of allocation limits shows how the consumptive use 
limits are a part of the allocation of water in Western Australia.  
Western Australia is undertaking water law reform with a new Water Resource 
Management Bill drafted in 2018. The Bill will result in the consolidation of six 
Acts relating to water into one. The Bill was preceded in 2013 by the release of a 
 
320 Rights in Water and Irrigation Amendment Act 2007 (WA), s 26GX(2b). 
321 Government of Western Australia Water Allocation Planning in Western Australia A Brief 
Overview (Department of Water, Perth, 2011). 
322 Department of Water and Environmental Regulation Ord Surface Water Allocation Plan 
Evaluation Statement 2013-2017 (Government of Western Australia, Perth, 2018) at 4. 
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Position Paper on Reforming Water Resource Management. 323  The reforms 
covered in the Position Paper included “water allocation planning, licensing, 
administrative processes, trading, risk assignment and environmental water”.324 
The policy drivers for further water law reform included the State’s commitments 
under the National Water Initiative, changes in climate, population growth, an 
expanding economy and other specific issues related to mining.  
A further driver of Western Australian water law reform is the lack of planning for 
environmental water. There is concern that environmental watering plans are 
inadequate to protect and prioritise environmental water as required under the 
National Water Initiative 2004 and Water Act 2007(Cth).325 Under section 26GW 
regional management plans should define environmental values. Under Schedule 1, 
Division 2 Clause  7(2)(c) of the Act the Minister should consider, amongst other 
matters, whether the take under a licence application is “environmentally 
acceptable”. There are no clear statutory obligation within the Act for the formation 
of specific environmental watering plans. The reform process is well underway and 
it is much needed to bring Western Australia in line with the expectations under the 
National Water Initiative 2004 and Water Act 2007(Cth). 
 
 Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of water allocation law and policy in Australia. 
It focused on the replacement of the riparian doctrine by a statutory system of water 
allocation as the riparian doctrine became unsuitable for Australian conditions and 
aspirations for irrigated settlement. Water scarcity was already an issue for the 
Australian continent and in the pursuit of irrigated settlement water was over-
allocated within states and colonies. The states and colonies had originally managed 
 
323 Department of Water (2013) Securing Western Australia’s Water Future. Position Paper – 
Reforming Water Resource Management (Government of Western Australia, Perth, 2013). 
324 At 1. 
325 Jeanette Jensen and Alex Gardner “Legal Duties for Environmental Water Provisions in 
Western Australia” (2017) 42 University of Western Australia Law Review” 206. 
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water resources within their boundaries; however, the establishment of the 
Federation and resulting Commonwealth government in 1901 raised tensions over 
the control and management of water. These tensions were not fully resolved within 
the Constitution. Over time, clauses relating to trade and external affairs powers 
were used by the Commonwealth to encourage co-operation in water management. 
To complicate matters the Murray-Darling River Basin spans several states. As 
state political boundaries did not align neatly with catchments, a response to over-
allocation was required at the Commonwealth level. The Commonwealth 
government worked hard to gain political co-operation to implement environmental 
policy needed to improve water allocation across states.  
However, when the Commonwealth desired to act upon its constitutional powers, it 
was limited in the area of water management. In order to overcome these 
limitations, state action was premised on the implementation of international 
treaties to protect environmental heritage. In the 1990s, the problem of over-
allocation became increasingly apparent at an international level. The approach of 
co-operative federalism was used to encourage a shift to improving water allocation 
and sustainability of supply through a market-based approach with each state being 
encouraged to implement the Water Act 2007 (Cth) to address the problem of water 
allocation in ways that both deal with past problems, including hydrological issues, 
and improve environmental outcomes.  
The factor that propelled Australia to act decisively in water policy and law reform 
was increasing water scarcity as demand increased and supply decreased during the 
Millennium Drought. In hindsight, water markets have provided Australia with an 
additional tool to manage drought conditions. The success of the Australian 
experience with water markets is identified in three key factors.326 The first area is 
the establishment of an “independent” entity in the form of the National Water 
Commission. Australia was able to use the National Water Commission to assist in 
facilitating and mediating the tensions between states during the implementation of 
 
326 Poh-Ling Tan (2007) “How do water markets function in droughts and other hard questions: 
Learning from law reform in Australia” presented at Legal Aspects of Water Sector Reforms 
Geneva, International Environmental Law Research Centre at 8.  
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the National Water Initiative 2004. The second area was the gradual introduction 
of water trading across catchments. Once Water Resources Plans were established 
they reduced the operational barriers to water trading. The third area was in 
effectively educating water users to a point where they were more receptive to water 
“recycling and desalination”.327 The legal system was faced with balancing the 
tensions between water as a common pool resource and the nature of property rights 
in that water permit or water share.328 
The example of Victoria provided an account of how regulation assisted in 
establishing a framework for water markets with environmental water. Victoria has 
created an Environmental Water Holder separate from other government 
departments, partly, so that decision making during times of extreme scarcity will 
not compromise environmental water, as has happened in the past. In creating the 
Environmental Water Holder office, environmental water entitlements are on a par 
with other water entitlements so that the environment as a public good has a level 
of protection in a market structure. New South Wales and South Australia, the other 
states in the Murray-Darling Basin, have also unbundled their water entitlements to 
create water allocations based on a share of water available. They have also created 
water registers and established legislative frameworks to encourage the 
development of water markets. In comparison, Western Australia has not yet 
created water entitlements that are allocated from a consumptive pool. The state has 
unbundled its water allocations in a more “traditional” sense by maintaining water 
entitlements that give water holders a fixed amount of water to access. Western 
Australia water law is, however, currently undergoing further reform. There is no 
doubt that the Water Act 2007 (Cth) and the requirements that it imposes on states 
to reform their water allocation law and policy is capable of providing a rich source 
of information on lessons to be learned from water reform. The following chapter 
will analyse the critical points of Australian water allocation law and policy to 
discover what lessons are relevant to New Zealand’s developing its water law and
 
327 At 8. 
328 Francine Rochford “Compensation for Regulation of Water Use – a Comparative Constitutional 
Perspective” (paper presented to New Zealand Centre for Environmental Law Conference, 
Auckland, April 2009). 
233 
 
CHAPTER SEVEN - COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 Introduction 
This chapter examines the lessons that New Zealand can learn from Australia’s 
experience in water law and policy development. Whereas New Zealand has not 
embarked upon extensive water allocation law reform, Australia does provide a 
valuable example of significant water allocation law reform. One of the difficulties 
with the comparison is that Australian water allocation is far more advanced than 
New Zealand. It makes a comparison between the two jurisdictions appear to be 
counter-intuitive. With a little patience from the reader, the comparative analysis 
forms a logical path through the water law and policy of both jurisdictions. 
The comparative analysis in this chapter answers the research question by 
addressing the problems identified regarding the gap in New Zealand’s water policy 
between 1991 and 2011. These problems related to the lack of alternatives to the 
“first come, first served” method of water allocation; the lack of opportunities to 
transfer water between users without heavy administration; addressing how to 
develop cohesive national guidance on water allocation law and policy 
development; and generally how to achieve sound water allocation for all water 
users.  
The chapter begins by examining the legal authority of national institutions 
responsible for the development of water law and policy. In Australia, this role is 
fulfilled by the National Water Commission. The responsibility for New Zealand 
water policy development is split across government departments, including the 
Ministry for the Environment and the Ministry for Primary Industries (responsible 
for water for irrigation). New Zealand is facing problems following a lack of 
national water policy from 1991 to 2011. It is therefore, worth addressing whether 




As has been stated previously, the “first come, first served” method of water 
allocation has been a problem for New Zealand and has contributed to the problem 
of fully allocated catchments with limited means to facilitate transfer between water 
users. It creates a “gold rush” effect in catchments that are close to full allocation 
as water permit applicants rush to ensure their application is submitted before the 
catchment is fully allocated. Adding to the problem of limited ability to transfer 
water is the fact that New Zealand water allocations are tied to the land. By drawing 
on the Australian comparison, it is apparent that if water permits were separated 
(unbundled) from land, it would assist in developing other water products to 
improve water transfers. The Australian experience shows that after unbundling, 
there are more options to develop new water products in the form of categorising 
water allocations and making separate rules regarding priorities based on those 
categories. The general categories identified are for environmental water, bulk 
water takes, and other water entitlements in the form of licences or shares. This 
chapter illustrates how unbundling would assist New Zealand in addressing the 
question of how to find methods to allocate water, other than the “first come, first 
served” method.  
When examining bulk water applications, some clear benefits emerge with regards 
to the processing of bulk water allocations. Australian states generally classify such 
water takes as “bulk water” applications and the regulatory process for determining 
whether they are granted or not can take into account infrastructure investment and 
state interests. There is no statutory distinction in New Zealand for large water takes 
that are for municipal supply, irrigation or electricity generation. Yet, these 
categories of water take involve significant investment in infrastructure to manage 
the water allocation. It is worthwhile to consider the potential benefits of legal 
recognition of bulk water applications in New Zealand.  
The Australian water reforms have been comprehensive. The inclusion of matters 
relating to recording and reporting on water allocation is an integral part of the 
reforms. Based on the Australian experience it is evident that embarking upon 
changes to unbundle should be complemented with an increased systematic 
collection of information on water takes. In the Australian experience, this 
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information is not just for water users but also for other stakeholders such as the 
public, government and financial institutions. Furthermore, the information is not 
just hydrometric. It also includes adjustments for seasonal or temporary takes, 
security interests, owners, the nature of the water permit and the level of security 
ascribed to the water permit. In response to the need to benchmark and report this 
water allocation-related information, Australia developed water accounting 
standards. The standards assist in communicating water information to a broader 
range of users. This analysis considers to what extent a similar approach to the 
collection and dissemination of water information would be useful in New Zealand.  
In terms of water scarcity, Australia is undoubtedly in a different position from New 
Zealand. Australia has had to respond decisively to evidence of physical water 
scarcity, particularly in the Murray-Darling Basin. Driven by the need to return 
more water to the environment, the Australian response to water scarcity included 
several measures. These included implementing water markets as part of a cap and 
trade system (not a free market) which is heavily regulated.1 Although Australia 
was innovative in developing water allocation law and policy, more recently its 
progress in water law reform implementation has stagnated. 2  There are also 
concerns about the effectiveness of regulation and enforcement of the cap on water 
abstraction. 3  Despite these concerns, the evaluation of the reform process in 
Australia shows the extent and commitment of the Australian Commonwealth to 
improving the allocation of water.  
In comparison to Australia, New Zealand is experiencing economic water scarcity, 
not physical water scarcity. Evidence of economic water scarcity in New Zealand 
includes some regional catchments such as in the Canterbury region which has 
become fully allocated or over-allocated. New Zealand can learn in a number of 
 
1 Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair “Water Markets and Regulation: Implementation, Success 
and Limitations” in Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair (eds) Reforming Water Law and 
Governance. From Stagnation to Innovation in Australia (Springer, Singapore, 2018) 141 at 142. 
2 Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair “Australia’s Water Reform Journey – from Stagnation to 
Innovation” in Cameron Holley and Darren Sinclair (eds) Reforming Water Law and 
Governance. From Stagnation to Innovation in Australia (Springer, Singapore, 2018) at 5. 




areas from the Australian experience of undertaking extensive water law reform to 
improve water allocation outcomes. As the Australian experience in implementing 
water allocation law has been not only complex but challenging, New Zealand can 
learn from both the success and shortcomings of Australian water law reform.  
 
 Comparative Analysis Table   
The following table compares the key features of Australian states’ water allocation 
law and policy with that of New Zealand. The table compares New Zealand with 
the Australian states of Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia and Western 
Australia. This comparison provides an account of how water allocation law and 
policy in individual states differ from New Zealand law and policy in this area. The 










Act 1991 (NZ) 
Water Act 1989 (Vic) Water Management Act 
2000 (NSW) 
Natural Resources 
Management Act 2004 (SA) 
Rights in Water and 
Irrigation Act 1914 (WA) 
Is there a 
commitment to 
sustainability in the 
objects of the Act? 
Yes 
Section 5 states: 
“(1) The purpose of this 
Act is to promote the 
sustainable management 
of natural and physical 
resources. 
(2) In this Act, 
sustainable management 
means managing the use, 
development, and 
protection of natural and 
physical resources in a 
way, or at a rate, which 
enables people and 
communities to provide 
for their social, 
economic, and cultural 
well-being and for their 
health and safety while— 
(a) sustaining the 
potential of natural and 
Yes 
In the purpose Section 1(d) 
states: 
“to make sure that water 
resources are conserved 
and properly managed for 
sustainable use for the 
benefit of present and 
future Victorians”. 
Division 1B of the Water 
Act 1989 (Vic) requires the 
development of Sustainable 
Water Strategies 
Section 22(1)(d) requires 
that the role of the 
Minister is 
“to make sure that water 
resources are conserved 
and properly managed for 
sustainable use for the 
Yes 
Section 3 states: 
“The objects of this Act are 
to provide for the 
sustainable and integrated 
management of the water 
sources of the State for the 
benefit of both present and 
future generations”. 
Section14(3) states: 
“It is the duty of a 
management committee to 
exercise its functions 
consistently with the 
principles of ecologically 
sustainable development”. 
Yes 
Section 7(1) states: 
“The objects of this Act 
include to assist in the 
achievement of ecologically 
sustainable 
development in the State 
by establishing an 
integrated scheme to 
promote the use and 




Section 4 states: 
“4.Objects of this Part 
(1)The objects of this Part 
are —  
(a)to provide for the 
management of water 
resources, and in particular 
—  
(i)for their sustainable use 
and development to meet 
the needs of current and 
future users; and 
(ii)for the protection of 
their ecosystems and the 
environment in which 
water resources are 
situated, including by the 
regulation of activities 




(excluding minerals) to 
meet the reasonably 
foreseeable needs of 
future generations”. 
benefit of present and 
future Victorians” 
Is there a separate 
Act for water 
management? 
No Yes Yes No 
Chapter 7 relates to the 
“Management and 
protection of water 
resources”. 
Yes 
Does the Act also 
include provisions 
relating to water for 
irrigation? 
No 
The Irrigation Schemes 
Act 1990 privatised 
Irrigation Schemes.  
Yes 
Part 11 of the Act covers 
Irrigation which applies to 
an “Authority” that 





Part I of the Act covers all 
Irrigation Corporations 
formed under the Irrigation 
Corporations Act 1994 
(s116). 




Irrigation Act 2009 (SA)  
Rights under the Act may 
be converted to a water 
licence under the Natural 
Resources Management 
Act 2004 (SA) under 
s32(1)(c) of the Irrigation 
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WATER REGISTER      





information is held 
by Regional Councils. 
Securities against 
water permits may 














Is it a public 
Register 
Information can be 
requested regarding 
water permits.  
Yes, the Securities 
Register is a public 
register. 
 
Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 




New Zealand does 
not have a Water 
Register 
Yes 
Mortgage interests on 
water shares in 
Schedule 12A 
Yes 
Recorded on security 
interest with evidence in 
approved form (S71D) 
Yes 
Natural Resources 
Management Act 2004 (SA) 
Schedule 3A 
Yes 
Division 3E Register of 
Instruments 26GZM  
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Does the Water 
Register Require 
Notice to Third 
Parties to change 
the security 
interest? 
The PPSR does not 
require notice to the 




changes to mortgage 
interests on security 
shares in Schedule 12A 
Yes 
Schedule 1A provides 
further details on 
registration and removal of 
security interests 
Yes 
Schedule3A regulates the 
creation, priority, variation, 
transfer, discharge, 
enforcement of a security 
interest. 
Yes 
Division 3E Register of 
Instruments 26GZO Holder 
of the security interest to 
be notified of certain 
events 
 
Are there statutory 
provisions relating 
to the type of 
information that 
must be provided. 
Not specifically about 
water permits, i.e. 
the volume of water 
allocated. Water 
permits may be 
registered as “goods” 
on the Personal 
Property Securities 
Register under 
s122(4) of the RMA. 
Yes 
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WATER ALLOCATION – STATUTORY CATEGORIES    
 “Water Allocation” 
Terminology  
A water allocation is the 
event or process of making 
an allocation of water 
under a water permit.  
Water allocation means the 
volume of water granted 
once an application for 
water has been 
determined.  
Section 3 of the Water Act 
1989 (Vic) defines “water 
allocation” by categorising 
it into environmental 
entitlement, bulk water and 
water licence.  
The final water allocation 
for environmental water 
and bulk water is based on 
a seasonal determination 
or under the terms of the 
entitlement if there is no 
seasonal determination 
made. 
 The final allocation for 
water shares is the volume 
allocated to the particular 
share at any time. 
 
Water allocation means the 
volume of water granted 
once an application for 
water has been determined 
under the water access 
licence 
There are three broad 
categories of licences: 
domestic use and town 
water supply, high security 
licences and general 
security licences. 
Actual water allocation is 
based on annual 
declarations and a system 
of water management 
plans.   
 
 
Water allocation means the 
volume of water granted 
once an application for 
water has been determined 
under a water licence as 
defined in  Section 3 of the 
Natural Resources 
Management Act 2004 (SA)   
 
Water allocation means the 
volume of water granted 
once an application for 
water has been 
determined. Under The 
Rights in Water and 
Irrigation Act 1914 (WA) d 
“water entitlement” as 
defined in ss 26Q(3), Sch. 1 
cl. 17(4), Sch. 1 cl. 28 and  





WATER ALLOCATION -   BULK WATER 
Bulk water is a 
category of 
water allocation 
No statutory distinction 
between applications for 
high volumes of water and 
smaller takes 
Yes  
s34(1)(a) for “water supply 
or irrigation” 
Yes 
Major Utility category of 
Water Access Licence 
s57(i) 
Categories of water licence 
exist for some categories 
of bulk water take such as 
municipal water supply and 
irrigation schemes. 
No statutory distinction 
within the Act for all bulk 
water, however, there are 
separate processes for 






Regional councils follow 
administrative procedures in 
the RMA. There is priority 
for all applications by order 
of time or “first come, first 
served” principle as per the 
precedent in Fleetwing 
Farms v Marlborough 
District Council. 
Decided separately from 
other water use applications 
at Department level 
Water supplier licences 
are given priority over 
all other categories of 
water access licences s 
58. 
Subject to provisions in 
Natural Resource 




No distinction for any water 
permit application based on 
volume, including bulk 
water. 
Applications are decided at 
regional council following 
the “first come, first served” 
rule to assess the merits of 
the application without 
making comparisons with 
existing or future 
applications  
Section 40 gives the 
Minister broad discretion. 
Under section 40(1) the 
Minister “must have regard 
to” any Ministerial report 
prepared under the Act, 
existing and projected water 
availability, avoiding 
adverse effects on the 
environment,  any existing 
water allocations made to 
the applicant, Government 
Rules for bulk water 
applications are 
included under s20 of 
the Act as part of water 
management plans that 
must be prepared for 
each area.  
The rules must be in 
accordance with 
priorities under section 
58 for water access 
licences.  
Regional Water Allocation 
Plans are prepared 
following the provisions of 
the Act. Once the Plans are 
prepared they must also be 
accredited. The Plans 
include limits on water 
allocations.  
The water allocation plan 
will state where 
applications for new takes 
are restricted and if so it 
Does not have separate 
provisions for bulk water as 
part of comprehensive water 
allocation legislation.  
Water allocations in regional 
plans cap consumptive use for 
particular categories of water 
take such as irrigation or 
hydropower. These limits are 
contained at the regional 




policies on water allocation 
and conservation, the 
purpose for which the water 
is to be used and  the needs 
of other potential applicants 
will outline how new 
allocations can be acquired 
through trading.  
Further water law reform may 
be able to address this area in 





WATER ALLOCATION -   ENVIRONMENTAL WATER  
Is Environmental 
water legally 
recognised as a 
separate legal 
entity for the 
purposes of 
water allocation? 
Not for the purposes of 
holding water allocations or 
water rights. There is legal 
recognition of the Wanganui 
River as part of the 
settlement process with 
local Maori tribes that does 









participate in the 
water market? 
N/A Yes.  
The Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder can buy water for the environment. State environmental water 
holders, such as the Victorian Environmental Water Holder, can also participate in the market to ensure that water is 
returned to the environment.  
Market participation and water buy back schemes by the government have been a contentious part of the reform 
process. Some rural communities in particular feel that they are unfairly bearing the burden of the effect of the 
reforms as it returns water to the environment by purchasing it from existing water holders who might otherwise 
operate businesses in the area.  
Principles for 
Water Allocation 
N/A Broad Ministerial Discretion 
to make environmental 
water allocations under 
section 48F.  
The Minister can consider 
potential adverse effects on 
existing users, government 
policies on conservation and 
Office of Environment 
and Heritage holds 
environmental water. It 
is ensuring that the 
water holdings are in 
accordance with the 
requirements of the 
Water Act 2007(Cth) 
Environmental water 




water is held by the 
Murray Darling Basin 
Authority, Commonwealth 
Subject to current reform as 
there is limited reference to 
environmental water planning 
under the Act. Environmental 
water planning is subject to 
Ministerial discretion.  
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water allocation, water 
management plans and any 
other matters the Minster 
thinks fit.  
 
which requires the plans 
to be accredited. New 
South Wales has 
experienced some 
issues with meeting the 
requirements of the 
Water Act 2007(Cth) on 
time.  
Environmental Water 
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WATER ALLOCATION – Unbundling (Water allocation in entitlements, licences and shares)   
Are water 
allocations tied to 
land (bundled)? 
Water Allocation 
Statutory scheme of 
water allocation 
which distinguishes 
between water take 
and use.  
In practice water 




allocation is a fixed 
entitlement recorded 
on the water permit, 
unless the Regional 
Plan allows for a class 
of water that has 
lower reliability. 
No  
Unbundled and actual 
water allocation will 
vary according to share 
available or declared. 




• Water Share 
(ss33F) 
• Bulk Entitlements 
(s34(1)(a) for 








Unbundled and actual 
water allocation will vary 
according to share available 
or declared. 
 
Water Access Licence with 
a “share component” 
which is expressed as 
maximum volume, 
proportion of available 
water, proportion of 
storage capacity of a dam 




Unbundled and actual 
water allocation will vary 
according to share available 
or declared. 
• Forest water licence 
s169(c) 
• Well drillers licence 
s139 
• Water access 





Actual water allocation is still a 
fixed entitlement but can be 
traded in full or part separately 
from the land. 
Nature of Statutory 
Property Rights in 
a Water Permit 
(NZ) /Unbundled 
Allocation  
Section 122(1) of the 
RMA states that “A 
resource consent is 
neither real nor 
personal property”. 
Can deal with the 
unbundled water 
licence or water 
allocation as personal 
property 
Can deal with the 
unbundled water licence or 
water allocation as 
personal property 
Can deal with the 
unbundled water licence or 
water allocation as 
personal property 
Can deal with the unbundled 
water licence or water allocation 





Property Rights in 







concepts to resolving 
water permit issues.  
The nature of rights 
in a water permit in 
common law does 
recognise elements 
of property for the 
holder of the 
consent. 
 
ICM Agriculture v The Commonwealth confirmed that property rights were not gained by the Commonwealth when 
irrigator’s entitlements under new legalisation were reduced.  
Principles for 
Water Allocation 
  For the Water Use 
Licence the relevant 
principles are in Section 
64U which are focused 
on limiting the adverse 
effects of irrigation at 
the location of the 
water take. The adverse 
effects include reducing 





Water access licences are 
issued based on being in 
accordance with relevant 
water management plans 
and not have an adverse 
effect on the environment.  
Water access licences are 
given priority under the 
Act. First priority is given to 
domestic water and town 
water supply, second 
priority is given to high 
security licences and third 
Regional Water Allocation 
Plans are prepared 
following the provisions of 
the Act. Once the Plans are 
prepared they must also be 
accredited. The Plans 
include limits on water 
allocations.  
The water allocation plan 
will state where 
applications for new takes 
are restricted and if so it 
will outline how new 
The principles for granting a water 
licence are contained in Schedule 
1 Section 7 of the Act. The 
Minister has broad discretion to 
refuse a licence application. The 
Minster must have regard whether 
the application is “in the public 
interest”, “ecologically 
sustainable”, “environmentally 
acceptable”, could affect current 
of future water needs, would be 
detrimental to others in the 
Minster’s opinion, could have 
another source of water, keeps 
within local practices and bylaws, 
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cumulative effects of 
water use. 
Water Shares - Broad 
Ministerial Discretion 
under section 33J.  
First under section 
33J(1), where there is a 
bulk entitlement in the 
zone or a “permissible 
consumptive volume 
has been declared” the 
Minister must ensure 
that the issue of a 
water share is 
“consistent” with the 
pre-existing bulk 
entitlement and it is 
“not likely to have” an 
effect on other water 
shares, environmental 
entitlements and “the 
needs of other 
potential applicants”.  
The second category is 
where section 33J(1) 
does not apply. Under 
section 33J(2)(a) to (k) 
the requirements are 
that the Minister “must 
priority is given to general 
licences.  
Once the water available is 
declared then the water 
access licence holder will 
know what percentage of 
their licence they have 
been allocated.  
Hence priorities between 
different water allocations 
is based on the type of 
licence held.  
allocations can be acquired 
through trading. 




consider” the “existing 
and projected” 
availability and quality 
of water,  potential 
“adverse effect” on 
existing uses of water, 
waterways, aquifers 
and the environmental 
water reserve , other 
water shares already 
owned by the applicant, 
“the need to protect 
the environment” and 
government 
conservation policy, any 
adverse effect there 
could be on maintaining 
the environmental 
water reserve, “the 
needs of other 
potential applicants” 
and relevant report or 
inquires under any Act  
• Other matters that 
the Minster “thinks fit 
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WATER ALLOCATION PLANS 
NATIONAL  Gap in national planning 
and policy from 1991 to 
2011.  
National Policy Statement 
for Freshwater 
Management 2014 
(Amended in 2017) 
National Water Initiative 
2004 
Water Act 2007 (Cth) and 
the Murray-Darling Basin 
Plan 
National Competition 
Reforms to promote 
improved efficiency in 
water management 
National Water Initiative 
2004 
Water Act 2007 (Cth) and 
the Murray-Darling Basin 
Plan 
National Competition 
Reforms to promote 
improved efficiency in 
water management 
National Water Initiative 
2004 
Water Act 2007 (Cth) and 
the Murray-Darling Basin 
Plan 
National Competition 
Reforms to promote 
improved efficiency in 
water management 
National Water Initiative 
2004 
Water Act 2007 (Cth) and 
the Murray-Darling Basin 
Plan 
National Competition 
Reforms to promote 






Regional policy statements 
and plans to be prepared 
by Regional Councils. 
However, not all Councils 
prepared Water Allocation 
Plans 
Sustainable Water 
Strategies established from 
2006 to 2011.* 
State Water Management 
Outcomes Plan which has a 
lifespan of 5 years 
Strong direction in the 
Water Management Act 
2000 (NSW) objects.  
Also regional water plans 
that state limits applicable 
to water access licences. 
State Natural Resources 
Management Plan is 
required under the Natural 
Resources Act 2004 (SA). 
Also Regional Natural 
Resources Management 
Plans prepared by the 
Natural Resources 
Management Board. 
Plans are required under 
the Rights in Water and 
Irrigation Act 1914 
Regional, sub-Regional and 
local plans for water 
management prepared by 
the Department of Water. 
Subject to further reform 
as Plans are not 
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RECORDING AND REPORTING WATER DATA 
National Water 
Statistics 
Until recently the 
Department of Statistics 
and Ministry for the 
Environment prepared 
separate reports on water 
data. A joint report is now 
prepared. 
 
Reported to and collated 
by the Bureau of 
Meteorology under the 
Water Act 2007 (Cth). 
Reported to and collated 
by the Bureau of 
Meteorology under the 
Water Act 2007 (Cth). 
Reported to and collated 
by the Bureau of 
Meteorology under the 
Water Act 2007 (Cth). 
Reported to and collated 
by the Bureau of 
Meteorology under the 






Regional Councils may 
develop their independent 
methods for collecting, 
storing and reporting data. 
Scientifically based as 
hydrological data 
Regional reports carried 
out by Regional Councils or 
their consultants 
Yes 




Through the use of Water 
Accounting Standards 
Yes 
Through the use of Water 
Accounting Standards 
Yes 














Accounting Standards have 
Yes 
Through the use of Water 
Accounting Standards 
Yes 
Through the use of Water 
Accounting Standards 
Yes 
Through the use of Water 
Accounting Standards 
Yes 




not been adopted in New 
Zealand. 
New Zealand government 
has established Guidelines 
for Councils to Report 
Water  





 New Zealand’s National Water Institutions 
The RMA is the primary legislation addressing water allocation in New Zealand. It 
included provision for resource management plans and policies to be prepared at 
the national and regional level.1 The review of water allocation law and policy in 
New Zealand since the enactment of the RMA established that the full 
implementation of the RMA for water allocation would be complete only once the 
plans at national and regional level were prepared. However, in contrast to the 
Australian situation, it was not compulsory to prepare these plans under the RMA, 
but it was one of the “functions” of councils under the RMA.2 While most regional 
plans were prepared, they were weak in their effectiveness in terms of managing 
water allocation or preventing over-allocation. Furthermore, no national policy 
instrument was prepared for water allocation from 1991 to 2011, a state of affairs 
that resulted in a policy gap.3 Chapter Four critically evaluated the policy gap and 
its implications. During the national policy gap, water allocation was carried out on 
a regional level through rules in regional plans. Essentially, between 1991 and 2011 
water allocation plans and policy development occurred without national guidance.4  
As has been stated earlier in the thesis, under the RMA New Zealand does not have 
a national water commission. Previously, New Zealand did have a national body 
responsible for water allocation policy development, a body which was established 
under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967. That body – the New Zealand 
National Water and Soil Conservation Authority – had a comparable role to the 
Australian National Water Commission. The Act defined the statutory role of the 
National Water and Soil Conservation Authority, reflecting its extensive powers. 
The Authority was meant to collect information on existing and future water 
 
1 For an account of the structure of water allocation planning in New Zealand see Chapter Four.  
2 Resource Management Act 1991, Part 4 defines the “Functions, powers and duties of central and 
local government”. 
3 See Chapter Four for a comprehensive discussion on the lack of water allocation policy at the 
national level under the RMA. 
4 For a discussion and analysis of regional plans in New Zealand see Chapter Four. 
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allocation. It was able to inquire into “future requirements” for water allocation and 
“competing demands”. 5  When making decisions on water allocation, it had to 
consider the “best use” of water.6 In 1988, the Authority was abolished, and its 
powers were placed with those of regional water boards.7 National oversight of 
water policy development and many of the functions of the Authority were 
devolved to the regional level.  
 
As has been shown, the Australian Commonwealth government overcame 
significant constitutional barriers when implementing water law reform. 8  The 
examination of the Australian Constitution in Chapter Six showed that the 
Commonwealth Government did not have express constitutional powers to allocate 
water. 9  Instead, it relied upon a variety of other constitutional powers to encourage 
states to co-operate on changes to water law and policy. Because of the 
constitutional context, it was important for the Commonwealth to work with the 
momentum of state agreement and to move relatively quickly to implement changes 
across states.10 The National Water Initiative 2004 and the Water Act 2007 (Cth) 
ensured that all states worked towards a common goal in implementing water law 
reform.11 The National Water Initiative 2004 provided the blueprint for state water 
law reform and the implementation of water markets. 12  The National Water 
 
5 Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, s 14(4)( a). 
6 Keam v Minister of Works and Development [1982] 1 NZLR 319 and Stanley v South Canterbury 
Catchment Board  (1971) Planning Tribunal 463,68 
7 Water and Soil Conservation Amendment Act 1988, s 3. 
8 James Crawford “The Constitution and the Environment” (1991) 13 Sydney L. Rev. 11 and 
discussion in previous chapter.  
9 See discussion on Australian Constitutional powers regarding water in Chapter 4 section 5 – 6.  
10 Tranche payments were provided to those states that could show they had met key performance 
indicators in implementing the water law reform. See Council of Australian Governments The 
Council of Australian Government's Water Reform Framework 1994 
11 Productivity Commission Impact of Competition Policy Reforms on Rural and Regional 
Australia, Report No. 8 (Productivity Commission, Canberra, 1999) at 94. 
12 The COAG Water Framework 1994 and National Water Initiative 2004 also stated that water 
rights should be unbundled to facilitate trading.  
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Commission was also established to provide continued support and leadership for 
water law reform implementation. It is therefore important to evaluate the reasons 
for the establishment and abolition of the Commission, notably to explore whether 
the Commission was abolished because it had fulfilled its statutory objective or 
whether other reasons that contributed to its demise.  
The Australian experience shows that it is essential to understand the role of 
national institutions in implementing water allocation reform. The National Water 
Commission provided an independent voice that gave much-needed transparency 
to the water reform process in Australia. There are therefore several reasons why 
New Zealand should establish a National Water Commission to implement 
comprehensive water reform like Australia. Water allocation law reform will take 
a long time and having the independent oversight of a National Water Commission 
will assist in systematically implementing the reforms while also providing support 
to the various stakeholders affected. The Commission should be a permanent body 
with similar responsibilities to those which Australia’s National Water Commission 
had to report on future water demand.  
Much of the New Zealand economy depends on water to produce commodities. 
Currently, the Ministry for the Environment does not have responsibility for water 
for agricultural production. As stated earlier, irrigation water policy development is 
the responsibility of the Ministry for Primary Industries. As demand grows for 
water because of climate change, population growth and economic growth, 
decisions about water allocation will only become more difficult. A central 
independent body would be the best means to bring the same transparency to water 
allocation policy development in New Zealand as the National Water Commission 
has done in Australia. The current quasi-judicial regionalised approach to water 
allocation decision making is not a long-term solution for New Zealand. There are 
examples of high-profile water allocation applications being decided by councils 
 
   See discussion in Chapter Six “Australia” section 6 “1994 COAG Reforms – An era of Co-
operative Federalism”. In some instances, this approach has led to the development of further 
unbundling so that delivery shares are separate from the actual water allocation. Unbundled 
entitlements for the actual water delivered may be in the form of a permit or licence that can be 
varied. In other words, the licence holder will receive a percentage of the water stated on their 
water licence. For an example of this approach see Water Act 1989 (Vic). 
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following the “first come, first served” rule, which have broader implications for 
the New Zealand environment and economy13 The critical evaluation in Chapter 
Five explained the problems facing New Zealand water allocation as stated in the 
Land and Water Forum Reports. The Reports are comprehensive in terms of 
identifying the barriers that water permit holders face when wanting to transfer 
water permits. While high profile media coverage is provided to water bottling 
exports, the impact of water bottling may not be at the same scale as water takes for 
other uses, such as irrigation. That is not to say that water permits for water bottling 
should remain unregulated. Rather the argument is that a wider and more 
comprehensive view of water allocation issues in New Zealand should be examined 
for their long-term impact.  
 
 A New Zealand Water Register 
New Zealand does not have a Water Register. One of the functions of councils is to 
hold information relating to water permits; however, that function does not include 
recording information about security interests attached to water permits.14 In New 
Zealand, the registration of security interests relating to water permits is maintained 
under the Personal Property Security Act 1999. The Comparative Analysis Table 
shows gaps in the use of a water register for the registration and removal of 
securities. For example, in New Zealand it is not compulsory to register the security 
interest over a water permit. In Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia and 
Western Australia the registration of security interests over water licences are 
required in order to provide information to third parties. As stated in the 
Comparative Analysis Table, all these states provide for comprehensive details 
regarding the type of information that must be required. In New Zealand, the 
information regarding water permits is currently split between councils and the 
 
13 See Matt Shand “Chinese company seeks consent to draw 580 million litres of pristine spring 
water” Sunday Star Times (13 August 2017); Chris Hutching “Chinese firm touts NZ’s potential 
as a major bottled water exporter”  stuff.co.nz (15 November 2018); Cate Broughton 
“Christchurch water protest attracts thousands” www.stuff.co.nz (9 March 2019) 
14 Resource Management Act 1991, s 35. 
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Personal Property Securities Register. The establishment of a water register would, 
therefore, assist in providing a transparent public record of water permits in one 
place. The ease of access to information relating to water allocation is evident in 
the Australian experience. In Australia, there is a wide range of people who seek 
access to water allocation information for a range of purposes from irrigators 
verifying the volume of water allocated to them to banks using water allocations as 
collateral for loans.  
Currently, in New Zealand purchasers of a business using water permits may rely 
upon record keeping by regional councils to verify consent conditions, a reliance 
which could raise significant legal issues.15 The reality is that water permits are a 
valuable part of business transactions.16 The recording of water permits in a national 
Water Register will standardise the collection of water permit information and the 
registration of security interests. Section 122(4) of the RMA already allows for the 
recognition of resource consents, including water permits, as “goods” to be 
registered on the Personal Property Security Register.  
In the process of unbundling the state of Victoria considered the link between 
information in the land register and the need to verify land and water information:17 
As part of the conversion process accurate land ownership data is required, 
particularly to ensure accuracy of the mortgage is maintained. This requires 
a comparison of some of the information in the water authority records and 
the land registry records, and to enable this to occur the legislation 
specifically authorises the use of the information in those records for cross-
checking. 
The point raised in the quote above is a very practical one. It recognises that land 
and water were bundled together as assets that could then be used to provide 
security for mortgages or other loans. The process of unbundling water permits 
 
15 The Supreme Court in Marlborough District Council v Vining Reality Group [2012] NZSC 11 
confirmed a duty of care is imposed on Councils to provide correct information regarding water 
permits. In this case there was a discrepancy between the actual amount of water under a water 
permit and the amount recorded in the sale and purchase agreement for a vineyard. Furthermore, 
if the Council is found to be negligent in providing information regarding a water permit it may 
be held liable for its actions. 
16 Eloise Gibson “When the river runs dry: The true cost of NZ water” www.stuff.co.nz (27 April 
2017). 
17 Parliament of Victoria Hansard (16 November 2005) above n 28 at 1947. 
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required regulation to maintain the legal obligations in existing mortgages and other 
securities. As shown in the Comparative Analysis Table above all the Australian 
states analysed have established a water register. The water register provides the 
legal definition of rights regarding the name of the owner, quantity, location of the 
take, the price of transfer and location and the registration of security interests. The 
Comparative Analysis Table also shows that notice must be given to third parties 
with a registered security interest if certain events occur. 
In comparison, in New Zealand, the registration of security interests attached to 
water permits does not require third party notification. A benefit of a separate water 
register would be that it enables changes to the underlying security to trigger the 
notification to a registered third party. The economic value of a water permit would 
be protected by the creation of a water register in New Zealand. New Zealand needs 
the requisite protection for the transfer of water permits to higher value use by 
providing the appropriate level of protection to businesses that rely on the value of 
their water allocation for lending purposes.  
New Zealand should consider the consolidation of water permit information in the 
form of a water register that is similar to Australia’s register. A New Zealand water 
register would improve the reliability of water permit information by recording it 
in a public register. Furthermore, it would recognise the economic value of water 
as an asset of businesses relying upon water allocation to operate successfully.  
 
As described in the previous chapter, policy objectives in the COAG Framework 
1994 required the development of water information collection. The comprehensive 
nature of the Australian reforms meant that this included the development of water 
accounting standards. The collection of water information and data is a key part of 
measuring the success of the Commonwealth-led water law reform. In Australia, 
water accounting was included in the water reform process on the basis that “high 
quality information is necessary to base sound decisions relating to water 
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management”.18 Before the reforms water accounts were kept mainly for internal 
technical purposes and users. The shift towards broader general purpose water 
resource accounting was prompted by the National Water Initiative water policy 
reform, government investment in water saving and the need to deal with the 
problem of over-allocation. 19  The Water Accounting Conceptual Framework 
formed the foundation for the development of the Water Accounting Standards.20  
The Water Accounting Standards were developed by taking into account the wide 
range of stakeholders that use water information. The Commonwealth government 
uses water accounts to measure progress on returning water to the Murray-Darling 
under the Murray-Darling Basin Plan. Water accounts are used to help market 
participants make informed choices about water use so that they can manage the 
risk of their transactions.21 For example, irrigators may choose particular crops in 
line with forecasts for water availability that are based on water reports, or councils 
may purchase extra water from the market to secure municipal supplies.22 Water 
account information could be used by government policy makers, lobby groups, 
regulators, consultants, academics and environmental organisations for decision 
making about a water project.23 Water Accounting Standard 1 and 2 are voluntary 
standards that may be used in the public and private sector.24 The true value of water 
accounting is that it allows information on water take and use to be benchmarked 
across all water users. These Water Accounting Standards also provided consistent 
definitions of water assets and liabilities.  
 
18 Jayne M Godfrey and Keryn Chalmers (eds) Water Accounting International Approaches to 
Policy Decision-making (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2012) at 4. 
19 Maryanne Slattery, Keryn Chalmers and Jayne M Godfrey “Beyond the Hydrographer’s Legacy: 
Water Accounting in Australia” in Jayne M Godfrey and Keryn Chalmers (eds) Water 
Accounting International Approaches to Policy Decision-making (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
2012) at 22. 
20 At Preamble. 
21 At Preface [9]. 
22 At 22. 
23 At Preface [16]. 
24 Australian Water Accounting Standard 1 Preparation and Presentation of General Purpose 




The Comparative Analysis Table shows that water information in the Australian 
states is reported using the Water Accounting Standards. Water accounts based on 
the Water Accounting Standards may be collated by the Bureau of Meteorology 
which is responsible for preparing annual water accounts. In comparison, whereas 
the Australian Water Accounting Standards are for all public and private water 
users, the New Zealand water accounting guidance has been prepared for regional 
councils only.25 The guide includes examples of the various approaches taken by 
regional councils’ collecting and reporting of water “accounting” data. This guide 
includes a reporting template which records consumptive and non-consumptive 
takes and categories of water for the environment. 26  The New Zealand water 
accounting guide would benefit from being expanded to all water users. There 
should be further research undertaken on whether the Australian Water Accounting 
Standards should be adopted in New Zealand.  
 
 Alternatives to the “First come, First served” Method of Water 
Allocation in New Zealand 
The comparison with Australia showed a significant difference between current 
water allocation in New Zealand and the extent of water law reform that has been 
undertaken in Australia. It is fair to state that New Zealand is lagging in addressing 
water allocation and finding alternative methods to allocate water to the 
environment, bulk water takes and other water takes.  
In Australia, states can prioritise water allocation based on the different categories 
of water take. One of the difficulties in making comparisons with Australia is that 
each state has a unique approach to the naming and classification of water 
allocation. The difference in approaches is important to note in the comparative 
 
25 New Zealand Government A Guide to Freshwater Accounting under the National Policy 
Statement for Freshwater Management 2014 (Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 2014). 
26 Ministry for the Environment A Guide to Freshwater Accounting under the National Policy 
Statement for Freshwater Management 2014 (Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 2015) 
at 48. Refer to Table 5.1. 
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analysis because it means that the comparisons are not direct comparisons between 
Australian states and New Zealand. With regards to water allocation, the 
Comparative Analysis Table shows that states can divide up their water allocations 
by volume.  The Comparative Analysis Table shows that bulk water entitlements 
for irrigation water or municipal water supply can then be given priority over other 
water takes if necessary. The distinction between water takes enables a prioritising 
of water takes according to water policy objectives. In comparison, regional 
councils in New Zealand currently allocate water under the “first come, first served” 
method, which does not allow for a comparison to be made between competing 
applications regardless of the size or volume of the take.27  
The lack of strong guidance in freshwater allocation priorities is an issue for 
councils deciding water allocation applications. Regional councils are challenged 
by the fact that there is no distinction between the demand for water for New 
Zealand’s national projects in irrigation,28 increased demand from municipal water 
suppliers and from other individual consents. 29 Councils are limited in their ability 
to assess the applications before them because of the “first come, first served” 
allocation method. 30  The current allocation method prevents councils from 
comparing one application against another or from considering other future 
potential uses for the same water. As a result, the “first come, first served” method 
effectively prevents water from being allocated to its highest value use. Some 
councils are calling for “a robust set of criteria” to determine priorities for water 
allocation. 31  As has been shown, the current National Policy Statement – 
Freshwater Management 2014 (revised in 2017) still does not provide the “robust” 
 
27 Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council [1997] 3 NZLR 257. 
28 See discussion in Chapter Four on the Irrigation Acceleration Fund.  
29 Tauranga City Council v Bay of Plenty Regional Council Notice of Appeal on behalf of 
Tauranga City Council Against Decision on Proposed Plan Change 9 (Region-Wide Water 
Quantity) (15 November 2018). The Tauranga City Council Submission to the Proposed Plan 
Change also stated that it is facing these issues as a future urban growth area. 
30 Waikato Regional Council Waikato Regional Freshwater Discussion: A Framework For Getting 
The Best Use Allocation Through Time Issues and Opportunities (Waikato Regional Council, 
Hamilton, 2016). The observations in this paragraph are drawn from this policy paper at 19. 
31 At 19. 
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guidance that the councils seek as it does not change the “first in, first served” 
method of allocation.32  
There are a number of options that could help New Zealand implement more 
effective policy water allocation; however, these options vary in terms of their 
effectiveness. On the one hand, the National Policy Statement – Freshwater 
Management 2014 (revised in 2017) should be revised further to include more detail 
on regulatory tools to assist regional councils in preventing over-allocation.33 This 
change would bring some minor improvements. On the other hand, there is a need 
for more extensive reform in the form of a specific statute focusing on water or 
natural resource allocation.34 The latter option goes beyond amending the RMA yet 
again.  
The Australian approach to address these water allocation problems has been to 
establish priorities by categorising water takes for “bulk water” takes, 
environmental water and other water takes. The other water takes are generally 
referred to as water shares or licences. These are simplified categories as there is 
no generic water allocation definition across Australian states. Each state has 
developed law to address these categories of water allocation as required under the 
NWI and Water Act 2007 (Cth). A core part of the reforms was to unbundle or 
separate water allocations from land. The unbundling process and how it led to the 
creation of different categories of water takes for environmental water, “bulk water” 




32 National Policy Statement Freshwater Management 2014 (Revised 2017). 
33 Ministry for the Environment A Guide to the National Policy Statement for Freshwater 
Management (Ministry for the Environment, Wellington, 2014).  
34 See Greg Severinsen and Raewyn Peart Reform of the Resource Management System The Next 
Generation Synthesis Report (Environmental Defence Society, Auckland, 2019) for proposed 
reform of the RMA including the potential to establish a separate Allocation Act.  
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Quite simply, New Zealand has not unbundled its water entitlements from land. 
Consequently, there is limited scope to develop new water products or methods of 
water allocation. New Zealand needs to consider the value of unbundling with 
regard to the Australian experience in water allocation law reform.  
Unbundling of water permits, i.e. separating the take and use of water from land, 
was an essential initial step in establishing Australian water markets.35 Unbundling 
was included as an objective in the 1994 COAG Agreement and required that states 
unbundle their water entitlements.36 Unbundling was required for two reasons: first, 
to facilitate trade in water markets and second, to improve the verification process 
of land and water information. Unbundling occurred at the individual state level. 
The Australian Productivity Commission has however been critical of the state 
implementation of unbundling at the individual state level stating that “growth in 
water markets and the attainment of allocative efficiency have been obstructed by 
the failure to unbundle water entitlements on a uniform basis”.37 Nevertheless, the 
benefit of unbundling for Australia was to enable further policy options when 
allocating water38 and the National Water Initiative 2004 which set the overall 
agenda for water allocation law reform reinforced the commitment to unbundling.39 
The analysis of the Australian experience in unbundling shows the points that need 
to be considered before passing a law to unbundle water take and use. 
 
35 Viki Waye and Christina Son “Regulating the Australian Water Market” (2010) 22 J. Environ. 
Law  431at 437 
36 Australian Government Department of Environment and Energy Intergovernmental Agreement 
on a National Water Initiative 2004. (Australian Government Department of Environment and 
Energy, Canberra, 2004). 
37 Australia Productivity Commission Rural Water Use and the Environment: The Role of Market 
Mechanisms (Australian Government, Productivity Commission, Canberra 2006).  
38 Jennifer McKay, (2008) “The Legal Frameworks of Australian Water: Progression from 
Common Law Rights to Sustainable Shares” in Lin Crase (ed) Water Policy in Australia. The 
Impact of Change and Uncertainty (RFF Press, Washington, 2008) 44-60. New water products 
allowed the spread of risk across a catchment if there was a water shortage.  
39 National Water Commission National Water Initiative. First Biennial Assessment of Progress in 
Implementation (Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2007) at 3. 
264 
 
Unbundling in Australia raised several concerns. There was a concern that 
unbundling and subsequent water trading could result in stranded assets. Water 
speculation was also an issue in terms of concern about the possibility that 10 per 
cent of water could be sold to non-users.40 The banking industry raised strong 
concerns regarding the potential effect of unbundling on financial transactions 
involving water shares. The banking industry questioned the lack of direction on 
how a water share was defined, the treatment of mortgages, and how to ensure water 
access remained viable for irrigators so that they could continue their farming 
business.41  
Before unbundling, the value of a farm for mortgage-lending purposes was based 
on the value of the land.42 After the process of unbundling was complete, the value 
of land was clearly separated from the value of water allocated to the business 
owner. As a result of unbundling the security interests in agricultural business loans 
also shifted. Banks were able to recognise the value of water allocation as a separate 
asset:43  
One consequence of unbundling was the creation of a water entitlement as 
an asset in its own right with a value independent of (and potentially greater 
than) the value of the land to which it was previously attached. 
For situations where the value of water was greater than land value, water provided 
the business owner with an additional asset, which illustrates that unbundling 
diversifies the asset base of agricultural businesses. The consequences for the 
banking industry are that unbundled water entitlements are more straightforward to 
mortgage and transfer.  
The unbundling process in Australia also affected land valuations because the value 
of water allocations was separated from land. Consequently, the total revenue 
collected from regional rates based on land value declined. Councils had to develop 
 
40 Parliament of Victoria, Council, Hansard (21 November 2005) “Water Resource Management 
Bill 2005 Second Reading” Speaker Stoney at 2252. 
41 At 2252. 
42 National Water Commission Current Issues Influencing Australian Water Markets (Australian 
Government, Canberra, 2013) at 16. 
43 At 16. 
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policy to address the problem of lower land rate collection. For example, in 
Victoria, transitional provisions were included to ensure that the valuation of land 
remained the same for three years after unbundling. Councils in Victorian irrigation 
districts were provided with an $18 million assistance package to make up for the 
lost rating revenue.44 New Zealand would also need to anticipate and address the 
potential changes to land rating and council revenue if unbundling went ahead. 
Little attention has been paid to unbundling and its potential effect in New Zealand 
legal literature although some account is taken of it in the environmental planning 
research.45  Unbundling in New Zealand deserves further attention as it is an area 
for further law reform that requires action from central government. Unbundling 
would be the first step of comprehensive water law reform similar to Australia. It 
would allow the separation of water allocation into categories for bulk water, 
environmental water and other general water allocations in the form of shares, 
licences or entitlements. Ultimately fully unbundled water allocation systems like 
that in Australia spread the risk of lower water availability across all water users. 
Hence the final allocation of water will vary on a seasonal basis.  
 
It can be seen that unbundled water allocation in Australia has enabled the 
development of greater options for water allocation. Examples of the different water 
allocation methods are detailed in the Comparative Analysis Table above. For 
example, the states of Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia issue a water 
entitlement (generally referred to as a “water licence”) as a permanent property right 
confirming the right to have water delivered to land. However, the actual water 
allocation is not equivalent to permanent water entitlement. The permanent water 
entitlement states the maximum volume of water that can be delivered to a 
 
44 ABC News “Councils back water rights unbundling aid” ABC News (27 September 2007). 
45 Jim Sinner and Andrew Fenemor Opportunities for separating the take and use of water in 
planning frameworks and resource consents. A Report for the Sustainable Water Program of 
Action (Ecologic Foundation, Nelson, 2007). 
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particular site. The actual water allocation is a percentage of the total water 
available for that season and is shared between water licence or water share holders. 
The exact methods and legal basis for calculating the share of the water allocation 
vary across states, which was evaluated in Chapter Six. 
The Comparative Analysis Table shows that unbundling in Victoria resulted in 
three broad categories of water entitlements: for general water users (not a bulk 
water take or environmental water take); a water share which enables the holder to 
use the water; water use rights for using water on defined areas of land and rights 
associated with the delivery of water for irrigators.46 Victorian irrigators choose 
whether they wish to unbundle their water entitlements or not. There is a different 
approach in New South Wales where the water share is a part of the water licence 
and the water allocation is stated as a proportion of water available, as storage 
capacity or as a maximum number of units.  
New Zealand irrigation schemes are self-regulated since the schemes were 
privatised under the Irrigation Schemes Act 1990. Once the irrigation scheme 
operator obtains a water permit, subsequent water allocation to irrigators is based 
on a contractual rather than a statutory basis.47 The Australian experience in water 
law reform shows how regulation of water allocation in irrigation schemes can 
provide greater protection to irrigators. The Comparative Analysis Table shows that 
Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia and Western Australia all have 
regulation that determines how rights to water in an irrigation scheme are allocated. 
For example, in Victoria, the transfer of water shares involves a two-step process. 
First, the “Water Corporation” must approve the transfer. Secondly, the transferee 
must then lodge the transfer with the Water Registrar as part of the notification 
process under the Water Act 1989 (Vic). The first stage in the notification process 
 
46 The Water Resour. Manag. Act 2005 (Vic) amended the Water Act 1989 (Vic) to introduce 
these changes. Parliament of Victoria Hansard (16 November 2005) “Water Resource 
Management Bill 2005 Second Reading” Lenders (Minister for Finance) at 1945. 
47 Central Plains Water Limited, “Central Plains Water User Agreement 2015” 




requires identity verification.48 The seller must also declare the value of water being 
sold when registering the water sale. If there is a mortgage against the water share 
bank approval is required before the transfer can occur. New Zealand’s unregulated 
irrigation schemes should also include these features. The Australian experience 
shows that unbundled water allocations are transferred with greater ease.  
 
New Zealand should consider separating bulk water applications as a separate 
category of water allocation. The Comparative Analysis Table shows the “bulk 
water” applications in Victoria and New South Wales are for major water takes 
generally involving dams for irrigation, municipal water takes or dams for water 
storage. For example, The Water Act 1989 (Vic) distinguishes between bulk 
entitlement holders and other water allocation permit holders. 49  One of these 
distinctions is that the bulk entitlement holders will hold water permits on behalf of 
others and the volume of water allocated is significantly higher than that for other 
water allocations.  
New Zealand does not have an equivalent recognition of “bulk water” or major 
water takes. Instead, all water permit applications received by the council are 
processed according to the “first come, first served” method of water allocation. 
Scant attention is paid to bulk water allocation for major water takes in New 
Zealand’s environmental law literature. The need of other potential water applicants 
in New Zealand is a factor that councils currently cannot consider under the “first 
come, first served” rule as discussed in Chapter Four. As a result, an application 
from a municipal water supply company is subject to the same priority rules as all 
other applications. As already noted, the priority rule for all applications currently 
rests on the time of application or the “first come, first served” rule. 50 This priority 
 
48 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 84J(2). 
49 Water Act 1989 (Vic). Part 4 of the Act contains provisions relevant to the granting of bulk 
entitlements to water.  
50 Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council [1997] 3 NZLR 257 (CA).  
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processing by time may put bulk water applicants at a disadvantage as the lack of 
certainty regarding water allocation may hinder further long-term planning. 
The process for deciding whether the bulk water allocation is granted or not can be 
separated from other water allocation applications. For example, in Victoria, bulk 
water applications are lodged with the Minister for Water.51 This statutory process 
shifts the decision making associated with the project away from the regional level. 
Consequently, the Minister assesses the bulk water application taking into account 
state rather than regional water policy and priorities. The Ministerial assessment of 
bulk water applications includes government policies relating to water allocation 
priorities and “the needs of other potential applicants”.52 In New Zealand, bulk 
water allocations could be suitable for high volume takes for irrigation, municipal 
water supply and electricity generation. The state policies for major water takes 
could then take into account other priorities that are important to consider in 
determining bulk water applications.  
 
New Zealand does not have an environmental water holder or an equivalent office 
with similar statutory functions to hold water rights for the environment like the 
Australian Environmental Water Holder. As has been detailed in the previous 
chapter, provision for the creation of the Australian Environmental Water Holder 
was stated in Objective 4(b) of the 1994 COAG Water Reform Framework. Under 
the Water Act 2007 (Cth) environmental water was recognised as a separate 
category of water and the Environmental Water Holder was established with special 
powers to purchase, dispose of or deal in environmental water in the water market.53 
 
51 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 36. 
52 Water Act 1989 (Vic), s 40(m). 
53 Water Act 2007 (Cth) Part 6 details the establishment, functions and operation of the 
Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder. For a comparison of legal personhood of the 
Wanganui River and the Victorian Environmental Water Holder see Erin L. O’Donnell and Jullia 
Talbot-Jones  “Creating legal rights for rivers: lessons from Australia, New Zealand and India” 
(2018) 23(1) Eology and Society 7. The Wanganui River legal personhood was granted as part of 
the settlement with local Maori tribe. It does not acquire or hold water for the environment. In 
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Further environmental water was acquired through measures such as the Murray-
Darling Basin Plan. The previous chapter showed that environmental water has also 
been acquired through buy-back schemes, trading and investment in water 
efficiency projects. 54  The recognition and aggregation of environmental water 
allowed the Environmental Water Holder to participate in the water market.  
In comparison, New Zealand does not have a regulated water market. The 
Comparative Analysis Table shows that New Zealand does not have a number of 
the regulatory features that are a part of Australian water allocation law and policy. 
The Environmental Water Holder has been a part of the Australian water law reform 
experience over the last 20 years. The previous chapter stated that its establishment 
was driven by the implementation of water markets and a need to provide a legal 
status to environmental water. If further reforms to water allocation were to be 
undertaken, then it would be worthwhile to examine whether a role for an equivalent 
environmental water holder would be appropriate for New Zealand.  
 
 Summary 
This chapter has provided a comparative analysis of water allocation law and policy 
in Australia and New Zealand. It critically evaluated the areas where New Zealand 
could learn from the Australian experience. The analysis showed that the Australian 
experience in water law and policy yields valuable lessons for New Zealand. New 
Zealand is in a unique situation where it does not have a dry climate like Australia’s. 
Nevertheless, New Zealand does have issues not only with the full allocation of 
 
contrast the role of the Commonwealth Water Holder is to acquire and hold environmental water 
allocations.  
54 Commonwealth of Australia Securing our Water Future (Australian Government Department of 
the Environment, Water, Heritage and Arts, Canberra, 2010) at 6: 
 Water for the Future has $3.1 billion for purchasing water entitlements to help  restore the health 
of our vitally important rivers, wetlands and floodplains. In the Murray-Darling Basin, the 
Australian Government is buying back permanent water entitlements directly from irrigators in 
order to restore the balance between water for human use and for the environment. By the close 
of 2009, the Australian Government had secured the purchase of 766 gigalitres of water 
entitlements worth just over $1.2 billion. 
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some catchments but also with the limitations of the “first come, first served” 
method of water allocation.  
The most valuable lessons from the Australian water law reform journey relate to 
the foundational changes in New Zealand water law that are now long overdue. As 
a starting point, the recording and reporting of water allocation take and use require 
a more uniform approach. The Australian experience shows how a water register 
can be implemented and the range of information that it can provide in a transparent 
manner. In the Australian experience, the water register forms an important part of 
the water market information. Market participants rely upon the water register 
information for information about whether they should trade water. New Zealand 
does not have the same policy drivers for introducing water markets. However, it 
would be irresponsible to continue to allocate valuable water resources without full 
and transparent records of how much water is being allocated and to whom. 
Maintaining regional councils as the repositories for this legal water information is 
not viable in the future. Businesses relying upon water are using their water permits 
as assets. Financial institutions are lending money based on the information on the 
volume of water allocated. Thus, there is a strong argument for recognising the 
economic value of water by recording the information, with increased security for 
those dealing with the register. In this way a water register would act much like the 
land register.  
The analysis of the Australian situation shows that there are alternatives to the “first 
come, first served” method of water allocation. Australia has progressed further 
with unbundling from statutory water allocations, separating take and use to further 
unbundling so that new water products are developed and the risk of how much 
water can actually be delivered to a site (the water allocation) is spread across all 
water users. New Zealand has many choices to make about how to allocate water 
in a wider range of water products and how far it wants to unbundle water take and 
use. New Zealand should consider trialing further unbundling in irrigation schemes 
which are currently privately administered and do not promote the transfer of water 
to other uses as freely as the Australian model does. Unbundling also strengthens 
the argument for a water register because there will be more information to record, 
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information with layers of complexity that a range of stakeholders will rely upon. 
To implement more advanced of unbundling will require promulgation of 
appropriate regulation by Parliament. 
Another lesson that New Zealand can take from Australia is to pay attention to the 
cautionary points that have been emerging more recently. These relate to the failure 
to implement water law reform. There are concerns relating to water theft and a lack 
of transparent auditing of the implementation of reforms at state level. New Zealand 
needs to be mindful of the underlying scientific debates relating to water allocation. 
These debates already exist in the form of appropriate scientific models on which 
to base water allocation decisions. The Australian experience shows that dealing 
with a lack of compliance, as evidenced with a lack of compliance with water 
metering requirements in Canterbury, cannot be ignored. Such problems need to be 
prominent in the mind of policy makers when reforming water allocation law and 
policy. A solution to this problem is to ensure that national water institutions with 
statutory oversight remain a permanent part of the water allocating framework. 
They should not be temporary institutions whose existence is subject to review. The 
literature on water scarcity proves that water allocation is a global problem. New 
Zealand is a country that has valuable freshwater resources. There is an inherent 
responsibility on the New Zealand government to ensure that water allocation in 
New Zealand is not frittered away or “locked up” for uses when priorities may 
change in the future. The “first come, first served” method of water allocation is 
outdated and no longer suitable for a country experiencing economic water scarcity. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT - CONCLUSION 
 The New Zealand Situation 
This research has shown that New Zealand water allocation is relatively 
unsophisticated in comparison to Australia. The allocation of water under the “first 
come, first served” method has led to problems with allocating water to higher-
value use. Nor can regional councils legally take into account alternative uses for 
water. The lack of comparison with other applications means there is hardly any 
opportunity to prioritise one use over another. In some catchments, the demand for 
water has resulted in a goldrush effect as applicants rush to be next in line to apply 
for limited water resources. Fully allocated catchment are facing the problem of 
how to reallocate water. In this context, the Australia experience of water law 
reform can provide valuable lessons in how to implement water law reform to 
improve water allocation. The Australian water law reform experience is 
comprehensive, and it must be considered as a package of reforms. 
The evaluation of New Zealand water allocation law in this thesis focused on the 
policy gap at the national level from 1991 to 2011. It addressed the significance of 
the gap contributing to problems with water allocation. The analysis showed that, 
in theory, the RMA and its hierarchy of planning instruments would provide a 
framework for resource allocation that allowed the resource users to determine how 
and when they would apply for resources, including water. Furthermore, it showed 
that adding to water allocation problems was the fact that during this policy gap, 
the development of water allocation plans and rules varied considerably amongst 
regions. This variation has contributed to the problems faced by New Zealand with 
over-allocation in some catchments, especially since some regions had weak plans 
for water allocation.  
One of the key policy responses to water allocation and water quality issues was 
the establishment of the Land and Water Forum. The Forum identified areas that 
required further attention and made recommendations to address them. The Forum 
also stated that the “first come, first served” method of water allocation was 
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problematic.  The “first come, first served” method of water allocation is a default 
mechanism for determining water permit applications. The problem is that it 
provides little incentive for water transfers and can result in a gold-rush effect 
between applicants. The Forum clearly articulated the problems with water 
allocation in its Reports. 
Some may question why the government has not closely followed the Forum 
recommendations concerning examining the potential of water markets. Part of the 
answer to this question is that the Forum was established outside the formal 
processes of developing national direction under the RMA. Hence the government 
was not legally obliged to follow its recommendations. That is despite its support 
for the Forum. From a policy perspective, the Forum Reports have influenced the 
national direction under the National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management, 
which was first promulgated in 2011. The analysis of policy development after the 
policy gap and of the National Policy Statement itself showed that measures to 
address over-allocation remained inadequate. The significance of this finding is that 
despite the identification of problems with water allocation, such as the lack of 
ability to easily transfer water to higher-value uses, further policy development and 
implementation remain slow. Specifically, there is a lack of national direction on 
unbundling, developing a water register, separate legal recognition of 
environmental water or re-establishing the hydrometric network.  
The research recognised that New Zealand is at a crossroads when it comes to water 
allocation in terms of addressing water allocation law and policy problems. There 
appears to be a degree of inertia in addressing water allocation problems in New 
Zealand in particular. This may appear to be a contradictory statement in light of 
the policy work undertaken as part of the Land and Water Forum and the revisions 
to the National Policy Statement Freshwater Management that focus on water 
quality. This is particularly true when making a comparison with the lack of policy 
direction during the national policy gap from 1991 to 2011. However, when making 
a comparison with the comprehensive package of Australian water law reform 
implemented across states, there is evidence of inertia in New Zealand water law 
and policy development to make improvements to the current system of water 
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allocation. New Zealand would need to implement changes to water allocation law 
and policy in one jurisdiction without the need to overcome constitutional barriers 
like Australia has grappled with. 
The research question was focused on lessons from Australian water law reform. 
One of the limitations of the Australian water law reform experience is that it does 
not address the issues relating to water allocation and indigenous people. Further 
research needs to examine the implications of changes to water allocation law and 
policy in relation to the voice of Māori in water allocation.  
 
 Lessons from Australia 
Australia has made an effort to deal comprehensively with it water allocation. The 
more recent reforms have resulted in a hard won commitment from states to allocate 
water more efficiently. The method of allocation generally involves categorising 
water takes based on their volume as bulk water takes, environmental water or 
general categories of water shares and licences. At the heart of the water allocation 
system in Australia is the understanding that the volume of water allocated is not 
necessarily the volume of water received. The water allocation system in Australia 
generally allows for the actual volume of take in water licences and shares to be 
adjusted by the state. The state reserves its discretion to adjust the allocation based 
on how much water is available in a season. For example, all water licence holders 
in a catchment may have their actual water allocation determined as a percentage 
of the total available water. At times of scarcity, this method of water allocation is 
able to spread the risk of a lack of water more evenly across water licence holders. 
The categories and rights associated with different types of water licences bring a 
level of complexity to water allocation that may not be embraced in New Zealand. 
The reallocation of water is then carried out through a market-based system. 
Through the market system water can be purchased or sold as needed and the 
environment has equal legal standing.  
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The research on Australian water policy and law found that the constitutional 
structure of the Australian government hampered water reform in the Murray-
Darling Catchment. It was not until 1994 that a comprehensive voluntary agreement 
between the Commonwealth of Australian States was reached with an agenda to 
improve water allocation through a range of policy tools including payments to 
states for implementing the reforms. The reforms are now facing a crisis of sorts 
with allegations of water theft undermining the extensive effort that has gone into 
reaching a consensus across states. The reform process itself may on the brink of 
policy failure if states step back from their commitments to restore environmental 
water flows to the Basin. A further issue that has not been addressed in Australia is 
that of where indigenous involvement in water allocation can and should occur. 
Again, in for New Zealand addressing settlement claims in relation to water 
allocation should be addressed as a part of any proposed change.  
Chapter Seven drew upon the issues identified in the comparative analysis to 
provide lessons for improving New Zealand water allocation. The chapter included 
a Comparative Analysis Table which focused on New Zealand and the Australian 
states of Victoria, New South Wales, Western Australia and South Australia. The 
comparative analysis answers the main research question which asks what lessons 
can be gleaned from the Australian experience in water allocation law reform.  
It is important to recognise that Australian water law reform did not follow a linear 
path; however, there were points of significance in Australia’s water reform 
experience. The first was the 1994 COAG Meeting where the Australian 
Commonwealth and states agreed on water allocation policy objectives. The second 
was the National Water Initiative 2004 which included agreeing to implementation 
of water markets and associated policy reform. Third was Commonwealth 
legislation driving change at the state level with the Water Act 2007 (Cth) which 
provided for statutory measures and timelines for implementing water markets, a 
water register, water accounting, water market rules, environmental water collation 




To begin with one of the lessons for New Zealand is the importance of having one 
body to lead the implementation of reforms that is not connected to any other 
government department. The distance from other departments is necessary because 
of the transparent review function of the body.  The comparison also showed the 
importance of national water leadership in Australia and New Zealand. In Australia, 
the National Water Commission was abolished to save costs. Yet its transparent 
review function and role in the implementation of the Australian water law reforms 
was praised by the Wentworth Group of Concerned Scientists. The 
recommendation contained in this research is that a body similar to the Australian 
National Water Commission should be established in New Zealand.  
The importance of information has been apparent in the Australian reforms. 
Information about water take and use has been so crucial that Water Accounting 
Standards were developed as part of Australian reforms. While in New Zealand, 
there is a lack of appreciation for the relevance of water accounting information and 
how it can be communicated to a broader range of stakeholders. The experience of 
Australia in setting accounting standards shows that water accounting is central to 
developing water allocation policy as it also serves to bring common terminology 
and understanding of concepts related to water allocation.  
The research identified what can be termed foundational problems with New 
Zealand water allocation. Any proposed changes to water allocation should be 
based on a robust system of recording water allocations in water permits. The 
research clearly showed that there is a lack of information regarding actual water 
takes and permitted water takes. The lesson from Australia is to ensure that 
comprehensive water law reform addresses water permit information. New 
Zealand’s water permit information is regionalised and not centralised with a water 
register. There should be a consolidation of information relating to water permits in 
a water register. The significance of this finding is that it would provide improved 
legal recognition of the value of water permits.  
This research has also emphasised that New Zealand must take heed of the 
comprehensive nature of Australian water law reform. The lesson is that markets 
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alone were not the solution to Australia’s water allocation woes. Markets were a 
means to an end and a part of a far more sophisticated approach to addressing water 
allocation than just implementing markets. Markets addressed political and 
constitutional barriers in the Murray-Darling Basin to assist with the transfer of 
water across state boundaries in a more sustainable manner for the Basin itself by 
following the Basin Plan. Markets played in important role in the purchase water 
for the environment. But to fully implement the return of environmental water the 
environment was given legal recognition. The environment was given legal status 
with the office of the Environmental Water Holder. The use of markets to buy back 
water raised political ire in rural communities too who felt unfairly burdening the 
implementation of water reforms. The markets were implemented following the 
process of further unbundling water allocations so that the rights to take, use and 
have water delivered could be traded independently of each other.  While markets 
operate to reallocate water, water allocation itself does include the categorisation 
and prioritisation of water according to its use. The broad categories are bulk water 
(irrigation, municipal supply, and storage), environmental water, and water shares 
and licences.  
There is a lesson for New Zealand irrigators too.  New Zealand privatised irrigation 
schemes under the Irrigation Schemes Act 1990 but stopped short of regulating 
them.  The Act stopped short of regulating irrigation schemes to provide irrigators 
with rights that would protect their access to water in irrigation schemes. Further 
regulation of irrigation schemes, like that in Australia, could also facilitate the 
transfer of water between different uses, not just existing uses. In the context of 
deregulation, the regulation of irrigation schemes may appear to be unnecessary 
interference in private matters. However, the Australian experience shows that 
regulated schemes can provide a range of benefits to those dealing with irrigation 
schemes. Underlying the regulation of irrigation schemes is the recognition that 
water allocations are a valuable economic asset for businesses. Irrigators are 
invariably operating businesses that rely on secure access to water. Providing 
irrigators with greater security with access to water and ease of transfer would assist 
in addressing at least some of the water allocation issues that New Zealand faces 
with the current “first come, first served” method of water allocation.  
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Furthermore, the Australian experience shows that valuing water allocations in the 
banking industry remains an area which requires further work. Yet, in New Zealand, 
there is a lack of discussion relating to the operation of irrigation schemes and the 
question of whether water transfers within them could be improved for irrigators. 
The Australian experience shows that further regulation of the schemes would ease 
some of the pressure relating to the lack of transfers of water allocation by providing 
greater transparency and security for irrigators than private arrangements may 
allow.  
The comparative analysis extends the knowledge base regarding water allocation 
policy and law reform that Australia has undertaken and which New Zealand has 
not. In some instances, the legal implications of the potential changes to New 
Zealand water law reform have not been examined in depth from a legal 
perspective. The potential areas for further action include further unbundling to 
assist with providing greater options for water transfers, distinguishing bulk water 
entitlements for municipal water, irrigation or hydropower and creating an 
Environmental Water Holder office. It is apparent that policy discussion alone will 
not bring change to water allocation. To make a change to water law action is 
required to improve water allocation and put an end to the “first come, first served” 
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